Hungarian Studies on György Lukács

volume II

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Institute for Literary Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Hungarian Studies on György Lukács

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György Lukács's Theory of Drama

by

Tamás Bécsy

György Lukács devoted two long works expressly to problems of drama theory, namely *A modern dráma fejlődésének története* [History of the Development of the Modern Drama] published in 1911, and *The Historical Novel*, written in 1936—37. Later he produced only relatively brief studies on the subject, and his *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen* makes only passing references to the theory of drama. The present paper wishes to treat principally drama theory, not ignoring, however, the fact that the two works mentioned first sum up how Lukács's philosophical thinking on the subject developed.

I

In Lukács’s theory—particularly its first phase—drama as such is not a comprehensive category, for it has no types or genres. Drama, here, is an undefined category—notwithstanding the fact that it is the subject of several definitions. Drama has only hierarchical levels leading toward the peak of perfection—which is tragedy. “Thinking over the criteria of dramatic material, one must arrive at tragedy [...] Drama culminates in tragedy; the perfect drama is inevitably a tragedy.”

This means in effect that the works that are not tragedies have not completely developed their latent problems and possibilities. Consequently, Lukács defines tragedy and not drama, and it is tragedy—or, more precisely, the tragic—that has sub-categories in his thinking. For him, however, the tragic is not an artistic or aesthetic category, but a quality of life. The tragic is very closely connected with fate, for tragedy is the highest-level manifestation of destiny; tragedy is the quality of self-realization, the realized quality of life of the person, as he achieves relevance in his generic being.

As fate and tragedy are both equally part of the quality of life, they can constitute various literary genres when certain tendencies become one with fate:

It is the mystical moment of union between the outer and the inner, between soul and form. It is as mystical as the moment of destiny in tragedy when the hero meets his destiny, in the short story when accident and cosmic necessity converge, in poetry when the soul and its world meet and coalesce into a new unity that can no more be divided, either in the past or in the future.

In this way it is entirely clear that tragedy interpreted as drama is likewise part of
the quality of life. Lukács in fact stated this in "The Metaphysics of Tragedy": "Dramatic tragedy is the form of the high points of existence, its ultimate goals and ultimate limits." Or: "The deepest longing of human existence is the metaphysical root of tragedy." It also follows from this that it is not drama, but tragedy that finds multiple expressions. Tragedy is always "a mystic duel between a person and destiny," and, therefore, it has two variations depending on whether "this great encounter elicits clear words from the person, or the clash [...] remains a silent feeling." This is a matter of Greek or Shakespearean tragedy: "The classical paradox concerns how relevance can become a living force; and the Shakespearean, how life can carry meaning."

It should be clear from the foregoing that in that period—and, as we shall see, later, too, although in different ways—drama and tragedy were identical for Lukács. The tragic—tragic experience or tragic quality—becomes destiny for the person who wants to develop his values, who wants to achieve relevance. (We shall soon come to the reasons why.) For instance, Lukács sincerely appreciates Friedrich Hebbel, for whom achieving relevance was so important as to make his approach pan-tragic; and that is why he counts Hebbel as the originator of modern drama. Of course, in this case again he means tragedy—or the struggles for tragedy—rather than drama.

Several researchers have already treated Lukács's philosophy of history and his relations to life and reality. Below, I shall follow György Poszler's analysis, for several reasons. This analysis is not only the most recent one, but, in my opinion, also the best and most penetrating essay on the subject. It is György Poszler who has fully and authentically reconstructed Lukács's views and principles on the history of philosophy and cultural criticism and their implications for the theory of literature. In his reconstruction of these principles Poszler makes use of the results thus far obtained, which I have also considered.

The views of the young Lukács were largely linked to the problematic of 'God has died', or, rather, how human beings in general—and Lukács himself in particular—are able to turn themselves into valued persons. This aspiration is also reflected in the form of his writings of the period, namely, the essay.

Once, especially in the Greek world of antiquity, existence was a cosmos that was arranged and patterned into form by mythology. For art, therefore, mythology had the function of arranging reality into an integrated pattern, and, more importantly, of creating the possibility for the cohesive pattern—that is, for the form—of works of art. Not only the external world, but also the internal world, was a cosmos, and that is why both individuals and communities were able to exist. The fact that the world has a center means that each of its parts is at the same time a center. Culture was possible because culture is a unity. Then the community dissolved; that is, there was no longer a center. This turned every person into a solitary individual because, for the lack of a center, one was no longer able to create genuine human relations. A coreless existence is chaos, to which only the experience of individuality can relate. For the very reason that life is chaotic and, hence, devoid of a center, this experience is fundamentally problematic and incommunicable. Experience, too, lacks the cohesion to hold together its various elements. Man is not in harmony with himself, but he can struggle for accord, he can struggle to "fill in and find the world", as György Poszler puts it. Living in a chaos, man is himself chaotic:

He does not find the way to another person, although he can become another person's fate [...] In this coreless whole, the part that has lost its center is no observation point of Archimedean point, but an insoluble
and incommunicable mysterious non-recurring riddle. That is why he seeks after his own core and the center of the world [...] It is from this critique of culture, the diagnosis of the loss of culture and the phenomenology of a world fallen apart that all the solution-seeking proceeds in the early [Lukácsian] oeuvre.9

In modern life, as György Poszler continues:

God is already outside of the world. After all, the great cosmic-organic unity has fallen apart. But He looks at what is happening in the world. Providence has turned into fate. Fate in which the substance, the once lost essence, invades life [...] in the miracle that takes shape in fate man can live at the peak of his possibilities. He can adjust his being to his essence [...] The proper genre for this—for the essence that wants an outlet in being—is drama. In this way human life becomes one with the ideal of human life.10

At this point the theory of drama returns to the point from which it has branched out—to the philosophy of history. For drama turns the essence of being, the culmination of life, into concrete life. The individual essential being, which clashes with the totality of unessential existence is, however, necessarily tragic.11

If this is the case, modern life actually offers the most suitable material for tragedy. But this is only apparently the case. For the corelessness and chaotic nature of modern life is such that there is nothing to give it pattern and cohesion, to give it form, the form that could establish distance from everyday life in art, or—to take a different approach and use different words—create its stylization.

This is the point at which form assumes fundamental significance for the philosophy of history as a whole, as well as for the theory of drama. For only form can give unity to life and to any work of art.

In the past only a mythology—or an ideology—which was shared by the community, made possible, and provided the foundations for, distance and, thus, the opportunity for stylization. Now form cannot be based on these shared views—neither the form that gives unity to life, nor the form that gives distance and style to works of art. It can come only from the internal effort of the individual, it can spring only from a single and unique inimitable root, and the same holds true for self-realization. Once existence and the generic being have become separated, the most valuable act for the individual is shaping oneself into relevance—or, more precisely, acquiring form through one's own effort. 'Life' (the quotes indicate that amorphous, coreless, chaotic existence is meant), soul, and form are connected in this fashion. As György Poszler interprets it:

the soul is the individual rising out of life, who has achieved generic relevance. And form is the means by which the individual rising out of life has given himself form and relevance. Of course, it is not only a means, but also the goal. For form is the assumption of generic relevance itself, or, in fact, generic relevance manifesting itself. It is the appearance of universality in being.12

After all, it is form that renders chaos into order, into organic unity. In consequence of the chaotic atomization (of existence from which it emerges) this form, however, can be only unique and individual—and at the same time, of course, tragic. Lukács expresses this in the following terms: "Tragic experience is the only thing, although it is only part of the whole, signifies the whole—the only thing that can be symbolic of the totality of life."13

This also makes it evident that there are no varieties of the tragic—just as there are no varieties of any given form. Each can only represent degrees of perfection. The most tragic form is the closest to perfection. As in the case of gradations in the philosophy of history, or even in ethics in general, in this case, too real, genuine form is only that
which manifests itself on the level of perfection. This is obviously ontological idealism, for the 'place' of being—the closer it is put to genuine tragedy, to the genuinely tragic—also defines its rank or value, and identifying the level and value of existence is idealistic ontology. Escape from this idealism is possible precisely because this place can be worked for and achieved, and is not pre ordained by any principle.

The dramatic person—or, to put it more trivially, the sort of person who can be the hero of drama—is likewise defined by Lukács on the basis of his philosophy of history. This is a significant question of drama, and he says that it takes a capacity for the 'achievement of relevance' and the willingness to struggle for it in order to become a hero. Consequently, the dramatic person is, of course, the tragic person. As Lukács writes:

The tragic person is he who as a person achieves his own perfection, who lives life without byways and compromise; who seeks and finds the meaning of life in its truth, depth, and fullness, rather than in its breadth, variegation, and contents; for whom his own personality constitutes a challenge, a road that has to be traveled to the end. But at the end of any road that is reached by man tragedy awaits him [...] as unambiguous truth and reality.14

This means, at the same time, of course, that the person who acts must be one with his deed, the act must symbolize the person himself and cannot be just an episode or a matter of chance. For this oneness, the will of the person who acts is necessary, and should represent him, rather than his feelings and moods, for it is his will that comes from his innermost identity:

Only the straining of his will can render a person and his fate dramatic. His mind, feelings, and any other internal or external attributes are only a trimming, an accompaniment for the dramatic person.15

This is the source of striving, of aspiration. This striving must mean the 'totality of life' for the person concerned, the totality of life from the aspect of the conflict that is treated in the drama concerned. Thus, dramatic form demands that 'the conflict should be in its content the central life problem of the person (type of person) concerned,' whereas form requires the form of the conflict to be of the kind

in which the person is able to give and he does in fact give of his life to the maximum, in which his life should gain expression with the greatest possible force and versatility. With regard to the person concerned himself, the requirement is that—from the point of view of the given problem—he should represent the culmination of his own type, a sample capable of maximal effort.16

In this way, it is will—which carries the central life problem and prompts one to make the greatest effort, in other words, to see the conflict through—that provides or creates the form that gives cohesion and makes for distance from everyday life. Since form and protagonist are related in such a way that one reflects the other and neither can exist without the other, since both can be traced from the history of philosophy, and since both meet in the conflict, the basic tenets of the theory of drama derive from the philosophy of history.

Thus, we have seen that in Lukács's theory: (1) whatever the word used, not drama, but tragedy is meant; (2) the tragic quality, or tragedy, has various manifestations, rather than versions in literature, namely, the short story, poetry, and tragedy; (3) the tragic, or tragedy, is ranked as the supreme concept by the philosophy of history, and this is

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the aspect that provides its formulation and definition; and (4) form—and the criteria of the dramatic, or, rather, tragic hero that precipitate the conflict and, consequently, form itself—are presented from this same point of view.

* * *

After the foregoing, the question is, of course, whether this beginning in the philosophy of history and the critique of culture authentically leads to results in the history or theory of drama, and whether the findings are meaningful for all dramatic works.

This question can hardly be answered by an unambiguous yes or no. To be sure, no history and theory of drama can be built without philosophical foundations. In fact, György Poszler demonstrates that from their starting points in the history of philosophy, both Hegel and Lukács arrived at authentic perceptions—perceptions correct from the points of view of both the history and theory of drama. However, from this basis it is impossible to build a history and theory of drama that is both historically and theoretically correct and is authentic in every detail. The fact is that, from such a starting point, one does not seek principally the criteria that put works of art into an abstract category—in this case, concretely, in the category of drama—and, consequently, one does not find them.

* * *

Lukács's theory of drama—or, more precisely, of tragedy—in this period excludes several periods and works from the field. In the history of European drama, he excludes first of all medieval drama—mysteries, morality and miracle plays alike. These works turn Biblical events into drama (mystery plays), the stirrings of the human soul (moralities), or the life of the saints (miracle plays). In these works, God, the Devil, and Angels—that is, supernatural powers and forces—appear. In fact, they depict the impact of these powers on man.

Although at this time he does not yet name medieval drama as an exception, Lukács does say in his history of drama, already on the first pages: “The operation of supernatural forces and powers [...] can be expressed by any art only lyrically, through the souls of human beings, through the effects that shape their souls[...] Obviously, all this [...] is impossible in drama.”

The reason why these works cannot be considered dramas (tragedies) is that ‘everyone knows that drama is the poetry of will, that only the straining of his will can render a person and his fate dramatic.” And in this case will is definitely not involved. But even though will and strife were involved, they would represent man’s struggle with God or Satan, and it is a basic tenet that ‘there must always be a certain balance between the forces in conflict.” Unless this balance exists, ‘this struggle can be expressed only in terms of the barren ecstasy of words, only intimately, lyrically, in outbreaks of impotent rage or painful resignation that is at best lyrically poignant.”

Furthermore, the requirement of form also excludes such works from the genre of drama—on the basis of the following chain of logic: dramatic form derives from unification, the imparting of order to the work of art, and, consequently, form is the most fully realized in the dialectic of conflict becoming destiny. On the other hand, an event of life is perceived as fate only if it is more than merely an episode, while an episode
becomes the 'totality of life' only through the death of the tragic hero. But the religious person is 'excluded from drama' because 'death does not end his life, his life is not final, is not tragedy.'

Another generalization of drama history follows from this: "It can hardly be regarded as mere chance that there are only dramatic eras, rather than isolated geniuses sometimes emerging even in undramatic periods. We know of every great dramatist that he lived at the height of some great golden age of drama." It cannot be just a matter of chance that every great period of drama (of Greek, English, Spanish, and French drama) was at the same time a period of great tragedies. In fact we know of no era in which the drama flourished without the dominance of tragedy, or in which the fading of the sense of tragedy, the flowering of the drama did not likewise come to an end.

Obviously, from this point of view not only medieval drama has to be qualified as non-drama, but also sixteenth-century drama, with the exception of Elizabethan English drama. In vain did Jodelle, Garnier, Montchrestien, Baiff, and some others write plays. They are left out of Lukács's history of drama, probably because their standard was found wanting, or because in the first third of the sixteenth-century comedy was dominant—chiefly in Italy (Ariosto, Machiavelli, Ruzzante).

It is a characteristic fact, which is not in accord with Lukács's explanations, that only the plays of the English Restoration are left out of European drama history starting with Shakespeare. From the authors of the eighteenth century, he mentions Johann Christoph Gottsched, as well as George Lillo; to be sure, Gottsched is treated rather negatively. Clearly it can be said only from the viewpoint of the history of philosophy—an approach in which drama is synonymous with tragedy—that there are 'only dramatic periods'. The history of drama shows that drama always existed whenever there was literature, but that it was not always the representative genre of the era. Thus, Lukács's theory of drama leads to the wrong extrapolation of drama history. His history of drama, based on an approach rooted in the philosophy of history, merely proves that there are periods in which very significant tragedies were created.

Let us just briefly refer here to the fact that some critics allege—sometimes almost to the point of slander—that Lukács had no feeling for quality. It is our conviction that it is precisely because of their want of an artistic standard that the French tragedies of the sixteenth century do not represent a dramatic period in his view. Of course, this is also connected with the fact that Lukács approached literature on a theoretical basis, on a basis rooted in his philosophy of history. Thus, he treated only those authors and works that were significant on basis of this approach. I think that is why, for instance, Paul Ernst and Beer-Hofmann receive so much praise in history of drama. What this really means is that Lukács, throughout his life, was particularly sensitive to problems. In fact, in his essay entitled "On the Nature and Form of the Essay", he asserts: "For the point at issue for us now is not what these essays can offer as 'studies in literary history', but whether there is something in them that makes them a new literary form of its own, and whether the principle that makes them such is the same in each one." The 'thing' that gives cohesion is fate: "poetry receives its profile and its form from destiny, and form in poetry appears always only as destiny; but in the works of the essayists form becomes destiny, it is the destiny-creating principle." That is, in bellettristic works fate gives form, while in the works of critics (or, rather, theoreticians?) form creates fate. What is important here is that fate and form are linked together.
everywhere, for after all, they derive from the history of philosophy. Probably here, too, we are dealing with the philosophical approach and the sensitivity to problems, and not a lack of feeling for quality.

* * *

On the first few pages of A modern dráma fejlődésének története it seems as if Lukács deduced a good many of his theoretical statements on drama from the requirements of theatrical performance. This is also supported in the introduction of the book, which says that the theoretical abstraction of the work have grown out of ‘manifestly practical dramaturgical and stage-directing problems’.26 ‘In the years from 1904 to 1907, as a leader of the Thalia Society, I experienced the questions treated in this book as they arose in conjunction with the selection, directing, etc. of plays,’ he writes in the same introduction.27 Thus, actually dealing with the problems of the theater influenced his theoretical views. But, perhaps, not them alone. István Hermann also remarks: ‘in Lukács’s life, the Thalia had approximately the same biographical significance as the theater for Wilhelm Meister.’28 This raises the additional question—one that I wish to treat briefly here—of how Lukács applied the requirements of stage performance in his theory.

This problem already seems to determine the first sentence in the volume: ‘drama is a kind of written work that intends to produce a direct and strong effect in a collected crowd through events taking place among persons.’29 Not long afterward he writes: ‘the aim of drama is to influence the masses.’30 Then he goes even further: ‘the consequence in regard to the form of drama is, we think, deductible from the attributes of a crowd that collects in a certain place expecting certain stimuli.’31 Whether he uses the term ‘form’ in his usual sense here, is beyond the scope of this paper.

Lukács deduces the criteria which, according to his explanations at the beginning of the work—and only there—are requirements deriving from the need for ‘direct effect on the mass (of people)’, from his philosophy of history and his critique of culture throughout his book. The essence of the question is, of course, whether the written text actually includes the factors that are demanded in order to produce a direct effect on the crowd, and—what is more important—whether these factors are clearly and fundamentally present in the text for the sake of exerting direct influence on the masses, or whether they are there because of something else—although they may incidentally serve the purpose of mass influence as well.

For it is quite evident that it is not the written drama, but the theatrical performance that ‘intends to produce a direct and strong effect in a collected crowd’. In the early part of the work Lukács concludes from this theatrical requirement that the performed happening needs ‘foreshortening in perspective’, which means that ‘from the same human life or lives that make up the plot, either only a single isolated occurrence can be selected—or, if the plot contains several episodes of these lives, they can only be suggested, drawn only in the main outlines of their contours.’32 The foreshortenings and stresses are necessary, he explains, because this is the only way to make the story general. ‘Only generalities affect the masses’ because ‘the requirement of being general stems from the idea of a crowd itself.’33

It is really surprising that Lukács deduces the need for symbolism and stylization from the same source:

Direct influence on a crowd on the one hand demands the general and symbolical nature of the occurrence depicted, while on the other hand the limits of length [also determined by the requirement of producing a
direct effect on the crowd] also force the drama toward symbolism and looking at things from some distance, from a bird's-eye view.\textsuperscript{34}

But Lukács links direct influence to the need for depicting fate, which he later likewise deduces essentially from his critique of culture and philosophy of history. The limited length and, thus, use of symbolism are needed for the effect on the masses:

their blending provides still more manifest meaning to the concept of the generality of dramatic action: if a person is depicted in it, it must represent or symbolize that person (or at least a certain kind of person), and if something happens in it, it must signify life—or, rather, the typical life of the given sort of person, his fate.\textsuperscript{35}

Thus, fate appears because this is the kind of symbolization of life that affects any collected audience the most strongly.

Lukács says in this context that striving for 'direct mass influence excludes from drama abstract concepts, and the material (spontaneous happenings with living people) does not permit it to appear nakedly in a logical or dialectical form.'\textsuperscript{36} This in spite of the fact that tragedy must represent the universality of life and of man, and, furthermore, the highest quality of life, the achievement of generic relevance, and so on. And these are rather abstract concepts, so much so that they must assume a symbolical quality. Thus, abstraction, thinking in the abstract, must certainly figure in drama for the adequate representation and satisfactory realization of the universal. Otherwise, the essence of the situation and the characters will be manifest only on the first level of immediate appearance, and the reader or audiences will be only aware of this level, leading again to false conclusions, which, as a matter of fact, are not mentioned again on subsequent pages. Moreover, the requirement of staging does not support—does not even try to justify—the basic tenet that the dramatic material always tends toward tragedy, in other words, that drama is essentially tragedy.

Obviously, however, if certain individual—though essential—characteristics of the written drama could be deduced from the theatrical performance, they would suggest the same criteria as those that Lukács attempted to derive from the requirements of stage performance. Any other problems lack theoretical relevance (e.g., how well the play can be acted and the text spoken, or the technical problems involved in staging). This only goes to show the uselessness of older or newer theoretical attempts to deduce or define written drama exclusively or primarily from the requirements of the stage, or from the laws of theatrical performance as a work of art.

In the foregoing I wanted to point out that not even Lukács's theory is acceptable for us as proof of the hypothesis that any criterion of drama, or the presence of any given thing in the written work, is exclusively traceable to the requirements of the theatrical performance and nothing else.

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'Happening among people'—the other half of the definition of drama given in the first sentence of A modern dráma fejlődésének története takes us to a different layer of Lukács's work. This is the certainly not insignificant layer that contains statements of drama theory and history, which are fundamentally correct. However true it is that Lukács's early theory of drama—as Hegel's (as György Poszler has very precisely shown)—is a theory of drama that starts out from the philosophy of history, but, nevertheless, necessarily reaches outstanding universal results.
The above phrase comes under this heading. It is, of course, much more than a mere phrase; it is the cornerstone of a theory. Obviously, most of the major results obtained from the viewpoint of the history of philosophy can be derived from the dramatic works themselves, and are consequently entirely acceptable results. It is quite possible that the happening among people is for Lukács concretely a happening among actors. At the same time, it is absolutely certain that the naming or any other labeling of the *dramatis personae* clearly turns them into human beings and, consequently, any action among them can be interpreted as an occurrence among dramatic persons.

This terminology is used not only in the first sentence of *A modern dráma fejlődésének története*. Writing about a play by Béla Balázs, Lukács raises the same basic problem in the following words: "What one wants to know here is how a happening that takes place exclusively among present-day people can attain the pathos of true tragedy."37 In another essay, he writes: "Shakespeare composed his plays on people, on characters, on inter-personal relations, whereas new drama deals with situations, or, more precisely, with the relations of people to situations."38 The term recurs in other pages of *A modern dráma felődésének története*, too:

the subject of the drama is about one occurrence or several occurrences from the life of a person [...] as manifested in the forms of struggle.39

Also, the material of drama is of a social character: it is a sociological happening that takes place exclusively among people.40

I have included these many quotes in order to guard against the possibility that my statements might be taken as nothing but my own interpretations. It is a fact that Lukács rather often uses the term ‘happening among people’. This is an association of words that functions as a phrase. Moreover, this term represents the first usage of its kind—with the exception of a comment by A. W. Schlegel41—in the history of drama theory. But it is not followed through. Let us mention a single example from Lukács’s work to point out that the term that is the most fundamental to the theory of drama can be derived from happening among people.

Concerning the universality that should be expressed in drama—later he will call it ‘totality’—Lukács writes that it has three creative elements, namely, the infinite richness of individual phenomena; the unlimited number of possibilities becoming realized in an unlimited number of happenings; and interrelation. And it is only this third element—interrelation—that can be expressed dramatically.42 To this, another point should be added that Lukács often makes: 'we see and hear only dialogues directly' in drama,43 and ‘drama consists merely of dialogues.’44 Obviously, if drama is a happening among people, which can manifest itself only in dialogue, then this interaction among the characters cannot be anything but the interrelation (or, in other words, the relationship that exists among them) and the ‘happening’ can only mean changes in this relationship. Lukács does not pursue this idea to its ultimate conclusion, for he always mentions only the ‘happening’. And yet it is doubtless true that a dialogue always created or presupposes a relationship between the people engaged in it; there is no dialogue, it does not exist, without relations. And once this is the case, the happening among people cannot really be anything but some change in the relationship of the people involved. This terminology introduced by Lukács is of basic significance, even though he himself did not put this conclusion into so many words.

Of course, in this theory of drama Lukács arrived at universally valid categories not only because he was a great philosopher, but also because from any approach to drama
from the angle of the philosophy of history—if the method is to have at least relative validity—one must inevitably arrive at the things that are manifest in dramatic works. Once we consider a happening among people as a change in their relationship, a happening is clearly a manifestation that can be found in all dramatic works.

To be sure, there are also other outstanding results to be found in this theory of drama which derives from the philosophy of history. Ferenc Fehér has already written about the fact that one of these statements can be considered a result of the approach based on the philosophy of history. This is simply a matter of the separation between background and happening in modern drama. This separation, as Fehér writes, "lays the foundation for the dichotomy between action and character (or, as Lukács later says, separates character and the line of fate)."45 This finding, which derives from the philosophy of history, is at the same time an authentic finding of the history of drama.

Lukács has arrived at this finding because he has a different view of ancient and of modern societies, as he contrasts the two. While he regards past societies, which had a closed organic center and were closed organic communities, from a distance, as it were, already with a degree of stylization, he sees a concrete social and sociological situation in the case of drama that is set amidst bourgeois development. In the latter case, he examines whether modern life offers the proper material for tragedy. And if it does so, he asks, how does it do it? And at this point Lukács reaches the interrelation between man in action and his deeds. This is at the heart of the 'dichotomy between background and happening' mentioned by Fehér.

In Lukács's discussion of the connection between the person who acts and his deeds, the significant achievement is his identification of the role and consequences of the division of labor. Even though he bases his approach on Sombart and Simmel, the interpretation is very close to that of Marx. In the new situation brought about by the division of labor, the totality of the personality is limited 'to the aspect that has to some extent become independent of each participant and has only something to do with the relationship itself.'46

From the point of view of the theory of drama, this is extremely important because the character portrayal of the plays written at the time can be objectively derived and interpreted from these facts, and this is what one sees in them. It is the division of labor and its consequences that terminate the close relationship between the person who acts and the result of his action. In other words, from this time on there is no autonomous action, and what people do is not a result of their personality; instead, they do what their sociological status and functions prescribe for them. In older dramas, action always derived from the personality: 'every detail of concrete life provided an opportunity for them to let their personality flow into acts, into things.'47 At that time, 'since the assertion, the expression of the personality in life has not yet become problematic in life, personality itself or its realization did not become a subject for drama in any form, while in current plays it is perhaps the most important and most central problem.'48 The desire for expressing personality becomes more ardent and stronger, at least partly because of the fact that 'the external circumstances which make its assertion impossible right from the beginning.'49

All this takes us to a still newer and splendid statement, which has implications for sociology, as well as for the theory of drama: 'just what is man's real generic being and what is the outside world become uncertain; what comes out of what he does from his innermost being and what comes out from what he does under the effect of external influences'.50 In other words, it becomes uncertain whether man acts on the basis of
his own internal dynamics—for example, on the basis of the ‘passion that fills his life’, or on the basis of external influences, expectations, or outright requirements. At that point, it becomes necessary to assess life—the situation or the circumstances: ‘There is a new force among those that make the drama: interpretation: in a new drama, not only passions clash, but ideologies and world views’; and in their conflict, ‘evaluations have at least as important a role’ as the ‘attributes that derive purely from the characters of individuals’.51

Rather than going into details at this point, let us content ourselves with an enumeration of the excellent findings on the history of drama that Lukács arrives at through his highly subtle analysis of the situation and the character, and of the separation between happenings and the essence, pointing out their consequences. These findings include the fact that, already in these dramas, everything has to be explained through psychology, and so it follows from this that the character must be made pathological in order to permit the dramatic to exist; that ‘the protagonists of new dramas are more passive than active in comparison to the old; they are more likely to be the object of some happening than the subject of action, they are more likely to be on the defensive than to launch an attack’;52 that is: ‘the final struggle, since fate has conquered so much in internal man, takes place more and more internally.’53 Concerning the relationship between the result of action and the person who acts, he also writes: “Man is at the point of impact of great forces and not even what he has done, what he has made, belongs to him […] And the reason why he does something is never quite his own either.”54 These are questions and problems that left a very strong imprint on the dramas written in the second half of the century.

The next splendid result of the theory of drama—again on the basis of the philosophy of history and the facts of everyday life—is the so-called ‘historical problem’, which is closely connected with the fact that modern life has no mythology. Mythology has, or should have, a double function: it projects the quality of life as perceived by people into ‘concrete symbols of definite tales’; and, what is more important, ‘it keeps the tragic case that it has expressed at a sharp and natural distance from the audience’.55 Thus, in this theory of drama, mythology promotes or creates a stylization that fills several functions. In modern life it can be replaced by ‘historical experience’:

Mythological origin or the past turning into mythology (as, e.g., the War of the Roses for Shakespeare) removes the subject of poetry from the influence of chance, arbitrary individual tyranny, and, at the same time, presents their effects from being entirely a matter of individual taste. In this way the topic, for all its chance ‘interestlessness’, will become profoundly trivial.56

Probably it is his brilliant finding with regard to Shakespeare’s works that leads Lukács to the statement that modern drama creates distance or stylization through the historical background.

The historical play must make its substitution for mythology; it must create artificial distance and monumentality, banish trivialities, and create a new pathos. […] The essence of placing things in historical distance is that things that happened long ago are substituted for what is happening today. But it is always a story in place of what happened, never a symbol in place of a reality.57

He immediately adds that, of course, he is not thinking of trivial ‘historical truth’. As Ferenc Fehér already observed,58 Lukács sees in history the external, objective possibility for creating the necessary distance, for stylization: and, at the same time,
enables historical experience and historical consciousness to eradicate chaos and remedy its lack of a center. It has the potential to filter out and put into perspective the details of experience, the moods and whimsies of the moment that have been blown out of proportion. Of course, he did not explain this in so many words, but it is an essential part of his concept. 59 It is in A modern dráma fejlődésének története that Lukács was to take his first step in following up this chain of thought in the proper direction.

* * *

It can be seen, then, that Lukács's theory of drama proceeds along a combination of two threads, above all in his above-mentioned book. The first of these lines is linked to the philosophy of history and the critique of culture—with the central hypothesis that drama is one with tragedy. The second thread follows a sociological line, with Lukács observing chiefly—though not exclusively—dramas, written after the mid-nineteenth century, whose central problematic is tied up with modern life and its unsuitability to be turned into material for tragedy. Each route makes connections with drama history and drama theory, and each leads to findings relating to the other. If one looks at the weighting of these lines of thoughts, a dominance of the approach based on the philosophy of history will be seen in “Dráma”, the first chapter of the first part called “Elméleti kérdések” [Theoretical questions], while in the second chapter (of the same first part), entitled “Modern dráma”, the sociological approach is emphasized. Except for the chapter on Hebbel, this second thread is stronger again in the historical review that begins with the second part of the work. This is useful and fortunate because that largely sociological thread leads to a discovery of the concrete aspects of modern life, which indeed characterize modern drama in the sense of the history and not the philosophy of drama. As Lukács starts out here from historical, social, and sociological facts, it is along these lines that he arrives at the discovery of a good many laws concerning drama theory. The findings or conclusions of drama history that derive from the approach based on the philosophy of history are often enough of another questionable authenticity from the point of view of the theory of drama.

II

The outlines of Marxist drama theory first took shape in The Historical Novel, written in 1936—37. In the Preface written to the English edition of 1962, Lukács calls the book a ‘beginning’, an essay in the literal sense, and writes: “I cannot sufficiently emphasize that I consider it, all in all, only a first beginning, which others, I hope, will soon extend—if necessary, correcting my results.” 50 There are preliminaries to this work, too. 51 “Marx und Engels über dramaturgische Fragen”, written about 1930, “Marx and Engels on Problems of Dramaturgy” of 1934, and “Art and Objective Truth”, also dated 1934, can be regarded as some of these preliminaries. 52

The aim and approach of The Historical Novel are theoretical, although its implications are not for drama theory. As Lukács writes in the Preface to the 1962 edition:

What I had in mind was a theoretical examination of the interaction between the historical spirit and the great genres of literature which portray the totality of history [...] In such an enquiry it is obvious that, even the inner, most theoretical, most abstract dialectic of the problem will have a historical character. 63
Posing the problem in this way has two consequences. In the first place, "the social basis of the divergence and convergence of genres" inevitably arises. In the second place, "this book no more claims to provide a complete theory of the development of dramatic and epic forms than it does to give a complete picture of the development of the historical novel in the domain of history." Thus, Lukács himself makes it clear that his statements in regard to drama theory in this work are to be interpreted within the context of Marxist epistemology, which studies the relationship between history and literature. But not only this relationship. "The second important methodological approach is to examine the interaction between economic and social development and the outlook and artistic form to which they give rise." In other words, the interrelations between history and literature and between ideology and artistic form are established.

* * *

The theory of drama is outlined starting with the second chapter of the work, "Historical Novel and Historical Drama". The chapter begins: "Both tragedy and great epic—epic and novel—portray the objective, outer word"; whereas the first sentence of the third paragraph is this: "We have only the problem of tragedy to deal with here", and the fourth paragraph starts with: "Tragedy and great epic thus both claim to portraying the totality of the life-process." The word 'tragedy' figures in each of the three sentences. Of course, he put down the word 'drama' as well, in fact in the sentence preceding the third one quoted here also in the following form: "great epic and drama both give a total picture of objective reality." Thus, there is reason—perhaps not only in the light of Lukács's youthful theory of drama, but also on account of the usage of terms here—to start with the fundamental question of whether we are going to speak here mainly about tragedy or drama.

In the case of both of these genres, the starting point is the portrayal of the 'objective, outer world', which in this case merely means the separation of drama and great epic writings from poetry. The other point of departure is that 'great epic and drama both give a total picture of objective reality.' However, Lukács adds: "It is obvious in both cases that this can only be a result of artistic structure, of formal concentration in the artistic reflection of the most important features of objective reality." Lukács's saying that "It is clear that the immediate question here is a formal one" has already been suggested. But what does 'form' mean here?

In order to present the external world and totality, the writer has first of all to grasp "the essential and most important normative connexions of life"; but the "mere knowledge of these essential connexions can never suffice", because these have to appear in a "new immediacy", and the purpose of artistic form is to create the new artistic immediacy, in other words, to render specific again whatever is generic in man and his fate. "The specific problem of form in great epic and tragedy is to give this immediacy to the totality of life, to conjure up a world of illusion which requires [...] a very limited number of men and human destinies to arouse the feeling of the totality of life." Here the term 'form' receives new meaning not through its relationship with new and artistic immediacy and the world of illusion, but chiefly through its link with totality, as a basic epistemological category. I am well aware what a neuralgic concept totality is, just as I am aware how much its meaning has changed in Lukács's works from History and Class Consciousness to The Ontology of Social Being, his last major work.
Now, to understand the concept of form, we can concern ourselves only with the interpretation of totality, as here laid down in connection with drama.

Here, as in Lukács's early theory, form is closely connected—true, only implicitly—with the integration of the world of works of art. But, in this case, distance and stylization are connected with the aspect of totality as it appears in drama, while form is linked with the artistic immediacy and directness that lend specificity to the universality of man and his fate, another epistemological category. But this specific problem of form is inherent not only in what is universal, but also in imparting 'this immediacy to the totality of life'. Therefore, form has a dual integrating function here: it has to render individual and specific what is universal, and it has to do the same with totality. In this way, form is not something tangible, but a principle, which has a central core.

Lukács presents this central core together with the definition of totality, as it is valid here. In so doing, he takes over Hegel's theses from the start: "Drama too, as we already know, aims at a total embodiment of the life-process. This totality, however, is concentrated round a firm centre, round the dramatic collision." After this, Lukács directly generalizes collision as the essence of drama: drama is an "artistic image of the system, so to speak, of those human aspirations which, in their mutual conflict, participate in this central collision".

We have seen that 'collision', that is, conflict, occupied an important place in Lukács's early theory of drama, as the form of any artistic genre. 'The dialectics of forces that strain against each other with maximal force—that is what dramatic force is.' Now it appears connected with totality, as an axiom taken over from Hegel. Hegel is also the source when Lukács asks what manifestation of totality is necessary in order for it to become recorded in the dramatic 'world of illusion' and give rise in the receiver to the experience of the 'totality of life'. This is the totality of motions. He develops this line of thought first in connection with King Lear, raising the question "But by what means is this impression of totality achieved?" In the first part of his answer, he mentions polarization—as it is related to the conflict—and then he specifies with universal validity what the meaning of the totality of motions is: "These extreme and—in their very extremity—typical movements form a completely closed system, the dialectics of which exhaust all the possible human attitudes to the collision." If not all the positions possible in connection with the given collision were present in the world of drama, there would be no recording experience of totality; on the other hand, if any position would appear twice, tautology would be produced.

We have to stop here for a moment, to emphasize that the previous definition of dramatic totality as the category of all the possible attitudes that can be taken, is a true and absolute category of dramatic theory, in any drama whatever its genre. But this holds true only if here, again, we replace the term 'collision' with 'system of relations undergoing change', for the latter, just as much as conflict, must contain the historical, social, and individual essence. Without this concept of totality as established or emphasized by Lukács, it would be impossible to define either a basic criterion of the world of drama or a criterion of what is drama.

In other words, form is the concept in which the totality of movements, artistic generalization, and distance from life are integrated as something unique. In this theory, the core of each constitutes the conflict. "Thus, in recognizing the truthfulness of dramatic form, the problem of collision as a fact of life must be kept very clearly in view."

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Before examining the ‘facts of life’ from which Lukács deduces the core of dramatic form—conflict—it should emphatically be said that the most important and most splendid result of the drama theory outlined in *The Historical Novel* is his discovery regarding the interconnections of the various literary genres and the various facts of life. This is not to say that he discovered the interrelationship, for it was most definitely perceived by Marx and Engels; but the thesis assumed fundamental importance only in his works. This interrelationship, as we have seen, also appeared in *A modern dráma fejlődésének története*. Lukács’s achievement is to have taken a step in the direction of formulating a Marxist materialist solution for the problematic. He laid down certain assertions of fundamental importance, and this first step was followed by several others, whose aim was to differentiate the facts of life from what we may define as the genre of drama. This is true even though his thinking here was focused on tragedy, and even though in regard to genres—that is how art takes on a specific genre—he had not yet reached the more sophisticated position that he would later set forth in *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen*; namely, that how the writer relates to the fact of life has a basic function—as do the facts of life themselves—in the development of specific genres.

At that point Lukács held that the definitive constituent factor of drama was to be found in the aspect considered the most important in the historical and dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels, namely, in "the great class struggle running through world history determining the development of mankind".81 What he says is this:

> It is generally accepted that the central theme of drama is the collision of social forces at their most extreme and acute point. And no special perceptiveness is needed to see the relation between social collision in an extreme form, on the one hand, and social transformation, i.e., revolution, on the other.82

Lukács is not satisfied, however, with designating only those periods which, according to his view at the time, were expected to produce great drama. He also mentions the ‘facts of life’.

The facts of life which can give rise to conflicts are the following: (1) the “parting-of-the-ways in the lives of individuals and of society”;83 (2) when the individual “has to settle his accounts”;84 (3) when “one must choose from among the endless possibilities one particular link in the chain, which one must firmly grasp in order to keep a real hold on the entire chain”;85 and (4) "a person’s deep involvement with his work".86

As an example of the first point, Lukács cites Hebbel’s *Herod and Mariamne* from literature, and a statement by Lenin on the situation following the July uprising of 1917, from life. In connection with the situation where one ‘has to settle his accounts’, he mentions *Oedipus Rex* by Sophocles, and Büchner’s *Danton’s Death* as literary examples, and then, for a historical example, refers to the French Revolution, which is “full of such catastrophes which are already dramatic in life itself”.87 It is noteworthy, however, that, in connection with the grasping of ‘one particular link’ in the chain, he mentions no literary work. He remarks, however: “Grasping the link in the chain need not in itself be connected with a collision, nor grow out of one, but the concentration of life’s problems around such a centre does in most cases produce collisions.”88 Nor is there a literary example for the fourth point (‘a person’s involvement with his work’), although it is in this context that he mentions Hegel’s ‘world historical individuals’, an aspect that I shall return to below.

Now questions arise as to whether these facts of life really lead to conflicts, and above all, where this term comes from, and what it means.
First of all, let us state that Lukács speaks of facts of life only in connection with the central figure, the hero. He speaks of action and the antagonist only in connection with the "one particular link", saying: "the concentration of one's own actions round one decisive point provokes a similar concentration about this point by the personal and human forces opposed to oneself." It is peculiar though characteristic, however, that he does not touch on the problematic of the actions of either the protagonist or the antagonist, although he mentions the "facts of life" as conflict-causing factors. As if there were conflicts that become realized otherwise than in action. At the same time, from the way Lukács develops his message, one can equally posit either the lack or existence of an antagonist. This gives rise to some problems.

It the drama, as the dilemma arises, concentrates on decision making, then the process that leads to the decision can elicit only conflicts internal to the hero, and these can be expressed only in the ecstasy of poetry—as was the case with the mysteries or morality plays of the Middle Ages, which are not drama in Lukács's view. Provided that drama concentrates on the action or the consequence that derives from decision making, there remains a question as to the personality and/or position of the hero—and of the antagonist. The same applies to the "particular link" of the chain: what is the subjects of portrayal—the road leading to the grasping of the link, or the action that follows it? Furthermore, here again: what are the protagonist and antagonist like, and what is the situation in which they find themselves? These issues lead us to ask whether the protagonist has the opportunity to realize the consequences of his decision in deeds and whether the antagonist or members of his environment have the chance to go into action against the protagonist.

The rather complex problem of the relationship between the person who acts and his action is treated neither in the context of the "facts of life" nor in the chapter entitled "The Peculiarity of Dramatic Characterization". Here Lukács treats autonomous action as something given:

The decisive dramatic question here is whether a person can express himself immediately and completely through a deed [...] Dramatic form requires immediate and direct proof of this coincidence (i.e., the correspondence between man and his action) at every stage of its journey.90

In his early history of drama, Lukács made a very thorough analysis of the problem of how the personality of the protagonist and the results of his action become detached from each other in the modern world. Here, however, he treats this relationship as a given unity that is an indispensable criterion of dramatic form, without which there can be no drama. The relationship of man in action to his own deeds—whether he is at all able to act, whether he is able to objectify his internal being—is the fundamental issue of the drama written in any period. This is so, even though the possibility of action that derives from personality, or the absence of such a possibility, actually appears in a great many ways, and for widely varying reasons. Lukács's non-treatment of this problematic and his clear acceptance of the idea that the essence of genre lies in the conflict, has grave consequences, even though the reasons stem from the then given position of Marxist literary theory and his own personal life at that time. I shall return to this at the end of the present essay.

It is true that the relationship between the protagonist and his action or deed became a general issue in the second half of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, in certain dramas and at given points in certain dramas, the problem figured prominently even earlier. To be sure, in these earlier dramas, the reasons for inability to act are still
entirely different from the reasons suggested in the second half of the 19th century. Let us also include the problematic of the facts of life in the course of giving (my own) examples.

Hamlet, for instance, makes his decision and in the meantime acts out his relationship with Claudius—and Claudius also has the opportunity for his own actions against Hamlet. The series of actions that Hamlet performs up to the point of arriving at his decision (Claudius is guilty and must be punished) and afterward is tantamount to 'settle his account' with Claudius. At the same time, Claudius—although at the end he fails to avert the sentence being carried out against him—has the chance to act against Hamlet and to avert being called to account by the prince.

Although he may not recognize the existence of the dilemma, King Lear faces the difficult decision of what to do with Cordelia, at the beginning of the work. In his case, however, no one has the means to influence the decision. After Lear has made his decision, life immediately starts that he 'has to settle his accounts', but by then Lear himself is in no position to engage in any counter-action.

Mark Anthony has become one with his contribution to world history. When, dazed by his love for Cleopatra, he has left the scene of the decisive battle, he gathers his wits to avert 'calling to account', although he does not succeed. Similarly, Danton in Büchner's drama has neither the means—nor the character and position at the time—to parry the concrete counter-action against him by life—that is, by Robespierre and Saint Just. At the same time, for Robespierre and Saint Just their 'calling to account' is the grasping of the decisive link. Nora, too faces a dilemma. She has the chance to call Helmer to account by grasping the decisive link that offers itself, and her final action is concentrated on this effort. Willy Loman's dilemma is whether to call on Howard Wagner to ask for a job in New York, and in the end, he opts to go. But he cannot get any farther than this decision: he has absolutely no means to influence Howard Wagner's decision or to assert his own will and desire.

With the foregoing we intended to show, above all, that these situations are indeed genuine 'facts of life'. That they definitely partake of this quality was first established by Lukács. But these facts of life do not in themselves constitute a subtype within the genre of drama. Of course, this is not the way that Lukács considered them: in his treatment, the conflict—the key concept of the genre—grows out of the life situation. At the same time, I would like to emphasize that theory grows only from primary historical facts, indeed, only certain kinds of facts, rather than from the actual history of drama. (Indeed, Lukács does not suggest a separate literary thesis for each.) As we have seen, the relationship between the protagonist and his action is not identical in these facts of life. There are cases and positions where either the hero or his opponent or environment are unable to act because they do not have the means, the power to act. For this reason, the conflict does not grow clearly from these facts of life. The reasons for the lack of means to act are, of course, widely varied, depending on the differences in the given historical and social situations. At the same time, it should again be called to mind in this context that Lukács raises the possibility of the continuity of drama in theory, but rejects it historically. He speaks about the circumstances in which the aforementioned 'facts of life' can be depicted in narrative works, which would suggest that "these facts occur permanently in life; which would mean that life is constantly providing the possibility for genuine, great drama. This, however, contradicts what has actually happened in the historical development of literature."91

Nonetheless, there is here a contradiction, which Lukács tries to resolve. The facts
of life listed above are "reflected in drama and form the basis of its specific problems of form, nevertheless something else must be added to them"; moreover, this something else must be "additional specific factors", whose presence is "necessary for the emergence of true drama". The identity of this specific contributory momentum is rather surprising: it is struggle. Lukács actually expresses this in a negative way. He says that in medieval drama it is in vain "being called to account by Death"; for "in the hour of death [...] nothing dramatic ever emerges [...] Because in such conditions, the consequences of the 'calling to account' can only be purely inward, psychological and moral and cannot be translated into action and struggle." 93

Obviously, the question has been left open, for Lukács has been unable to revise the view that conflict is the factor that determines genre, even at the points where, with reference to the circumstances of life that he mentions, the contradiction becomes clear.

The theory formulated on the basis of the aforementioned 'facts of life' again obviously excludes certain dramas from the definition, among them the same one excluded from Lukács's early drama theory. For instance, those in which the reverse of the 'calling to account' is the case, in which life returns the check, grants a gift. In the medieval mystery play, Abraham faces the dilemma of whether to sacrifice his favorite son at the command of God. As he agrees to do so, God rewards him by 'multiplying his seed as the stars of the heaven'. Nor does the theory have any place for the comedies in which the protagonist can live happily ever after. Or course, neither Abraham nor any of the vast multitude of lucky sweethearts in life and comedies face a real decision, for they know quite clearly what they have to do, just as Antigone does.

We have been able to see, then, in both of Lukács's works, particularly in The Historical Novel, that he considered conflict the kernel of drama. Relevance, generic being, is achieved through the conflict, and the facts of life constitute drama only if they give rise to struggle and conflict. Actually, this is how Lukács reaches incorrect generalizations. Of course, conflict was introduced into dramatic theory by Hegel, and from him—'set on its feet again'—conflict makes its way to Marx and Engels's approach to drama, and Lukács's theory. Even the solution of the problem of form derives from a Hegelian statement concerning the totality of movement centralized around collision. Therefore, it is important to know how Hegel interprets conflict and how his interpretation is related to Lukács's.

* * *

I cannot go into detail here on the development of the term 'conflict' in Hegel's philosophy. Thus, I shall probe only into that part of the problematic which is important in the present context.

The term appears already at the beginning of the Phänomenologie des Geistes. Hegel writes in the introduction, in the context of a passage on conceptual thinking:

Formell kann das Gesagte so ausgedrückt werden, dass die Natur des Urteils oder Satzes überhaupt, die den Unterschied des Subjets und Prädikats in sich schliesst, durch den spekulative Satz zerstört wird, und der identische Satz, zu dem der erstere wird, den Gegenstoss zu jenem Verhältnisse enthält.—Dieser Konflikt der Form eines Satzes überhaupt, und der sie zerstörenden Einheit des Begriffs ist dem ähnlich, der im Rhythmus zwischen dem Metrum und dem Accente stattfindet. 95

This, then, is one kind of conflict whose character differs completely in meaning from the conflict content that Hegel suggested elsewhere. For already in this work of Hegel's,
the theory of genre appears—and not only within ‘artistic religion’, but also within ‘professed religion’. And, in this case, conflict is already a key concept in relation to the genre of drama, but, at the same time, it is also the criterion of a specific internal state of mind. This is so chiefly in connection with ‘unhappy consciousness’, and to a lesser extent in ‘perfectly happy consciousness’. As a matter of fact, the term has a place in the entire Hegelian system. We know very well that, in this system, the subjective mind evolves into the objective intellect and then into absolute intellect, as successive phases of development; of the process of integrating into a whole. It is in the last phase of the emergence of absolute intellect that the question appears in sharp relief.

This phase is closed by art, by art and poetry; and poetry is closed by drama. Thus, in this system, drama is the triple closing movement in one stage of the phases and forms of development, from which the next phase—religion—starts. Therefore, drama earns an eminent place in the system: in it, two great forms of the development of absolute intellect come into contact with each other. We also know that, in the sequel of this evolution, Hegel also includes several triple categories of different meanings and contents. It is a basic attribute of the transitional phases that they create a synthesis. For Hegel, however, synthesis does not merely combine and summarize, but also integrates in such a way that synthesis terminates what the next phase preserves. Therefore, the internal state of mind that can be described as conflict always appears in these stages. In this way, the contents of conflict are of different kinds; and ‘conflict’ is a term that belongs to the realm of the philosophy of history, rather than to the domain of the theory of drama. To be sure, these phases also include fading away and death, requiring not only the term ‘conflict’, but also giving rise to the view that tragedy appears in periods of decline. It is then because of the foregoing that, in his Aesthetic, Lukács says, in drama which takes its place in the triple closing movement, conflict becomes the key concept. In the dramatic individual, writes Hegel, ‘the plot is influenced by intrigues and conflicts,’ and ‘dramatic plot is fundamentally based on conflicting actions.’ It should be obvious from the forgoing that, in this case, conflict is of an entirely different content than suggested by the meaning in the sentence quoted from the Phänomenologie. From the place and function of conflict in the whole of the system, it is quite clear that its origin has to be sought in the philosophy of history, rather than in drama. Although he has accepted conflict as the key concept of genre, György Pozsler already found that, with Hegel, “The basically logical-constructive character—rather than generalization from the history of literature—becomes the most salient in the definition of drama.”

Conflict, which was doubtless introduced into the theory of drama by Hegel, survives in the work of Lukács, although with his own interpretation and own meanings. The proper interpretation and contents are imparted by Marx and Engels, or historical and dialectical materialism.

Already in the essay written around 1930 on “Marx und Engels über dramaturgische Fragen”, Lukács writes: ‘Marx and Engels regard literature in general and drama in particular as a form of the mirroring of economic development and class struggles in the minds of people.’ The formulation of the problem, of course, is still somewhat rough at this point, but does not miss the essential questions. He says, for instance: ‘The structure of every drama depends in the final analysis on how well the poet succeeds in depicting the relationship between the individual and society (the “hero” and “fate”).’ Then, already at this point, anticipating his later writings on drama, he mentions the so-called ‘Sickingen debate’. Marx and Engels show, he writes, that Lassalle
would have been able to write a truly significant drama if he had picked a 'character central to history as his point of departure, for instance, Thomas Münzer, the representative of the Peasant War'. Lukács places the emphasis on the conflict: 'For, from the fact that they criticize Lassalle's wrong and idealistic concept of the uprising of the nobility and the Peasant War, the tragic as well as the dialectical materialist theory of dramatic style inevitably emerge,' he writes; Marx and Engels, he adds, 'as they analyze the period, reach 'on their own account' the idea of true, objectively inevitable, tragic conflicts. For them, the tragic follows from the objective historical situation, from the unresolvable conflicts into which the class situation can plunge some of the representative individuals of history.' Münzer, on the other hand, could be a tragic hero, as 'he is the revolutionary who has come too early'.

Four years later, Lukács wrote a paper on the same problematic, noting that, in the view of Marx and Engels, 'dramatic content constitutes [the] great world historical class struggles.'

Obviously, for Lukács, conflict assumes its own objective meaning. To put it another way, conflict in this way determines the historical and social validity of its contents. But, as I have suggested in my sketchy discussion of the 'facts of life', it does not acquire drama theoretical content, and, consequently, does not attain the place that this concept merits in drama theory; it holds a place of less significance. After all, in each of the life situations, a great many interpretations of conflict are possible. This is also true of the facts of life. Conflict that accompanies a dilemma can be realized as one that takes place within the hero, and may take place after the decision, or even in action after the decisive link has been grasped, in actions whose objects are others. But deeds gain implementation differently, depending on whether both the protagonist and the antagonist have the chance to put their decisions into effect, into action against each other. And then again, something else happens when neither party has the chance to realize in action the inner hostility that he feels toward the other. This matter of chance should be taken very concretely: the question is whether each has the means and the ability to express objectively and translate into effective action what is taking place in him.

Once we call the pre-decision struggle of various psychological dynamisms within a person just as much a conflict (Hamlet before his decision) as the struggle that takes place when both sides are able to objectify their opposing wills (Antigone and Creon, Hamlet and Claudius), when both have the means for it, and if we then apply the same term to the relationship in which only one has the power, but the other does not (i.e., Lear has not and his daughters have; Nora and Howard Wagner have, Helmer and Willy Loman have not the power), we are using the term 'conflict' to denote entirely different situations in drama and life. In this way, 'conflict' is the term for so many facts of life and their appearance in drama that the term itself becomes a metaphor. But the key concept of a genuine theory of drama cannot be a mere metaphor! And yet for both Hegel and Lukács it is. If the term is fully valid and of authentic meaning with reference to the facts and situations to which it was originally applied—and this holds particularly for Lukács's views—the various dramatic situations to which it is applied only by way of extrapolation bear contents and meanings different from the one for which it was originally employed. In vain is it true that—looking at drama alone—one sees conflict both in Antigone and in the dramas reflecting historical transition periods on which Lukács bases his thinking, the term cannot be applied to all dramas to which one can arrive at from the original basis only through extrapolation.
As I have sketchily analyzed the 'facts of life', it was not merely by accident that I have emphasized the presence or absence of means, the possession or want of power. For the meaning of conflict that is authentic and valid for the theory of drama or provides an authentic category for the theory of drama, depends on the action and on the possibility or impossibility of action. In other words, the decisive factor is not the existence of opposing wills and aims; real conflict depends on the existence or absence of the means through which the wills can be implemented and the aims realized. In my opinion, a genuine conflict (according to the standards of dramatic theory) is produced only when the world of the work contains two opposing intentions and goals, and both sides have the means for objectification.

We would be must unfair if we called Lukács to account for not having clarified this interpretation of conflict. After all, when he wrote the book in question he was as yet only able to lay down the bare foundations of the Marxist theory of literature, or, more particularly, of drama. But—however strange this may seem for all those who approach Lukács's life work or this particular work with prejudice—it was his splendid discovery that the problem of dramatic form provides the key to the general interpretation of the problem of the genre. And this is true even if Lukács limited the problem of form—in a fully understandable, and, in fact, inevitable way—to conflict, as its kernel. For this limitation as any real limitation in meaning gives extra stress to the definition. Here it is not conflict that gains stress, but its limitation to the determinative relationship between facts of life and genres.

It remains a fundamentally true and brilliant invention in the theory of drama, even though Lukács sees the facts of life as life situations that constitute drama only if they lead to a conflict, or if a conflict can be developed from them; and even though, in his view on the constitution of genres, he has not yet arrived at the essential function that is manifest in the relationship of the author to the facts of life in this context.

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I have mentioned that, in The Historical Novel, Lukács arrives at Hegel's 'world historical individual' as the hero of tragedy. This view is closely allied with the assertion that 'there are only dramatic periods'. In Hegel's case, the substance of history is historical intellect realizing itself. It manifests itself primarily in the world historical individual, who is the individual subject of history and who realizes the future and sets its trends, who makes the future manifest in himself and wants to manifest it in the world even if but as a potential. Opposed to him stands the conservative person, who operates in the same period, yet wants to preserve the characteristics and express the possibilities of the present. Between them, there develops the conflict that becomes the sharpest at the great turning points in history, as one era gives way to another. Substantiality that carries the trends of the future, and the idea of preserving the status quo assume their true contents when we give them meaning through the revolutionary—and particularly the revolutionary who has come too early—on the one hand, and those who want to maintain and rigidify the existing historical and social situation on the other hand, and if thus we see the problematic on the basis of the true dynamics of history. In this way, the idealistic view of Hegelian historical substantialities is replaced by a materialistic view of realities, as they gain expression in history and its class struggles. If we look at the consequences of these views on the questions of the history of drama,
then the two views—both separately and together—provide grounds for the thesis that there are only dramatic ages.

Already in 1930 Lukács suggested that Hegel "regards tragedy as one form of the great historical turning points".\textsuperscript{106} In Hegel's view, it is not the conservative "preserver", but the world historical individual who is tragic. Like Hegel, Marx, Engels, and Lukács, too deny the tragic status of the "preserver", but unlike him, they proclaim the Münzers of history to be the tragic heroes—the revolutionaries who have come too early.

Lukács already begins his differential treatment of this question in The Historical Novel. He does so above all by suggesting that, for him, the tragic is no longer the quality of life inevitably following from a philosophy of history imbued with the criticism of culture, but, instead, the principal quality of life of the personality who wants to achieve his own relevance. Thus, here Lukács does not speak of the tragic experience as the basic experience of generic man in any given period. In this case, the tragic quality follows from the real dynamisms of history, and it is interpreted as the fate of man as conceived by Hegel, the fate of progressive man with social relevance, or his fate, as it turns out in certain situations.

Lukács treats the question even more subtly when he says that "the historical height at which the collision is pitched [...] is by no means identical with the outward historical significance of the events represented."\textsuperscript{107} He calls to mind Hamlet and King Lear, to show "how much a personal destiny can evoke the impression of a great historical change."\textsuperscript{108} This also means that not only historically authentic events, dates, and occurrences can constitute the drama of the conflict, but also the problematic of any age, if it is universally true and relevant, provided, of course, that it corresponds to the personality of the hero.

If these by now are generally known statements it must be emphasized that Lukács formulated them in this period. Concerning the protagonist of drama, he says that "all the characteristic factors of the time have been thoroughly and organically assimilated into the characters, becoming factors in their personal behaviour."\textsuperscript{109} Nor can this be taken to mean narrowly that this is something that can happen only at important turning points in history.

In other words, the preceding statement is fundamentally true and correct in dramatic theory, even though Lukács deduces it only from great historical turning points and the dramatic characters who express them, and even though this view leads to certain false conclusions, for instance, that the history of drama is not a continuum, and that there are only dramatic ages.

Even at the time that Lukács made this statement, it must have been a rather confusing one, even to its author. While, in his early theory of drama, he has not even formulated the view—which derives from the philosophy of history—that "the tragic is drama," here he already asks the question of "the social and historical reasons for the discontinuous appearances of drama".\textsuperscript{110} Quite clearly, he is unable to find an answer.

He again mentions the medieval morality plays and mysteries first. But he no longer simply says that the problem can be internal and psychological, but also states that the problem is "so general that it cannot be expressed in a dramatically individualized case".\textsuperscript{111} He does not even mention the undramatic nature of the period. Even more peculiar is the other example. He mentions a work by Prosper Merimée and one by Louis Vítet. In other words, dramas from periods that he regards as dramatic, but by writers who are insignificant as dramatists. He criticizes Les Barricades by Louis Vítet because it sticks to a "breadth of empirical detail, of mere facts".\textsuperscript{112} Then, having com-
pared Prosper Merimée's *Jacquerie* with Goethe's *Götz*, he considers the latter to be the better work because "Goethe succeeded in creating a figure in whom the deepest individual and personal traits merge with historical authenticity and truth to form an organic, inseparable, directly effective unity."¹¹³ In other words, here he does not insist that there are only dramatic periods; for what he brings up as faults in *Les Barricades* and *Jacquerie* are erroneous treatments of certain essential theoretical criteria of drama.

Of course, Lukács senses this contradiction. He refers to cases where "the presence of dramatic facts of life [...] do not lead to real drama."¹¹⁴ To reach this conclusion, he compares *Romeo and Juliet* with John Ford's *'Tis Pity She Is a Whore*, adding Alfieri's *Mirra* for good measure. In contrast to the Shakespearean play, the fault in the latter two works lies not in the period not being dramatic or the writers not being significant enough. The actual trouble with the works by Ford and Alfieri is that the brother-and-sister love in them is "too eccentric and too subjective", and "the action takes refuge in the heros' souls."¹¹⁵ In other words, here again, as in the case of the nineteenth-century authors mentioned above, either the theme itself or the treatment of the topic is not dramatic enough. The cause for disapprobation is not that the period in question is not dramatic enough.

At any rate, here, as before, Lukács arrives at a completely valid thesis of drama theory—namely, at the criterion of the correspondence of the personality to the historic-social dynamics.

As we have seen, for neither Hegel nor Lukács is the promotion of conflict to the key concept of drama a consequence of abstraction from the facts of the history and theory of drama. In Hegel's case it is clearly derived from the philosophy of history, and in Lukács's, it is an extrapolation from a thesis concerning the epistemology of historical and dialectical materialism. It is equally characteristic of Lukács's theoretical acumen and sensitivity to problems that a great many criteria that he applies exclusively to drama with a conflict—for, in his case, this type of drama is identical with the whole of the genre—remain valid, even though conflict is not the key concept for the genre.

* * *

The reliability of theoretical analysis requires that I also refer to the other reasons why Lukács—in my opinion—regards conflict as the essence of drama, and sees behind the works the facts of life out of which conflict can arise. There are several reasons, but a personality such as his necessarily integrated them.

Although Marxism may have inspired the approach of some earlier writers on the subject, the Marxist theory of literature was as yet hardly worked out. The development of a comprehensive view of literature from the Marxist perspective was possible only amidst unceasing struggle. Consequently, Lukács was always engaged in struggle, sometimes against a schematic or oversimplifying leftist approach to literature, and sometimes against literary concepts and political ideologies rooted in an idealist philosophy and world view. As unnamed opponents, these trends are always present even in his writings, if only implicitly. These facts clearly explain why at that time he emphasized the priority of objective historical and social foundations. In the given situation, one continually had to verify this way of approach. And it was absolutely impossible to present a fully worked out and nuanced theory all at once, one based on every aspect of the history of drama as a whole. In this context, it likewise must not be forgotten that, here, as in
his early theory of drama, Lukács’s personality also makes itself manifest. What I have in mind is by no means merely some kind of ‘neophyte’ Marxism, but, instead, the vital struggle in which Lukács was personally engaged: the struggle of the proletariat, and the other struggles for concrete goals of a more immediate nature in the Soviet Union, Germany, and Hungary. The ethical and ideological struggle that the members of the working-class movement, the intelligentsia, and particularly those dealing with problems of aesthetics had to fight within themselves contributed to these goals. Everywhere there was struggle and a series of conflicts for the great goal, the emancipation and strengthening of the proletariat, and the progress of mankind. And Lukács was not an outsider in these struggles in either position or personality, he was not the kind of man who was a Marxist in theory and a non-Marxist politically. It is not surprising, then, that in his case, struggle and conflict as a theoretical problem coincided with the nature of the internal world of the personality, as well as with the characteristics of the objective situation of man. It is not by chance, then, that ‘the problem of the character of the dramatic hero’, as stressed here, is the decisive point in Lukács’s theory of drama. Nor is it mere chance that, in this situation, Lukács regards the person who acts as identical with his action and deed. Certainly, no one who is himself an active participant in the working-class movement or shares in the struggles for social progress can have a different view. And it is therefore no wonder at all that Lukács disparaged any kind of psychological mumbo-jumbo, formalistic tricks, and playing of games with life or with art.

* * *

In conclusion one more thing should be emphasized. At the beginning of the second part of this paper, reference has been made to the fact that the theory of drama outlined in *The Historical Novel* derives from Marxist epistemology. Lukács begins his discussion with the problem of totality, and then proceeds to the totality of motion. This category is just as epistemological as the categories of social, historical, and personal relevance, or the categories of the individual and universal. Leaving no room for chance ‘empirical contingencies’ and ‘eccentric and over-subjective’ passions, he likewise applies an epistemological approach in order to analyze the necessarily deep and intimate connection between the personality of the dramatic hero and socio-historical dynamics. The approach is the same when he asserts that content and form must both be ‘personal to the core’. Lukács’s analysis of the content, character, and function of conflict is likewise epistemological.

Without the definite and specific appearance of these epistemological categories, or of their essence, there can be no really significant, no great dramatic work. This is not to say that the presence of the concrete epistemological categories is in itself necessary to produce significant artistic value, but the statement does mean that, without this substance, there is no genuinely great artistic value. Thus, Lukács already at that time also solved certain fundamental problems concerning artistic value. And the status of Marxist literary theory at that time made it fully necessary to emphasize this aspect of artistic value, constantly illuminating it from different points of view.

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Thus, we have seen that, in his early drama theory, Lukács examined the theoretical and historical problems of drama from the approach of the philosophy of history, which
led him to establish the essential identity of drama with tragedy. In The Historical Novel, he considered tragedy the peak of drama, but no longer held that the struggle of a person who wants to become respectable, who wants to achieve universal relevance, could only be tragic. By that time it was already from the angle of the epistemology of historical and dialectical materialism that he regarded tragedy as a representative example of drama.

Whatever the point of departure, this is already in itself a limitation of the topic. This restriction also derived from the fact, as has been suggested here, that in Lukács’s theory there is no place for subtypes of the genre, which is why he saw fit to extrapolate the criteria of a subtype to the genre. But—and this is the first paradox—in saying that drama equals tragedy or that the most representative example of drama is tragedy, or that the substance of drama is conflict, there is actually only one Lukácsian conclusion that cannot be verified from the point of view of the history of drama, namely, that there are only dramatic ages, and there is no continuity in the history of drama. From the point of view of the history of drama, once again, there is but a single Lukácsian thesis that cannot be verified, namely, that conflict is the substance of genre; and this, too, remains unverifiable only in that particular extrapolation.

Thus, strangely enough, the conclusion can be drawn that, whatever Lukács has theoretically established about the nature of conflict is in agreement with the findings of the theory of drama, as inferred from the history of drama. It is indicative of Lukács’s exceptionally subtle sensitivity to the problematic and his brilliant theoretical acumen that, whatever he mentions in connection with conflict is essentially just as valid—or, perhaps, more precisely, becomes truly valid only then because only then fully and universally verifiably valid—if we induce the substance of the genre from what can be read in the first sentence of A modern dráma fejlődésének története, namely, that drama is ‘a happening taking place among people’.

I have hinted that from the term ‘a happening taking place among people’ it is easy enough to arrive at the altered phrase, ‘in the relationship between people’. In my opinion, this is the essence of the genre. And what can be deduced from this holds true for both the genre of drama and its subtypes: (1) The internal contents of the characters of the drama, which give rise to their relations, must be integrally and intimately connected with the intrinsic socio-historical contents of the era. Every additional theoretical finding made by Lukács is also fully verifiable if we substitute ‘change taking place in the relationships among the characters of the drama’ for ‘conflict’ or ‘collision’, if we apply whatever he said about conflict—or what he said are the attributes of conflict—to this term. (2) Any internal problem can be turned into drama if it can be authentically objectified into the relationships undergoing change among the character. (3) The changing system of relations as a fact of life constitutes drama and also its contents and form. (4) The relationships concerned and the changes shown in them must not be just episodes in the life of the characters. (5) Totality is recorded and the experience of totality felt if all the possible positions and orientations of action connected with the given and now changing relations become apparent; and tautology is avoided if each of them is depicted only once.

All the foregoing, we are convinced, demonstrate the exceptional value of Lukács’s theory, on the basis of which—especially if we make use of the applicable categories in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen and The Ontology of Social Being—can be built a fully developed Marxist theory of drama.

(Translated by Éva Rácz)
Notes

4. Ibid., p. 162.
6. Ibid., p. 529.
10. Ibid., pp. 384—5.
11. Ibid., p. 295.
12. Ibid., p. 215.
16. Ibid., pp. 32—33.
17. Ibid., p. 31.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 38.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 51.
22. Ibid., p. 53.
23. Ibid., p. 36.
25. Ibid., p. 7.
27. Ibid.
29. Lukács: A modern dráma fejlődésének története, p. 28.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 29.
32. Ibid., p. 28.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., p. 30.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 41.
38. György Lukács: "Shakespeare és a modern dráma" [Shakespeare and the modern drama], in ibid., p. 481.
40 Ibid., p. 54.
41 See August Wilhelm Schlegel: "Erste Vorlesung", in his Ueber dramatische Kunst und Literatur (Wien: 1825).
42 Lukács: A modern dráma fejlődésének története, p. 37.
43 Ibid., p. 47.
44 Ibid., p. 48.
45 Fehér: "A dráma történetfilozófiája, a tragédia metafizikája és a nem-tragikus dráma utópiája: Válaszuk a fiatal Lukács drámameletében", in op. cit., see especially pp. 58 ff.
46 Lukács: A modern dráma fejlődésének története, p. 106.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., p. 97.
51 Ibid., pp. 87—88.
52 Ibid., p. 100.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., p. 101.
55 Ibid., p. 125.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., p. 126.
58 See Fehér: "A dráma történetfilozófiája, a tragédia metafizikája és a nem-tragikus dráma utópiája: Válaszuk a fiatal Lukács drámameletében", in op. cit., p. 73.
59 In my opinion, in the history of drama the first Marxist outlook on history (or the historical problem) conceived of and interpreted in this way appeared in István Órkény’s drama, Pisti a vérzivatarban [Pisti in the Blood Bath].
61 See G. Lukács: “Marx und Engels über dramaturgische Fragen” (in manuscript at the Georg Lukács Archives and Library); further, see his “Marx and Engels on Problems of Dramaturgy”, International Theatre (1934) No. 2.
63 Lukács: The Historical Novel, p. 12.
64 Ibid., p. 14.
65 Ibid., p. 15.
67 Ibid., p. 90.
68 Ibid., p. 91.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., p. 90.
71 Ibid., p. 91.
72 Ibid., p. 92.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., p. 92.
75 Ibid., p. 93.
76 Ibid.
77 Lukács: A modern dráma fejlődésének története, p. 49.
78 Lukács: The Historical Novel, p. 93.
79 Ibid., pp. 93—4.
80 Ibid., p. 100.
82 Lukács: The Historical Novel, p. 97.
83 Ibid., p. 101.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., p. 102.
86 Ibid., p. 103.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., p. 102.
89 Ibid., p. 103.
90 Ibid., p. 123.
91 Ibid., p. 107.
There is no place here to go into detail on the further history and spread of the concept of conflict, and to discuss the roles played by the Freudian and Darwinian interpretations of the term or the views on the subject of other authors who made, e.g., free will the pivotal point of their philosophy.


Lukács: “Marx und Engels über dramaturgische Fragen”, op. cit.

Lukács: The Historical Novel, p. 118.

Ibid., p. 118.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 108.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 109.

Ibid., p. 111.

Ibid., p. 112.

Ibid., p. 113.
It was some thirty years ago that the first study, by Gábor Tolnai, on the influence of György Lukács on the new historiography of Hungarian literature was published. It was some twenty years ago that the first work of comprehensive ambition, by Imre Bori, on Lukács’s relation to Hungarian literature appeared. Later others also treated the principal aspects of this relationship: Ferenc Tőkei, Péter Nagy, and István Sóter.

In an earlier study, I tried to review the influence of Hungarian literature and history on the changes in Lukács’s way of looking at the issues, and now I would like to sketch out the inner ‘biography’ of his view of Hungarian literature, at least as it centered around some events of major importance, from the beginnings to 1945, summarizing, at the same time, how far we have come in shedding light on this topic, which, contrary to all rumors in common knowledge, is very abundant. Keeping in view the changes, transformations, or embedment of the world of thought of Lukács’s Hungarian studies until 1945, which displays an organic interrelation with his aesthetic and philosophical works, I chose as the method of my paper a simple, I could say, didactic kind of chronological progression, in the spirit of Hegel’s idea, so close to that of Lukács himself, that the essence of a thing is identical with its history.

There has been, until now, almost no debate over the temporal articulation of György Lukács’s nearly seven decades of intellectual activity. There seems to be an agreement among scholars that the first period of his career falls between 1902 and 1918, the second lasts from 1919 to 1929, the third from 1930 to 1945, the fourth from 1945 to 1949, and the fifth from 1950 to 1956, while the last began in 1957. Even if we compress the last two periods and demarcate sub-periods within the longer, comprehensive periods, this articulation is not fundamentally changed. Thus, in the first stretch of time, we can draw lesser demarcation lines in 1911 and 1914, indicating certain trends and changes of thought. In addition, prior to 1906—the first formulation of his book on drama, A modern dráma fejlődésének története [History of the Development of the Modern Drama] and the publication (in the periodical Szerda) of the study “A dráma formája” [The form of the drama]—only the first steps of the beginning of his career can be mentioned. Although Lukács himself regarded his career as beginning when he first met Sándor Bródy and when his articles in Bródy’s Jövendő were published, these first efforts, made when he was still more or less a child, can be delimited from the ‘real’ scholarly career beginning with his book on drama, without depreciating the significance of his very early writings.
The, metaphorically speaking, 'spatial' position, or definition of affiliation, of Lukács's life work is more open to debate. The problem is now and then brought up in the context of the larger question whether the social sciences that operate with general categories have national characteristics and whether it is possible at all. This question, leading toward, in Lajos Fülep's words, 'national autototelism', is a false question, and every time it is uttered, it appears as a symptom of unsolved ideological problems. "Has the life work of György Lukács a special message for his homeland, Hungary?"; as early as 1955, Gábor Tolnai characterized this question as a pseudo-problem, that is, a pseudo-problem from the perspective of the history of scholarship, but still, this kind of approach of speciality or individuality, and, in general, of the Hungarian character of Lukács, could provoke heated debates even much later, in the first part of the seventies. And this, I repeat, reflects the fact that the Hungarian concept of the nation and a number of problems in terms of social consciousness underlying that very concept are not settled. But what I mean here when I mention affiliation is not this node of problems because the Hungarian character of Lukács has to be taken as something as natural as the French character of Descartes, who wrote the majority of his works in Latin, or the German character of Leibniz who, in turn, published works in French: it makes no sense to treat this problem separately. The question of the spiritual homeland in the wider sense, however, could be and, in fact, recently has been raised. Historians dealing with the turn of the century—William M. Johnston in the USA and Kristóf Nyíri in Hungary, to name just two—treated the beginning of Lukács's career in the context of the particular cultural life of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the literature on Lukács tends to take into consideration the characteristic intellectual atmosphere of the Monarchy when looking for the impetuses behind this period of Lukács's work.

But maybe an even wider intellectual and cultural circle can be drawn in connection with these notions, and this circle could be Central Europe conceived of in terms of cultural history. This once popular concept is rarely used in the historical studies since World War II, which can be ascribed to the fact that it gained reactionary implications as early as before World War I, due to the expansionary ambitions of German imperialism. But it would be a mistake to dismiss this concept altogether just because of some prejudicial substrata: it is hard to ignore the separate nature of the area between Western and Eastern Europe when studying, say, the history of literature, music, the fine arts, social sciences, and educational systems from the end of the Middle Ages to the first half of the twentieth century. The researches of Jenő Szűcs have proven that the Marxist science of history can, within the framework of the general history of society, elaborate and fruitfully apply the theory of the three European regions, and this theory is especially needed when exploring the cultural history of the period from the Compromise of 1867 to the end of World War I. Central Europe? East Central Europe? Central Eastern Europe? It is no use to trifle with the names. As to the period between 1867 and 1918, the area in question can be delimited by the trigonometrical points of Berlin, Prague, Heidelberg, Munich, Vienna, Zagreb, and Budapest.

Seen from another perspective, this historical and cultural concept of Central Europe is needed as a concept of speciality as well, since a great deal of the history of literature, drama, painting, etc. cannot be understood if the individuality of the national events is connected directly, that is, without any transition, to the abstract concept of Europe as a whole. Nagybánya is connected to what is called European painting via Munich, growing out of, and transcending, Munich; and the case of the Thalia Society is similar, inasmuch as it had its contact with the experimental theater via the Freie Bühne. This
did not mean dependence or subordination, but rather, provided a natural framework: the art and science desirous of the new rose against a similar social order, whether it fought with the Hungary of the gentry or with the Prussia of the Junkers. The similarities of the obstacles to progress did not, however, homogenize the region at all. Central European cultural life at the turn of the century was characterized by a divergent, split value system, according to the social and national strata of the region. Ambitions of quite a different and divergent nature appeared in it at the same time, and each wanted to enforce its own point of view of evaluation. Besides the abstract use of concepts and the 'cult of essence', fashionable in the circles associated with the beginnings of Geistesgeschichte, there was the language and style of Alfred Kerr's impressionistic criticism, which was colorful and, as seen from the side of philosophy, almost frivolous; the adoration of the Russian novel and the Scandinavian drama was paralleled by a nearly equally exaggerated Gallomaniac attitude. Even the attempts at a breakthrough, toward something greater, were characteristic, whether manifested in space—for example, widening the horizon toward Anglo-American literature—or in time—for example, the turning back toward the classics.

With all its peculiarities, even with its individual traits, the intellectual life of Budapest, the capital that had, by the turn of the century, grown into a big city, a real metropolis, and, in general, the Hungarian artistic and scientific world of the age, were an organic part of this Central European culture, of this culture of divergence, while still retaining their special flavor and atmosphere, their unmistakable character. This narrow world surrounded Lukács, who, owing to his extraordinary abilities, intellectually matured in a very early age. It was the world of first influences forming his character, providing a pattern of attitudes, giving examples of ethical behavior, in the persons of Elek Benedek, László Bánsági, and Imre Pethes. The first arena of action was opened for him precisely here, by the establishment of the Thália Society. And the subject matter of his first studies, too was related to precisely this world, especially to the theater life of Hungary, even if Lukács did not always write of performances of Hungarian plays. He surveyed the wider circle of Central European culture for the sake of this closer Hungarian milieu. This is proven by his report, sent to the paper Magyarság in the summer of 1902, on the cultural life of Berlin, where his critical message was expounded through the perspective of Budapest and by means of constant comparisons with corresponding Hungarian phenomena; thus, it was essentially about Hungarian conditions rather than German ones.

The first changing, throbbing, full-blooded intellectual life surrounding him was that of Hungary of the turn of the century. It is known that, as early as in his secondary-school years, he regularly read the literary magazine of József Kiss, A Hét, and the poems, short stories, and journalistic writings published there addressed the reality that surrounded him and impinged on his existence. The first genuine, great, living literary experience for Lukács was, however, the poetry of Endre Ady; through it, he learned that man could transcend his own possibilities and his own age by a literature arising from precisely that age. The lyric poetry of Ady exerted a revealing and illuminating influence on him in 1906, the first time that he encountered it. From then on, he became one of Ady's most devoted partisans, and he was among the first critics to provide a theoretical defence of this poetry, attacked from almost every angle and received without any comprehension. In his famous essay published in Huszadik Század, he was the first to treat the revolutionary nature of Ady's poetry, and the poetical connections of this revolutionary character. In the twilight of his life, he turned back, again and again, to
the real quality of this experience of Ady, to this experience of the force of forming the character, one may even say, forming a life, to the decisions and recognitions to which he was led by Ady’s protesting spirit, which influenced all his later career. He formulates this in shrewd words and a beautiful pathos in the foreword to his collection of essays entitled Magyar irodalom—magyar kultúra [Hungarian Literature—Hungarian Culture].

But Ady’s poetry not only exercised an emotional influence on him, for it also furthered his development as a thinker: the idea of ‘Ugocsa non coronat’ made him realize that, although much could be adopted of Hegel’s system, the category of Versöhnung had to be abandoned.

The information on the beginning of Lukács’s career is growing. The history of the Thália Society has been elucidated. The publication of his Ifjúkori művek [Early Works] is the most complete collection of his works written until 1918. His diary, and the correspondence between 1902 and 1917, as well as Béla Balázs’s letters and the correspondence with Ernst Bloch are illuminating as regards the background of his works themselves and, in general, they serve as documents of the intellectual orientation and personal connections pertaining to the birth of these works. Besides a number of studies on the details, in the last decades there have appeared some books attempting a comprehensive evaluation of the young Lukács, for example, the studies by Ágnes Heller et al., the books of Michael Löwy, Andrew Arato, and Paul Breines, as well as the book of F. László Földényi in Hungary. There is only one issue that I would like to sketch out, on the level of theoretical generalization, of the Hungarian literary studies of Lukács’s first period, and this is his relation to Nyugat. This choice is motivated by the fact that Nyugat was the most important Hungarian literary review of the first part of the century, in fact, much more than a review: it marked out an orientation, a movement, a definite group of intellectual attitudes toward the world, and it provided a framework of different, but in a larger context allied, social, aesthetic, artistic, and ideological principles in Hungarian intellectual life.

It has been said that, however great an editor Ernő Osvát may have been, he was unable to draw Lukács into the activities of the Nyugat group: “it is astonishing how little Lukács has published in Nyugat.” And, indeed, he published no more than seventeen articles there. Considering that at least two hundred and fifty numbers of the review appeared between 1908 and 1918, the small size of Lukács’s contribution cannot be stressed enough. This disappointing share, however, looks quite different if compared to the publications in other reviews by the author of A modern dráma fejlődésének története, Soul and Form, Eszéletiskai kultúra [Aesthetic Culture], and The Theory of the Novel. To date, we know of about a hundred articles, studies, and smaller or longer pieces of Lukács up to 1918, of which eighty-five were published in reviews and newspapers. Eighteen were written before the launching of Nyugat, and sixty-seven between 1908 and 1918. Twenty-four of these sixty-seven were published in languages other than Hungarian, ten in the Pester Lloyd. As compared to the forty-three articles and studies published in Hungarian, the seventeen published in Nyugat can no longer be regarded as insignificant. Twelve of the forty-three were published in Huszadik Század, five in Renaissance, three in A Széllem, and the remaining six studies in other periodicals. Thus, proportionally speaking, Lukács’s contributions to Nyugat were the most numerous.

Of course, his relation to Nyugat cannot and must not be measured by mere numbers, assessed on the basis of quantitative data. The punctum saliens of this relationship is the principles, ideas, the contents of the essays, and the intellectual orientation of the
studies. As compared to these factors, personal relations are of secondary importance, and even the intricate network of sympathies and aversions belongs to the realm of biography, rather than to the history of intellectual affiliation. One or two words, however, must be said of these personal relations. It is known that Ernő Osvát, who affectionately supported the majority of his generation, was not on good terms with Lukács; the latter was, rather, assisted in the circles of Nyugat by Ignotus. Lukács was not on good terms with Mihály Babits either. Babits had an aversion to him, although Lukács had initiated his relationship to Babits with a friendly gesture: writing of the anthology Holnap in 1908, he stressed only the poems of Béla Balázs and Babits, apart from those of Ady, as the real treasures of the book. (Which Balázs was proud—and justifiably so—to mention in a letter to Babits.) Lukács repeated this emphasis in an essay of 1909, in which he devoted considerable space to a detailed appreciation of Babits’s first volume of poetry. But perhaps the accents of this appraisal did not fall where Babits would have wished them, that is, Lukács highly esteemed the artist of forms, and not the poet as philosopher; hence, the sensitive soul was offended. Babits could have taken offence at a general critical remark of “Az utak elváltak” [The roads have parted] as well, alluding, though without overt reference to the name and the title, to a poem of Babits, “A ifrikus epilógja” [The epilogue of the lyricist]. Perhaps all these had an effect on the fact that in 1910 Babits did not need Lukács’s call to support the efforts to reorganize Renaissance. Not only did Babits refuse to become a supporting member of this group, but in that same year, he wrote a cold, unfriendly review on the Soul and Form for Nyugat. To his motives it can be added that he wrote his lines de profundis, that is, he regarded his teaching post in Fagaras, Transylvania, as a sort of slavery, just as, decades later, László Németh saw his own translating job as that of a galley slave, and Babits might have been irritated by Lukács’s easier life. The article itself, despite the polite gestures of exchange of letters, was a sort of critical dueling, akin to literary fencing. If Lukács, in 1909, had damned Babits with faint praise, calling him as virtuoso of the form, Babits now returned the blow, calling into question Lukács’s writing skills, and charging that his opacity stemmed from a lack of style. And to reproach Lukács with a German manner of thinking was no less a disguised attack than the adjective ‘urbanist’ would be some twenty-five years later. In his answer, published after a delay, Lukács tried to direct the line of the discussion to a, for him, more familiar philosophical field, but it was a vain effort—in the debate, Babits got the better of him. Ignotus wrote some reassuring lines and, years later, a letter, stating that Nyugat was ready to accept Lukács’s experiments—but could this have been enough to heal the undeserved wound? And Géza Feleky wrote a critically appreciative review of A modern dráma fejlődésének története, on the face of it praising the philosopher, but without attempting to unfold the essence of the way of argumentation contained in the two big volumes—but could this have been enough of a remedy? It is most interesting that the only really comprehensive analysis concerning Lukács to appear in the course of the long history of Nyugat came only when Lukács had been living in exile and the direction of his political activities was clear, evidently, not only to the police hunting communists.

Among the first generation of Nyugat, only Béla Balázs was Lukács’s friend and intimate confidante. Ferenc Fehér wrote an essay on the nature of their alliance some twenty years ago, and there is not too much to add to that study, although much more is now known of the age itself, in the light of the studies on Ady, Babits, Oszkár Jánsz, and others carried out since then. The intellectual direction represented by Balázs and
Lukács differed, in fact, from all the other directions and ambitions of the progressive movement, but this deviation and isolation were seen even by contemporaries, although they were unable to name it. Géza Feleky, for instance, mentioned that his “opposition to both directions” made “this weighty person who cannot be classified anyhow” embarrassing. Later Lukács himself told about and wrote of the fact that he had not felt at home either in the circle of Jánsz, or at the table of Nyugat, and although his pieces had appeared in Huszadik Század as well as Nyugat, he had not belonged to any group.

There is no reason or right to call into question the subjective truth of these statements. From a historical point of view, however, it must be stressed that, as regards the contents of his writings, Lukács was a writer of Nyugat and he belonged to the movement of Nyugat, conceiving this latter not merely as a small circle of friends, but as a wide intellectual movement. The Nyugat cannot be narrowed to the “coalition of Ignotus and Babits”, all the more so, given that such a coalition did not exist. But the circle cannot be delimited to the favorites of Osvát either. In the last few decades, there have been some attempts at isolating Ady and portraying him as being in opposition to the spirit emanating from the literary review; but the Nyugat, as a concept of the history of literature, loses its meaning if either Ady or Zsigmond Móricz is left out of it. The review constituted an alliance of the progressive Hungarian intelligentsia, with a wide range and scope—a loose organization, where not only Babits or Dezső Kosztolánya, but Ady and Móricz had their own place as well, and where Lukács himself belonged until 1918, by virtue of his literary studies. Thus, the alliance of Lukács and Balázs has to be regarded as a characteristic wing of Nyugat, as one of the many inner directions and ambitions serving progressive Hungarian literature and literary thought.

Who, after all, was Lukács supporting in his critical studies? He elevated Ady above all others, and praised Kosztolánya, Babits, Móricz, and Margit Kaffka. He spoke for Holnap when there were fierce attacks against it from the right. It is known that some of his important, analytical studies on this subject were published in Huszadik Század instead of Nyugat; but, as ironic as it may sound, the columns of the Huszadik Század devoted to literary and artistic criticism were, in their attitude, of the character of Nyugat. They represented a standpoint similar to, even identical with that of Nyugat, opposing the camp of conservatism and the taste of the gentry. No line of demarcation of principles or contents can be drawn between the studies by Lukács that appeared in Nyugat and in Huszadik Század; these articles are related to each other organically, and express their real message when read together. The situation is similar in the case of Renaissance and A Szellem. Both reviews were founded as an intellectual secession, seemingly in opposition to Nyugat, but, in reality, they worked by amplifying thoughts originally conceived within the circle of Nyugat, rendering them independent, projecting and signaling the first crisis within the house (manifested in the debate between Osvát and Lajos Hatvany). A Szellem, the review of Fülep and Lukács, wished to realize a turn in philosophical culture, a turn of Geistesgeschichte, the manifestation of which was never opposed nor prevented by the editing; the role of editor simply was not accorded as prominent a role here. The Renaissance, on the other hand, attracted those wishing to free themselves from the rigorous editing practice of Osvát, while preserving and developing the free, modern spirit of Nyugat. In the activity of Lukács, both magazines were but a short interlude: A Szellem had only two issues, and it must have been a more important affair for Fülep than for him, and his collaboration with Renaissance ended already in the autumn of 1910.

Most of the avant-gardist movements started on the narrow path of a manifesto, soon
becoming rigid, acquiring dogmas of their own. At such times they gave way to the pioneering attempt of yet another manifesto promising, again, a redemption. The Nyugat, on the other hand, differs from the internal dictatorship of taste characteristic of the avant-gardist ‘isms’, as regards both its organization and its activity. It was not only a narrow path that it followed, but, permitting a multiplicity of variations, it always formed a large, wide field around itself. As to style, voice, and topics, there was a great distance between Ady and Árpád Tóth, between Móricz and Géza Laczkó, but all of them had their own place side by side in the magazine. And there was room for both the impressionistic-liberal critical attitude of Ignotus and Aladár Schönpfli, and Lukács’s way of writing, looking for deeper philosophical foundations. The sharp theoretical oppositions, the ‘either-or’s’ of the Kierkegaardian type became part and parcel of his view of literature in the essays on Baláz, but Baláz himself was almost a founding member of the Nyugat; Osvát (whom Baláz did not like from the outset) asked for a contribution from him as early as January, 1908.31

The Baláz studies of Lukács belong to the most significant works of the Hungarian history of criticism, owing to the fact that the philosophical connections of poetic formation are analyzed with an erudition unrivaled up to that time in this country. It is pointless, of course, to ask whether Baláz was worth supporting in such a heavy-handed way; these essays and critical reviews have been justified by the later development of Hungarian literature. Hardly did modern Hungarian lyric poetry break through the common poetic language of the populist-folk tradition that evolved from Kálmán Tóth to Mihály Szabolcska, besides the French boulevard drama the dominant genre on the Hungarian stage was the peasant play, Sándor Bródy was usually doomed to fail—when Lukács wrote his essays on the further consequences of Béla Baláz’s move toward the form of the genuine folk song, toward its “succint, laconic language”, and his use of the treasury of the fairy tales of folk culture on his experimental path.32 It remains to be determined if and how these thoughts were influenced by the fact that Baláz himself had personal contacts with Zoltán Kodály, but, in any case, Lukács and Lajos Fülep—after folklorists like József Húszka—were among the first theorists to see, realize, and assess the significance of the new, pure folklorism as regards the modern arts.33 A modern dráma fejlődésének története gives very early evidence of Lukács’s interest in folklorism, since in its critical consideration of Hungarian drama, a part of the book that is far from flattering, Mihály Vörösmarty’s Csongor és Tünde [Csongor and Tünde] is accorded a distinguished position in the classical tradition, and the folk-tale drama is characterized as one of the most promising signs of the development of Hungarian dramatic culture.34 This display of Lukács’s taste and thoughts is not in opposition to the directions of Nyugat; as is known, Babits made attempts toward a folk-tale drama in verse, and an excerpt of his Második ének [Second Song], the only to appear in his lifetime, was published in Nyugat, in the very year that A modern dráma fejlődésének története appeared.

The polemic around the works of Baláz and Babits shed light not only on the internal articulation of the Nyugat movement, but also on some underlying theoretical questions. In the last lines of his famous essay, “Az utak elváltak”, Lukács evidently alluded, with a disparaging tone, to Babits’s extremist ‘I lyricism’, when he said that the really new, modern art, like the painting of Károly Kemnok’s circle, starts where the centering around the individual of the impressionists ends.35 At the end of the same year, Babits, in his poem “Új könyvekre” [On new books], saluted, from the solitude of Fogaras (a small town in Transylvania), Béla Baláz’s volume, A vándor énekel [The Wanderer
Sings], and, as György Rába writes, formulated in his poem his poetic ideal, differing from that of Balázs. What was this ideal? An objective poetry, transcending the 'lyricism', and focusing on universal laws. Lukács could not perceive this ambition in Babits's poems, just as Babits failed to recognize the related theoretical need in Lukács's studies. Experiments went on as if in parallel, and writers who, on a higher level of generalization, struck out in the same direction, often quarreled with each other over details.

Still, the intellectual unity of Nyugat was created by the new conception of the individual, to be constructed on the ruins of nineteenth-century individualism. Although literary works of entirely different styles appeared in the magazine and various principles of art and aesthetics competed in the essay column, a bridge of the new demand for individuality was constructed over the divergence of opinions, a bridge consisting of the desire to formulate an ideal of humanism harmoniously comprising the individual as well as the community, the private life as well as the human perspective. This was the ambition of the experiments in poetry, drama, and prose; the writers and essayists of Nyugat had as their objective a reformulation of the issues of the ego and society, of homeland and humanity. Their revolt, later disdained and too often found wanting, was directed, beyond the sphere of intellectual life, against the whole ancient regime, and this rebellion was well understood by all those united against them, from Élet and A Cél to Magyar Figyelő. István Király gave a detailed account of the vicissitudes and crises of Ady's path to the experience of species character (Gattungsmässigkeit), to the problems of the universally human, which, rather than detaching his poetry from the world, became a melting pot of all he had experienced. The conception of personality transcending nineteenth-century individualism implied that 'the ego looks beyond itself; has a glimpse into the perspectives of the species.' This perspective of mankind, of human totality, was manifested, as a personal concern, in Babits's poetry as well, no matter how it may have differed from that of Ady; and he later formulated the criteria of this perspective by means of the concept of catholicity in his preface to Sziget és tenger [Island and Sea]. Not to give up the nature of personality is, at the same time, a creation of community, beyond all failures: this ambition was inherent in Nyugat, and the new humanism embodied in this ambition was the ultimate organizer of the unity, the alliance of internal trends, different in character, and competing with one another.

At this point, Lukács's literary studies must be connected with his works on general aesthetics and philosophy. For him, starting with his essay on Novalis, the first published in Nyugat, art was not only expression and representation, but an act, a deed, an alteration, which, like any creative activity of man, raised ethical concerns. The personality beyond individualism appeared in the ethic of responsibility; if creativity was an intervention in the state of the world, what right and what possibility did the artist and the thinker have to undertake it? Did he not have to withdraw from everyday life in order to fulfil what 'the work' demanded or, on the contrary, did he not have to give up the act of creation itself in order to obey the command of 'now' and 'today', by way of pure action? Until his very last period, Lukács formulated his standpoint in terms of these extremes that excluded the really ethical behavior—but, as regards details as well as certain larger relationships, he gave voice to his opinion even before 1918, on the highest level of the European philosophy of that age. Thus, in his essays on Balázs, the category of species character, as opposed to the particular nature of individualism, and as a measure of the new personality leading to a complete humanity, formed part of his analyses of the works in question. (The category itself, needless to say, was more primi-
tive than that later used in *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen* and in *The Ontology of Social Being*.)

His ethics-based conception of personality underwent a most remarkable concretization in a theoretical debate. In the spring of 1918, the Society for the Social Sciences held a discussion of a study by Béla Fogarasi, on the conceptual and practical differences between conservative and progressive idealism. The tone of the debate reflected the tense, sinister, and anxious atmosphere of those months, a fear of the crash mixing with the expectations of the revolution, the exasperating developments of the hopelessly continuing war mixing with the desires for the passing of the Monarchy, which many believed to be very close. This was the characteristic time of reckoning and planning, looking backward as well as forward. Lukács, in his intervention, claimed that politics and ethics were two distinct spheres. While politics had as its aim the creation or transformation of institutions, ethics aimed at the internal transformation of man. But the consequence of this difference was not, he argued, to exclude politics and to dismiss it—from the point of view of human progress—but, instead, it should be treated as a tool: not as an end but as a means. If politics became an end in itself, it would stiffen the network of institutions and block further development, but if it worked like a tool, it might help, by means of a constant and long overdue alteration of institutions, to create the circumstances for the possibility of deeper human changes.

But this show-down, the political activity appearing necessarily as a mere means, does not imply by any means relativism, or degeneration to the level of Realpolitik. On the contrary: this and only this attitude makes it possible to recognize and long for the political and social process as an eternal development, until the time when the institutions created in this way will exclusively serve the ethical development of man. The first consequence of this is the eternal nature of progress, since every institution can serve this aim only approximatively, and this aim can really be successfully achieved only through an independent progress in ethics.38

This theory of politics started out not from the reality of social praxis, but from the abstract conception of ethos, grasping, nevertheless, some deep truths on some points, and unfolding them decades later in a Marxist framework. One of these truths was the recognition that politics as an end in itself leads to dogmatism; another was the concept of Würdigkeit, taken from the ethics of Kant and Fichte. Lukács stated that the remedy of political rigidity must be sought in a demand never fulfilled, that is, in the demand that nothing should hinder the ‘autonomous dignity of man’. And the “autonomous dignity of man” means that “every man is bound to respect himself as well as other people as somebody possibly realizing this ideal, but only as this”; in other words, one should not permit man, under any conditions, to lose his independence: “it cannot be tolerated that man ever, for the sake of anything, become a mere tool.”39

This was a beautiful idea, full of pathos, but in this form it could not find its connection with practical action, of short-term but urgent necessity. This idea did not claim action, and neither was this its center of gravity. Instead, it bore a relation to the arts of great perspectives, of sweeping vision; ideas of a similar kind were proposed by the literature searching for a way out of the world crisis. Even though this literature had no mobilizing slogans on its flag, it rejected the ‘age of sinfulness achieving perfection’. This was the voice of intellectual progress represented, in this country, by the Nyugat, from its foundation, issue by issue; for a humanism fighting against all kinds of conservatism and militant anti-humanism. When Lukács in these tense, critical times, at the nadir of the age, appealed to the ‘autonomous dignity of man’ as against the war—then humiliating man and threatening to reduce him to a tool or a means—he in fact
summarized the ideal of humanity, the conception of humanism of this influential circle in Hungarian cultural life. It was the constructive deed of the intellectual before the revolution.

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Lukács’s activity between 1917 and 1919 had become a topic of novels and episodes of autobiographical writings even before it was a subject for scholarly studies. Apart from Marcell Benedek’s novel, Vulkán [Volcano], written in 1918 and dealing with the years from the founding of the Thalia Society to 1914, it was the right-wing literature that portrayed the figure of Lukács, in a biased tone, full of hatred. After her spectacular conversion, in 1921, Emma Ritoók published her novel A zsellem kalandorai [The Adventurers of Spirit], which, in its story fabricated along the lines of a boorish anti-Semitism, represented the environment of the birth of the Sunday Circle and the Free School of Intellectual Sciences. The figures of the novel are constructed from characteristic traits of real persons, picked out and reassembled in mosaic fashion; no doubt, some moments referred to Lukács. A view of a much more biased kind was shown in Cecile Tormay’s An Outlaw’s Diary, published in numerous editions, which, obeying the rules of the memoir, named the figures by their real names. Ferenc Herczeg, in his Északi fény [Aurora Borealis], included a figure resembling Lukács, inasmuch as Ács, originally a philosopher, became a commissar. Dezső Szabó, in his Megered az eső [It Starts Raining], modeled the character of Elemér Király after Lukács. The representatives of the ideas condemning the revolution of the proletariat had their own reasons and justifications for such ill temper, but how can one explain the reservations, ironic overtones, and suspicions of the left-wing, socialist, and even communist literature? József Lengyel’s historical documentary novel on the revolutions appeared in 1932, with a preface by Béla Kun; in Visegrádi utca [Visegrádi Street], Lengyel’s aversions to Lukács in 1919 are described without any embellishment. And his Prenn Drifting, completed decades later, contained a caricature of Lukács. Lajos Kassák, in his Egy ember élete [Life of a Man] (1935), writes of him with an ironic superiority as well as with a kind of hostility. Even those wishing to present him in the most favorable light, Ervin Sinkó and Anna Lesznai, gave way to their reservations concerning his well-nigh maniacal brand of messianism and his irrationalistic extremes. When we consider, in addition, the speculation that Lukács served as the model for the character of Naphta in Thomas Mann’s Zauberberg—a speculation that Lukács himself did nothing to dampen—it is inevitable that we reflect on the question of whether his behavior was not in fact similar to its literary presentations, from the Heidelberg period to the Republic of Councils. This transformation of great internal shifts could well have had moments of obsession and obstinacy—provoking, along with an appreciation, certain aversions on the part of his contemporaries.

These literary works present the extreme and contradictory gestures of his behavior in a genuine way, and the authenticity of this representation holds true not only for Lukács personally, but for a whole type of intellectuals. But as to the contents of his studies, articles, and works of the period of “Tactics and Ethics” (1918), of its merits and deficiencies, it is the task of scholarship to deal with all of these. From a historical point of view, Lukács’s development from The Theory of the Novel to his acceptance of Marxism was first analyzed by István Hermann. Since then, several books and publications have treated this period, rich in ideas and historical lessons. Éva Fekete
wrote about his life during World War I, and the history of the Sunday Circle has been treated in Arnold Hauser's memories, Zoltán Novák's monograph, and the collection of documents edited by Éva Karádi and Erzsébet Vezér. His activities in 1919 are even better documented. Béla Köpeczi has dealt with his cultural policy, while vast and detailed background information on the intellectual life of the age is now available, thanks to the studies that explore the traditions of Hungarian socialist literature, by Miklós Szabolcsi, Farkas József, and László Illés, from the Institute of Literary Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Information on the period between the fall of the Republic of Councils and 1929 is, however, not as abundant. The whole system of connection of his activities between History and Class Consciousness and the "Blum Theses" could be analyzed in a more comprehensive and profound way only after a detailed inquiry into the grave factional fights of the Hungarian communist movement, but the historical explorations of this field are far from sufficient. Still, there have been a number of valuable works in this field, too. The list of Lukács's writings of the age has been significantly augmented by the identification of some articles that he published anonymously or under a pseudonym in the communist press, and a treatment of this material has begun. Now it is evident that it was a mistake to think, some ten or fifteen years ago, that Lukács's connection to Hungarian literature was negligible, because it simply obviated the need for a careful examination of this issue within the overall framework of his career. Not only is this connection worth examining, but it is positively necessary that we do so, in order to discern the most important moments of his conception of Hungarian literature, crystallizing at that time. This process of crystallization foreshadowed in outlines his later standpoints and, besides, reflected his earlier opinions in new formulations.

What was missing from his Hungarian studies written prior to 1919, was the theoretical layer of a coherent conception of history. These writings related, on the one hand, to abstract aesthetic views through a metaphysical conception of form, and, on the other hand, through the sociology of Sombart and Simmel, relied on a sociological doctrine with a critical touch, but merely structural and formal in nature. Instead of the concrete and real conception of history, there was a passionate rejection of the Hungary of the gentry, of the country based on compromises. This ahistorical emotional sphere, without any political ideology, can be seen, for instance, in the well-known lines on the Byzantine scene of Imre Madách's The Tragedy of Man. In the twenties, the theoretical field, left vacant until then, at last began to acquire ideological content, with a close correspondence with his actual work in the party.

Given the limitations of space imposed by the form of this essay, I must simply refer here to the fact that the ideological 'occupation' of the historical past was one of the important domains of the political fight, and, at the beginning of the twenties, the communist movement found itself severely handicapped in this regard. While the ideology supporting the consolidation of the Horthy regime made use, for instance, of the Petőfi centenary, employing it for its own ends in a voluntaristic way, the communist and social democratic press hardly said a word. We cannot know if the members of the Vienna group resolved this handicap on a theoretical level, but, in any case, in 1925, on the occasion of the Jókai centenary, Lukács was given the opportunity to speak.

One could say that to interpret and reinterpret classical values was a task very adequate to his taste and to the original directions of his erudition. His modernism was, from the outset, of a traditional kind, and it was not an avant-gardist refusal of the past; A modern dráma fejlődésének története showed his attraction to classical authors, and
in his critical writings he supported the experiments of Ady and Kernstok’s circle in harmony with a respect for traditions. Even in the time of his neophyte zealotism, he refrained from any manifestations of the proletkult. But, besides his taste, he had his political reasons as well. The new theory of the revolution, formulated in Új Március in 1927, and implying that “the bourgeois revolution is not separated, by a Great Wall of China, from the revolution of the proletariat,”48 must have been paralleled by a theory of cultural continuity as regards the conception of culture and literature. That is, the parallel trend had to be a selective, critical theory of continuity, not only in order to preserve the outstanding values of the bourgeois age for a future age of socialism, but also to turn these values into weapons in a battle for the present age.

From 1919 on, Lukács exerted a significant influence on the young József Révai, and they worked closely together in their Vienna exile, in the Landler faction. It would be an exaggeration to liken this relationship to the friendship and intellectual alliance of Lukács and Balázs, but, no doubt, Lukács’s relations with Révai proved to be significant and stable, not shaken even in the debate after the “Blum Theses”, and broken only in 1949—50, during the time of the first purges.49

From the middle of the twenties, they jointly started to elaborate the foundations of the Hungarian Marxist-communist conception of history and literature, the first manifestation of which was Lukács’s study on Mór Jókai in Új Március. This study is an interesting document of the formation of the ideology mentioned above. On its first level of meaning, Jókai’s writing is totally rejected, while on the second level, it is placed, despite all such rejections, within the continuity of Hungarian literature as a work making room for the development of Hungarian prose writing up to that of Móricz, and, on the third level, the ideal historical dichotomy, for the sake of which the whole study was written, is presented. On the negative pole, there is Hungary with its compromise of 1867 and its subsequent bourgeois development; the “ideologist” of this compromise and development was Jókai. And on the positive pole, there appeared 1848, a bourgeois revolution in the form of a ‘popular revolution’; according to this line of argumentation, Sándor Petőfi was its representative.50

The first moves toward the creation of an ideology are necessarily rough and stiff. They require sharp oppositions for the sake of an unequivocal formulation, and operate on the assumption that the subtle shades of transitions will be made visible by future inquiries. Thus, the over-polarization of these issues is not something that Lukács (and Révai) should be blamed for, as regards their early conceptual initiatives. But it must be clearly seen that these first steps led only to the crossroad of real historicity, exploration of undercurrents, and of symbolization of history, an analogical, actual, journalistic use of the historical events, always relating them to the present. And it must also be seen that these first moves showed a move in the direction of the former alternative; 1848 and 1867 played the role of a historical allegory in this way of looking at history, they functioned as contemporary events, instead of representing merely the genesis of the present processes. The apparent contradiction between a loud affirmation of the bourgeois revolution and a total rejection of the bourgeois development itself was solved by means of this allegorization. And only this allegorization could make it appear both possible and understandable that 1848 was not an event of actual history, but a signal of the transition preceding the revolution of the proletariat, a fundamental conception of Jenő Landler’s followers. And, similarly, the mentioning of 1867, rather than aiming at the analysis of the real contents of the period after the Compromise (and it was not even to induce such an analysis), referred to a political rejection of the new
consolidation of the twenties, including the majority of the art of that age. This explains why Babits, for instance, was condemned by 100%, as the ‘Pál Gyulai’ (a conservative critic of the late nineteenth century) of his age. Thus, the passionate emotional rejection of the Hungarian ancient regime provided a place for an allegorical view of history, still essentially ahistorical, but filled with a clearly expounded ideology.

This conception stressed the significance of Petőfi, besides Ady, as the principal figure of the literary tradition, and this emphasis, in conjunction with those mentioned above, had still further actual levels of meaning. These included the following: in practical political work it was not only proletarian literature par excellence that provided a firm basis; the Republic of Councils itself was, as it were, put into parentheses in order to clear the way for another level of discussion, that of establishing the new tactics and strategy capable of transferring power to the workers. After all, whom—what audience—were these studies addressing? Lukács must have had too keen a sense of reality to believe that his articles in 100%, for instance, in 1927—28, were read by a large circle of the intelligentsia. These writings were, first of all, addressed to the party members among whom Lukács himself worked, as well as to those strata of the intelligentsia which had close connections with the workers’ movement. Thus, the policy of alliance expressed in these articles was only of a restricted kind, not attempting to win large circles of the intelligentsia; rather, contenting itself with providing ideological information and direction to those already won over, as it were, preaching to the converted.

In this connection, Lukács’s critical positions concerning the immediate antecedents and the beginnings of the populist movement must be accorded special attention. If the continuity marked by the names of Petőfi and Ady established the exclusion of Jókai, then, naturally, no place could be given, in the extension of this line of tradition, to the literature of Nyugat (considered a bourgeois one) either. Lukács, having drawn a wide circle around Ady, including Dezső Kosztolányi, Margit Kaffka, Zsigmond Móricz, and Anna Lesznai, now had to come to terms with his own earlier stands. In his critical writings of the twenties, he turned sharply against the traditions and especially the present tendencies of Nyugat, regarding this literature as one situated on the pole of the Compromise, in the framework of his historical dichotomy of 1848 and 1867. Politically, however, even if he was a biased messianist, he could not force the gradually evolving cultural policy of the party into isolation; he had an aversion to the avant-garde and proletkult. Thus, it was imperative to find at least potential allies among the ranks of the living Hungarian literature, in a trend or group of this existing literature. This potential ally was found in the populist movement just beginning at that time. In this choice, taste and political concern were interwoven: his attraction to high culture that made use of folklore, manifested as early as the beginning of his career, coincided with the political lessons of his critique of the Republic of Councils and his analysis of the 1920s. These political lessons, in the period before the “Blum Theses”, brought peasant policy and the unsolved problem of the countryside to the fore. As Miklós Lackó has shown, “the communist positions, critical as well as understanding, in the case of populism” appeared almost a decade before the development of the popular-front policy in the discussions within the communist party and in the illegal journal 100%, and, as early as in the second half of the twenties, the communists “regarded the sharp romantic anti-capitalism of the populists as a more revolutionary way of thinking, an idea that could be directed toward a radical revolution far better than the neo-liberalism appearing in the form of bourgeois radicalism”.

The most important document of this phase of Lukács’s work, known as the “Blum
Theses”, constitutes a summary as well as a closing of this period. In the last decades, there have been a number of scholarly discussions of this draft, and there is a growing literature on it, of which Miklós Lackó’s studies must be mentioned here as synthetic analyses of Lukács’s political views, ideology, and theory of culture. Naturally, definitiveness is out of the question, since a great number of issues arise if one scrutinizes the context of the theses more closely. The articles and studies of the time between 1925 and 1928 imply a theoretical foundation, a longer process of maturation, and prove that, when Lukács stressed the objective of a democratic dictatorship, that formulation was not simply a concession to the 1928 program of the Communist International that he made use of, as Sándor Szerényi has suggested. Instead, he used this text, then authoritative for every communist, for his theoretical generalizations; indeed, he had to use it. Nevertheless, his starting point was not this text, but, rather, an analysis of the situation and the tasks in Hungary. On the other hand, and in this respect Szerényi must be right, the political realism of Landler’s faction must not be exaggerated. Gyula Alpári, for instance, took a more sober stance when he refused to identify the Bethlen regime of consolidation with the fascist dictatorship, or to regard the social democratic party as an enemy in every regard; and the “Róbert tézisek” [Robert theses] by Béla Szántó, discarded earlier, presented, in many respects, a realistic picture of the Hungary of that age, too. This, however, makes the puzzle even more intriguing: namely, why a realistic analysis of the situation led to a more unrealistic set of objectives and why the formulations of the tasks were separated, in many points, from reality. The discussions of the drafts, in any case, go far beyond the debates of the two factions.

Furthermore, there remains the crucial question of how and in what sense Lukács used Lenin’s concept of democratic dictatorship. Democratic dictatorship may be a power of the peasant and workers (1) fulfilling the radical claims of the bourgeoisie revolution while excluding the bourgeoisie from the execution itself and, thus, creating a ‘proletarian epilogue to 1793’; or (2) working, within the democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie, as a separate current, as one of the aspects of the dual power; or (3) alternatively, it may be a creation of a revolutionary power that would not accept a division of power and refuses coalition but, in a long transitional period, focuses its forces for the realization of the objectives of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The problem of the interpretation and the typology of possible interpretation was raised by Ferenc Fehér, and he found that Lukács tended to accept the second interpretation. But Fehér’s analysis may be wrong, since the design of the Petőfi–Ady line, rejecting Jókai and the Nyugat, implies, rather, the first interpretation. And this is further supported by Lukács’s expectations concerning the beginning of the populist movement as a non-bourgeois movement, despite all his reservations and criticisms.

After the discussion and failure of the draft of the theses, in 1929, Lukács was relieved of his office in the Foreign Committee of the communist party, and, with the exception of two years, lived in the Soviet Union from that time until 1945. In the last four years, the examination of this period has become an even more cultivated field, and, besides a number of valuable shorter specialized studies, there is László Sziklai’s massive work of textual research and analysis devoted to assessing the changes in Lukács’s views—the substantial collection, some eight hundred pages long, is a compilation of Lukács’s works of this period, containing, in part, hitherto unknown or ignored studies. Unfortunately, this otherwise prolific period of Lukács’s career is very poor in studies on Hungarian literature, and, until 1938, the year of the launching of the Moscow Új Hang, there is hardly anything to mention in this field. This fact is, however, rather natural,
considering the fact that he was, as it were, warned off Hungarian affairs; he was bound to work on a general ideological line, even with a two-year digression on German affairs. What is shocking, rather, is that some signs of the Hungarian connection could be seen even under the circumstances sketched above. Lukács had a polemical essay, dated 1931, a study in 1932, published in Valóság, a journal edited by Attila József, and a book review in the same year in Társadalmi Szemle. In 1935, Gábor Gaál, the editor of Korunk, wished to get in touch with him, via László Sándor, and in 1937, Lukács sent some longer essays to Korunk. It is characteristic of him that, when he would not accept royalties for his studies, he wanted, instead, some books, which were not Hungarian books, but Russian classical literature in German translation.59

In 1931, the Hungarian group of the Association of Moscow Proletarian Writers (AMPW—Russian abbr.: MAPP) prepared a draft platform in order to clarify the situation of proletarian literature and mark out its tasks. This draft, in our time, is known as the one that caused Attila József ‘fascist’ plain and simple. Attila József replied to this attack, but his hot-tempered article was published only much later, in 1958. The draft was published in Sarló és Kalapács, where a discussion of the text took place, and the first to contribute was Lukács. It must be made clear that Lukács was not on good terms with the AMPW, and the draft itself blamed him for his activity under the Republic of Councils in Hungary, calling his attitude an idealistic and Hegelian one, and condemning him for establishing, in 1919, the definitive list of writers (the ‘writers register’) and for letting Lajos Kassák and his circle play a leading role. As the draft put it, the whole literary policy of the commissariat was confined to a prolonging of the ‘eternal values’, without selection. Lukács did not reflect on this criticism, containing correct and incorrect elements alike, and neither did he analyze the fundamental line of argument in the draft, but, in his contribution, he picked out the paragraph on the assessment of the past, tradition, and the ‘cultural heritage’. That short passage runs as follows:

The use of the values of the preceding cultures, the question of the so-called cultural heritage must be raised, taking the dialectical materialist principle of art as a starting point. We have to strive to learn in a dialectical way from the classics of the bourgeoisie. What is close to us, besides the products of Russian and German proletarian literature, the writers and the folklore of the bourgeois revolution, is, in the first place, the working method of the French and Russian realist writers. Thus, in Hungarian terms, one can learn from [József] Katona, [József] Eotvös, Pétdfi, [János] Arany, and, from a later period, from [Kálmán] Mikszáth, Bródy, Móricz, etc.60

Lukács regarded this formulation as an ill-advised one, as regards both world literature and Hungarian literature. As for world literature, the draft took into account two trends and three countries, that is, besides the tradition of proletarian literature it named the working method of realism, and it referred to Russian, German, and French literature. Lukács tried to avoid the discussion of the trends by confining the issue to the bourgeois classics, but, by so doing—so as to shun basic debates—he suspended, in a way, the concept of proletarian literature, and treated only realism, thus making one out of the two. From the list of the three national literatures he removed the German as unfit and replaced it with the English. As a justification, he referred to the principle of uneven development, arguing that “the history of the movements of bourgeois revolutions presents a different picture in each country,” and these differences “are reflected in the development of the literatures, again, in different forms”.61 While, in French and English literature, “an outstanding and decisive role was played by revolutionary, socio-critical realism” in Germany the revolutionary, classical period proper was conceived “in the
spirit of idealism", and German realism could develop when, in the second half of the
nineteenth century, the bourgeoisie "gave up all its revolutionary ambitions". Then,
without any social or historical reasoning, he related classical Russian literature to the
French–English model, and compared the Hungarian to the German.62

The voluntaristic nature of the argumentation can be seen at this point: as a derivation
from this typology of world literature, the accents of the interpretation of the Hungarian
classical tradition are very different from those intended by the writers of the platform.
The draft, some lines below the paragraph just quoted, went on record as declaring
Petőfi the most advanced representative of the Hungarian bourgeois revolutionary tradi-
tion and, within the list of his epoch-marking merits, it stressed that it was he who
transplanted the ideas of the French utopian socialism into Hungarian soil. The next
sentence, speaking of Mihály Táncsics, appreciatively referred to him as the Hungarian
Blanqui. Lukács did not mention the name of Táncsics, and he did not stress Petőfi's
utopian socialism; he emphasized, instead, that Petőfi "turned against the trends of com-
promise on plebeian grounds, relying on the ideology of 1793", that is, what he appraised
was not the socialist, but the populist Jacobin.63 As for the positions of Katona, Eőtvös,
and Arany, he suggested that further studies were needed before one could arrive at a
definitive appraisal of their works, but he did not exclude the possibility of including
them in the classical tradition.64

By contrast, he clearly rejected the picture drawn of Mikszáth, Bródy, and Móricz.
Of Mikszáth, he wrote, all that he did was continue Jókai's apologetism. And, what is
more, Jókai's "naive and benevolent apologetism becomes a conscious cynicism" in
Mikszáth's work.65 Móricz glorified the rich peasants and the intelligentsia of kulak
origins and, in so doing, became so corrupt as openly to defend the situation after the
revolution.66 Of the three, perhaps Bródy was the best, but, ultimately, he was no more
than an apostle of the Wekerle era.67 Lukács's contribution to the discussion closed
with a three-point summary. First, he established that 'there is no classic writer in
Hungarian literature after 1867 from whom a proletarian writer could learn'. Then he
reiterated his belief that the period before 1848 has to be scrutinized. And, lastly, he
suggested that "the literature of the earlier periods should be inquired into with a special
cautions", referring partly to the age of the Enlightenment and partly to the populism
before Petőfi.68

It was the first time that Lukács, in a period of his career that he himself considered
a Marxist one, sketched out the outlines of a new Hungarian literary history. Although
it was the very beginning of this period, he had a long path of classical Marxist studies
behind him. The prejudices of his contribution cannot be regarded simply as the exag-
gerations of messianism, thus capable, in a way, of absolving him. But, by the same
token, the historical studies of our own age must also avoid the trap of losing themselves
in details concerning the injustices of this or that irritating judgment of Lukács's. We
cannot and must not lose sight of the essence of the philosophy of history underlying
the argumentation. Thus, there is no use in arguing about Lukács's misreading Móricz,
or about his mentioning precisely the doubtful political stance of Vörösmarty in 1848,
of his entire life and oeuvre. Behind these details there lies the vital issue of cultural
continuity and discontinuity. And the decisive point here is not whether he called Mik-
száth a cynic, but his interpretation of Ady's significance. In fact, the essence of the
whole debate and the contribution itself is illuminated by the consideration of Ady.

The name of Ady occurred twice in the draft platform, first in the context of the
period before World War I, and then in a survey of the literature produced during the
war. His activity before the war was taken, by the writers of the draft, as part of the activity of the Nyugat circle. They noted that Ady “was one of the most revolutionary representatives of the Nyugat writers”, but immediately added, so as to make the appraisal more complete, that “in his ideology, he united the despair, characteristic of the insurrectionist petty noblemen, with the rebelliousness of the radical petty bourgeois, sympathetic with the proletariat as the only revolutionary force.” Later, in the analysis of the period of World War I, they expressed a preference for his ‘militant pacific poems’ over the social democratic literature of the same kind, but failed to mention the deeper significance of his poetry. The draft did not place Ady beside Petőfi, and did not regard his poetry as an asset of the cultural heritage to be followed or made use of. In fact, the lines on his work revealed, if not an opposition, a scarcely hidden reservation. Lukács, however, had started to sketch out, as early as the twenties, the family tree of Hungarian revolutionary literature beginning with the names and intellectual-spiritual kinship of Petőfi and Ady, but now he tried to avoid an overt debate on this issue. He remembered having been labeled as an opportunist in 1929, and he saw himself criticized, precisely in the text in question, as a prolonger of the “eternal values”. He wanted, or perhaps had to prove that he was as radical as the authors of the draft. As we have seen, this ambition was not fruitless. As regards the assessment of the tradition, it was he who proved to be more strict, in each and every point. It was he who restricted the circles, to criticize more sharply, to blame Hungarian literature for lacking a single writer worth learning from—after the Compromise of 1867—and it was he who formulated the statement that “the whole bourgeois literature of the period after 1867 is of an apologetic nature: it is a literature of the ‘Prussian path’ of the bourgeoisie.”

He tried to withdraw Ady from the scope of the anathema, but his attempt was not entirely successful. The title and the subject matter of his polemical essay suggested that he was going to express his opinion only of the Hungarian literature of the past, but Ady was a poet of the recent past, and thus, the words of condemnation did not refer to him. They referred, however, to Móricz, a contemporary of Ady’s—and so this argument does not hold. There is, however, another aspect in the text, involuntary, to be sure, that reveals Lukács’s attempt to save Ady, and this is the inherent logical contradiction of the line of argumentation. The sequence of arguments concerning Ady and Petőfi, which hangs on the mazy thread of a single multiple-compound sentence, involves the impossibility, from the second half of the nineteenth century on, of uncompromisingly criticizing the existing regime from the perspective of the bourgeoisie—a literature filled with the ideas of the bourgeois revolution could not do this. “For Petőfi, on the basis of a general plebeian stance, it was possible” to break with the compromises of his age, but “Ady had to appeal to the proletariat, even if in contradictory forms, when he launched his radical battle against the Tisza regime.” His qualifying phrase, ‘even if in contradictory forms’, referred to the reservations of the draft platform, at the same time weakening their force, as if making a stereotype of it. Ady’s sympathy with the proletariat was, once again, mentioned in the draft, and Lukács used the expression ‘had to’ in order to stress that he himself did not overestimate this sympathy and, accordingly, that he himself did not regard Ady as a proletarian writer either. But Ady’s fight against the Tisza regime was a new element in the argumentation and, what is more, a new fundamental aspect for historical criticism. The whole line of argumentation advanced along the dimension of accepting or refusing compromises, opportunism, and intransigency was a political-ethical point of division, and everything was judged from this perspective. Mikszáth, Bródy, and Móricz were found wanting in this respect. Only
a single writer could stand the test, and it was Ady. What arguments could be employed to classify this intransigent opponent of the Tisza regime as part of the literature of the apologists? And if such a move was not possible, why did Lukács not formulate this unequivocally in his contribution, and why did he not elevate Ady to the level of Petőfi?

The reason was not only caution, not only tactical consideration and self-defence, although these factors may have been among his motives. He did not restore the Petőfi–Ady continuity as a mainstream of tradition of Hungarian revolutionary literature, as a bridge between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, because he now had certain doubts concerning the issue of historical continuity and discontinuity, and although he referred to the principle of uneven development, he had not elaborated its literary historical interconnection. As mentioned, the emotional rejection of society, which was characteristic of him in the tens, was replaced by an essentially unhistorical analogical–allegorical view of history. Lukács’s ideology acquired a genuine view of history only in the thirties, in his Moscow period, when he became acquainted with the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin in a more detailed way, beyond the accidental nature of his earlier encounters with these works. It was in this period that he reflected on the historical materialist ideological demands of the theory of revolution. Already in the twenties he had written of the contradictory nature of the bourgeois revolution and bourgeois development, but he had employed this essential distinction merely in an allegorical and practical way, for the sake of the objectives of the democratic dictatorship, without any deeper contents or sufficient reasoning.

In the thirties Lukács developed genuine historical arguments to explain the aforementioned opposition, and in this endeavor, theories drawn form the works of Marx and Engels as well as from Lenin’s “Two Tactics” served as a basis. According to this theory, the bourgeois revolution is not fought by those who ultimately enjoy its advantages. Rather, it is the plebeian masses who fight it, only to see themselves deprived of its achievements by a Thermidorean reaction, while the bourgeoisie, even despite attempts at a restoration, remains firmly established. This was the theory underlying Lukács’s connecting Petőfi to 1793, and it also furnished the background of his ideological division according to the refusal or acceptance of historical compromises. He regarded the Compromise of 1867 as a kind of Thermidorean turning point or worse, under the conditions of the Prussian way of Hungarian development, and he desired that art should oppose this turn entirely and without reservations. He allowed himself some hesitation only for the writers of the period preceding the revolution, which is why he turned to the first part of the nineteenth century and, further, to the age of the Enlightenment and to the populism beginning somewhere around Mihály Fazekas, as these writers had taken part in the preparation of the bourgeois revolution, even if not from a Jacobin standpoint.

The essence of the theory of literary history implicit in his contribution was that a more or less continuous string of development could be traced from the last third of the eighteenth century to 1848, but that this continuity was broken there after, especially by 1867: after that time, the emphasis had to be laid on discontinuity. The Enlightenment, populism, and the Age of Reform constitute the fundamental triad of his view, which now replaced the earlier continuity of Petőfi and Ady. Lenin’s theory of imperialism could also have contributed to this shift: Lukács tried to situate this line of continuity before the age of developed imperialism, as far as not only Hungarian literature, but the whole of European literature was concerned, with the exception of the Russian classics. Meanwhile, he was aware of Ady’s significance and did not abandon
his earlier opinion of Ady’s poetry, but he could not unambiguously fit it into his developing conception of history and his view of literature, which was then in a state of flux, taking shape on the basis of the former conception. Thus, he left his formulation overtly ambivalent, reflecting his unsettled thoughts on the issue. It was only years later that he found a resolution, in the spirit of the developing popular-front policy.

The fight against fascism overshadowed the theoretical debate of what kind of revolution could overthrow the bourgeois social order and what types of transition could initiate a socialist change. Hence, the alternative of proletarian dictatorship and democratic dictatorship were relegated to the distant future, while the problem of democracy itself came to the fore, in order that a fruitful alliance against Hitlerism might be created. The communists did not give up their own aims in the popular front; rather, guided by a perceptive analysis of the situation, they sought and found a collaboration of a wider scope than would have been needed for a proletarian takeover. The ideology of the popular front raised and elaborated a whole series of categories of transition to justify the logic of the new kinds of decisions within the movement: the history and theory of politics would find abundant material in the debates that blazed up again and again in the course of this tragic half-decade. A tragic half-decade because the alarm-bells of nazi brutality were sounded just when the prisons started to fill with the victims of the purge trials. The history of literature may, even if not ignore, at least accept these categories without detailed analysis and turn instead to the results themselves.

The first issue of Új Hang was published in January, 1938. Its editor was Sándor Barta (who soon became a victim of the trials), and Lukács was one of those listed as principal contributors. Others on this list were Béla Balázs, György Bölöni, Zoltán Fábry, Imre Forbáth, Andor Gábor, József Madzsar, and László Vass. The editorial reflected the ideas of the antifascist popular front, developing and becoming a political trend from 1935:

Új Hang is proud to embrace as a heritage the Hungarian national revolutionary, democratic, liberty-loving literature, the literature expressing, in Tibor’s words, the misery and despair of the oppressed peasants; erecting a monument, in János Arany’s Toldi, to the legendary son of the people; presenting, as a gift, Sándor Petőfi, the genial singer of world liberty and of the national war of independence, to mankind; announcing, in the words of Mihály Táncsics, the fourth order, the proletariat, for the first time; giving our people Endre Ady, the great scourge of the bigoted and corrupt upper classes [...] Új Hang is a review of the Hungarian spirit devoted to liberty, of the entire working Hungarian people.73

Lukács regarded the victory of the policy of the popular front as a confirmation of his “Blum Theses”, and he returned to his concept of alliance, the essence of which began to unfold in his Petőfi–Ady line. With the help of the popular-front ideology, he restored this line of continuity: this ideology made it possible, even necessary to widen the alliance in the present as well as in the past. Lukács did not write of Attila József, but the first volume of the review published two articles on him, correcting (perhaps not entirely, but partly) the earlier errors and signaling a breakthrough in the lack of comprehension. But the authors of these articles were far from a real understanding of the significance of Attila József.76

Lukács started his work on the review with ideological essays, delimiting the concepts of democracy and liberalism, relating them to certain questions of German and Russian literature. He used this pair of concepts as a compass in defining the alternative of antifascism and fascism, and to replace, as it were, the earlier pair of categories, that of bourgeois revolution and bourgeois development, which allowed only for a narrower
and stricter circle of alliance. The new pair of categories, thus, drew a line within bourgeois development. The concept of democracy was completed and interpreted by that of the European humanistic tradition (by which Lukács meant, above all, the Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but without excluding the recourse to earlier ages, to the Renaissance), which was further enlarged by that of populism, as a literature turning toward the life of the people, working up the popular tradition. Lukács, of course, was primarily concerned with principles of content, rather than form. This system of categories and conceptual apparatus—whose rise and development would deserve a separate study—simultaneously provided him with a means to revive his view of Hungarian literature based on Petőfi and Ady, serving the policy of the popular front, and permitted him, in spite of his reservations and grave disagreements, to show a sympathetic interest in the left wing of the populist movement.

Lukács’s first Hungarian literary study appeared in the seventh issue of the first volume, and dealt with Gyula Háy’s play, Have, written in the spirit of the theory of realism. In addition to providing theoretical lessons, the study had symbolic value, too: it served to support the realist writers from among the Hungarian literary exile. The first issue of the second volume contained Lukács’s “Ady, a magyar tragédia nagy énekesé” [Ady, the great singer of Hungarian tragedy], treating the problem of the Hungarian literary tradition, as well as the intellectual kinship of Petőfi and Ady, and the difference between their respective eras. The study was governed by the topical task of searching for alliances, and it emphasized what should be a commonly accepted compromise for all the different intellectual groups opposing the Horthy regime, for populists as well as for urbanists, for Marxists as well as for non-Marxists. Thus, his starting point was the national character with the representation of the fate of the working people, thereby connecting, and, in a way, creating a unity of the twin concepts of ‘national’ and ‘popular’.

His critical treatise on Gyula Illyés was similarly influenced by this search for allies. Even his choice of the subject matter has to be interpreted as an act of ideological emphasis: he praised Gyula Háy as a realist writer of his immediate émigré environment, he used Ady as a pretext to express his opinion on the Hungarian tradition, and, arriving at the present, he turned to Illyés. Illyés’s significance as a writer and his authority as a person were beyond doubt, and to treat a problematic in connection with him, or by means of an analysis of his work, lent a sort of importance to the problematic itself. What did Lukács want? He longed for a solid intellectual left wing, in order to create a possibility for the uncompromising fight for the real interests of the country. He found, instead, two opposing groups tangled up in a fruitless fight, and it was all too apparent that this factional conflict on the left would benefit only a third party, that is, the extreme right. Lukács regarded the restoration of the unity as the principal task, and he himself moved in that direction, although, as we know now, without much success. His idea was not a compromising reconciliation, not a lukewarm, middle-of-the-road solution, but, instead, a united front based on principled foundations. On this level, his ideal was the popular writer, the plebeian writer, of the sort that he saw in Tolstoy, in spite all of the latter’s contradictions, and Illyés was the closest to this type.

Illyés seemed to be beyond (or, rather, ‘above’) the debate between populists and urbanists and not simply outside it, and it seemed that an analysis and criticism of his journalistic writings (called ‘diary entries’) could direct both parties of the conflict toward the correct path. The book in question, Magyarok [Hungarians] was published by Nyugat, and in those years Illyés was the most frequently published poet in the
journal, who served as the right-hand man of Babits in editing it. At the same time, he was an influential personality in the camp of the populists, an incontestable authority in the left wing, which had to be won for the collaboration. He was not popular in the circle of Szép Sző, but his significance was not called into question. Choosing to review Illyés's book was not a capricious idea on Lukács's part: he considered Illyés's role to be a central one in the generations of writers to be mobilized, and, for him, Illyés was the most clairvoyant writer among them. But he described all this by means of negative statements. There is hardly a single sentence without a criticism of Illyés's claims and standpoints, and indeed almost exclusively deficiencies and inadequacies are mentioned. According to Lukács, Illyés slid dangerously toward the right, made major mistakes, committed error after error. This sharply critical tone was demanded by the inherent logic of the ideology underlying the study, as well as by tactical considerations. But behind the words and lines, Lukács provided a special status for Illyés. He did so by emphasizing plebeian democratic literature, using the work of Illyés as an example: he criticized it only in order to ‘transform’ it into what it should be, according to its ideal type.

Beginning in the autumn of 1939, a change took place in the political jargon of the review because, as István Hermann writes:

> In der auf den sowjetisch-deutschen Nichtangriffspakt folgenden Periode zwischen August 1939 und Juni 1941 war eine offene und direkte Kritik des Faschismus—aus taktischen Gründen—in der sowjetischen Presse im allgemeinen nicht möglich. Immer noch möglich war hingegen eine inhaltsbezogene und versteckte Kritik des Faschismus.81

And, we should add, this situation embarrassed the circles of the intelligentsia not only in the Soviet exile, but everywhere in Europe. The change in phraseology was most visible in articles treating general and international subject matter, and it was less evident in the case of articles of minor scope. A characteristic example of this phenomenon was Lukács's “Aktualität und Flucht”, a lengthy, almost obscure, and oracular treatise on war literature, which appeared, in Hungarian, in the third issue of the 1941 volume of Új Hang, as “Aktualitás és menekülés előle” [Actuality and escape from it].

In the preceding years, Lukács had written a book-length study on the nature and ideology of German fascism, and often even the titles of his ‘militant papers’, his pamphlets, had served an agitative purpose, had argued and shown a direction: “Alfred Rozenberg—estetik natsional-sotsializma”, “Der faschistische Mythos der deutschen Literatur”, “Der faschisierte Goethe”, “Der faschisierte und wirklliche Georg Büchner”, “A fasizmus és az irodalomelmélet Németországban [Fascism and literary theory in Germany].82

Now, however, after the nazis had overrun half of Europe, he wrote of the war in this study as if he were contemplating the events from another planet, using, for instance, the expression ‘belligerent countries’, without ever mentioning who was fighting against what and whom, or why. He spoke of an imperialistic war, as if its nature were similar to that of World War I. In his meandering sentences, the term ‘fascism’ did not occur. What is more, he stated: “the central question everywhere, except in the Soviet Union, is capitalism.”83 The study concluded with the alternative of war and peace: ‘socialism means peace, imperialistic capitalism means war.’84 stressing that one should not flee from the reality of the present, from the ‘demands of the day’ (‘Forderung des Tages’).

The bipolar opposition of socialism and capitalism, which he placed in the foreground, was not a sign of the principal task of searching for intellectual allies, characteristic of
Lukács’s earlier writings. It implied, rather, a division and separation, a sharply critical formulation. But the search for allies could not be removed from the agenda, for as far as Hungarian literature and culture were concerned, behind the change of phraseology there was only a change in tactics. Still, there were some touches of the cooler tone, more stress on criticism, and more apparent negation in the Hungarian studies, too.\textsuperscript{85}

As we have seen, until August, 1939 Lukács had laid the emphasis on the fundamental principles of collaboration. Within the form and content of his negative affirmation, he had stressed the affirmative element. From September of 1939 to June of 1941, that affirmation was expressed by a series of more definite negations, the emphasis now falling on the negation. Earlier, the criticism had been intended to further the establishment of unity for action, based on principles and directed against fascism and Hungarian reactionary forces. In the second period, however, his criticism was formulated from the perspectives of the radical, democratic transformation of Hungarian society, essentially of the sort that he had advocated before the fascist war, moreover, as if it had been a question of the general capitalistic-imperialistic structure of European society and policy in the period prior to nazi rule in Germany.

And this had a double consequence. The social scientific and journalistic language—and partly the scope of validity—of the studies and articles written in this period were not restricted by the quotidian, practical tasks of the antifascist fight, and, hence, these writings could be ‘transplanted’ in the period after the defeat of German fascism and the end of World War II relatively easily. On the other hand, after 1945, when these studies became more widely known in Hungary and began to exert their influence, they suggested a more rigid policy of alliance appropriate to the partial suspension of the popular-front policy. Thus, the periodic waves that had been characteristic of Lukács’s works since the “Blum Theses” now continued: he enlarged the circle of alliance when the idea of the popular front and the theory of democracy pertaining to it came to the fore, and narrowed the circle when that idea was pushed into the background. Around the end of the war he could see that these ‘waves’ might produce a harmful disturbance in a period when the winning over of the intelligentsia and the writers would be a major political task. To prevent this, he ruthlessly selected from among his essays when he assembled his volume \textit{Írások felelőssége} [The Responsibility of Intellectuals] in 1944, indicating that the circle of alliance was widening once again.

Between 1940 and 1941 he devoted four long essays to the criticism of the weaknesses of the progressive Hungarian intelligentsia because, in his judgment, distorted ideas had led the left wing in the wrong direction, with the result that not only the present tasks, but future ones, too might be put in jeopardy. First he analyzed the tendency of Szép Szó, then, in conjunction with the debates on the national character, he condemned László Németh’s minority conception. The next step was a sharp criticism of Zoltán Gáspár’s theory of democracy, and, finally, he dealt with the general deficiencies of the populist movement. The four studies are linked by their evaluation of the populist—urbanist conflict. Lukács regarded the whole debate as a tragedy, and set as his goal the theoretical clarification of the origins of this grave conflict, demonstrating the dangerous one-sidedness of both parties. Two of the studies treated the urbanists, the other two, the populists. He did not, however, express his judgment in a reconciling or a balancing ‘fifty–fifty’ way, and neither did he resort to the tactic of ‘one for you and one for you’. Instead, faithful to the conception of alliance as it had originated in the twenties and evolved since then, steadily acquiring new layers of meaning, he tilted slightly in favor of the populists, not because he had fewer words of criticism for them, but out of a
more sincere desire to collaborate with them. No striking bias could be noticed here, and the difference between the two judgments was in fact very slight. It was thus not a distortion of the facts, but rather his principles of plebeian democratism, constantly maturing and developing, that played the most important part in this decision.

While Lukács divided the populist movement into 'good' and 'bad' camps, on the basis of a sharp polarization, he treated the circle of Szép Szó without distinctions, as a homogeneous group, without regard to the ideological differences between Pál Ignotus, Ferenc Fejtő, Géza K. Havas, or Zoltán Gáspár, with whom he argued, without elaborating the various trends of thought within the journal. His approach in this case was all the more surprising, given that the policy of alliance necessarily proceeds from judgments of distinctions referring to persons, and involves not only the establishment of a common aim, but also the selection of a possible set of collaborators. Lukács raised the question of whether the ideologists of Szép Szó "would be followers of Endre Ady and Mihály Károlyi, or of Vilmos Vázsonyi, in a would-be crisis of the Hungarian destiny". But he regarded the circle that idealized bourgeois democracy as a continuation of the latter alternative, and, even if he did not regard them as enemies, he tended to treat them as a negligible element within the list of potential allies.

In the case of the populist movement, by contrast, he laid out a number of tactical oppositions, connecting, for instance, the reforming quality of Móricz with Lajos Zilahy, and contrasting this with the stern ideas of Imre Kovács; in connection with the planned people's high schools, he counterbalanced the ideas of the 'Féja wing' with József Darvas's conception; as a counter-example of the idea of the 'Danish solution', he appealed to Ferenc Erdei, and so on. He included in the circle of alliance Imre Kovács, Darvas, and Erdei, as figures who, though not socialists, "want a more advanced, democratic Hungary". Lukács did not concoct his judgments on the populist movement out of thin air, for he had followed its formation attentively—if not continuously—and what he said was intimately related to his views of the transformation and transformability of Hungarian society. And it also had a connection with Révai's book of 1938. Looking back to these years in 1945, Révai was right to note:

There was a political aim implicit behind the theoretical and literary analysis and criticism, namely, to pave the way for an alliance with them for Hungarian democracy, against fascism. The first to realize immediately the essence of the populist movement were the Hungarian communists, and they were the first to declare that, in populist literature, it was the peasantry that was depicted.

Révai classified even Zoltán Szabó and Gyula Ortutay as part of the wing of 'greater democratic consistency', as opposed to the 'narodnik' trend represented by Péter Veres and Géza Féja. In his book, he several times took issue with László Németh, but did not make him a figure of central significance in his line of argumentation. Lukács, however, chose Németh as his principal adversary, and in his concluding study, he singled out Németh as "the main ideologist of romantic anti-capitalism", who "idealizes the cultural significance of a Hungary full of feudal remnants". Similarly, in his review of Mi a magyar? [What is Hungarian?], a collection of essays edited by Gyula Szekfű, he focused his attention on Németh's pamphlet, Kisebbségben [In Minority], when he discussed the debates on the subject in question. He pointed out that an a priori concept of Hungarian underlies the oppositional pair of 'deep Hungarian' and 'shallow Hungarian'.

The gist of the theory, presented with a great deal of pseudo-profundity, is very poor. What is at stake, in short, is the 'law' of organic development, the problematic nature of literature that is 'made' as opposed to
literature that is organic, that is, the opposition between German or Hungarian literature and French or English literature. The value of this theory is very slight. Not because it was produced by Németh from a store of antiquities, from the polemic of Burke against the French Revolution, from the writings of the German 'historical school', and so on. But because this theory had not been true in the very moment of its birth. The 'made' or 'fabricated' nature is, in reality, hardly as rigid an opposite of national as the revolution is of the organic development. And let us not speak here of the fact that German literature never again became as great, as deeply and genuinely German, as when it was 'made' by Lessing and Herder, Goethe and Schiller.

Then Lukács examined Németh's view of Hungarian history more closely, to point out how Németh connected Burke's ideas and Gyula Szekfú's views on the so-called 'Hungarian Machiavellians' (István Bocskai, Gábor Bethlen) and how he identified this tradition with István Széchenyi and Zsigmond Kemény, and that, hence, Németh was to 'draw the day-dream picture of the 'deeply Hungarian realist' who would solve, inwardly in a Machiavellian way, and outwardly in a conservative populist way, all the problems of the Treaty of Trianon'.

A similar sharp tone characterizes his debate with Zoltán Gáspár, a representative of the urbanist-bourgeois party. In Gáspár's view of history and conception of democracy, Lukács sensed a danger that well-meaning and decent people might slide over to the side of the reactionary forces. Gáspár wrote that when the opposition of democracies and dictatorships was at stake, one should not have forgotten that "in this formula the idea of democracy is what is opposed to the reality of dictatorship." Lukács replied that the ideal democracy, represented by Gáspár,

excluded all struggles of the masses for an expansion or a serious defence of democracy. This 'idea' implied a 'structured' society where all the demands of a bourgeois democracy were set into action, and every party peacefully and amicably respects all the 'rules of the game' of democracy.

And the working masses "realize, more than once, that the flawless functioning of every democratic form would not help them at all". Thus, Lukács condemned Gáspár for advocating a (to his mind) merely formal, bourgeois democracy, instead of a democracy relying on the people, a 'genuine' democracy at once requiring and making possible the participation of the masses.

Although Lukács regarded Németh's theory of 'deep vs shallow Hungarian' as identical with the latter's entire work as a writer and a thinker, he did not identify that standpoint with that of the entire populist movement. Meanwhile, he took Zoltán Gás-

pár's views as a uniform conception of the Szép Szó circle, and the book reinforced Lukács's own belief that the urbanist writers still could play a beneficial role in putting an end to the populist-urbanist debate if they but learned to understand the essence of the Hungarian peasant problem, although in the event of a leftward turn of the society, caution would be needed, in order to prevent their bourgeois orientation from gaining the upper hand.

Lukács thought that separating Németh from the populist movement could deprive the latter of a comprehensive social and cultural ideology. Hence, the populist camp, with its fragmentary conceptions, its varied social propositions of various shades, and with its dissidence and rejection of the domestic policy of the Horthy regime, would resemble an uncompleted house, still lacking the top floor and the roof. With the help of an alliance, recruited from this group, a Marxist theory of democracy could be superimposed on them, and their revolt could, thus, be channeled into a more favorable direction, their activity could be controlled.

What Szép Szó lacked, by contrast, was a solid foundation. It had no relationship with
the masses and, with the exception of a thin stratum of the intelligentsia, it was without roots in Hungarian society. But it started to construct its building from the top down, and the upper levels were already in place—to pull them down promised to be a hard fight. And this hard fight could take up much energy (not from the antifascist battle against Hitler because in this respect the urbanists would remain allies without reservations; in spite of any sharp criticisms, they had no tendency whatsoever toward nazism), energy required in order to win acceptance of the long-term proposition that the country needed a bourgeois democratic revolution, but one surpassing the objectives of bourgeois society. It is hard to decide if Lukács’s caution was justified, and the theory of democracy emerging from the Szép Szó circle is one of the still unexplored territories of the modern ideological history of Hungary, which must be examined more closely in order to arrive at a more detailed critical analysis of it. We must also ask if, in the ideological debates after 1945, there was a connection of principles between these theories and István Bibó’s conceptions, that is, we must ask how isolated this system of ideas later remained and to what extent it became an active power in the coalition period, in the age of multi-party system.

Lukács’s study on Babits occupies a special place among his critical and analytical writings published in Új Hang,97 all the more so, as it did not belong to the populist-urbanist dimension and, furthermore, because it was not simply about publicistic activity, but about belles lettres and even about poetry. It was the first time in decades that Lukács had written such a profound study of a living Hungarian writer, and he was never to equal that achievement, even if we include his later studies on Tibor Déry. The language of the study was not that of his vexed, hectic, polemical essays, but, instead, the calm, objective tone of a scholarly literary study. The sentences were better formed, even a lyrical pathos radiated from those lines, alongside their rational clarity. The circumstances of the genesis of this study deserve a more thorough examination, for one longs to know what Lukács, after so many years of hard struggle, could have felt while reading the book of the adversary of his youth. By no means did he want to take vengeance against Babits, did he seek compensation for the former defeat. Rather, he was deeply moved by the ethical pureness, the noble and great humanity of the writer, then mortally ill. And he was equally seized by the beauty of the works themselves.

It is impossible to fail to note that this tough and relentless ideologist who, in the cruel internecine struggles of the movement (where his life had quite literally been at stake), had conducted whole series of campaigns of aggression as well as defence in terms of the interpretation of certain concepts or on behalf of some qualifer, now chose to forgo the new opportunities to score easy knockouts. If there was a divergence of principles between Lukács and Babits, the latter’s essay, “A tömeg és a nemzet” [Mass and nation] (which appeared in Pesti Napló in 1938, and was not reprinted until 1978, in Babits’s volume, Eszék, tanulmányok [Essays, Studies]), provided a summary. Nevertheless, Lukács did not place this divergence at the center of his analysis—compared to his customary combative jargon, the tone that he sounded at this point was rather subdued. We find but a handful of references to Babits, who ‘wages a two-front war against radical democracy and dictatorship’. And this is really a far cry from what and how he wrote of Németh or Gáspár. The aim of the study was an appreciation, it was written to acknowledge and express gratitude for Babits’s opposition as a writer to the inhumanities of his age. Without any concession in principles, but by a shift of stress, just as in his study on Illyés, the tone of respect and esteem predominates over
the words of criticism and detachment. The method, motive, and style of this polemical essay differ sharply from those of the others written at that time.

There is a virtual superstition, insisted on too often in connection with Lukács's literary studies, that the author felt comfortable only among his abstract philosophical and aesthetic categories and was sensitive only to ideological and political relationships, without having a real sense of literary quality. Clearly, the inspired and beautiful essay on Babits gives the lie to this notion, and moreover, demonstrates Lukács's profound sentiments upon encountering true artistic greatness. Even if he chose not to recount innermost spiritual experiences, instead formulating his thoughts on the level of higher generalizations, it is readily apparent that aesthetic beauty moved him deeply. In the case of this essay, he did not subordinate this faculty to the short-term program of creating ideologies. Hence, the analysis of Jónás Könyve [The Book of Jonah] not only activated his capacity for generalizations, but also proved that he possessed the sensitivity required for close literary analysis, the ability to make subtle distinctions between the different shades and keys of the formulation of the work. The essayist and literary historians of the age, even László Bóka, in his beautiful paper published in the Babits emlékkönyv [Babits Commemorative Volume], analyzed the intimate lyrical tone of the poem, its "solemn, biblical" style. Since then, we know, as memoirs have confirmed, that Babits made fun of some of his own words in writing his poem, that he read some parts of it aloud, laughing. This humor alongside the pathos, the irony alongside the lyrical character was first discovered by Lukács, and he covered both aspects of the work in his analysis. He was the one who first called attention to the fact that the poem itself is full of humorous, tragicomic passages. The subjectively sincere pathos as opposed to these grotesque elements, necessarily consistent with the message itself, together with the pointed humor of the contradictions, provide the special, very individual poetic character of this poem.

The study raised a number of theoretical questions related to the theory of poetry and the history of lyrics, and, as far as its richness in categories is concerned, only his 1951 study on Becher can be compared with it, from among his Marxist works on modern poetry. As regards the history of poetry, it was better and more profound than any of his studies on Ady. Here he raised the theoretical interconnections of objective lyric, the question of poetic reflexivity, the crisis of personality as expressed in modern lyric poetry, and the problem of the 'confined ego'. However, the study cannot be judged on the basis of the fact that the latter concept became, by the end of the decade, using it in a superficial way, almost a slogan, or even a seal to put on decrees of silence for years.

The analysis of Babits was published in the last issue of Üj Hang, for the review no longer appeared after June, 1941. Lukács was arrested on June 29, charged with being a Hungarian police spy working in Moscow. "Es war sehr komisch," he said laconically to Lifschütz after he was released some two months later, owing to the intervention of Becher and Dimitrov. In fact, a kind of deep sense of humor was needed on both sides of the front, not simply in order to survive in that age, but also in order to experience its essence. In their late, spiritual encounter, Babits and Lukács met in precisely this respect. As of the summer of 1941, Lukács accorded the ideological struggle against fascism a heightened priority. This priority was marked by titles such as "Lev Tolstoj, a német kultúra és a fasizmus" [Lev Tolstoy, German culture, and fascism], "Gorkij, az antifasiszta" [Gorky, the antifascist], and by his studies written between 1941 and the spring of 1945. And this thrust was, of course, affirmed by the contents of these
studies as well. Furthermore, as the military defeat of nazism became more apparent, it also became increasingly clear that a turn in the Hungarian destiny was possible, and the sweeping transformation of the country, a dream of so many generations, no longer appeared as a remote utopia: it became an increasingly real task.

During the respective period, an ideological preparation was required in order to fulfil that task. The main lines had been well known since 1935, and the principles formulated within the policy of the popular front showed, unchanged, the proper direction. A continuation of this line remained characteristic of the movement as a whole until 1941, and even until 1945. It is known that Lukács regarded the democratic transformation in this spirit as a strategic kind of task, and not only a transitory, tactical one. Since then, on this issue there have been a number of scientific debates in our country and worldwide. Now, not only Marxist historians, but bourgeois ones, too are inclined to accept the standpoint that the so-called ‘long transition’ as a perspective was indeed a serious and well-considered element in the political philosophy of the Soviet and East European communist parties, which remained valid until the second half of 1947, when the menace of the cold war pushed the French and Italian communists out of the bourgeois governments.102

In 1944, Lukács made a small collection of selected studies, from among his ideological and literary writings that had appeared in Új Hang. It was entitled Írások felelőssége and published by the Moscow Publishing House for Foreign-Language Literatures. Besides his studies on Ady and Babits, it included the analyses of Szép Szó and Illés. The political strengthening of the ideology of the popular front and the theory of democracy was proclaimed by the very nature of the selection: from among the four polemical essays dealing with the populist–urbanist debate, written in 1940–41, Lukács chose only one. Later, in the second (1945) edition of the book, he added to this one his essay dealing with the populist movement, but with considerable changes.103 The two sharpest polemics were not reprinted and, even later, Lukács did not want to publish them in his volume entitled Magyar irodalom—magyar kultúra. Without abandoning his principles, in his 1944 book he wished to take the edge off the criticism. Instead of exclusion and separation, he set as his aim the clarification of the main principles of possible collaboration. The preface of the volume, which displayed both the length and quality of an independent study, served precisely this aim. Regarding the divided nature of the left and the character and ideological causes of the schism, it was the most balanced position that he ever presented, reminding both parties of their increased political responsibility.

He referred to the centuries of social engagement on the part of Hungarian literature, and reminded his readers that, in countries similar to Hungary, where there was not and had never been a tradition of democracy,

literature plays a distinguished role in the actual clarification of ideas, and there is hardly another forum for advocating real democratic ideas, only literature. Apart from some very poor and very brief episodes, the great Hungarian literature, from [Miklós] Zrínyi to Ady or Attila József, raises and solves the great national problems better, more profoundly, and in even more political a fashion, than Hungarian political life itself. This is the eternal glory and strength of Hungarian literature.104

By means of this historical argumentation, he not only affirmed the central significance of the Petőfi–Ady continuity, but significantly enlarged the line of tradition, laying out that continuity of Hungarian literature from which a source of strength for the fight for independence and democracy could be derived, from Zrínyi to Attila József. It was

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the first time that he mentioned the name of Attila József in such a connection. At the same time, he expounded, in a cautious way, the notion that a line of tradition marked out ideologically should not imply any exclusion, and that Dániel Berzsenyi, Vörösmarty, Arany, and Móricz deserved and, indeed, had to find appreciation in literary public opinion, as well as in a contentually novel literary history yet to be elaborated.105

(Translated by György Kálmán)

Notes
1 Gábor Tolnai: “Lukács György és az új magyar irodalomtörténeti irás” [György Lukács and the new historiography of Hungarian literature], Irodalomtörténet (1955)—also in his Örökség és örökségek [Heritage and Inheritors] (Budapest: 1974).
2 Imre Bori: “Lukács György és a magyar irodalom” [György Lukács and Hungarian Literature], Híd (1965) No. 4.
7 Tolnai: Örökség és örökségek, p. 105.
10 Jenő Szűcs: Válasz Európa három történeti régiójáról [A Sketch of Europe’s Three Historical Regions] (Budapest: 1983).
11 See Lukács: “Record of a Life”, in op. cit., p. 32.

Lukács: Magyar irodalom — magyar kultúra, pp. 11–12.


Lukács: Magyar irodalom — magyar kultúra, pp. 54–7.

See Ferenc Fehér: “Bálsz Béla és Lukács György szövetsége a forradalomig II” [The alliance between Bálsz Béla and Lukács György before the revolution II], Irodalomtörténet (1969) No. 3.


Lukács: Magyar irodalom — magyar kultúra, p. 9.

This coalition is mentioned by Ferenc Fehér, in his “Lukács György és Bálsz Béla szövetsége a forradalomig I”, in op. cit., No. 2, p. 328.


Lukács: Magyar irodalom — magyar kultúra, p. 79.

Lajos Fülep: “A magyar nép művésze” [The art of the Hungarian people], A Hét (May 5, 1907)—also in A művészet forradalmától a nagy forradalomig [From the Revolution of Art to the Great Revolution], ed. by Á. Timár (Budapest: 1974).


Lukács: Magyar irodalom — magyar kultúra, p. 67.


Ibid., pp. 843–4.


István Hermann: “György Lukács’s Career from the Theory of the Novel to the Theory of Realism”, in the present volume.


Lukács: Magyar irodalom — magyar kultúra, p. 131.

For example, Gyula Szekfű: “Petőfi-centenárium” [Petőfi centenary], Napkelet (1923) No. 1.

Quoted by Lackó, in his Szerep és mé, p. 100.


Lackó: Szerep és mé, p. 63.

Ibid., p. 52.

Miklós Lackó: “A ‘Blum-téisek’” [The Blum theses], in his Válságok és válaszidézet [Crises and Choices] (Budapest: 1975); “The ‘Blum Theses’ and Lukács’s Conception of Culture and Literature”, in the
present volume; László Sziklai: "A 'Blum-tézisek' nagysága és bukása" [The greatness and fall of the Blum theses], Világosság (1984) No. 4.


55 Ibid., pp. 147–8.

56 Urbán: "Révai József", in op. cit., p. 181.


59 János Szilágyi: "Az emberiség normáinak megfelelően": Lukács György dokumentumok" ['In accordance with the norms of humanity': György Lukács documents], Kritika (1981) No. 8.


61 Lukács: Eztétikai írások, p. 599.

62 Ibid., pp. 599–600.

63 Ibid., p. 66.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., p. 601.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid., p. 602.

68 Ibid., pp. 602–3.


70 Ibid., pp. 433–4.

71 Ibid., p. 435.

72 Lukács: Eztétikai írások, p. 600.

73 Ibid.

74 See ibid., pp. 707–12.

75 Új Hang (1938) No. 1, p. 3.


77 György Lukács: "Háy Gyula új drámai" [New play by Gyula HÁY], Új Hang (1938) No. 3.

78 György Lukács: "Ady, a magyar tragédia nagy énekesé" [Ady, the great singer of Hungarian tragedy], Új Hang (1939) No. 1—also in his Magyar irodalom — magyar kultúra. This number of Új Hang was edited to the anniversary of Ady's death, in the spirit of the renewed cult of Ady. The number was introduced by two poems of Ady, "Szerencsés exzendirő kívánok" [I wish a successful year], and "Úlj törvényt, Werböczy" [Sit in judgment, Werböczy], which were followed by Lukács's essay and three other poems, "Nagy lopások bűne" [The sin of great thefts], "Sipja régi babonának" [The whistle of old superstition], and "Utálatos, szerelmes náción" [My hateful and amorous nation]. Among other literary works (e.g., Hemingway's short story), we can find two further Ady poems, "Az halottas űnnep" [The funeral feast], and "Beteg szárudokért lakolva" [Doing penance for ill centuries].

79 For a more detailed account, see Zoltán Kenyeres: "Lukács Adyóról!" [Lukács on Ady], in his A lélek fényűzése [The Splendour of the Soul] (Budapest: 1983).


82 Lukács's ideology historical work, Wie ist die fashistische Philosophie in Deutschland entstanden?, also belongs to this period.


84 Ibid., p. 27.

85 Not only in Lukács's writings and not only in relation to Hungarian literature. Új Hang began the serial publication of Révai's essay on Ady in 1940, No. 9, which, in contrast to Lukács's essay of 1939, insisted strongly on the reservations, practically turning down the Ady cult.

86 György Lukács: "Harc vagy kapituláció?" [Fight or capitulation?], Új Hang (1940) No. 2—also in his Magyar irodalom — magyar kultúra.

87 György Lukács: "Prolog vagy epilog? [Prologue or epilogue?], Új Hang (1941) No. 2—also in his Magyar irodalom — magyar kultúra.

89 Ibid., pp. 71, 133.
90 Ibid., pp. 86—7, 109—11, 117.
91 Lukács: Magyar irodalom — magyar kultúra, p. 240.
93 Ibid., p. 14.
94 György Lukács: "Magyar demokrata történetírás és a modern demokráciák története" [Hungarian democratic historiography and the history of modern democracies], Új Hang (1940) No. 10, p. 27.
95 Ibid., p. 30.
96 Ibid., p. 25.
98 László Bóka: "Az utolsó nagy múd" [The last great work], in Babits emlékkönyv [Babits Commemorative Volume], ed. by Gy. Illyés (Budapest: 1941).
99 Lukács: Magyar irodalom — magyar kultúra, p. 263.
100 Lukács: "Record of a Life", in op. cit., p. 115.
101 We have to mention another work which he wrote in the winter of 1941—42, when he lived in evacuation in Tashkent, and which appeared only recently: Wie ist Deutschland zum Zentrum der reaktionären Ideologie geworden?, ed. by L. Sziklai (Budapest: 1982).
102 Keith Kyle: "A different Eastern Europe?", The Listener (October 18, 1984), p. 28.
103 Some elements of how Lukács reshaped "Prológ vagy epilóg?": he left out sub-titles which emphasized his criticism with striking words, e.g., "Németh László és a Nyilaság" [László Németh and the arrow cross]. On p. 240 of Magyar irodalom — magyar kultúra, he left out a longer passage between the last two paragraphs, and inserted a new passage between the last paragraph of p. 241 and the last paragraph of p. 242. The essay mentions Hitler by name only once, which can be found in this insertion.
104 Lukács: Magyar irodalom — magyar kultúra, p. 272.
105 Ibid., p. 284.
"Return Home with Hopes"

by

János Ambrus

"Individual participation, etc. here: position on literary problems: to put up with. Here even discussion—given the necessary caution—possible."

György Lukács, when applying for a chair in philosophy at Heidelberg University in 1918, as Georg von Lukács, could hardly have foreseen that he would get one at the University of Budapest some thirty years later, in recognition of his affinities with the 'intellectual sciences' before he became a Marxist.

In the autumn of 1945, Tivadar Thienemann, the leading authority on intellectual sciences in Hungary and the former editor of *Minerva*, recommended that the Faculty of Fine Arts of the University of Budapest grant a lectureship to Lukács, whom he described as the most 'eligible' among all the candidates. As Thienemann wrote:

I have had no opportunity to study the works that he wrote in exile. One of them discusses Lenin, another is entitled *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*, and both were published by the communist Malik-Verlag. The one attempts to elevate Lenin's theory to a metaphysical sphere—an endeavor flatly rejected by the communist party. In *History and Class Consciousness* he strove to add a metaphysical dimension to historical materialism [...], and drew harsh communist censure. His communist critics claimed that György Lukács was a late advocate of Hegel's philosophy of spirit, rather than that of historical materialism. László Rudas, his most rigorous critic, published his views in *Arbeiter Literatur* [...] Gentlemen! I know little of and cannot assess Georg Lukác's literary accomplishment in exile. I know, however, his earlier career. He was a friend of Thomas Mann's, and a preeminent advocate of the German philosophy of spirit. I earnestly recommend [...] inviting him to the Department of Aesthetics and Cultural Philosophy.²

Thienemann's commendatory words show his tactical ability and, indirectly, the fears and reservations of a considerable segment of the Hungarian intelligentsia toward the early endeavors and gradual ascent of the communist party, and Marxist theory and ideology. In autumn of 1945, Lukács could join the Budapest Department of Aesthetics only in the—obsolete—guise of the German philosophy of spirit.

He was not to wear it for long.

Lukács returned to Hungary in August, 1945, after more than twenty-five years in exile. As he put it later:

my return home in 1945 in no way looked like the coincidence to which I owed my presence in Hungary during the 1918 revolution. On the contrary, this was a fully conscious decision in favor of returning home against concrete offers attracting me to places where German was spoken.³
The decision had both external and internal, that is, intellectual motivations. Let me stress two factors in this connection.

In the second half of the thirties Lukács turned to philosophical issues and wrote *The Young Hegel* and other works.⁴ He came to consider aesthetics an inevitable detour on the way to making himself and the reading public conscious of the philosophical problems of the period of transition, the Thermidor of socialist revolution. He was probably looking for a country where social conditions were fit for grappling with philosophical issues, and Hungary was apparently such. He expected a period in which his theoretical contribution would be welcome,⁵ for Hungary was to retain bourgeois constitutional forms, and the motor of social development was a strong left wing. It was on the threshold of a gradual transition to socialism—a perspective that Lukács favored.

He wrote in a letter to Mikhail Lifschitz in April, 1945:

> I have recently come to the conclusion that the statement that Marx made following the revolution of 1848, namely, that the democratic republic is a stable form of government only in the United States and just a transitional form in Europe, has not been fully borne out by the events. We can, of course, consider today's democracy as transient, yet if a transition is to last for ten to twenty years, it necessarily has some static features.⁶

Others shared Lukács' view. The communist party, for instance, charted the political line to be followed in Hungary in broad terms in Moscow in autumn, 1944. During the conference, which Lukács attended, and in which the party's targets were defined, József Révai considered the idea of the party working outside the government, in opposition.⁷

Following the adoption of the popular front policy after the seventh Comintern congress (1935), Lukács' works were reinterpreted—another circumstance that made Hungary attractive for him. After the congress, it was no longer sensible to condemn the "Blum Theses", in which Lukács had ruled out an immediate transition to a dictatorship of the proletariat, and called for the establishment of a republic and a democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants. Lukács disclosed in his later reminiscences that, in a private conversation of the time, Révai described the theses as a 'precursor' of the seventh congress.⁸ There was a turn in the party's relation to Lukács after 1929. He had had to engage in public self-criticism following the row over his theses, and found himself outside the reelected Central Committee in 1930. His ties with the party and its leaders thereupon became informal, and he worked now as a member of the Soviet, now of the German Communist Party. After the adoption of the popular front policy he could join the editorial staff of the antifascist journal *Új Hang* and was readmitted to the Hungarian party in April, 1941.

Lukács was still in Moscow in April, 1945, when he received a letter of congratulations from the Hungarian Communist Party, on his 60th birthday and word that, as a candidate of the party, he had been elected a deputy to the Provisional National Assembly.⁹ He wrote in a letter a few days later:

> I hope that my election as a deputy is the high point of my political career. I cannot, of course, be quite certain of that. And the more I have to work as a politician, and not a scholar, in Hungary, the less chance I shall have to realize the dreams that I cherished in Vienna, let alone [...] to do genuine research.¹⁰
He left Moscow in low spirits, both because he had inside information about Soviet political life and was at the close of an eventful period of his life, in which he had produced several noteworthy works. He wrote to Anna Lesznai from Budapest:

In Moscow I had a good time that I could never experience before. After unending daily engagements in Vienna and Berlin, it was a novel thing to be able to pursue my research aims [...]. A militant journal was launched soon after my arrival, of which I became a senior staff member from the start. Later on I became very good friends with three people from that circle. In fact, one of them became as intimate a spiritual companion as no one else since the death of Leo Popper [...]. This does not mean, of course, that the whole period was marked by tranquility. On the contrary. There were major polemics over the questions of literature and literary theory. I was subjected to criticism several times. But, all in all, I can describe my life in Moscow as rather enjoyable.  

I am quoting such a long passage from the letter because it shows the thorough impact of the decade in exile in the Soviet Union on the new stage in Lukács’s career. There is no demarcation line between his work before 1945, the liberation of Hungary, and after it. The historical turn and the subsequent social changes merely created new conditions and transitional forms. Lukács exerted a decisive influence on Hungarian intellectual life in 1945—50 comparable only to that of József Révai due to a special instance of historical asynchronicity. Works that he wrote both before and after 1945 became available to the Hungarian intelligentsia at the same time. It is enough to think of works like Balzac, Stendhal, Zola, which gave rise to a controversy, Nagy orosz realisták [Great Russian Realists], Goethe and His Age, Nietzsche és a fasizmus [Nietzsche and fascism], The Historical Novel, Essays über Realismus, and Marx és Engels irodalomélélete [The Literary Theory of Marx and Engels].

12 to realize that the sources of what was at that time described as Lukács’s ‘intellectual preparedness’, and of the impact that his works had at home and abroad in the postwar years were to be found in the (mainly aesthetic) writings of the thirties. In fact, Lukács’s output down to 1949 (or even Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, 1963) cannot be assessed correctly without knowing the works that he wrote in the Soviet Union.

In the first half of the thirties, after he stopped working as a politician, Lukács had to face the socio-political aspects of socialism in one country and the advance of fascism, whose followers had come to power in Germany. In the theoretical field, he had to grapple with the philosophical legacy of Hegel and Marx. The practical and theoretical issues that he had to come to grips with affected vital world historical questions of the era. Lukács’s passage to resolving these problems was not a straight avenue: he could not help committing the mistakes made by the communist movement. Tenets such as the idea of overthrowing fascism by a proletarian revolution in Germany, or the view that the social democratic movement was a wing of fascism, hindered Lukács in finding the right answers. His views were not free from contradictions, and he had relapses on the way to arriving at correct conclusions. Suffice it to say that he who in 1929 had defined the strategy of the Hungarian Party of Communists and proposed the establishment of a democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants, in the early thirties came to espouse a mistaken approach of the communist movement, namely, to reduce the socio-political problems of the time to the choice: fascism or bolshevism.

Some of his writings, however, anticipated his later theoretical position. One of them, written in 1934, runs as follows:

Marx grasped the dialectic of capitalism in a most complex manner. He recognized that the massive and fearful process that wrecked and enslaved millions of people, shattered all old idyllic forms, dissected man,
and turned the world into a warehouse and marketplace, is, at the same time, of a revolutionary significance in creating the material preconditions of a genuine revolution.\textsuperscript{13}

After the popular front policy gained general currency, he gave full elaboration to his important idea, namely, that, although bourgeois society is full of contradictions, its contradictions are those of progress. This conception enabled Lukács to make his analyses of tendencies in bourgeois society and culture more differentiated, and consistently to conceptualize the consequences that an alliance with the progressive and radical advocates of bourgeois democracy would have for artistic theory. He was convinced that, under the world historical conditions of the time, an alliance between the progressive representatives of bourgeois democracy and the forces of socialism would open up a lasting perspective of historic and strategic importance. It is particularly in this sense that classical German philosophy and literature, and the progressive literary works of England, France, and Russia become the starting point and historical basis of Lukács’s aesthetic investigations and theory of realism. He came to the habit of referring to Goethe, Balzac, Tolstoy, and Stendhal as great realist writers because that was his historically-philosophical response to the world historical challenges of the era, and not because he was conservative or biased, as some of his critics would allege. Lukács described realist writers as the allies of democracy and, after 1945, he considered realism as the appropriate literature of the emerging new democracy.

My brief survey of Lukács’s life and work before 1945 can, I hope, show why readers found it difficult to understand his works when they were published in Hungarian, one after the other in rapid succession. Since old and new works came out side by side, readers who were not familiar with the sources and historical conditions of Lukács’s aesthetic theory, and the environment in and for which his earlier works were written, often overlooked certain implicit aspects of these works.\textsuperscript{14}

3

In Hungary Lukács was assigned the role of a scholar who is active in public life. He did not work for the governing bodies of the party, yet his international renown, philosophical erudition, and expertise as a Marxist theorist destined him to assume a major role in shaping and popularizing communist culture and policy toward the intelligentsia. In addition to working as a university professor, he helped to reorganize the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and restart the work of the Society for the Social Sciences and the National Council for Public Education. He served on the editorial board of Társa-dalmi Szemle, and the Forum was edited in his apartment for some time. He was chairman of the reorganized Society for Literary History and a member of the Endre Ady Society of Debrecen. His visits to Geneva, Rome, Paris, Milan, Weimar, Berlin, and Wroclaw attracted international attention and comments. He delivered numerous papers between 1945 and 1947 at the university, on the radio, in various organizations of the party, at the party’s political academy, in students’ residential halls, and at meetings held by the Hungarian-Soviet Friendship Society, in the capital and elsewhere.

The papers included in Irodalom és demokrácia [Literature and Democracy]—which later provoked a major controversy—were written for special occasions between 1945 and 1947. He delivered most of them at meetings that were organized by the party, and they were written with due consideration of the party’s cultural policy. “Lenin és a
kultúra kérdései" [Lenin and the problems of culture] was the introductory lecture in a meeting organized by the Hungarian–Soviet Friendship Society on January 23, 1946, to commemorate the anniversary of Lenin’s death. “Irodalom és demokrácia I” [Literature and Democracy I] and “Népi írők a mérlegen” [Populist writers in the balance] were delivered at the political academy of the party (January 26, and March 2, 1946); “Párt-költészet” [Party poetry] was delivered in the national headquarters of the party on December 2, 1945; “A magyar irodalom egysége” [The unity of Hungarian literature] incorporates the contributions Lukács made at the start and at the close of the debate at the congress of Hungarian writers in Debrecen on June 27 and 28, 1946; and “Szabad vagy irányított művészet?” [Free or controlled art?] was delivered as part of a party-organized series of lectures on questions of literature and art in Fészek Club, on March 30, 1947.

What motivated Lukács to publish these writings once again, this time in book form? (The preface was written in April, 1947, and the volume published during Book Week, in early June.) In order to find an answer, we have to look at the socio-political processes and circumstances that determined domestic policy at that time. In the second part of 1946, following the opening of the peace conference in Paris on July 29 and measures taken to consolidate the economy (the forint, the new currency, was introduced on August 1), the domestic political situation reached a turning point: conditions of the country’s economic and political independence began to materialize. At that time, the social and political developments since 1945 were assessed, and decisions made about the political course that the country should follow. The Independent Smallholders’ Party envisaged the future of people’s democracy, in the form of a bourgeois–peasant alliance. The Hungarian Communist Party, at its third congress (September 29—October 1, 1946), described people’s democracy as a stage of development that opens up the way toward socialism in a peaceful way, without the dictatorship of the proletariat. The party expected a long period of democratic transformation, in which big capital would be constrained and the people guided toward socialism by an alliance of the left-wing forces within the coalition government. Irodalom és demokrácia was published to promote the endeavors of the communist party and propagate this interpretation of people’s democracy and related cultural-political aims.

Lukács identified himself with this line in an address to the congress. As he put:

If we intend to propagate Marxism in the ranks of the intelligentsia, we shall have to make a turn in our work. We have to stop using stereotypes and overusing quotations as well as putting on airs [...] If we want to succeed, we have thoroughly to understand the genuine needs of the intelligentsia and start out from them. We have to learn to propagate Marxism not as a dogma, but, instead, as a lively response to acute and painful challenges [...] We should not confine Marxism to being a tool to criticize erroneous bourgeois views. Marxism should enter the era of construction and prove that nothing else can give the best response to the questions of Hungarian history and culture.

It is by no means accidental that Lukács chose “Demokrácia és kultúra” [Democracy and culture] as the opening piece of the volume, and “A magyar irodalom egysége” as the closing one. He proceeded from general issues (the state of democracy after the war, the relation between culture and democracy in bourgeois democracies and in people’s democracies, etc.) toward (literary) unity, which he interpreted as a possibility, a target to be pursued, and a perspective that transcends literature and affects the whole of world view. The pieces are not placed in chronological order, but, instead, are arranged to convey the author’s conception. The first sentences of “Demokrácia és kultúra” show that the opening stage of the process was consensus. As Lukács put it:

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In order to understand the new situation, it has to be realized that a new, democratic culture is emerging all over Europe, without its being accompanied by a change in the material basis of society, the capitalist economic order [...] it is a harmful [...] and paralyzing utopia, one that confuses the democratic self-consciousness of the masses, to speak of socialist culture as long as the capitalist economic order exists.¹⁸

In “Lenin és a kultúra kérdései” Lukács described concrete cultural processes to illustrate the Leninist dialectic of the relation between old and new.

In subsequent pieces of the volume, Lukács focused his analysis on questions of literature and democracy, populist literature, the freedom of the writer, and partisanship. By the end of the volume, he reached a new generality of the unity of Hungarian literature through a series of concrete individual problems. It is understandable, therefore, that when technical problems emerged at the printer’s office concerning the order of the pieces, Lukács insisted on retaining the order that he had originally assigned. As he put it: “These corrections must be made by all means. The order of the articles is a political question.”¹⁹ The order of the pieces had political significance not directly, but in terms of the way the problems were tackled. That the order did have political importance was borne out especially by the debate that it later provoked.

The way the volume was received in 1947 was highly indicative of the social and political conditions of the time. ‘It is the Bible of tolerant Marxism,’ a critic wrote. Indeed, the polemic did not start at that time, but later, after its second edition appeared in 1948.

What lent topicality to a second edition? Lukács’s works have been published in several editions (especially in those years). The repeated publications were always connected with the rapidly changing conditions in the political and ideological sphere, and the works themselves became part of those processes. The second edition of Irodalom és demokrácia was connected with the changes taking place following the merger of the two parties and the reformulation of the policy of alliances of the Hungarian Working People’s Party. At the June 12—14, 1948 joint congress of the communist and social democratic parties, in which the merger was finalized, the ‘independence front’ to be established was defined as a mass organization of popular unity, instead of a coalition of parties. As Máté Rákosi put it in his report to the congress:

Conditions are ripe for the reorganization of the independence front in the form of a unified mass organization. The new independence front will become a unified mass organization of the alliance of the workers, peasants, the intelligentsia and other working people. For that reason it should include, in addition to the democratic political parties, also the major social organizations of the Hungarian people: the trade unions, cooperatives, and the organizations of the women and young people.²⁰

After the Communist Information Bureau condemned the Yugoslav party in June, it became unrealistic to think of the implementation of a popular front model of this—Yugoslav—version. At that time, however, it was not yet illusory to think of the establishment of a state that would be adjusted to Hungarian characteristics and would have socialist orientation, a multi-party and people’s democratic character. Lukács’s work can be associated with the policy proclaimed during the June congress of the two parties, the type of policy of alliance declared on that forum. In such a situation, the publication of the second edition was a sort of taking sides in favor of a socio-political process that keeps an eye on its perspectives, but defines the several stages and pace of the passage toward socialism after considering the real social balance of power.
The correct question is, therefore: if we related the first and second editions of Irodalom és demokrácia to political and cultural political considerations, what was the political motivation behind the fact that Lukács, who used to be a celebrated author, came under fierce attack in 1949?

Discussing the “Blum Theses”, Miklós Lackó points out that Lukács has “always considered questions of daily policy in connection with general theoretical issues, and has aligned them with his intellectual development”.21 When Lukács juxtaposed popular front policy with his theory of realism—a method that he regarded as valid and historically sound even after 1945—he followed the above-mentioned procedure of treating political matters as strategic affairs, and as general problems of world history.

In September, 1946, Lukács participated in a conference of intellectuals, the Rencontres Internationales de Genève, whose central theme was the ‘new Europe’. In his contribution to the deliberations, entitled “Aristokratische und demokratische Weltanschauung”, he discussed the roots of the crisis, writing that its particular, barbarian, and inhuman solution was fascism.22 Lukács found the historical source of this crisis in the French Revolution, whose victory, in his view, opened up the way for “the economic basis of modern bourgeois society, capitalism, with its explicit contradictions and concrete historical conditions”.23 As far as ideas are concerned, this victory meant the realization of the tenets of the age of Enlightenment and also the refusal thereof. Lukács traced the cause of the crisis of bourgeois democracy to the crisis in the wake of the French Revolution.

Analyzing this crisis, Lukács pointed out that the movements that attempted to overcome this crisis represented the highest manifestations of political, social, and ideological efforts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: Jacobinism, revolutionary democracy, and socialism. Lukács found the future of a new Europe in an alliance of democracy and socialism. As he put it: “The genuine struggle for peace must renew the essential substance of 1941: the alliance of socialism and democracy.”24 Lukács considered the emergence of the antifascist coalition as a high stage of the popular front policy, its extension to international dimensions, “which will offer new possibilities for a political, social, and ideological renaissance of democracy, never experienced before”.25 The possibility that Lukács was speaking of was indeed a realistic option. By the mid-forties the Soviet Union, a victor of World War II, which was stronger after the war than before, had managed to overcome the international isolation it had to endure for many decades. The results of the conferences in Potsdam and Yalta, the foreign-policy orientation of the neighboring countries of people’s democracy, the gains and subsequent victory of the revolution in mainland China, all offered an opportunity for the Soviet Union to readjust its political practice of what has become known as socialism in one country. It can therefore be concluded that the continuation of the policy of alliance, as outlined by Lukács, cannot be considered a mere utopia.

This conclusion applies particularly to Hungary. Irodalom és demokrácia is clear evidence of the fact that, after his return to Hungary, Lukács reacted sensitively to the special characteristics of social developments in Hungary. Let me offer an example: Lukács at that time repeatedly considered the question of whether the development of Hungary after 1945 was organic. “In Hungary, the Liberation was not the result of a revolution,” Lukács pointed out in his article “Irodalom és demokrácia”.26 It was not Lukács’s aim to stress this fact in order to condemn his nation, which at that time was
described by many as 'fascist', 'guilty', and 'suffering from a collective sense of guilt'. On the contrary, he emphasized that point with an eye to the future development of the country. He was of the view that, in Hungary, the absence of a revolution and of popular resistance rendered the transformation of the world view of the people incomplete. He attached special significance, in terms of social development, to the guerrilla warfare against German occupying forces in, for instance, France and Yugoslavia because, he argued, it gave rise to the social conditions of a democratic development.

Today the conditions, both in terms of economy, society, and power, are such that the heroic struggle of the working people to stamp out fascism should result in more than bringing about a period of transition to the restoration of pre-war formal democracy. Today the conditions are present, so that the people, which was fighting and reached victory in these struggles alone [...] should retain and consolidate its rule without imparting a socialist form to this rule. This is today the central issue of the situation of democracy in Europe. In brief: it is the question of creating a new type of people's democracy.27

I have hereby touched on a central problem of the work under discussion and the related controversy that it provoked: namely, Lukács's conception of democracy. It is clear from the preceding passages that, for Lukács, the organic road for the development of Hungary was people's democracy, that is, not yet following the socialist road, but moving toward the perspective of socialism. At several points, Lukács's view of a new democracy is closely connected with his criticism of bourgeois (formal) democracy. In bourgeois democracy, Lukács argued, the social and political aspects of the individual's life, his activities in public forums, are the privilege of a narrow segment of society. Whereas private life in bourgeois democracy is real, the civic matters and the public affairs are abstract: the individual is isolated. For this very reason, discussing people's democracy, Lukács emphasized the democratic aspects of everyday life. Lukács put forward the view that Lenin's criticism of formal democracy can be applied, in the course of building the new people's democracy,

in order to solve concrete problems of that democracy which, although it has not cancelled the capitalistic character of production, has set the aim of not just endowing the working intellectuals, the workers, and the peasants with the right to freedom and equality in a formal sense, but, granting them institutional guarantees that they should be able to exercise these rights in key questions of their everyday lives.28

With this train of thought, Lukács has arrived at the problems of direct democracy. He is, of course, aware that representative democracy has in the course of history supplanted direct democracy, and that the evolution of factory industry has rendered the democracy of the citizens' meetings of the democracy of ancient Athens illusory. He considers, however,

entirely mistaken the allegedly empirical experience originating from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that such a conclusion would be tantamount to a full and institutional cancellation of the principles of direct democracy. On the contrary, the development of affairs are following the direction—simultaneously with the systematic institutional and social upgrading of the political consciousness of the masses—that an increasing section of the state, social and cultural life should come under the influence of the direct initiative, guidance, and control of the masses concerned.29

Lukács argues in his article that, though economic backwardness and the political consequences of the influence of extreme right-wing political endeavors during the war prevented an immediate breakthrough, people's democracy will, in the long run, give rise to the permanent, organic, and organized participation of the masses in social life
and "will once again encourage the blossoming of direct democracy as a life principle".

In *Irodalom és demokrácia*, Lukács made it a point to give a historical discussion of the problematic of democracy. He pointed out that direct democracy and the democracy of everyday life are both closely connected with the *hic et nunc* of the historical process. The target of Lukács's criticism was not representative democracy in general, and he never unconditionally affirmed direct democracy. Given the capitalistic conditions of his time, he emphasized the social dangers of a "full and institutional elimination" of direct democracy. (It would, of course, be a one-sided interpretation to state that, in emphasizing the need for direct forms of democracy, Lukács confined his criticism to the manipulative economic and political practices of capitalism, although they bore the brunt of his criticism. It is, however, not the right place to examine to what extent Lukács's statements touched on questions of the political mechanism of the Stalinist period.) Lukács considered representative democracy as a necessarily evolving historical phenomenon. Several times in this work he underscored the point that the development of factory industry rendered these forms a dominant moment of the political life of society. On the other hand, the elements of direct democracy (their survival, the social sway and consequences of their importance, etc.) chart the historical direction of progress. Lukács was far from finding an evident relationship between direct democracy and non-formal democracy, yet he treated the democracy of everyday life as a pivotal question of the socialization of the individual and the humanization of society.

What has been said so far indicates that the way Lukács interpreted democracy was equivalent with, and presupposed a consistent application of the popular front policy. His point of departure included both the international and national conditions, the historical significance of the antifascist coalition, and the characteristics of historical development in Hungary. His interpretation of democracy was plebeian. He supposed a gradual transition to a higher stage of social development, and emphasized the need for a special road toward the building of socialist society, one that had its origin in real processes.

The conditions and methods of the public debates are telling in every era. The very name of such a debate can be meaningful, the way such a polemic is referred to in the ideological and intellectual histories of an era. It is in this sense that the name of the polemic with Lukács is symptomatic. Both the journalists and the public mind of the time and, by now, the literary historians have come to prefer the name 'Lukács debate' over the term 'literary debate'. The term 'literary debate' is, undoubtedly, too general and offers little orientation in terms of literary history. It should not be forgotten, however, that in the course of the debate—even though they were familiar with the terms 'Lukács debate' and 'Rudas—Lukács debate'—Révai and Lukács themselves used the expression 'literary debate'. In fact, they used the latter term in the title of their relevant articles ("Megjegyzések irodalmunk néhány kérdéséhez" [Remarks on some questions of our literature]—written by Révai—and "Következtetések az irodalmi vitából" [Conclusions concerning the literary debate]—by Lukács).

The use of this or that term was motivated by differences in outlook. The term 'literary debate' referred to a broader context, in which questions of the life-work of Lukács are
treated as a subordinate problem of the general affairs of literary life as a whole. The approach associated with Révai emphasized moments other than the personal ones, which was also brought home by the composition of his article. He considered Lukács by way of an example, and he strove to assess Lukács, taking literary life as a whole as his point of departure. The term ‘Lukács debate’, however, which gained currency after Márton Horváth had used it in an article in the daily Szabad Nép, was the expression of quite another manner of reasoning. Lukács himself was at the center of attention, and emphasis was laid on the subjective moments of the mistakes and errors he allegedly committed. For the followers of Horváth’s approach, the objective contradictions of the beginnings of an over-rapid development, at that time referred to as a turnabout and a ‘leap forward’, assumed the form of mistakes by individuals. This approach in itself suggested possible ways of ‘overcoming’ these contradictions.

In order to pinpoint the political antecedents of the debate, it is relevant to consider the period preceding the merger of Hungary’s two workers’ parties. On March 7, 1948, Szabad Nép carried an article on questions of theory by Mátyás Rákosi. Rákosi warned that the party was behind as far as theoretical work was concerned, and that the ‘new facts of life’ were posing the danger that ‘in the foreseeable future our party’s Marxist–Leninist standards will further decline.’ Rákosi ascribed this danger to the massive transfer of social democrats, peasants, and intellectuals to the party. As he put it: “In a matter of just a few months, the unified party will include hundreds of thousands of former social democratic comrades who will be justified in demanding that we acquaint them with the Leninist–Stalinist theory.” Rákosi’s aim was apparently to close the ranks of the party prior to the merger, and his arguments reflect that he misinterpreted the relation of social democrats to Marxism. More important is his remark in the same article concerning the theoretical works of communist authors who claimed to be Marxists. Rákosi wrote:

Társadalmi Szemle, the theoretical journal of our party, has to strive more than ever to carry as many as possible theoretical articles instead of ones that merely inform. The journal should bring under criticism especially those works that claim to be Marxist and which, though written by our comrades, often comprise grave theoretical errors.

Rákosi’s emphasis on the need to raise theoretical standards merits our attention both because it constituted the kernel of Rudas’s arguments, and because it was a ‘theoretical formulation’ of a political practice, which in its extreme form appeared only later. Namely, provided that the enemies of the party, the political opposition, need to be exposed within the party, then the theories that prove to be harmful, hostile, and inadequate to promote the party’s tactical aims should also be sought within it, especially among its theorists.

The response to Rákosi’s appeal came as early as the April-May issue of Társadalmi Szemle (i.e., immediately). László Rudas wrote a review of Béla Fogarasi’s Marxismus és logika [Marxism and Logic] (1947), entitled “Elméleti színvonalunk emeléséért” [To raise our theoretical standards]. Rudas’s article, which both in its title and introduction identified itself with the above-mentioned article by Rákosi, was an archetype of the one in which he attacked Lukács, in terms of both method and conclusions. Rudas’s article transcended the realm of theory: it was the outwore of a process whose high point was the trial of László Rajk. Rudas made arbitrary use of the sources he referred to, and, in fact, the function of his review was the political condemnation of Fogarasi’s work, rather than its critical consideration. Fogarasi’s response confined itself to chal-
lenging the factual content of some of Rudas’s arguments, but it also shed light on the ideological consequences of his reviewer’s method. Rudas exchanged the relationship of conflict and contradiction for that of antagonism and contradiction, Fogarasi wrote, with the

definite aim of diverting attention from the true significance of a statement by Lenin, to which comrade Zhdanov has called the attention of, for instance, philosophers. Namely, that contradictions do not vanish even under socialism, and that it is the task of philosophy and the social sciences to explore these contradictions.36

Fogarasi’s response remained unpublished. An open ideological and political polemic between party members would not have served internal political unity in the months preceding the merger of the two workers’ parties. Moreover, from the point of view of domestic press affairs, the very person of Fogarasi, who was at that time editor-in-chief of Társadalmi Szemle, made it impossible to escalate the debate. The answer to the question why the affair did not become the debate of the era was that a theorist with a firmly established reputation was needed for the regime to adequately illustrate the ‘decisive turn in the realm of ideology’. Furthermore, owing to the uneven development of the forms of consciousness, an affair related to literature and the arts was a more suitable field for such a debate than (logical) philosophy, which had an appeal to a narrower circle. The content of Fogarasi’s article did not live up to the requirements of the era either. In 1947, a long debate emerged in the Soviet Union about G. F. Aleksandrov’s History of Western Philosophy.37 Aleksandrov, whose work had also been condemned by Zhdanov, published a notorious argument against Hegel in Voprosy Filosofii (1948, No. 1)—allegedly ‘at the guidance of Stalin’—denouncing the German philosopher as a reactionary opponent of the French Revolution.

To acquaint the reader with the immediate antecedents of the Lukács debate, let me offer a few words concerning two articles: “Író-diplomaták” [Writer diplomats]38 and “Lobogónk: Petőfi” [Petőfi: Our banner],39 both written by Márton Horváth. Lukács’s name does not appear in either of the two, and yet it was clear that, in discussing naturalism and the relationship of individual conduct and artistic conduct, Márton Horváth was mounting criticism against Lukács. Horváth wrote:

Some contemporary authors preach about the independence of the individual attitude from the poetic one. They claim that a work can be progressive even independently of the author’s personality, and they have themselves and not Balzac in mind [...] The time has come that our democratic writers, who aspire to deserve that description, should overcome the decadent theory about the duality of work and attitude.40

The events connected with the celebration of Pushkin’s birth eloquently bespoke the change in the official attitude toward Lukács. In May, 1948, the central press reported that he would deliver the keynote address at the centerpiece program of the series marking the 150th anniversary of Pushkin’s birth, events organized by the Hungarian–Soviet Friendship Society.41 Lukács himself had been commissioned to deliver that address even earlier, evidence for which can be found in the letters that he exchanged with Tibor Barabás, acting Secretary General of the Hungarian Writers’ Association. In a letter of May 6, Barabás asked Lukács to deliver a speech at an industrial plant on the occasion of the Pushkin anniversary. In his answer, Lukács declined to do so, mentioning
his participation in the centre piece program of the series. Lukács was not, however, to deliver the lecture scheduled for June 2. While on May 28, in a letter to Szikra Publishing House, he had promised to submit a manuscript after he could end the "shock work in connection with Book Week and the Pushkin anniversary," the June 1 issue of Szabad Nép announced that the main address in the Pushkin commemorative events would be delivered by Márton Horváth because Lukács was ill.

It happened only a few weeks later that the article by László Rudas was published in Társadalmi Szemle.

Let us compare the way Lenin and Lukács discuss the period of transition: for Lukács that is ‘merely’ a moment, while for Lenin it is a ‘rather long affair’. Now let us consider what Lukács and Lenin require as preconditions for the transition from capitalism to communism, ‘the realm of freedom’. For Lukács, the only precondition is ‘just’ the conscious will of the proletariat, while, for Lenin only: ‘a massive stride in the development of the forces of production’ [...]. No doubt, the man who has that view—and comrade Lukács is one!—is, to use Engels’s expression, a ‘bookworm’. Since he is a voluntarist as well, everything for him depends on nothing else than ‘conscious will’.

The passage had been written by László Rudas, not in 1949, but, instead, in 1924. The quotation is from a document of the debate that was taking place in connection with Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness. The passage deserves attention in particular because it reflects the changes in the position of the participants in the debate: in 1924 Rudas condemned the author of History and Class Consciousness from the platform of the era of consolidation after the revolution. A quarter of a century later, Rudas appeared to have forgotten Lenin’s characterization of the period of transition that Rudas himself was so keen to emphasize. In 1949, the apologist of the ‘moment’, and of ‘conscious will’ was not Lukács. The most conspicuous common element of the two debates was, apart from the fact that the same persons were taking place, that Rudas applied the same method in both.

To shed light on Rudas’s method, I shall concentrate on just one aspect of the polemic: the interpretation of democracy. Rudas claimed that Lukács had failed to carry out a social analysis with relation to the individual classes. Now, to clarify Lukács’s position, I shall quote from a study (“Népi írók a mérlegen”) in Irodalom és demokrácia:

The development of classes is never an isolated process. It is the overall development of society, the movement of society as a whole that determines the individual questions of the several social strata, that is, the details are but constituent parts of a unified whole. This applies particularly to the intelligentsia, which, in a strict economic sense, is not a social class in its own right. Where society as a whole is concerned, the question sounds like this: how can and how does Hungarian society want to overcome the feudal past, how can it create a new Hungarian democracy?

The passage cited clearly shows the presence of a class-based analysis, and Lukács’s focus on social totality, just as in the case of his remarks on Marxism in the Lenin study. In the latter, under the influence of Lenin, Lukács wrote: “The revolutionary outlook of the working class cannot be discussed merely in the terms of the conflict of capital and labor. It affects all the problems of the development of society as a whole.” At this point, it becomes clear that Lukács’s controversy with Rudas transcends the assessment of concrete questions of people’s democracy: the controversy refers to the whole of the Marxist method. As a consequence, the two theorists differed in their entire interpretation of the socialist revolution.

The differences in the two men’s views can be seen most clearly in a remark of Rudas’s: “Democracy is, at the same time, dictatorship; what matters is whom it is
against." Lukács, of course, had the same view where formal democracy was concerned. I have pointed out above that Lukács believed that the crisis of formal democracy during the era of fascism had been due especially to the fact that

in the advanced capitalist states democracy assumed a form in which it was possible to use all its achievements and to abide by all its 'rules of the game' and yet to govern a country—where the substance of the matter is concerned—to the detriment of the interests of the working people. None of the constitutional safeguards of formal democracy (universal suffrage, equality before the law, freedom of meetings and freedom of the press, etc.) could block the way of these tendencies [...] because formal democracy incapacitates the 'direct manifestations of the popular will' in all fields of public life.49

The socialist revolution, on the other hand, realizes the substance of democracy, direct democracy (even if, in the first phase, only rudiments of it). As Lukács put it:

Lenin considered socialism not just a radically different and new stage in the development of the economic structure of society by comparison to the capitalist order, but also democracy of the highest order. The latter standpoint enables us to make a fruitful application of Lenin's assessment in the endeavors to promote the new people's democracy.50

In Lukács's theory of democracy it is the perspective of the democracy of socialist revolution that determines the interpretation of people's democracy. As Lukács stated, people's democracy is a form, which, by overcoming formal democracy, paves the way for the realization of freedom and equality, 'even though in a partial and rudimentary form'. People's democracy, he continued, calls into being those forms of the spontaneous activity of the people that assure institutional opportunities for the masses to participate in the direction of the country's economic, political, and cultural life. In this connection, he gave the following definition of the leading role of the working class:

it galvanizes to action and renders sensitive to the political and social questions those social strata which, under the class societies, were unable to enjoy such conscious social activities. Hence, it follows that under the rule of the working class the progressive intelligentsia are involved in socialist construction, the status of the intelligentsia is honored, what is more—within the framework of the strategy of the working class—a guiding role is assigned to them.51

For Lukács, people's democracy as transition meant the recognition and social program of the historic importance of mediation. By identifying democracy with dictatorship, Rudas attempted to justify a political practice. The motivation of Rudas's criticism was not theoretical and, consequently, it did not have theoretical significance. A thorough discussion of the Lukács debate would require a detailed account and assessment of the domestic and international events taking place between the middle of 1949 and the summer of 1950. All the scope of this study allows me to do, however, is to note that, when Rudas's article was published, there were unfavorable tendencies in international political life, the antifascist coalition was in disintegration, reconstruction was straining the strength of the Soviet Union, the war psychosis was hanging on, Soviet–Yugoslav relations were tense, and domestic political tension was heightening in the countries of people's democracy. Moreover, the trial of László Rajk coincided chronologically with the Lukács debate,52 and the trial amplified the political character and weight of the debate. József Révai recognized the danger that Lukács was facing on. He warned Lukács of Rudas's forthcoming article before its publication, which was more than an expression of the decades long friendship between the two comrades of old.

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Immediately after the publication of Rudas's article, Lukács did not find it imperative to offer any self-criticism, even though, as can be ascertained from his letters, he made wide-ranging consultations to acquire information about the new situation. The first draft of his "Bírálat és önbirálat" [Criticism and self-criticism] was different from the published version. In the first draft, stress was laid on his polemic with Rudas, while self-criticism and self-correction were of secondary importance. Yet, it did not take long for Lukács to recognize the true nature of the debate, as was indicated by the response that he published in Társadalmi Szemle, and the announcement that he would withdraw from public life. In a letter to József Révai, dated November 26, 1949, he applied for permission to take a sabbatical year.

The decision to transfer from his chair at the university to a research institute had been made earlier because he found the Institute of Philosophy a better place for the realization of his scholarly projects: writing an introduction to Marxist aesthetic and an ethic. What is more, as a research associate of the institute, he would have been better disposed to assist with the work of postgraduate students preparing their PhD's. Let us mention in this connection that, when the curricula at his university were reformed, his lectures were made optional classes for the teacher trainees. The formation of the Institute of Philosophy took a longer time than planned. He began to consider taking a sabbatical year in the spring of 1949, but the publication of Rudas's article prevented him from realizing his plan. For that reason, when, in November, 1949, Lukács announced his intention to withdraw from public life, he could refer to an earlier decision of his. At that time, he had the erroneous conviction that his withdrawal could be temporary: he discussed with Révai how to return to literary life.

The process turned out to be irreversible, however; articles attacking him were published one after the other, and even some of his pupils, for example, József Szigeti, came under fire. In an article published first in February, 1950, in Pravda, A. Fadeyev denounced Lukács who, as he put it, 'rejected room for party guidance in the arts'. He charged him with 'attempting to justify bourgeois ideology and [supposing] that it can exist side by side with our own ideology'. Accordingly, Lukács is "striving to disarm the intelligentsia of the countries of people's democracy in the war waged against the capitalistic elements in the course of the building of socialist culture".

Révai's article, which summed up the debate, was published alongside Fadeyev's article in Társadalmi Szemle. It is therefore evident that Révai's article was also an interpretation of Fadeyev's article, and that the readers of the time could consider Révai's article not just as a criticism of Lukács, but also as an example of a more differentiated handling of the 'Lukács question'. Révai expounded the political aim of his article already in the introduction: the polemics with Lukács were dictated by the backwardness of the ideological sphere, the declaration of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the effort to strengthen 'our relationship with the Soviet Union—our model and teacher'. Let me add that, when Révai published this article, the political situation in Hungary was marked by the slogans of the strengthening of the class struggle and the need to heighten political and ideological vigilance.

By finding immediate continuity between Lukács's post-1945 errors and his activity before that date, Révai was adhering to the old method of the debates within the working-class movement and party historiography. Révai claimed that the origin of Lukács's errors was to be found in the "Blum Theses", and that a certain 'trend' was being expressed in Lukács's views. The term 'trend' is a reference to Lukács's contributions to Literaturny Kritik in the thirties. Révai arrived at the conclusion that, by advocating
plebeian democracy and bourgeois realism in literature, Lukács identified himself with
a middle-of-the-road line. Révai, too, attached importance to Lukács's approach to the
Soviet Union and its literature. These issues were, in fact, prominent elements of the
entire debate.

Both Rudas and Márton Horváth condemned Lukács's views—which Lukács formu-
lated in the spirit of Marxian works—about the uneven development of the politico-
economic and cultural life. Rudas's wording was in fact threatening: "Comrade Lukács
should without delay make an unequivocal and firm statement as to whether the alleged
law of 'uneven development' applies to the Soviet society, too, or not?"56 Lukács's
statements about uneven development indeed contained a measure of reservations con-
cerning Soviet literature that had adjusted itself to the dogmatism of the Stalinist era.
Yet the whole of Irodalom és demokrácia offered a realistic position. Lukács strove to
propagate an approach to the Soviet Union, and to some extent, to its literature, under
the auspices of learning, rather than imitating. (We have pointed out the consequences
of this approach where the question of democracy was concerned.)

After the publication of the articles of Fadeyev and Révai, Lukács also realized that
self-criticism, even if in part only formal, would be inevitable. He sent the draft of his
second self-criticism, "Következtetések az írodalmi vitából", to József Révai. The draft
and Révai's response have apparently been lost. Yet, we know the letter in which Lukács
replied to Révai's response, in which Lukács made it clear that he was identifying
himself, first of all, with the line of József Révai as expounded in his article in Társa-
dalmi Szemle. It meant, in effect, that he dissociated himself from all his 'fellow de-
baters' and defined the areas on which he agreed with Révai, even if with certain res-
ervations. These areas included first of all the question of the guidance of the arts. Révai
was of the view that guidance should be realized with the mediation of a general literary
public. It is clear from Lukács's answer that Révai strove to soften the contours of those
parts in Lukács's article which—as a consequence of imprecision in Lukács's word-
ing—could provide further ammunition for Lukács's critics.

The publication of Lukács's second self-criticism made his withdrawal from public
life 'irreversible'. His room for publishing became narrower: measures were taken to
put the publication of his works abroad in abeyance and, to use Lukács's own words,
Hungarian publishing houses (including Szikra Publishing House) also 'boycotted' his
works. In August of 1950, the Forum, which was edited by Lukács, ceased publication,
and he was relieved of his post of university lecturer under the pretext of having received
a sabbatical year.

The situation was unique, indeed. When discussing Lukács's motives at the time that
he decided to resettle in Hungary, his philosophical orientation might be best charac-
terized as illustrated by the monographs that he wrote in the thirties: Wie ist die faschi-
stische Philosophie in Deutschland entstanden?, The Young Hegel, Wie ist Deutschland
zum Zentrum der reaktionären Ideologie geworden?, The Destruction of Reason, which
Lukács was about to finish in 1949—50, was the last piece of the period. After the
decisive turn in Hungarian history, Lukács—in a manner similar to that of the thirties—
returned from philosophy to aesthetics, from the planned Ethics to the Aesthetic. The
radical transformation of political conditions, the restriction of manoeuvring room in
cultural and ideological life, in which the so-called ‘Lukács debate’ itself served ideologically to legitimize the ‘turn’ in a forcible way—all these were unfavorable to Lukács’s attempt to recognize and make conscious in the public mind the philosophical problems of the period of transition. Only via the detour of aesthetics was he to find his way back to philosophy.

(Translated by Iván Sellei)

Notes

4 For evidence, see a large number of studies and Wie ist die fashistische Philosopie in Deutschland entstanden?, a book-size study completed in Moscow in 1933 (Budapest: 1982) and another monograph, Wie ist Deutschland zum Zentrum der reaktionären Ideologie geworden? (Budapest: 1982) which was written in 1941—42, when the war compelled him to live in Tashkent.
5 Lukács paid special attention to the publication of his philosophical works after his return to Hungary. That is understandable, for The Young Hegel and the above works on fascism had not been published in the Soviet Union. The Young Hegel was published first by Europa Verlag, Zürich and Vienna in 1948—ten years after its completion. The Hungária Publishing House of Budapest had planned to publish it in 1949. Later, however, due to the ‘increase in the intensity of class struggle’, the cold-war climate, and the Lukács debate, the Hungarian translation was not published. (In fact, it was published in 1976.)
8 See Georg Lukács: “Gelbtes Denken”, in Record of a Life, trans. by R. Livingstone (London: 1983) p. 122. Let me add, however, that, referring to information from Ágnes Szabó, discussing the ‘Blum Theses’, Miklós Lácsó writes: “When in 1958 József Révai was asked if he found an immediate connection between the ‘Blum Theses’ and the popular front policy, his answer was in the clear negative.” Válságok és válaszítások [Crises and Choices] (Budapest: 1975) p. 187.
9 For the full text of the letter, see Vildgosság (1981) No. 1, p. 45.
10 See Lukács’s letter to Lifschitz, April 16, 1945, in op. cit.
11 György Lukács’s letter to Anna Lesnai, December 25, 1945 (in the Lukács Archives and Library—hereinafter referred to as LAL). The friends mentioned are: I. Sáts, E. Usevich, and M. Lifschitz.
12 Balzac, Siendính. Zola (Budapest: 1945) and Nagy orossz realiszták [Great Russian Realists] (Budapest: 1946) were soon published in English as Studies in European Realism (London: 1950); Goethe és kora (Budapest: 1946) was published in German as Goethe und seine Zeit (Bern: 1947); the two essays in Nietzsche és a fasizmus [Nietzsche and Fascism] (Budapest: 1946) appeared originally in German; A realisztum problémái [Problems of Realism] (Budapest: 1946) was also published in German as Essays über Realismus (Berlin: 1948); Marx és Engels irodalomelmélete [The Literary Theory of Marx and Engels] (Budapest: 1949) contained two essays from Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels als Literaturhistoriker (Berlin: 1948), while the third one in the volume appeared only in Hungarian.
14 Difficulties in adjustment made the situation more complicated. Lukács developed his aesthetic theory on the basis of the analysis of the genre of epic works. This was due, first, to the nature of Lukács’s own development (cf. The Theory of the Novel), and the fact that the epic genre held a central position in Russian—Soviet literature after the 1917 revolution. In Hungary, however, poetry was at the center of literature. Lukács strove to resolve this contradiction by writing numerous studies on poetry, including those on Endre Ady, Mihály Babits, and Attila József.

Mention should also be made of other instances of Lukács’s readjustment, which was connected with characteristics of bourgeois social development in Hungary. I have repeatedly stressed the importance of Lukács’s strategic alliance with the progressive wing of bourgeois democracy, where the basis of Lukács’s aesthetic achievements is concerned. It is now time to call attention to his attitude toward Hungarian bourgeois literature
and bourgeois radicalism in Hungary. Numerous studies of his (e.g., “Népi írók a méreglen” [Populist writers in the balance], “A népi irodalom múltja és jelene” [Past and present of populist literature], and “A magyar irodalom egysége” [The unity of Hungarian literature]) indicate that Lukács, when he stressed the unity of Hungarian literature, sided with the camp of populist writers. He had numerous motivations: during the period between the two world wars the populist writers created the most important works in Hungarian literature; moreover, the agrarian question was a key issue of the Hungarian democratic transformation. The populist writers represented masses of peasants and sizeable groups of intellectuals. For that very reason Lukács’s alliance with the populist writers was of immense political importance. He legitimated in terms of cultural policy the general political alliance between the communist party and the National Peasant Party (1939—49)—an alliance of key importance for the communist party, which did not enjoy substantial support in rural areas. It is understandable, therefore, that Lukács had cool relations with representatives of Hungarian bourgeois radicalism. Suffice it to refer to his polemic with Béla Zsolnai and the fact that Lukács did not vote in favor of granting a university lectureship to Imre Csécsy.

15 The first publications of the studies of the volume are as follows: “Demokrácia és kultúra” [Democracy and culture], Társadalmi Szemle (1946) No. 1; “Lenin és a kultúra kérdései” [Lenin and the problems of culture] (Budapest: 1946); “Irodalom és demokrácia” [Literature and democracy], Társadalmi Szemle (1946) No. 3; Népi írók a méreglen (Budapest: 1946); “Pártkölteszet” [Party poetry], in György Lukács and Márton Horváth: József Attila (Budapest: 1946); “Szabad vagy irányított művészet?” [Free or controlled art?], Forum (1947) No. 4; “Régi és új legendák ellen” [Against legends old and new], Forum (1947) No. 4; “A magyar irodalom egysége” [The unity of Hungarian literature], Forum (1946) No. 1.

16 Major political changes were taking place in June, 1947, when Irodalom és demokrácia [Literature and Democracy] was published, yet the ideological and cultural political consequences of that process could not yet be seen.


19 György Lukács’s letter to Géza Seress, April 22, 1947 (I.A1.).


21 Lackó: Válaszok és választások, p. 178.


23 ibid., p. 406.

24 ibid., p. 432.

25 ibid., p. 430.

26 Lukács: Irodalom és demokrácia, pp. 64—5.

27 ibid., pp. 76—7.

28 ibid., p. 35.

29 ibid., pp. 75—6.

30 ibid., p. 83.

31 József Réval’s contribution to the debate appeared under the title “Megjegyzések irodalmunk néhány kérdéséhez” [Remarks on some questions of our literature], Társadalmi Szemle (1950) No. 3—4. Its foreign-language editions, however, had direct reference to Lukács. In English it was published as Lukács and Socialist Realism (London: 1950). In the introduction, Eric Hobsbawm wrote: “The argument in Hungary has, in the main, turned on the work of one man, Professor György Lukács, of Budapest, whose reputation as a Marxist scholar and student of literature is world wide [...] Certainly a battle of the big guns, for Lukács is a man of great distinction, generally regarded as the most eminent Marxist writer on aesthetics and literary history outside the U.S.S.R.” In French it was published as La littérature et la démocratie populaire: A propos de G. Lukács (Paris: 1950). See also A magyar irodalom története 1945—1975 [The History of Hungarian Literature 1945—1975], ed. by M. Béládi (Budapest: 1982). I shall use the term ‘Lukács debate’.

32 Mátőás Rákosi: “A következő láncszem” [The next link in the chain], in his Válogatott beszédeik és cikkei.

33 ibid., p. 280.

34 ibid., p. 282.

35 László Rudas: “Élméleti színvonalunk emeléséért” [To raise theoretical standards], Társadalmi Szemle (1948) No. 4—5.


37 For more details about the debate, see István Hermann: A szocialista kultúra problémái [Problems of Socialist Culture] (Budapest: 1970), pp. 491—3. On Zhdanov’s contribution to the debate, see his Hozzászólás

38 Szabad Nép (April 17, 1949).
39 Márton Horváth's paper was delivered on July 30, 1949, on the occasion of the centennial of Sándor Petőfi's death.
42 Tibor Barabás's letter to György Lukács, May 6, 1949 (LAL).
44 Márton Horváth's lecture, "Pushkin", appeared in Csillag (June, 1949), whereas Lukács's essay, "Pushkin helye a világirodalomban" [Pushkin's place in world literature], was published in Forum (October, 1949)—see also "Pushkins Platz in der Weltliteratur", in Georg Lukács: Der russische Realismus in der Weltliteratur (Darmstadt — Neuwied: 1964).
47 Ibid., p. 43.
49 Lukács: Irodalom és demokrácia, p. 72.
50 Ibid., pp. 34—35.
51 Ibid., p. 45.
52 László Rajk was arrested on May 20, 1949. He was executed after a trial, on October 15.
54 The intellectuals rallying behind Literaturny Kritik were referred to in the Soviet Union as belonging to a 'trend' ('techenie').
The Lukács Debate: 
Further Contributions to an Understanding of the Background to the 1949–50 Debate

by
Károly Urbán

The Origins of the Rudas Article

On April 29, 1949, László Rudas submitted a manuscript to Mátyás Rákosi, accompanied by the following letter:

Dear Comrade Rákosi!

Not wishing to break my promise and make you wait, I enclose the first part of my critique of György Lukács (two chapters). There is a further part I have yet to write on literary questions, but I won’t get around to it until next week partly because of other commitments and partly because writing these 27 pages has left me exhausted.

The critique is sharp, but I cannot write any other way; I really feel what I write and cannot remain indifferent in the face of this distortion of Marxism. But as far as I know, it won’t be published as an article for public consumption, but only as an internal document. I did not feel a need to hold back anything for your sake. If it is to be published at all, do let me know what you consider requiring changing or adding, and I would also willingly alter its tone but not its essence.

I will be sending you the last chapter at the end of the next week.

With comradely greetings,

László Rudas

P. S. Please let me know if you wish me to write the third part. I will only write it if this is to be published because I do not want to undertake such an exhausting and unpleasant task unnecessarily. What I have already written more than suffices to expose Lukács’s views for you!

Greeting,

Rudas!

The letter and the accompanying manuscript—the first draft of Rudas’s critique—which were found a few years ago among Mátyás Rákosi’s papers, shed considerable light on the origins of the much discussed debate. We had already known that the so-called ‘Lukács debate’ was initiated by a handful of top leaders of the Hungarian Working People’s Party (HWPP). However, Rudas’s aforementioned letter makes it clear that Rákosi himself was behind it from the very start, and in fact we know that Rákosi asked Rudas to write the article in April, 1949, albeit not telling him whether it was to be published or to be used only as an internal party document.

These surface matters, however, fail to be of much help in revealing just what led to the conflict in the spring of 1949 between the leadership of the Communist Party and the communist theoretician György Lukács. Even in the second half of 1948, following the merger between the social democrats and the communists—the formation of the HWPP—there was every indication that Lukács’s position was stronger than ever and
his reputation unblemished. In the months following the merger, he played a key role in determining the cultural policy of the HWPP. He was active in the various committees set up by the party to work out a policy on art, literature, and book publishing, as well as in the party college of the Hungarian Scientific Council (HSC), which was in charge of science policy.

We know that, in retrospect, Lukács saw the merger of the two parties as the turning point that brought about a different assessment of his own person among the party leadership. The way he saw it was that, after the merger, the HWPP leadership no longer required his contributions, that is, the kind of activity that he had carried out in order to win over the intelligentsia during the years that the communist party sought to seize power. Looking back on the affair, Lukács felt that it was a case of his having played his role and having been subsequently dismissed. His view is not in contradiction with the initial role that he assumed in forming the cultural policy of the HWPP as he himself had never claimed to have noticed any changes in the way he was regarded by the party leadership immediately after the merger of the two parties. Indeed, in "Gelebtes Denken", the autobiographical sketch written shortly before his death, he recalls that he did not consider the merger of the two parties a sign that he should have taken as any sort of warning, and he continued to believe in the correctness of the cultural policy that he upheld. This is further supported by his brief comment in the preface to the second edition of a collection of his articles entitled Irodalom és demokrácia [Literature and Democracy]. Writing in August, 1948 about the preface to the first edition, he states that it "was written in April, 1947. I see no need to change anything."

Irodalom és demokrácia was an anthology of his articles written between December, 1945 and April, 1947. Based on the concept of people's democracy propagated by the Hungarian Communist Party (HCP) during the years immediately after World War II, his essays faithfully reflected and popularized this program in the field of literature. Lukács saw the concept of people's democracy as an attempt to find a way out of the global crisis of capitalism. As he wrote in the aforementioned preface:

A people's democracy is the search for a solution to the crisis on the basis of an economic, political, and social transformation. The struggle waged by the people's democracy with internal and external forces seeking to obstruct its development—without this being in every case a conscious process—is at the same time the struggle to overcome this general crisis and, within it, the ideological and aesthetic crisis, and to attain a consolidation."

Lukács was led to this interpretation of people's democracy by his analysis of the political situation. He thought that, in the wake of the collapse of fascism, there was a strengthened desire in all of Europe to build such a 'new democracy'. Even where capitalist private property continued to exist, but with restrictions and under supervision, the cultural and material needs of the masses should nevertheless dominate. This is what he saw realized in the people's-democracy slogan of the Communist Party in Hungary.

Although Lukács tried fully to reflect the party line in all regards, his statements between 1945 and 1947 nevertheless deviated from those of most of the leaders of the HCP on one essential point, that of direct democracy. In the same preface, he wrote that a people's democracy can be viable and develop only if it ensures the ongoing, concrete, and real participation of the working masses in public life. Only if this participation leads not only to immediate political gains but also to the unfolding of concrete and real public-mindedness and clear judgment in such matters on
the part of the working people and a genuine requirement on their part to participate in public affairs can [people's democracy] be viable and have a chance to develop.³

At least initially, there was less of a discrepancy in the fact that Lukács saw this process of transformation as taking place over a long period of time, as a transition to socialism. This view was generally accepted in the HCP in 1945—46.

A bare six months after the publication of the last article found in Lukács's book, this view underwent a change in the interpretation of the party leadership. At the founding meeting of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties (Cominform) held in Poland in the fall of 1947, the representatives of the HCP, Mihály Farkas and József Révai, returned with the impression that the theoretical work of the HCP lagged behind that of the other communist parties. They stated in their report that changes had to be made in the area of theoretical work and that the entire development of people's democracy in Hungary had to be reexamined theoretically.⁵

The Political Committee (PC) of the HCP met twice in the course of the next few months to analyze the party's theoretical work. The conclusions were made public in early March in an article written by Mátyás Rákosi and published in Szabad Nép. Rákosi criticized the leaders of the party, the PC, for neglecting theoretical issues during recent years and for having merely employed what they had learned before 1945. In this article, Zhdanov's views on culture—the Soviet party line on literature, philosophy, and music—were listed as examples to be followed in Hungary. The theoretical journal of the HCP, Társadalmi Szemle, was assigned by Rákosi the task of criticizing primarily those works that "claim to be Marxist and which although written by our comrades nevertheless often contain serious theoretical errors".⁷

In the wake of this Rákosi article, a wave of criticism began, the first target of which was Béla Fogarasi's Marxizmus és logika [Marxism and Logic]. The attack was written by László Rudas and appeared in the April—May issue of Társadalmi Szemle. In its approach it bears a striking resemblance to Rudas's later criticism of Lukács, and we are justified in seeing it, as does János Ambrus,⁸ as the forerunner of the Lukács piece that was to follow a year later. However, it is also proper to keep the two events, that is, the 1948 spring attacks and the 1949 Lukács critique, separate, not only because in 1948 Lukács still enjoyed the trust of the party leaders and was one of the first to be given the Kossuth Prize, but also because the various criticisms published in 1948 did not focus on the problem that became such a key issue a year later, namely, the issue of the relationship between people's democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Of course, this was not accidental given that, in 1948, the leaders and theoreticians of the HCP, in their speeches and writings, emphasized those aspects of the Hungarian people's democracy that distinguished it from the dictatorship of the proletariat and, more precisely, from its Soviet form, although they were also saying with considerably more emphasis than previously that a people's democracy develops in the direction of socialism. The program announced by the new party created out of the merger of the communists and social democrats reflected this thinking, stating that the people's democracy in Hungary was a unique and relatively peaceful transition to socialism. The issue of the dictatorship of the proletariat was not even raised.

In the fall of 1948, there was yet another endeavor to clarify the nature of state power being exercised in all of the people's democracies, including Hungary. The, as yet unclarified, theoretical issues surrounding the question of how a people's democracy becomes transformed into socialism were to be discussed during an extremely tense period in international relations, a situation that was only compounded by the differences with
Yugoslavia. The clearing up of these theoretical issues was already overshadowed by the then nascent distortions in the political line of the party and its goal of liquidating the multi-party popular front—an aim adopted at the November 1948 session of the Central Leadership (CL) of the HWPP. Within the party leadership, Ernő Gerő was the one who most strongly urged the clarification of the relationship between people’s democracy and dictatorship of the proletariat. In a letter dated September 22, 1948 and addressed to József Révai, Gerő called attention to the fact that Révai’s speech on the NÉKOSZ (National Federation of People’s Colleges) and the tasks facing it, which was carried in the party’s daily Szabad Nép, ‘contains an obviously incorrect formula on a fundamental issue’. Gerő took exception to the following two sentences: ‘The basic teaching of Marxism—Leninism concerns the role of the party. Those who fail to understand this, understand nothing of Leninism.’ Gerő pointed out that, in his *Problems of Leninism*, Stalin wrote that

> if Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution, and the main goal of the proletarian revolution is the dictatorship of the proletariat, then it is clear that the essence of Leninism concerns the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the elaboration of this question, the justification of this question, and its concretization.9

The Stalin quote aside, Gerő continued, it was clear that, while the theory of the revolutionary workers’ party was one of the basic questions of Leninism, it was not the fundamental one, because the Leninist theory of the party itself issues from the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Gerő went on to add that it would be desirable to correct this mistaken statement in some way, lest it give rise to dissension within the party.10

In his letter to Révai, Márton Horváth, and to Gyula Kállai on December 5, 1948, Gerő took exception to the following sentence in the same day’s Szabad Nép editorial, which was written by Kállai: ‘A people’s democracy can more or less develop without the clarification of ideological questions, but the building of socialism cannot.’ Gerő said that such a differentiation between a people’s democracy and socialism was contrary to Stalin’s teachings and added: ‘If we were to accept comrade Kállai’s formulation, it would mean that the people’s democracy is something between a bourgeois democracy and the building of socialism.’ Calling this absurd, he peremptorily stated that “it is clear that a people’s democracy needs the clarification of ideological issues just as much as socialism itself does in order to develop, given that in our situation we are talking about not two different processes, but one and the same”.11

At the end of December, 1948, this internal debate within the party leadership entered a new phase once the so-called ’Stalin formula’ entered the ideological consciousness of the international communist movement, according to which the people’s democracy fulfils the basic functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Upon returning from the founding congress of the Polish United Workers’ Party, Gerő conveyed this new formulation to the CL of the HWPP. There was tension among the party’s leaders when, in his December 26 letter to the members of the HWPP Secretariat, Gerő did not content himself with merely calling for drawing the consequences, but struck a very critical note in connection with the party’s previous theoretical positions. “Essentially speaking, our formulation meant that, in a certain respect, we revised the essence of Leninism, stating that socialism can be built without the dictatorship of the proletariat.”12

The accusation implicit in the aggressive fashion in which Gerő posed the problem was aimed at József Révai, who was in charge of the party’s ideological work. Answer-
ing a question put by Rákosi. Gerő cited Révai’s September 25, 1948 speech at the National Pedagogical Conference of the HWPP. Révai took a position favoring a politically pluralistic (multi-party) people’s democratic state power developing in the direction of socialism while adapting to the Hungarian circumstances, and without identifying this with the dictatorship of the proletariat. But Rákosi realized that the charge involved not only Révai, since this touched on party policy on a key issue. Rákosi, and later Révai, too, who became involved in the debate conducted via letters, primarily endeavored to repel the charges of revisionism. As Rákosi wrote to Gerő on December 27:

I am not familiar with the relevant writings of the leaders of our party on this issue, and it is my understanding that there aren’t any such writings. Our party has not analyzed the problems pertaining to people’s democracy and the Soviet state, and people’s democracy and dictatorship. Given that such a work has yet to be undertaken, Gerő’s allegations concerning the revision of the essence of Leninism lack foundation.13

In his December 29 letter, Révai pointed out that the draft version of his September speech contained the following statement: ‘historically, the state of the people’s democracy belongs to the same type as the Soviet state.’ But, he added, this line was deleted in the wake of the debate on the draft version at the suggestion of Gerő and others. The tension among the party’s leaders was finally eased when it was decided that Stalin’s theoretical views must be brought to the knowledge of the party as a whole as soon as possible, and accompanied by self-criticism on the part of the Hungarian communist leaders. Révai, who had recently returned from the Bulgarian communist party congress, admitted the need for self-criticism, adding that ‘the Bulgarians themselves did likewise.’ What he did not agree with was the notion that self-criticism should become some sort of self-reproach or worse. He warned that “if we one-sidedly keep emphasizing only how far we are from the full realization of the dictatorship, then this, whether we want this or not, will become seen as a call to resort to bureaucratic means.”14

Stalin’s views were conveyed to the public in an article written by Rákosi and printed in the January 16, 1949 issue of Szabad Nép under the title “A népi demokrácia néhány problémájáról” [On some problems related to people’s democracy]. The collective self-criticism of the party leadership took place at the March 5, 1949 session of the CL, primarily in Révai’s address. At that meeting, a motion on the liquidation of the people’s front was adopted, and the new interpretation of state power was accepted, according to which ‘people’s democracy is the dictatorship of the proletariat without soviets.’ In fact, however, the new formulation was not in line with reality, since, in both the political and intellectual spheres, the mechanistic copying of practices in the Soviet Union started around this time.

This then is the background to the Lukács debate. The conflict between the Communist Party and the philosopher in the spring of 1949 was inevitable. Lukács’s understanding of democracy was in contradiction with the dogmatic interpretation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, just as his cultural concept of a ‘great realism’ in aesthetics and his cultural policy based on a popular front notion were in contradiction with the new, sectarian cultural political objectives, which vulgarized realism with their one-dimensional approach. In April, 1949, that is, around the time that Rudas received the assignment to write a critique of Lukács, a settling of accounts with the views propagated by Lukács since 1945 also began in the field of literary policy. The new wave of criticism that began in the spirit of the March, 1949 CL session was inaugurated by Márton
Horváth's article, "Író-diplomaták" [Writer diplomats], in the April 17 issue of Szabad Nép. Even though it did not mention Lukács by name, the piece, which struck in many directions, was nevertheless a sharp attack on Lukács's concept of literary policy. Horváth—as István Szerdahelyi has pointed out—had already started an anti-Lukács line of attack in the sphere of literary policy, and did so with the support of Rákosi, crossing the intentions of Révai in the process, but it was only now, in the wake of the sectarian turn adopted at the March, 1949 session of the CL of the HWPP, that he could go on the open offensive. Horváth's article called for an immediate change in approach in literature. He had an impatient and totally oversimplified view of the artistic representation of the building of socialism. 'It has to be stated frankly: the Five-Year Plan defines the main course and main theme of our literature,' he declared. To soften the impact, he added that the theme of construction was to be understood as primary, but not exclusive. This, however, did not much alter the threatening tone of the article. Those who find the topic a "straitjacket", he wrote, "can only find the whole of new Hungary a jail, and can hardly expect to have a place in the new literature".

The publication of the Horváth article in the main publication of the HWPP signaled the defeat of the Lukács line in literary policy, although at this point, still in veiled form. The fact that Rákosi did not pick Horváth to write a comprehensive critique of Lukács's views, and instead delegated the task to Rudas, a philosopher unfamiliar with aesthetics and literary questions, indicates that, initially, the top leaders of the party assigned only a secondary importance to literary issues in the unfolding debate.

One of the characteristics of the Lukács debate is that neither in the preparatory phase nor later was the question put before the leading bodies of the party. However, a smaller group composed of PC members coordinated and channeled the debate. This we learn from Révai's September 30, 1953 submission to the PC. (It should be noted here that Révai was dropped from the party's operative leading bodies after the so-called 'June turn' in 1953, and his submission concerned his role in various decisions.) Révai sought to vindicate himself by saying that the articles he had written in connection with the Lukács debate and on the Déry question were not simply reflections of his own views, but, rather, had been submitted to and discussed with Rákosi, Gerő, Farkas, and Horváth prior to publication; a fact, Révai added, that "could not have taken the place of the genuinely collective debate of these questions within the Political Committee".

The same handful of PC members prepared the initiation of the Lukács debate as well. As we have seen, in his letter of April 29, quoted above, Rudas was willing to write a third chapter only if the article was to appear in print. He finished the third chapter within three days. The manuscript bears the date May 1st, but the last chapter was sent to Rákosi only on the 5th, presumably after further urging. Knowing that the article was to be published, Rudas, in the accompanying letter, requested only that the full length be retained, that is, that no cuts be made in the work, writing to Rákosi as follows:

As far as the length of the article is concerned, please take into account that (1) Lukács cannot be criticized in a superficial manner, (2) Lukács has published several much longer pieces in both Társadalmi Szemle and Forum. I would be reluctant to make any cuts because I wish to avoid possibly being charged with not being thorough enough.

Nevertheless, he had to delete parts of the manuscript, but for reasons of content, rather than length. We have no knowledge of Rákosi's views on the first draft. It is likely that the reason why there is no written record of it is simply because he discussed
it with Rudas in person. Compared to the amount of time it took Rudas to write the first draft, it took him rather a long time to revise the article. He sent the revised manuscript to Rákosi on June 13, adding in a note that he had made major cuts and expressing the hope that “it meets with your approval in its present form.” The article was published in July 1949, in the combined Nos 6—7 issue of Társadalmi Szemle. The article retained its original structure in that it contained three chapters. Rudas, as noted above, considered the first two to be the essential ones, in which he focused on Lukács’s interpretation of democracy and his relationship to Lenin’s theories. In Rudas’s view, the mere exposition of Lukács’s views on these questions was in itself sufficient to expose Lukács. However, without the third chapter, written in a hurry and dealing with literature, the article would not have been comprehensive.

On the basis of the first draft and the final version as published in Társadalmi Szemle we can reconstruct Rákosi’s expectations.

Rákosi recognized that any aspect of the critique that reflected the fact that, decades ago, Lukács and Rudas had belonged to opposing factions in the party would blunt the impact of the criticism, and, therefore, although not with any consistency, he ordered cut from the first version those sharply personal comments by Rudas which actually referred back to those old conflicts between the two philosophers, Rudas, like Révai later on, employed a ‘geneticist’ method in criticizing Lukács. However, while Révai saw the roots of Lukács’s ‘mistaken’ views of the post-1945 period in the “Blum Theses” (written at the end of 1928 and in early 1929) and in the positions that he had adopted in the Soviet literary debates of the thirties—mentioning the latter only indirectly—the first version of Rudas’s article links chapter two and three, which reaches five years further back into the past than Révai did and focuses on an episode that occurred during the Moscow émigré years. Rudas writes as follows in the first draft:

Before closing this chapter, I wish to recount an episode which clarifies better than anything else comrade Lukács’s method: the method of ‘objectively’ being-outside-of-the-party.

Since my 1925 critique of his works, when I showed that we are dealing with an idealist, orthodox philosopher, and not with a dialectical materialist one, I have not read any of comrade Lukács’s works. However, during my Moscow stay, immediately before my departure, I walked into a reading room and saw a German-language literary magazine, called Literaturzeitung or Literarische Rundschau, on the table. Starting on the very first page was an article about Hitler. It began like this—and I quote from memory: The essence of Aristotle’s theory of drama is that the hero’s real character is revealed in the course of the drama, and this character is in contradiction with the one that the hero believes his own to be like. This clash between true and assumed character constitutes dramatic conflict.

Well, I thought to myself, this must be by Lukács. I turned the page and, sure enough, his name was at the end of the article. I read on.

That’s how it is with Hitler, the article went on. Now we discover that Hitler’s character is not what he had believed it to be and what others had believed. His real character has been revealed. And his tragic conflict consists in that his assumed character and true character have come into conflict.

Is any comment required? Hardly. Seeing Hitler as a tragic hero, whose tragedy consists in his character becoming revealed only later—this is nothing but Marxist ‘aesthetic’. Explaining Hitler according to Aristotle is anything but the Marxist analysis of that phenomenon whereby a common criminal and his cohorts could send millions of people to their deaths.

Now, as I have been leafing through this book by Lukács, this episode came to mind. Lukács has not changed since 1925; he has remained the same idealist, ivory-tower doctrinaire thinker to whom any Marxist analysis is alien and about whom Lenin wrote that his Marxism is purely ‘in words only’ (‘stovesniy marxizm’). To see just to what extent this is true, all we need to do is examine Lukács’s views on literature.

The really interesting thing about this eventually excised passage is not the charges that it makes about ‘being objectively outside of the party’, but Rudas’s extension of
his criticism to a new area, so as to call into question the Marxist foundations of Lukács's antifascism. However distorted and sweeping Rudas's account is, it is clear that he is referring to Lukács's article, "Schicksalswende", published in Internationale Literatur, No. 10, in 1944. Lukács makes the point that, since Aristotle, one of the key concepts in dramaturgy has been peripeteia, which denotes the point of tragic turn, the height of dramatic action, the deeds of the hero, and, at the same time, that point at which the relation between the hero and tragic fate—more closely, the contradiction between the latter—is expressed. Aristotle, wrote Lukács, linked peripeteia with the recognition scene when the hero, previously not conscious, awakens and becomes conscious. In Lukács's train of thought, however, the 'hero' here was not Hitler, but humanity victimized by fascism, and especially the German people, for whom the horrors of the SS death camp in Lublin were their moment of peripeteia.

Nur scheinbar haben wir hier eine quantititative Steigerung der Hitlerschen Untaten vor uns. Denn wir wussten längst, wie vielsichtig die Nazis überall hausten. Unzählige Dokumente und Prozessberichte geben dafür unwiderlegbare Zeugnisse. Trotzdem handelt es sich hier nicht nur um eine blosse Steigerung der Greuel, sondern um etwas schreckhaft Neues: um das konzentrierte Bild des gesamten Systems. Der ganze Hitlerismus, seine Beziehung zur Welt, seine Verbundenheit mit allen Schichten des deutschen Volkes erscheinen auf einem Ort, in einem 'Betrieb' zusammengefasst. Es ist die grausige 'Erkennungsszene' der Welt mit Hitler, mit Hitlerdeutschland.21

At the same time, Lukács did consider it important to reveal the true character of Hitler in order to destroy the legends being spread by fascist propaganda about his extraordinary qualities. In assessing this issue Lukács felt that Hitler's true nature could be revealed only by examining the development of Germany as well. This same attitude was the starting point in his criticism of Ernst Bloch's article, "Der Nazi kocht im eigenen Saft".22 In his polemic written in the form of a letter, entitled "Kritik von rechts oder von links?" and dated 1943, he accuses Bloch of viewing Hitler in isolation from the development of Germany, as a result of which his rise to power, decade-long rule, and staying in power remain a mystery.

Zweitens, wenn die Nazi, wie Du sagst, wirklich nur im eigenen Saft kochen würden, so wäre Herr Hitler wirklich das, was er zu sein sich nur einbildet und was er über sich verbüllen lässt, nämlich ein Genie. Denn wenn es ihm gelungen wäre, ohne eine vorangehende Entwicklung, die im deutschen Volk eine derartige politische, soziale und moralische Demoralisation hervorgebracht hat, dass es sich auch von einem solchen Gauner betrügen lassen könnte, zur Macht zu kommen, wenn er all dies wirklich aus eigener Kraft vollbracht hätte—wäre er wirklich ein Genie. Du willst ihn, richtiger Weise, als geschickten Gauner entlarven, aber Deine Argumentation ist mehr eine Erhöhung als eine Entlarvung.23

What most likely explains the fact that the passage quoted above was deleted from Rudas's draft version is that, by attacking Lukács's antifascism, Rudas went beyond what the party leadership had in mind with this campaign, and the same goes for the attempt to revive the 1925 debate.

This was not the only passage to be dropped from the final version that was published in Társadalmi Szemle. The draft contained a historical introduction, which suffered a similar fate. It emphasized the differences in the Hungarian situation of 1945—48 and that of the following period, and noted that these must be taken into consideration in assessing Lukács's articles published between 1945 and 1947. In this introduction, Rudas brought up the pre-1917 Russian Marxist literature as an analogy.

It is true that in the Russian Marxist literature we find many examples of the situation whereby, under the given circumstances, Marxist writers had to conceal to some extent their real message in order to get their
works published. In Tsarist Russia the censorship forced them to do this. And before 1945 in Hungary, too, the communists had to resort to various stratagems in order to get published. And after the liberation of the country there remained certain reasons that made it necessary to use reserve in expression, and this was at the expense of clarity. These reasons are clear; Marxist theory and Weltanschauung, Marxist social science and strategy were so unknown, indeed, held so suspect in Hungary, that many questions, which in other countries could be posed openly and discussed frankly, not only would not have been understood here, but would have been misunderstood and even misinterpreted.

In assessing comrade Lukács’s articles, this circumstance must be taken into account. However, the question arises as to how far this Aesopian language can be taken? It should be clear from the above, and even aside from that, it should go without saying that it cannot go so far as to allow Marxists to compromise questions that pertain to the essence of Marxism or are contrary to the spirit of Marxism. We do not know of a single instance in Russian Marxist literature when this was the case, either due to the censorship or any other reason. Sometimes they did not write words like ‘Marxism’ or ‘historical materialism’, using instead a formula like ‘the most modern social science’, but in discussing ‘the most modern social science’, they strictly adhered to the Marxist position. The same can be said in the case of the Hungarian communists when the party was illegal. And we had even less reason after the liberation to detour from this sole correct path, since this would have been tantamount to throwing out the baby with the bathwater, what is the use of having your writings published if they do not contain what is correct from the Marxist standpoint, which would have done more harm than good.24

The historical background in the published version of the article was cut to a single sentence, which simply stated that between 1945 and March, 1947 ‘many things had to be said differently than today.’ It is hardly surprising that the historical introduction, which was not really fair, but only made a pretense at fairness, was ordered cut. It was in the interest of the party leadership to recall the specific circumstances of the previous few years; after the self-criticism exercised at the March, 1949 CL session, it was felt that the collective pronouncements of recent years were best forgotten. The leadership of the HWFP wanted to carry out a public revision of the previous ideology without any loss of its own prestige. This is why the Lukács debate, from beginning to end, was restricted to the philosopher’s own ‘private’ views and lacked any analysis of the unique circumstances of the struggle for power.

Self-Criticism in Two Stages

The readers of Szabad Nép were not likely to assign much significance to the brief article in the June 1, 1949 issue of the party daily, announcing that the meeting organized by the Hungarian–Soviet Friendship Society to mark the Pushkin anniversary on the following day would have Mátó Horváth as its main speaker, replacing György Lukács, who could not attend due to health reasons. The Hungarian public learned of the conflict between the party and the philosopher only from Rudas’s article. The news spread in the West somewhat earlier. Ferenc Fejtő wrote in Paris that

Some—generally well informed—news agencies reported in early July that since the arrest of László Rajk, the purges taking place in Hungary have now reached even the Philosopher György Lukács, who is well known in France, several of whose works have been translated recently (Existentialismus oder Marxismus?, Geschichte der neueren deutschen Literatur, and Goethe and His Age), and who last winter gave several highly noteworthy presentations. These news, which do not claim that he was arrested, but only that he has been granted leave at ‘his own request’, seem now confirmed with the publication of an article in the theoretical journal of the Hungarian CP [Communist Party], Társadalmi Szemle, which is a very notable indictment authored by a certain László Rudas, who attacks György Lukács’s latest work, Irodalom és demokrácia [Literature and Democracy].25

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The quotation marks that Fejős uses to signal his own doubts are only partly justified, since Lukács had long been interested in taking a sabbatical. However, given the threatening atmosphere surrounding his person by the spring of 1949, Lukács’s old plan took on a new meaning in that, by submitting his request, he gave the party leadership a chance to allow his voluntary and partial retreat. Lukács had learned of the coming attack from Révai, and at the end of May, 1949, that is, well before the publication of Rudas’s article, he wrote a letter to the Secretariat of the CL of the HWPP. In his application, he did not make any reference to the fact that he was aware of Rudas’s article. He started his letter by saying that both his work in Hungary and the experiences of his travels abroad made it clear to him that there was an urgent need to write a serious scientific work on certain basic questions of Marxism–Leninism, which thus far had not been worked out in sufficient depth. The task that he felt himself best suited to tackle was a Marxist ethic, he wrote. He had amassed a great many preliminary studies in the course of the years, but given his present workload, found it impossible to complete such a work within the foreseeable future. At the same time, he added, he realized that under the present circumstances, he could not request a full year’s leave, which he would in fact require. Given these considerations, he requested in the first place that the Secretariat allow him to request a year’s sabbatical from the university (or, rather, from the Ministry of Religion and Education). He added that, in the wake of the university reform, his lectures were not among the mandatory subjects for future high-school teachers. Furthermore, regardless of his leave of absence, next year’s course on an introduction to aesthetics would be given by József Szigeti. He pointed out that everyone dealing with this issue was of the opinion that his main activity at the university should be focused on the training of scholars. The HSC had recently reached a decision concerning the establishment of an institute serving precisely this purpose. Thus, Lukács reasoned, his present request came at an opportune moment because by the time that institute would be ready to start functioning, it would be possible to determine just where he fit in within the new circumstances. In the second place, he asked the Secretariat to release him from the obligation to participate in the work of the various party committees of which he was a member (the party college of the HSC, the social science department of the HSC, the art, literature, and publishing committees of the CL of the HWPP, the Society for the History of Hungarian Literature, and various state and social organizations). It went without saying, he added, that whenever important issues of principle were on the agenda, he would attend. In the third place, he also requested that he be freed of the obligation to give speeches at a multitude of forums sponsored by the party and other organizations. Again, he added, it went without saying that whenever the party wished that he speak on some important question before such a forum (e.g., the Political Academy), he would readily comply.

Finally, he called the Secretariat’s attention to the fact that he was over 64 years of age, and given his less than sound health, could not afford to wait for years before completing his long-planned works. He reiterated his belief that his projected books would be both important and timely, and requested that the Secretariat grant him his request for the period between September 1, 1949 and September 1, 1950.26

Acting on behalf of the Cultural Policy Department of the office of the CL of the HWPP, Gyula Kállai supported Lukács’s request. We know how Rákosi and Gerő reacted to the proposal. Rákosi passed the letter on to Gerő for his opinion, stating his own views—bearing the date May 27—as follows: ‘The answer partly hinges on the opinion of the HSC. I am not enthusiastic about the idea: ethics is not the most pressing
task awaiting attention." Gerő was considerably more decisive in his reply, in a note dated May 28:

In my opinion Lukács must be dismissed from the membership of the HSC party college. Concerning the book on aesthetics, we must say that the Secretariat expects a totally different book from him, namely, such a self-critical book which corrects the serious political errors contained in his own writings. Of course, this necessitates the raising of the Lukács question in the press as well.27

Gerő’s rigid response clearly indicates that Lukács’s plan of voluntary retreat was unrealistic. He did, however, receive a formal reply. Rákosi’s Secretariat wrote him on June 2, 1949, informing him that “the Secretariat is considering his request.”28 Lukács could have surmised from the delay concerning his submission that the party leadership would insist on his self-criticism. At any rate, the publication of the Rudas article created a new situation.

The appearance of Rudas’s attack in Társadalmi Szemle elicited an unusually strong international response. Not only the intelligentsia, both in Hungary and abroad, showed an interest in this criticism, but given the obvious political significance of the event, the diplomats also paid attention to this development. A report of the United States embassy in Budapest, dated August 1, 1949, expressed the view that it was possible that Lukács might be removed altogether from the country’s intellectual life in the wake of the Rudas attack and that this depended on whether Lukács would defend himself in the next issue of Társadalmi Szemle or admit the validity of the charges.29

We know that, many years later, Lukács explained his behaviour during the debate, and especially his two acts of self-criticism (1949 and 1950), by the fact that he feared for his personal safety, given that the debate took place in the shadow of the Rajk trial. He did not know at that time that the show trials would not involve people who had been émigrés in the Soviet Union. We find this dilemma summarized in his "Gelebtes Denken" as follows: “These circumstances determined the debate: my aim: to retreat without falling victim to the Rajk period. (A mistake. Understandable.)”30

The 1949—50 self-criticisms, just like the previous ones, remain an endless source of debate. What were these two self-criticisms? Were they a tactical retreat made on the basis of his assessment of the historical circumstances and due to an overestimation of the dangers awaiting him—as claimed by Lukács and his defenders; or was it the denial of his critical and aesthetic works—as seen by François Erval and Maurice Merleau-Ponty?31 I do not think that this issue can be settled by uncovering various, so far unknown details of the historical-political background to these debates. However, in order to get a realistic picture of the extent of this self-criticism, we need to compare the two documents with what the party leaders had expected of Lukács, to examine just where Lukács gave ground and where he stuck to his convictions despite the demands made on him.

We have the necessary prerequisite for such an investigation, since the Lukács Archives and Library of the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences has published two volumes of writings and documents pertaining to the Lukács debate, including Lukács’s correspondence with the party’s leaders during the time of the conflict. From these letters we learn that the first draft of Lukács’s “Bírálat és őnbírálat” [Criticism and self-criticism], which was mainly concerned with refuting Rudas’s charges, and in which the self-critical aspect was minor, was torpedoed primarily by Gerő and Horváth. Both told Rákosi that Lukács’s self-criticism was unsatisfactory and demanded that Lukács write a proper reply.32 Following this and consultations with
Rákosi and Révai, Lukács introduced changes in his response. He wrote an introductory section containing a formal self-criticism, but rejected Rákosi’s suggestion that the polemic with Rudas come at the end of the article and not run to more than two or three pages, “since the self-critical part makes most of the polemic redundant”. Lukács, however, continued to devote the first part of his response to refuting Rudas’s charges (slandering Lenin, cosmopolitanism, idealism, etc.). Lukács explained in his own article that he had to insist on this since, by taking quotes out of context, Rudas raised charges so serious that, if true, they would have sufficed to deprive Lukács of the right to call himself a communist. Although he expanded the self-criticism part by a few pages, the party leaders still felt that it contained too many qualifications and counter-arguments. ‘Essentially it is the same article,’ Horváth wrote to Gerő on August 2, 1949. He found only a few pages in the new version which ‘were written under the influence of our criticism and make the article more closely resemble self-criticism’. And even these changes, Horváth went on to say, failed to alter the party leaders’ criticisms of Lukács’s article. Therefore, Horváth recommended to Gerő that Lukács’s article in Társadalmi Szemle be accompanied by a hard-hitting editorial comment at least one page in length, which would point out the shortcomings and errors of the article, and which would say that the editors would return to the debate in a later issue. At the same time, he also recommended that, in the Sunday issue of Szabad Nép, following the publication of Társadalmi Szemle with Lukács’s article, there should be a continuation of the debate, couched in terms understood by the broad masses.

Instead of a critical editorial comment, there was only a single sentence following Lukács’s article (Társadalmi Szemle, Nos 8—9, 1949): ‘We shall return to the very important issues raised in comrade Rudas’s criticism of comrade Lukács’s book and those in Lukács’s self-criticism.’

Lukács found himself in a unique situation following the publication of his reply to Rudas. Although in a November letter to Révai, he repeated his request for a leave of absence, Lukács had yet to receive an answer from the party leaders and thus had no choice but to carry on with his duties, and so he attended the meetings of various political and scientific bodies. His scheduled trips abroad were not canceled either, and at the end of August, 1949, he spoke in Weimar and Berlin on Goethe, and in October he was in Rome. Domestically, however, he was ostracized from the intellectual life of the nation. The Western media defended him, but the Hungarian press continued to carry further attacks on him, which were aimed not only at him, but at his disciplines as well. In assessing his situation and possibilities, Lukács was considerably hampered by the contradictory behavior of the party’s leading ideologue, Révai. In the course of a private discussion at Christmas, 1949, Révai raised the possibility of Lukács being allowed to participate again in the intellectual life of the country. Lukács soon had to recognize, however, that his situation was hardly one allowing for such optimism. In early January, 1950, he wrote to Révai as follows: “I repeat, it is incorrect to talk about my return to Hungarian literary activity in private conversations while articles in the party daily treat me as a literary Rajk.”

At the turn of 1949—50, the Lukács debate entered a new and more heated phase. Horváth had an article published in the December 25, 1949 issue of Szabad Nép, which went beyond attacking the ideas in Lukács’s Irodalom és demokrácia. It attacked a statement that Lukács had made in a March 1949 speech, which later became well known: ‘Marxism—Leninism is really the Himalayas of world views. But that does not make a rabbit jumping about on the summit a bigger animal than an elephant on the
plains.' Horváth went on the offensive: 'Is the climate on these ideological Himalayas so severe that it cannot support larger animals? And if it is not that severe, why is it that Lukács fails to mention those larger animals?' Horváth answered his own question and stated his charges: for Lukács, the only genuine realism is the same as bourgeois realism, and the more profound and broader sense of the concept that is embodied in socialist realism remains in Lukács's works "a foggy generalization, which can be approached only by abstract concepts and not through the living reality of Soviet literature".  

On February 1, 1950, the Soviet Communist Party daily Pravda carried A. Fadeyev's speech given at the 13th plenary session of the Soviet Writers' Union. In his presentation, Fadeyev focused mainly on the tasks of literary criticism, and criticized various phenomena primarily as found in Soviet literary life, but he also devoted a surprisingly great deal of attention to Lukács's views, referring to 'a Hungarian theoretician much in attendance at various international congresses and conferences'. Fadeyev criticized Lukács for 'always keeping silent about the cultural experiences of the Soviet Union', although he had spent many years there and knew its intellectual climate. Fadeyev claimed that Lukács denied the possibility of party leadership in the arts, was far too understanding of existentialism, and sought to justify bourgeois ideology and 'its coexistence with our own ideology'. Quoting and misinterpreting a passage in Lukács's "Demokrácia és kultúra" [Democracy and culture], Fadeyev charged that Lukács endeavored to disarm the intelligentsia of the people's democracies in the struggle that they were waging against capitalist elements in the course of building socialism.  

Fadeyev's speech was printed in Társadalmi Szemle, Nos 3—4, 1950, and the same issue carried Révai's article on the Lukács debate. Not only is the ambivalence reflected in Révai's summation evident today, given the results of new analyses, but it was also noted by his contemporary and one-time friend, Ervin Sinkó, who was living in Yugoslavia. Sinkó felt that Révai, in his reflections on the debate, "attempted to strike a more appropriate and more sophisticated tone than Rudas and Fadeyev. In places, one has the distinct impression that [Révai] plays his role very much against his own wishes, very reluctantly." Be that as it may, Révai's article, while undoubtedly toned down the shrillness of the debate, provided a historical 'foundation' for the charges against Lukács by recalling the "Blum Theses" and the literary debates of the thirties. The tone of Révai's article (which differed markedly from previous attacks), its recognition of Lukács's qualities, the absence of the charges made in the initial phase of the debate and especially in Rudas's article (cosmopolitanism, idealism, etc.), combined with repeated assertions that the party counted on the further work of Lukács and on his participation in literary and ideological activities, all these served Révai's main aim, namely, to get Lukács to accept the necessity of undertaking a new, 'serious and consistent' self-criticism.  

Initially, Lukács wanted no part of another self-criticism. Horváth spoke with him at Galyatető (at a resthouse operated by the Academy) on April 17, 1950, that is, after the publication of Révai's article, and sought to persuade him to write a new self-criticism. The next day, Horváth wrote Révai that

I can't report anything positive on our talks; György is uncooperative on all of the essential questions. In connection with your article, he summarizes his criticisms as follows: (1) It is not true that his views concerning the issue of people's democracy were any more mistaken than those of others and he only admits to 'noticing the turn too late'. He unequivocally rejects the view that his error was the result of a consistent line in his thinking over the years. He never said that sectarianism characterizes the movement in general. Both

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the overestimation and the rejection of the French Revolution and of the democratic revolution are far from him. (2) He rejects the notion that he had ever seen parallels between Soviet literature and Western decadence and says that his article which you [Révai] had quoted only criticized capitalist remnants still found in Soviet literature, at the time he wrote the article. (3) He does not agree with either of us on our assessment of the Sholokhov and Vírta articles. In other words, we have made no progress whatsoever beyond his first answer to Rudas, and while he may possibly be persuaded to go further in his self-criticism in certain details, he would do so only while continuing to reject what he considers unjust accusations, that is, the key points themselves.39

Both political and personal reasons were also introduced into the attempt to convince Lukács to modify his stance. Horváth argued that, by remaining silent, Lukács joined the ‘rotten band’ of dissidents who were opposed to the party and that the enemy profited from his silence, mentioning that a recent program on the Voice of America spent fifteen minutes defending Lukács against Révai. We do not know just what impact these arguments had on Lukács, but the fact remains that he did write a second self-criticism, which was published in Társadalmi Szemle, Nos 7—8, 1950.

This second self-criticism shows that Lukács made significant concessions, including the acceptance of Révai’s and Fadeyev’s criticisms. With hindsight, we can call it a temporary but unconditional surrender. At the time, Ervin Sinkó, in his aforementioned article, called it a ‘total surrender’. The question is: How did those manipulating the debate view Lukács’s article? We know Révai’s opinion because Lukács had sent him a draft of his second self-criticism, and Révai made his views known to Rákos in a note dated May 8, 1950. Révai wrote that this new self-criticism was ‘an improvement, and mainly, it’s more concise’. However, it did not escape the attention of the chief party ideologist that, in several respects, Lukács either did not accept the criticisms or did so only formally. ‘He doesn’t want to recognize’, wrote Révai to Rákos, ‘that his views on literature are also related to his “Blum Theses” (democratic dictatorship). I think he is wrong, but it’s not that important’. On the issue of partisanship, he ‘is trying to explain himself (attacking me for bypassing essential aspects of his article), but essentially speaking, he admits that his conception of partisanship was mistaken’. Révai felt that the part dealing with Soviet literature was the least clear and least satisfactory. "Only indirectly does he agree that he underestimated Soviet literature”, Révai wrote, but he concluded that, all things considered, this new article could form the basis of a dialogue with Lukács and was suitable for publication in Társadalmi Szemle.40

Révai not only took exception to certain passages, but also took the liberty of deleting what he did not like. On May 18, Lukács replied to Révai as follows:

Of the deleted parts I have reinstated the following: first of all that passage in the part on Soviet literature where I write that my old articles were not directed against the whole of Soviet literature but only against capitalist remnants; secondly, where I show that even before the debate began I clearly referred to the superiority of Soviet literature. The inclusion of these passages is the sine qua non in order for this self-criticism to be mine.41

In the same letter, Lukács assured Révai that he agreed with the perspective of his article, but added that it was important that he at least allude to having reservations about the whole of the debate. He then closed his letter with a quote, which was his way of telling Révai that he was not willing to make further concessions: ‘“Hier steh ich, ich kann nicht anders,’ said the youthful, still revolutionary Luther.”42
The Limits to Criticism

With Révai's article and Lukács's second self-criticism, the debate came to a close, at least in the pages of Társadalmi Szemle. This, however, did not mean that the Lukács question was taken off the agenda. The lessons of the debate continued to be discussed in the wake of Horváth's and Révai's articles: the Hungarian Writers' Union debated the question, as did the literary journals, Csillog and Irodalmi Újság. The first congress of the writers' union, held in April, 1951, also discussed the Lukács question.

The fact that the focus of the debate had changed and that the main focus was on literary matters—indeed, the very fact that the attack on Lukács was officially termed a 'literary debate'—signaled a narrowing of its scope as compared to the total critique launched by Rudas. The tone and certain assertions of the Rudas article had a counter-productive effect on many readers including ones in Hungary, as evidenced by some of the reactions. This was clearly reflected in an article by Gábor Devecseri, who himself criticized Lukács, but expressed his doubts about Lukács's having 'slandered' Lenin, and also observed that the passions manifested in Rudas's article only undermined the impact of his presentation.43

It is also true that the party leaders were not wholly indifferent to the exceptionally unfavorable reception that the debate had found in the West. This is reflected in Révai's article, where he noted with irritation that in the West there was idle talk about Lukács's 'execution'. The campaign waged in the West actually made Lukács's position more difficult, leading him to divorce himself totally from his unsolicited supporters in his second self-criticism. This was not a tactical move on his part. In refuting the allegations made in the course of the campaign in the West, he passionately denied Merleau-Ponty's statement that, in his self-criticism, he had disowned Goethe and Balzac—and thus Lukács expressed his continued adherence to his earlier views.

Along with the diversion of the debate into literary fields, there were other signs that, beginning in the spring of 1950, the party leadership was no longer interested in a Rudas type of 'annihilating' critique of Lukács, and was instead more interested in keeping the debate within manageable limits. For example, it was this tendency that kept Géza Kassai's attack on Lukács from appearing in print. In mid-February, 1950, Kassai sent an article to Szabad Nép. Entitled "Mélyek a gyökerek" [The roots are deep], it called on Lukács, if he really wanted to engage in self-criticism, to dig deeper to find the roots of his errors, expose the relationship between his present errors and his errors of the past, and then exercise self-criticism concerning the whole of his work and its influence. After waiting nearly a month before making up its mind, the editorial board of the party daily explained its rejection of the article—as we learn from the letter of complaint that Kassai wrote to Rákosi—by saying that "others have already written on the Lukács question and comrade Révai is writing an article in which he will touch on the Lukács debate as well."44

The danger remained that the passions stirred up by the Lukács debate would again burst to the surface even after the publication of Révai's article. Lukács sought to protect himself by keeping within the bounds of Révai's criticism—although, as we know, he never really accepted it—as the 'lesser evil'. This is how he acted in November, 1950, making use of the welcome opportunity when the Secretariat of the HWPP agreed to his acceptance of a corresponding membership in the Berlin Academy of Arts, which
was offered him at the initiative of Arnold Zweig. Lukács sent Zweig’s letter to Rákosi, accompanied by another letter:

I’m sure you are aware that the last volume of the Russian History of Philosophy, edited by Alexander, contains a chapter on the people’s democracies, which, together with the chapter on Hungarian philosophy from the Soviet Encyclopaedia, has been submitted to the party center for review. Both writings deal with me (in connection with the debate); both go considerably further than comrade Révai’s article (speaking of anti-Marxism).  

In his letter, Lukács writes in connection with the possible publication of these passages in Hungarian translation that Rákosi should consider the question in the light of the “new situation (my discussion with comrade Fadeyev, my election to the permanent Peace Council), that is, would it be correct in this question to go beyond the position adopted by the HWPP.”

This letter reflects the thinking of a man just getting over the shock of the debate, being bolstered by his international fame. In “Gelebtes Denken”, he summarized his situation in Hungary after the debate: “Retreat. I remain an ideologue, but only on a personal basis, not as a functionary. No public assignments. Academy: cooperation with Fogarasi, he acts as intermediary. Thus total personal freedom: it is even possible to reject official trends.”

This account requires considerable background information. My own opinion is closer to that of István Hermann, who characterizes Lukács’s relationship to the official cultural policy from 1950 on as ‘relatively keeping apart’. Lukács’s aloofness was really only relative, despite the fact that his situation in Hungary after the 1949—50 debate remained uncertain and contradictory. After the closure of the monthly Forum, the party, without asking him, appointed him one of the editors of Csillag, a new literary journal, which had published a number of articles attacking him. The party continued to allow him to participate in the peace movement abroad to speak at foreign scholarly meetings, but Lukács had to struggle hard and tenaciously in order to effect the lifting of the publication ban, which had been imposed at the time of the debate and barred his works from being published abroad.

Those in charge of official cultural policy counted it as a success that Lukács wrote an article on Stalin’s work on linguistics. It contained some original thoughts and was published in 1951. An even greater coup was getting Lukács involved in the Déry debate, despite his many reservations and great reluctance.

The preparations for the Déry debate revealed that the dogmatic cultural policy, however closed it deemed the Lukács debate, could not really rid itself of its memory. ‘Lukács’s views on the Déry novel are far too well known to allow us to pass over them in silence,’ is how Horváth put it to Révai early in September, 1952, when they were preparing the Déry debate, and when Horváth—thus far unsuccessfully—conducted talks with Lukács on the matter. Horváth said that Lukács’s silence was in itself a stand against the opinion of the party, but noted that if he were to speak out on the question, even if in some aspects he expressed views contrary to the party’s position, ‘it would give us a chance essentially to liquidate the Déry and Lukács type of incorrect views in the field of literature.’ What Horváth had really hoped—and as it turned out, not without foundation—was that, out of loyalty to the party, Lukács would not openly oppose the official position. Horváth definitely wanted to avoid a repeat of the 1949—50 debate; “there are few things I have less taste for than a second serving of the Lukács debate,” he wrote in his letter to Révai.
The admission reflected in the above statement remained publicly unstated. The dogmatic cultural policy had no desire to get into a new discussion of the Lukács debate. In his self-criticism at the June, 1953 session of the CL of the HWPP, in discussing the debates of the previous years, Révai criticized only the methods employed in the course of the debates, but did not examine their content at all.

Lukács was quietly rehabilitated in the wake of the June, 1953 political changes and then, in 1955, his 70th birthday was publicly celebrated. By that time it was plain bad manners even to recall the 1949—50 debate. Nevertheless, the debate survived the circumstances that had given rise to it. The 1956 conflict between the philosopher and the party again rendered it impossible for a time to carry out an objective assessment of the 1949—50 debate.

The shock of the debate notwithstanding, the 1949—50 attacks did not lead to any sudden changes in Lukács’s attitude and political views. In subsequent years, several of his pronouncements—for example, the position that he took in the Madách debate—supported the dogmatic camp. On the subjective level, the Lukács debate prepared the way for his break with dogmatism, but Lukács reached the turning point only gradually, with occasional regressions along the way.

(Translated by Sándor Bándy)

Notes

1 Archives of the Institute of the History of Politics (hereinafter referred to as AIHP), archive reference 276, f. 65/5.
4 Ibid., pp. 6—7.
5 Ibid., p. 12.
6 AIHP, archive reference 274, f. 10/15.
7 Mátéás Rákosi: “A következő láncszem” [The next link in the chain]. Szabad Nép (March 7, 1948).
9 AIHP, archive reference 276, f. 68/4.
10 Ibid.
11 AIHP, archive reference 276, f. 68/37.
12 AIHP, archive reference 720, f. 9, p. 150.
13 Ibid., pp. 152—3.
14 Ibid., pp. 155—8.
17 AIHP, archive reference 793, f. 2, Vol. II.
18 AIHP, archive reference 276, f. 65/5.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 279.
24 AIHP, archive reference 276, f. 65/5.
Lukács and Hungarian Culture*

by

Ferenc Tőkei

Georg Lukács and Hungarian culture is a vast subject. All I can really do on this occasion is to throw some light on certain aspects of a rather complex problem that in my opinion have not been given the attention they deserve by Lukács scholars either in Hungary or in other countries.

My starting point is a simple question: Was Lukács a thinker in the Hungarian tradition or a German philosopher who happened to live in Hungary? The question may seem absurd to some and superfluous to others—after all, the whole world is aware that the important facts and periods in Lukács's life were closely linked to Hungary (at least in part). Moreover, Lukács's lifework, in the eyes of Marxists and non-Marxists alike, is of general significance and of a standard that gives it international importance. The question is really not absurd, since it is well known that Lukács was also part of the German philosophical tradition; he wrote his principal works in German, and, what is more, he spent a great deal more time and effort on German than on Hungarian literature. His lifework can therefore also be regarded as part of German culture. Nor must it be forgotten that Lukács, the scion of a Budapest Jewish haute-bourgeois family, as a young man at the turn of the century sharply turned against the Hungary of that time, and against the gentry and pseudo-gentry interpretation of what being a Hungarian meant. All his life, Lukács emphasized his solitude as a thinker in Hungary and, true enough, also in Germany. Following a stay in Florence and Heidelberg (between 1908 and 1917), he lived in exile between 1920 and 1945, first in Vienna, then in Moscow, Berlin, and again in Moscow. He was one of the leaders of the Association of German Proletarian Writers while in Berlin. There is therefore every reason to wonder how deep and how strong the threads were that tied Lukács to Hungary and Hungarian culture—in other words, in what sense one may look on him as a Hungarian writer, and on his work as something Hungarian culture can be proud of. To put the question this way makes it clear, I think, that it is not superfluous to examine what being Hungarian meant for Lukács. After all, if there were strong ties between Lukács's work and Hungarian culture, then the facts of Hungarian history and the characteristic features of Hungarian culture must be borne in mind when trying to understand Lukács's work even on the most elementary level. It seems to me to be one of the most serious weaknesses of the


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large and increasing volume of literature dealing with Lukács that scholars are not able to understand the actual relationship between him and Hungarian culture. Even in Hungary there is still a great deal of uncertainty in this respect; few of the prejudices involved have been overcome as yet, and research into the problem can be said to be only in its initial stages.

I

Perhaps Lukács himself is the right person to provide an answer. In 1970 he published a selection of essays, written in Hungarian, on Hungarian subjects. In a preface specially written for this volume in 1969, he described how he saw his relationship to Hungarian culture, and the way in which it developed. I should like to quote at length from this autobiographical sketch, particularly where he refers to his origins and early oppositional attitude:

It is well known that I was born into a capitalist family living in the Lipótváros in Budapest. I would like to say that since early childhood I was thoroughly dissatisfied with the Lipótváros way of life of those days. And since my father's business activities brought us into daily contact with the city's patriciate and gentry, this rejection was automatically extended to them. Consequently, I was ruled from an early age by sentiments opposite to the whole of official Hungary. Corresponding to my immaturity, this opposition extended to all areas of life, from politics to literature, and was obviously expressed in some kind of callow socialism.

It does not matter how childishly naive I consider it now, a posteriori, that I uncritically generalized this antipathy and extended it to all phases of Hungarian life, history and literature alike (with the sole exception of Petőfi) it is certain that those views then dominated my way of thinking. The serious counterpart, the only firm soil that then existed for me alone in which I could dig my toes, was the modern European literature of those days, and I became acquainted with it around the age of 14 or 15. I was touched primarily by Scandinavian literature (mainly Ibsen), the Germans (from Hebbel and Keller to Gerhart Hauptmann), the French (Flaubert, Baudelaire, Verlaine) and English poetry (first of all Swinburne, then Shelley and Keats). At some later point, Russian literature became very important to me. These works provided me with the means to countervail the dominating Jewish as well as the gentry and pseudo-gentry attitude. This not entirely accidental conjunction of circumstances led to my attempt at spiritual liberation from the spiritual servitude of official Hungary, taking on the accents of a glorification of the international modern movement as against what I looked on as boundless Hungarian conservatism, which under those circumstances I identified with the entire official world of the time.4

Lukács then goes on to speak of two Hungarian contemporaries whose uncompromising moral attitude had a positive effect on him, describes his role in the Budapest theatrical life of the time, and then continues:

It was at that stage that I discovered that important negative circumstance that I would take part in literature only as a theoretician and not as a creative author. The practical consequences of this lesson took me away from stage work itself, I began to prepare for theoretical and historical research into the essence of literary forms and turned toward scholarly and philosophic work. This again made me more acutely aware of the importance of the contradiction between influences from abroad, mainly German ones, and Hungarian life. It is hardly surprising that under those circumstances my starting point could only be Kant. Nor can it be surprising that when I looked for the perspectives, foundations, and methods of application of philosophic generalization, I found the theoretical guide in the German philosopher Simmel, not the least of reasons being that this approach brought me closer to Marx in certain respects, though in a distorted way.

My interest in the history of literature carried me back from the "great names" of the present to those mid-nineteenth-century scholars in whose writings I found methods of a higher order in the understanding of society and history. I deeply despised Hungarian theory and literary history from Beöthy to Alexander. But important counterweights were to appear soon, acting against this theoretical onesidedness. Ady's volume Új Versek (New Poems) was published in 1906; in 1908, I read the poems of Béla Balázs in Holnap (Tomorrow), and within a short time we were linked by both personal friendship and a close literary alliance.10
This takes us to a decisive moment in Lukács's life, decisive also when it comes to understanding Lukács's work. The friendship between Lukács and Balázs was important in itself, even more so owing to the fact that Balázs and Béla Bartók cooperated closely in their work. But more important still was Lukács's encounter with Endre Ady's great poetic oeuvre, one of the great achievements of early twentieth-century Hungarian literature, which unfortunately is almost inaccessible to those who do not read Hungarian.¹¹ This encounter proved to be decisive for Lukács's philosophy. It would be difficult to formulate it better than Lukács did himself.

My encounter with Ady's poems was a shock, as one would call it today. It was a shock the effect of which I began to understand and to digest seriously only years later. My first experiment in the intellectual exploration of the significance of this experience occurred in 1910, but it was only much later, at a more mature age, that I was really able to grasp the decisive importance of this encounter for the evolution of my worldview. It may mean sinning against the chronological order of things, but I believe this is the right place to give account of the nature of Ady's influence.

To sum things up briefly: although the German philosophers appeared to be ideologically subversive—and I include not only Kant and his contemporary followers but Hegel too, under whose influence I came only years later—they remained conservatives as far as the evolution of society and history was concerned; reconciliation with reality (Versteckung mit der Wirklichkeit) was one of the cornerstones of Hegel's philosophy. Ady had such a determining influence precisely because he never, not for a single moment, reconciled himself to Hungarian reality or, on that basis, to the overall reality of the epoch. A longing for such a view of the world had been alive in me since adolescence without my being able to generalize these feelings conceptually. I did not for a long time understand the clear expression of the very same attitude in Marx—even after I had read him several times. Consequently, I was unable to make use of him to oppose Kantian and Hegelian philosophy in a basic way. But what I did not perceive in Marx struck my heart in Ady's verse. Ever since I became familiar with Ady's work, this irreconcilability has been present in all my thoughts... Admittedly, I did not become conscious of this—at least not to the extent that its importance demanded. For clarification, may I quote a few lines of Ady, which he wrote much later. In the poem "Hunn, új legenda" ("The Hunn: A New Legend"), Ady describes his attitude to life, what was yesterday, what is today, and what will be tomorrow: "Vagyok ... protestáló hit és küldetéses vétő / Eb ural fakó. Ugocsa non coronat" (I am ... the faith that protests and a veto that has a mission / Only the dog has a master, Ugocsa will not crown). It is indeed strange that a feeling about the world could have had such a broad and deep influence on me ... transforming the whole world of my ideas without my having attained as yet any true understanding of the world around me or having formed definitive ideas about it. This experience also resulted in my considering the great Russian writers, first of all Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, as true revolutionary factors in my developing worldview that, slowly but surely, took the direction where the internal transformation of man became the expressed focus of social transformation, and where ethics became more important than the philosophy of history. This, then, became the ideological foundation of my Weltgefühl (feeling of the world), which, in the last resort, grew out of my experience with Ady. All this did not, of course, mean the total elimination of an objective sociohistorical foundation. On the contrary! It was exactly at this stage of my development that French syndicalism started to exert an influence on me. I was never able to see eye to eye with the so-called democratic theory of those days, especially with Kautsky. Thanks to Ervin Szabó,¹² my knowledge of Georges Sorel helped me to develop the combined Hegel–Ady–Dostoevsky experience into a sort of ideology that I then considered to be revolutionary, this is what made me stand in opposition to Nyugat and what it represented,¹³ it also isolated me within the Huzsztik Század circle¹⁴ and placed me in the position of an "outsider" in the circle of my later German friends as well.¹⁵

This passage makes it quite clear that the encounter with Ady's poems had a decisive effect on Lukács's development; it was not, however, enough in itself to ensure that he should think of himself as a Hungarian. In a 1966 interview Lukács stated that Ady's work Új Versek (New Poems) really changed him; "roughly speaking," said Lukács, "this was the very first Hungarian literary work that allowed me to find my way home, the first I could fully identify with." This fact should by no means be interpreted as a

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wholesale identification, cautioned Lukács: "What I now think of the Hungarian literature of the past is another question and the result of long experience. At that time, I must admit, I felt no inner relationship with classical Hungarian literature. I was creatively influenced only by word literature, mainly by German, Scandinavian, and Russian literature—in addition to German philosophy, which influenced me throughout my life. The way the Ady experience moved me did not essentially diminish or change this German influence. It neither put an end to it, nor did it take me back to Hungary. One could say that, at the time, the Ady poems meant Hungary to me."16

Lacking close ties with Hungary, Lukács almost became German, as he reminisces in his 1969 preface:

The experience of meeting Ernst Bloch (1910) convinced me that philosophy in the classical sense was nevertheless possible. I spent the winter of 1911—12 in Florence coping with the impact of this experience; I wanted no distraction while trying to work out an aesthetic theory as the first part of my philosophy. In the spring of 1912 Bloch paid me a visit in Florence and did his best to persuade me to accompany him to Heidelberg, where the atmosphere was most congenial to our work. All this must have made clear that by now nothing stood in the way of my settling in Heidelberg for an extended period, even permanently. Although I always preferred life in Italy to that in Germany, the hope of finding understanding was stronger. I went to Heidelberg without knowing how long I might live there.17

Lukács spent the years 1915 and 1916 in Budapest serving in the Auxiliary Military Service. During this time, a group of like-minded friends surrounded him, first forming the so-called Sunday Circle, followed by an interesting experiment at (public) education, called the Free School of the Humanities. To a certain extent, however, Lukács already felt somewhat isolated, even among his friends, because of his revolutionary left-wing attitude. While most of those friends later had positive things to say about the stimulating effect and high-spiritedness of their discussions, Lukács’s evaluation is less positive. While he claims that his early work “no doubt played a certain role” in the formation of this circle, and acknowledges that it became important later “thanks to the role played abroad by some of its members” (Mannheim, Hauser, Frederick Antal, Charles de Tollnay)18 Lukács nevertheless thought that “its influence in Hungary is often overestimated ... for the very same reason.” He added “It was not really important to me since it was essentially linked to a way of thinking and acting that I had already outgrown.”19

III

Then the events occurred that proved to be the decisive experiences of Lukács’s life: the 1917 Russian and the 1918—19 Hungarian revolutions. Lukács, “by chance,” was caught by them in Budapest. Lukács stated fifty years after those events that the Russian Revolution “and its reverberating echo at home” gave him the first inkling of what the answer to his questions might be. The road to be followed was shown to him first in Hungary, but “it was no ideologically conscious homecoming; it was not a necessary consequence of my evolution. Seen objectively and intellectually it was mere chance” and, as such, it was a help, a “fate pointing toward the true path.” Lukács concluded this train of thought by saying that “even if my staying at home before and during the revolutions was purely chance as far as the immediate causes were concerned, it created entirely new contacts for my life which, after years of internal struggles, produced an entirely new attitude in me.”20

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Lukács understood right away that a popularly based revolution could only be a socialist revolution in twentieth-century Europe. Not long after the founding of the Communist party of Hungary in November 1918, Lukács joined it and became one of its leaders. This meant giving up his past ways of thinking and undertaking a thorough study of Marxism. He became a People's Commissar of Culture in the Hungarian Republic of Councils. At that point he found out that Hungary was not destined to be the country of revolutionaries without a revolution, but that the elite and the masses could be united in revolution in Hungary also. "The cultural policy of the Hungarian proletarian dictatorship was," in Lukács's words, "the first attempt to unite on the part of all those forces in Hungarian society that truly wished to progress and that sought a genuine renewal."²¹

I am inclined to argue that this decisive change meant that by becoming a Communist Lukács was clearly tied to his native country, Hungary; that his becoming an internationalist at the same time meant a strengthening of his ties to a particular nation. This is certainly not a chance conclusion but necessarily follows from the nature of what has been said. To be sure, the Hungarian Republic of Councils was suppressed after only a few months of existence, and Lukács was forced to live in exile. He began to study Lenin seriously in his Vienna exile, initiating a period in his thinking that lasted more than ten years. As he himself said, in the 1920s he tried to reconcile a "right-wing epistemology" with "left-wing ethics," resulting in a "messianic sectarianism." It is interesting that this "messianic sectarianism" was manifested, in the first place, in his philosophic views and in his attitude toward international questions; as regards the problems of the Hungarian working-class movement, he supported the Landler faction as against Béla Kun²² and in opposition to his own theoretical views. Landler's more realistic ways of thinking serves as a basis for overcoming the "leftishness" that Lenin also criticized.

Following Landler's death, Lukács formulated the so-called Blum Theses,²⁴ which saw the future of the Hungarian working-class movement in a democratic dictatorship of the working class and the peasantry. Lukács's theses were rejected by the party leadership at the time, and Lukács himself was removed from his position in it. But this failure did not put a distance between him and Hungary; on the contrary, it made the links closer still. Lukács said of the importance of the theses for his own development that it was here that "in my case a general theory allowing for further generalization grew directly out of a proper observation of reality, that is, where I first became an ideologist who took his cue from reality itself, what is more, from Hungarian realities."²⁵

Lukács therefore was ready and willing, consciously and finally, to accept his role as part of Hungarian culture precisely at a time when, following his removal from the responsibilities of political office, he tended to concentrate his work on German as well as French, English, and Russian literary questions. I hope I will be forgiven for the extended quotation that follows, but Lukács's own words best express what is involved here; moreover, as with the preceding quotations, these autobiographical musings have not been translated into English until now:

The Blum Theses put an end to my political career and took me away from the Hungarian Communist Party for a long time to come. At the same time, as a direct consequence of the crisis, my theoretical and critical work as an aesthetician received a new impetus. I was able to take an active part in the struggle against literary sectarianism on the German and Russian fronts; I was able to lay down the theoretical foundations of socialist realism, in uninterrupted but, needless to say, concealed opposition to the Stalin-Zhdanov
views then prevalent. This took me to the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, which came out with the first public statement summing up the popular front policy and at the same time reopened the door to the Hungarian CP for me. When, after this congress, the paper of the Hungarian popular front, Új Hang (A New Voice), appeared, I became an active contributor right from the start, once again working with József Révai. We had been apart for a long time. It was then that, for the first time since I became a Marxist, I discussed Ady and the Habit of The Book of Jonah. It was then that I attempted to criticize the false antithesis between urbánus (urban) and népi (populist) writers from the point of view of a true Hungarian democratic popular front. I wrote those articles as a Marxist Communist, but those papers never centered on the opposition of Marxism and bourgeois ideology but on a united Hungarian popular resistance to the Horthy regime. This meant a break with the critical practice of Hungarian Communists, in which arguments expressed in Hungary were judged by Marxist standards. When arguing against the urbánus group, I pointed out the distortions caused in the Hungarian development of revolutionary democracy by liberal prejudices, such as the rejection of radical land reform in the interest of the undisturbed capitalist development of large estates. These were differences between liberalism and democracy, and not between socialism and democracy, and both Révai and I recognized and supported consistently the spontaneous plebeian democratic faith of the népi writers; we only reproached them for often expressing those ideas inconsistently (making concessions to reaction in opposition to the people). But I, for instance, showed that their ideology in some important respects was dangerous to Hungarian democratic evolution, even by Tolstoyan and not Marxist standards. In this way I joined the mainstream of the best traditions of Hungarian literature. Csokonai and Petőfi, Ady and Attila József, all took this starting point with activities that grew out of the people’s attempts to determine their own fate. If Hungarian literary criticism and history—apart from such exceptions as János Erdélyi long ago, Ady later, and György Bálint in the Horthy era—did not proceed along this path, this does not cast doubt on the validity of this particular way of posing the question, nor does it lessen its depth and significance in the life of the Hungarian people. Because of this radical change in my internal evolution, my return home in 1945 in no way looked like the coincidence to which I owed my presence in Hungary during the 1918 revolution. On the contrary, this was a fully conscious decision in favor of returning home against concrete offers made to attract me to places where German was spoken.

IV

Lukács’s self-analysis must be looked on as decisive with regard to his relationship to Hungary, and he clearly and unambiguously declared himself to be Hungarian. Following his return to Hungary he passionately threw himself into cultural and literary life and wrote a number of important papers that dealt with basic problems of Hungarian culture. Summing up this last, more than twenty-year period of his life, he said,

If I wished to characterize this whole period ideologically, I must note that in addition to Ady the influence on me of the plebeian democratic nature of Bartók’s art (Cantata Profana) became stronger and stronger. I would of course give a misleading picture of the totality of my activities, including the part dealing with Hungarian problems, if I made it appear as if Hungarian cultural and literary topics then dominated my thinking and activities. This definitely was not the case. Just to give a few examples: at the time of my preoccupation with Ady’s Új Hang, I wrote my book about the young Hegel; after the liberation in 1945 I worked on The Destruction of Reason and The Specificity of the Aesthetic as well as my Aesthetics, and I am presently about to formulate the philosophical nature of social existence. The bulk of my ideological activities always dealt with general philosophic questions. This must necessarily go beyond Hungarian reality. Not even a member of the greatest group of people on earth would be able to think philosophically (including, of course, thinking about aesthetics) merely on the basis of his own national experience.

Every page of the volume of selected treatises on Hungarian culture and literature bears out Lukács’s statements in the preface. A close reading of the anthology proves beyond any doubt that Lukács’s theoretical and critical work is in accord with his self-analysis. What needs to be done, I think, is to draw attention to certain particularly interesting aspects of it.

In 1908 the young Lukács still could write that Ady “had no need of tradition,” that
he did not accept the dominant Hungarian values nor did he “join any existing trend,” and that it was precisely to this that Ady owed his greatness as a poet. In another article Lukács said that it was a “tragedy” that Ady was Hungarian. One year later, in The History of the Development of Modern Drama, Lukács voiced his opposition to the vulgar interpretation of the “international modernist movement” and spoke of Mihály Vörösmarty’s fairy play Csongor és Tünde as the “most alive, and perhaps only genuinely organic Hungarian play.” It is argued that “it was not chance, not a meeting of fortunate outside and inner circumstances, that proved successful in this instance; rather, it was the conscious and artful welding of Hungarian folk humor and the mood and techniques of Shakespearean comedy. The main reason why Hungarian fairy-comedy ceased to be organic later on was that it lost its once present connection with Hungarian life.”

Looking ten years ahead, Lukács predicted the events of 1919, stating that Ady was “conscience, trumpet, and fighting song, and the standard around which all can gather if there should ever be a fight.” That same year, writing about a volume of short stories by Zsigmond Móricz, Lukács exclaimed “One can only speak of this book with genuine joy. It contains true Hungarian stories, and Hungarians in the simplest, most common, and most complete sense of the term.” Reading such an evaluation, one might well wonder whether Lukács did not somewhat exaggerate when he said in his preface that he had “no inner relationship” to Hungarian literature at that time.

In 1918, when Mihály Babits accused Béla Balázs and Lukács of being “German,” Lukács argued and proved the point that Babits wanted to protect Hungarian literature against philosophic “depth.” He showed how retrograde the Hungarian stiff-upper-lip and nil admirari attitude was. Lukács asks whether it is proper to say that there will not be “and there must not be any philosophic depth in Hungarian literature of the future just because there was none in the past.” He also inquires whether “the Hungarian soul should have any reason to be afraid of depth.” It is evident that Lukács even at that time was fighting the same fight as Ady and Bartók, the leading spirits in Hungarian cultural life.

A picture of Lukács without his relationship to Hungarian culture would be a pretty anemic one, even when taking a look at his activities in the 1920s. In 1925, for instance, only two years after the publication of History and Class Consciousness and right in the middle of his “messianic sectarianism,” Lukács published a short article on Mór Jókai, who dominated post-1867 Hungarian literature. Lukács argued that for several reasons Jókai’s work represented what is best in the Hungarian literary tradition:

Jókai’s narrative style is still fully interwoven with the old Hungarian manner of telling a tale that is humorous and imaginative and anecdotal, a style that only loosely links up events. As against his contemporaries, Zsigmond Kemény and József Eötvös, who insist on forcing the style of the foreign novels of the time on nascent Hungarian prose, Jókai’s style grows organically out of the Hungarian life of his own period. In this respect, his prose can justifiably be compared to Petőfi’s prosody. Though it is undeniable that this manner of writing is full of loose and undisciplined elements, ... this was nevertheless the only road along which Hungarian narrative prose could progress right up to Zsigmond Móricz, while the artificial prose of Jókai’s contemporaries remained an episode in the development of Hungarian literature.

All his life, Lukács remained true to the simple principle that “the true greatness of poets rests in their being welded to the life of their nation.” What is more, in his own
work this principle was to be put into practice in an increasingly consistent manner. This is why his internationalism has nothing to do with cosmopolitanism; and that is why his criticism of the népi and urbánus movements of the 1930s is still valid today. He explains the real achievements of both as the effect of the 1919 Hungarian revolution, and that is an interesting point even in the context of world literature. By and large, Lukács considered the népi movement to be the more important of the two, precisely because of the close links with the peasant masses and the life of the people. In 1947 he came across an article in which the népi writers were viciously slandered—while writers of Jewish origin (the urbánus) were unduly praised. Lukács set out to prove that the author of this article applied two different standards in an unprincipled way and reprimanded him as follows:

This method and attitude have their own social background. ... To put it briefly, what is involved is the literary and cultural role of the so-called Lipótváros. Béla Zsolnay describes its style with great love, applying positive standards only, allowing at the most for certain “tragic” features. But that social and national lack of roots which the Lipótváros culture meant for Hungarian writers of Jewish origin at the time [i.e., at the turn of the century], only rarely grew into a genuine tragedy. The break with genuine Hungarian folk culture bred the false extremes of snobbism and literary prostitutions. There were of course writers... who preserved their human and literary integrity. ... But one cannot, without applying two separate standards, argue that genuine tragedies like János Vajda’s or Lajos Tolnai’s took place—not to mention that of Kálmán Mikszáth. It is the great merit of Ady and of the Nyugati revolution as a whole, with all its limits and contradictions, that they started to demolish these barriers. The real work of demolition was, however, done by the class struggles of the counterrevolutionary period, and by népi literature that arose as part of that struggle. Until then, there were only a few writers here and there ... who rose above the dilemma of snobbism and literary prostitution. The counterrevolutionary period produced a new type of writer, liberated from the Lipótváros culture; there were not too many of them, perhaps, still enough ... and they were of a quality that commands respect. ... In the case of more than one outstanding writer alive today, that ideal and artistic, meaningful, and formal engagement in the great social and national problems of the Hungarian people that destroys the differences of origin in the eyes of all men and women without prejudice, became part of their flesh and blood—and this is what helps to pull out the ideological roots of anti-Semitism.

At the time of the first revolutionary uprising of the Hungarian nation, Hungarian Jewry had only reached a stage of development that could supply thousands of brave soldiers for the fight for freedom. The social backwardness of Hungary made it impossible for this fight for freedom to become manifest in Hungarian Jewry in an ideological form. Heine, for example, was the true representative poet in Germany—a more developed country. ... Nothing like that could happen in the sultry atmosphere of the 1867 Ausgleich and of the pseudo-gentry ghetto, Lipótváros. The breeze of the revolution was needed to bring that about. That is what started with Nyugati, and continued at a higher level of social development in the period between the two world wars. As Marx correctly says: "The soil of counterrevolution is also revolutionary."59

There are not many in Hungary who could deliver such a scathing critique of Lipótváros culture with greater justification, and therefore with greater persuasive force, than Lukács, who was born and bred in the Lipótváros but who became a revolutionary and found his way home to his country through that revolution.

Writing of Ady’s importance and influence on him, Lukács said in 1969, “Those who were not satisfied with the Ausgleich [1867] ... did not consider the situation from a specifically Hungarian point of view.” The passages I have quoted at length give a good indication of how one ought to read this sentence. Lukács elaborates: “I have not lost touch with Ady, not even for a day, since reading Új Versek more than sixty years ago. This is part of the story of my life [italics added]. And without wishing to exaggerate my importance, I cannot really consider myself as typical of Hungarian development.”

We might take this with a grain of salt; it is my suspicion that Lukács in this case did not use the term “typical” in the sense of his own aesthetics, but in the everyday sense of the word; his language would have been more exact if he had said “average.” I am
convinced that, taking the term as used in aesthetics, Lukács was the most typical manifestation of Hungarian culture—though he was, of course, no more average than Ady, Bartók, or Attila József.

It is certainly worth investigating how Hungarian culture managed to accomplish a whole series of achievements of international significance in the twentieth century. This seems to me necessary for a proper understanding of the achievement itself. All that I have outlined is, of course, no more than one of the necessary preconditions of asking the right questions. This is also true even as it regards a proper understanding of Lukács’s lifework.

Postscript

Although the above was written ten years ago, its basic tenets have by no means become obsolete. I would, however, like to add a few remarks and references. The growing literature on the subject of “Lukács and Hungarian culture” points in many directions. There are some who discuss Lukács’s views on this or that achievement of Hungarian culture, examining the depth of his understanding of this or that work and analyzing his judgments. There are others who examine the impact of the fact on Lukács’s thought that his career, naturally, began in Hungary and remained—through his connection with the Hungarian Council Republic through his activities in exile, and with his return in 1945—in close connection with that country. The latter interpretation of the subject is in some measure the more serious one. It points to many problems of detail that are worth examining. These researches cannot, however, do anything more than produce new data, cannot facilitate the exploration of Lukács’s accomplishment as a thinker, unless by telling us how central problems in his work originated in Hungarian history and in the peculiarities of Hungarian culture and society in the twentieth century.

In 1969, in the above-discussed preface to Magyar irodalom—magyar kultúra, Lukács outlined the story of how he became a communist and traced his ideological development. He described as decisive his struggle to understand Hungarian social reality, which is directly documented in the so-called “Blum Theses”. This is what he wrote on the subject:

I seriously doubt the objective value of the ‘Blum-theses’ as a theoretical document of the labor movement. This is chiefly because, compelled by tactical considerations, I made quite a few concessions to the political prejudices of that time [...] in order to be better able to assert my essential ideas concerning the cardinal issue. Yet it is a historical fact that, on the one hand, the course of development followed by Hungary has borne out the general perspective of the ‘Blum theses’ and that, on the other, I was after all the only one who foresaw that development.52

Lukács then went on to emphasize (see the quote earlier in my paper) that for his own development those “Theses” had been crucially important. He saw his becoming a Marxist and his conscious attachment to Hungarian culture as processes occurring side by side in such a way as to form a unity, despite all contradictions, processes that bore fruit in his works of the émigré years in Moscow. Evidently, Lukács’s oeuvre (like other major achievements in Hungarian culture) could not rely solely on Hungarian sources. But his becoming a Marxist and growing attachment to Hungarian culture were undoubtedly related developments, and an analysis of their relation must necessarily be of significance for an understanding of his work. When this topic is treated on its merits, it will be clear that Lukács’s oeuvre is among the highest achievements of Hungarian
culture in the twentieth century and, what is more, is of a paradigmatic importance from the viewpoint of the relation of modern Hungarian history and communism, of modern Hungarian culture and Marxism, that is, problems vital to Hungary and to Hungarian culture.

Seen in this light the subject "Lukács and Hungarian culture" will rid itself first of all of that distortion of an ostentatiously Hungarian provincialism that rejects Lukács and his consistent radicalism because he belongs to all the world. But it will rid itself also of that equally ostentatiously non-Hungarian provincialism, which, under the sway of New Left utopias, rejects the popular and national problems that are so important in Lukács. Both sets of views in fact underestimate Hungarian culture; the first is, after all, afraid of measuring our culture against the standard of world history, world literature. They represent extremes which, with their shared element, the underestimation of Hungarian history and culture, were alien to Lukács.

In 1948, Lukács published his "A Magyar Kommunista Párt és a magyar kultúra" [The Hungarian Communist Party and Hungarian Culture]. It was the opening essay in the volume Új magyar kultúrdíj [Toward a New Hungarian Culture]. In it he pointed to a central problem of Hungarian culture, namely

the absence of Hungarian philosophy of any kind. A great Hungarian literature does exist which, chiefly on account of its poetry, is on par with the literature of great European peoples. Our modern music is highly esteemed throughout the world. For a long time our fine arts have been of a European standard. We have had achievements of international stature in the natural sciences, mathematics, and certain areas of historiography. We have not, however, had any thinker who so far would deserve to be ranked even a modest second-rate internationally. 33

It is clear from this passage that Lukács compares Hungarian culture with the greatest and most original European cultures. He continues to point out:

What I speak of is not the history of philosophy in the professional sense. What I have in mind is the productive impact of philosophy on culture, the interplay of national culture and philosophy. ... What Descartes or Diderot did for French culture, Kant or Hegel for German culture, Belinsky or Chernyshevsky for Russian culture had been unknown to us, and one cannot find even a remote analogy. In fact, we have not had a demand for it either. 34

Lukács is at this point raising problems of national history.

Philosophy at its best is the most abstract summation of man's relation to the world, that is, to nature, society, his own self and thought. From this standpoint the connection between a nation's social character and philosophical culture is important and serious. 35

Further on Lukács gives the following characterization of two of Europe's greatest philosophical cultures:

French development in an earlier period, and the upturn in Russian thinking that started in the early 19th century. In both cases philosophy was the prime theoretical weapon in ... the elimination of medieval vestiges, in the revolution that eradicated feudalism. In what lay the strength of the two trends of philosophy in France and Russia? What was the secret of their profound impact on the two national cultures? They explored reality with great perseverance, conceptualized the findings shrewdly and without fear of the consequences, and went on to discover the laws inherent in them. They did so with the conviction that the generalized knowledge which they were amassing would be translated into reality and become the guideline by which the people might transform society, that, by enlightening the people, philosophical enlightenment would become the guideline for a superior, meaningful and happy way of life for society, nation and mankind. 36
The great era of French philosophy paved the way for the bourgeois revolution, and the upturn in Russian philosophy prepared the ground for the socialist revolution.

The golden age of German philosophy also coincided with the intellectual preparations for the bourgeois democratic revolution. Yet this latter development may be characterized briefly as follows: that its highly refined intellectual generalizations and syntheses lacked the lively and real social basis which lent exceptional courage and insight to the French and Russian philosophies. German philosophy was, consequently, basically idealistic. Though in philosophy's most general and abstract sphere it has managed to make a transition to dialectical thought and, on an idealistic basis, to create the most sophisticated form of dialectic (Hegel), concerning reality it has necessarily been more obscure and backward and less courageous than the other two philosophies. Its statements of principle are of a very high standard, yet in applying the principles to practice, it has been hesitant, abstract and vague. Hence it follows that the resultant philosophy and culture have exerted a profound influence on high accomplishments in ideology (Goethe, Schiller, Heine), without having shown themselves capable of influencing the innovative tendencies of the people at large. It is no accident that this intellectual preparation for the German democratic revolution was the preparation for a revolution that failed. It is no accident that the most refined new German philosophy, materialist dialectic, has had the least influence upon the culture of its homeland. Neither is it an accident that after the downfall of the revolution of 1848, all the negative aspects of philosophical development multiplied in Germany, and that German thought became the guideline for reactionary thinking around the world.37

We can see from this passage that Lukács did not idealize even German philosophical culture. The less so the English one. As he put it:

Concerning its type, the first period of modern English philosophy (Bacon, Hobbes) resembled the French development. Yet after the 'Glorious Revolution', the class compromise between the nobility and bourgeoisie, which facilitated the prosperity of capitalism in Britain, the social function and entire character of philosophy underwent a radical change. Since then philosophy has sought to clear the way for the development of capitalist production and capitalist ideology in such a way so as to use epistemological considerations for eliminating from the thinking of the people all problems that could disturb the class compromise. The resultant hypocrisy, which manifests itself philosophically in agnosticism and skepticism, has since determined the official mainstream of English thought.38

While English philosophy became the ideology of the compromise between the nobility and bourgeoisie after a victorious revolution, in Hungary the pre-1848 philosophical endeavors were arrested just because the revolution had been put down and the compromise of 1867 shut the door before radical thought for a long time.

Hungarian development has been marked by a cant that strongly differs from the English one, a particular hypocrisy that thrives on Hungarian soil: it is a general agreement among 'responsible' persons that to speak of the vital and decisive problems of the Hungarian nation is forbidden, not polite, unbecoming of gentlemen.39

The vital problems are oppression, exploitation, the relationship between Hungarians, the ethnic minorities and neighbours, and Hungarian national independence. The set of Hungarian compromises was abrogated first and most forcefully by Endre Ady, whose radicalism, Lukács holds, makes him the greatest poet in the world literature of the beginning of the century. The compromise, again, was cancelled by Béla Bartók, whose art has ascended to becoming one of the greatest achievements of music in the twentieth century. And finally, in part under the influence of Ady and Bartók, Lukács strove to annul the compromise in the sphere of philosophy. Since that sphere was all but a terra incognita for Hungarian culture, his was the most difficult task. Within a period of twenty to thirty years, his endeavors had begun to produce internationally recognized works, the first products of Hungarian thought that were of a world standard. The secret of these internationally recognized achievements lies in this: that only communism has
been able to solve the fundamental problems of the Hungarian people in the twentieth century. It is convincingly proved by Lukács’s work that a new Hungarian culture is inconceivable without identification with the Marxist method and with the application of its theory.

Lukács’s philosophical accomplishment provides only the opportunity for thought to play a serious role in Hungarian culture. It is absolutely necessary to argue about that trend of the literature on Lukács which alleges that with the advance of science the epochal ideas in his work have become obsolete, or which claims that his works are sketchy, doctrinaire or abstract, or—most importantly—which arrogantly attempts to discredit his analyses of Hungarian culture. Only if literature of this kind is rigorously criticized can that Marxist philosophy of which Hungarian praxis was the basic source, be capable of exerting its full influence on Hungarian culture.

Notes
1 György Lukács, Magyar Irodalom—Magyar Kultúra (Hungarian Literature— Hungarian Culture), Válaszadott tanulmányok (Budapest: Gondolat, 1970), pp. 695 ff.
2 Lipótváros was a fashionable residential district in Budapest, located on the left bank of the Danube, in Pest; it was favored by the nouveau riche, mostly Jewish, bourgeois. Lipótváros also symbolized a certain ambivalent attitude common in those circles: on the one hand, a frantic nouveau riche desire to be noticed at all costs; on the other, a heightened sensitivity to cultural matters, which was rare in the traditional Hungarian ruling class. The district—no longer called by its old name—is still favored by Jewish professional and business groups.
3 Sándor Petőfi (1823—49) was one of Hungary’s greatest and most beloved poets, who played an important part in the 1848—49 Hungarian revolution and War of Independence. He was killed in battle at the age of 26.
4 See Lukács, preface to Magyar Irodalom, pp. 5—7.
5 Zsolt Bethy (1848—1922) was a novelist and literary critic who became an influential Hungarian literary historian of the positivist school. He was a professor at the University of Budapest and a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. From the 1890s on he was a staunch opponent of progressive movements and was instrumental in defeating Lukács’s academic aspirations at the University of Budapest.
6 Bernát Alexander (1850—1927), philosopher and aesthetician, was a professor of the history of philosophy at the University of Budapest (and father of the renowned psychoanalytic pioneer Franz Alexander). He was the mentor of a whole generation of Hungarian humanists; as editor of the official journal of the Philosophical Society, Athenaum, he furthered many aspiring scholars such as Karl Mannheim and Lukács. He translated many works by Kant, Spinoza, Hume, Descartes, and Diderot into Hungarian.
7 Endre Ady (1877—1919), the most famous twentieth-century Hungarian poet, was a central figure of Hungary’s cultural life. His revolutionary poetry and opposition to Hungarian officialdom and provinciality had a far-reaching and lasting impact on a whole generation of young Hungarians.
8 Béla Balázs (Herbert Bauer) (1884—1949) was a poet, playwright, critic, and revolutionary, best known in the West as the first theoretician of the cinema. His friendship with Lukács lasted from 1909 to 1919. He was the initiator of the so-called Sunday Circle and lectured at the Free School of the Humanities. He joined the Communist party in 1919 and fled to Vienna after the collapse of the Hungarian Republic of Councils. He returned to Budapest after 1945.
9 Holnap (Tomorrow) was an anthology of modern Hungarian poetry published in 1908.
10 Lukács, preface, pp. 7—8.
11 Edmund Wilson, the American man of letters, recounted in a New Yorker article (April 20, 1963) how he had first become acquainted with Ady’s poetry in French and English translations, all of which he found “rather flat.” So he embarked on learning the language of Ady, whose poetry impressed him “as deserving the enthusiasm that is felt for him by most of his compatriots” (p. 190).
12 Ervin Szabó (1877—1918) was a left-wing social democrat who was at one time Lukács’s mentor in Marxism. He was a leading member of the anarchistsyndicalist opposition within the Second International.
13 Nyugat (West), a leading periodical of the literary renewal in Hungary, was founded in 1908. Most of the period’s literary celebrities were published there, and not only those from Hungary. It was open to rep-
resenatives of all kind of -isms: symbolism, impressionism, naturalism. Lukács always had a strained relationship with the editors of Nyugat. Its progressive editorial policy was responsible for the fact that in the early 1910s it had commissioned articles by Sigmund Freud.

14 Huzdak Század (Twentieth Century) was the leading sociological journal in Hungary between 1906 and 1919. Oscar Jászi was its founding editor. Not only Lukács but also Karl Mannheim, Karl Polányi, and others were among its contributors.

15 Lukács, preface, pp. 8–9.


17 Lukács, preface, p. 13.

18 Arnold Hauser (1892–1978), art historian and sociologist of art, was a member of the Sunday Circle and friend of Karl Mannheim. He emigrated after the collapse of the 1919 revolution and in due time became a professor at the University of Leeds in England. He returned to Hungary shortly before his death. Frederick Antal (1887–1954), art historian, was also a member of the Sunday Circle who left Hungary in 1919. He lived and worked first in Vienna and Berlin, then settled in England in 1934. His best-known work is Classicism and Romanticism (1966). He was considered the leading Marxist art historian of his time. Karl Mannheim (1897–1947) is best known as the founder of the sociology of knowledge. He chose Lukács as his mentor at an early age, but their friendship came to an end in 1916. Mannheim attended the Sunday Circle and was a founding member of the Free School of the Humanities in 1917. He left Hungary in 1919, took his Habilitation with Alfred Weber in Heidelberg, and taught at the universities of Heidelberg and Frankfurt am Main. He emigrated to England after the Nazi takeover, and held teaching positions at the London School of Economics and the University of London. Among his works are "Conservative Thought" and Ideology and Utopia (1926). Charles De Tolnay (1899–1981), art historian, member of the Sunday Circle, and lecturer at the Free School, left Hungary in 1919, studied in Vienna with Dvorak, and went to live in Paris in 1933. He emigrated to the United States in 1939 and became a professor of art history at Princeton. He returned to Europe in 1965 and became director of the Casa Buonarroti in Florence. He was a well-known Bruegel and Michelangelo scholar.


21 Ibid., p. 15.

22 Jenő Landler (1875–1928) was a Hungarian-Jewish lawyer and later a leading member of the Hungarian Communist Party, especially during the Vienna Exile.

23 Béla Kun (1886–1939) was one of the founders of the Hungarian Communist Party in November 1918 and the leader of the Republic of Councils in 1919. He emigrated to Vienna after the collapse of the Commune and finally settled in the Soviet Union, dying a victim of Stalin's purges in 1939.

24 Reference is to the Blum Theses, originally a draft report to the Second Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party, written in 1928.

25 Lukács, preface, p. 18.

26 József Réval (1899–1959) was one of the leading members of the Hungarian Communist Party, a leading theoretician, often a counterpart of Lukács, and a one-time member of the Sunday Circle.

27 Mihály Babits (1883–1941) was, after Ady, the most important member of the Nyugat group, editor of its review section. Poet, writer, and essayist, he was Hungary's most prominent literary and progressive-liberal-humanist spokesman between the two wars. Jónás könyve (The Book of Jonah) is a confessional narrative poem dealing with guilt and responsibility, written shortly before Babits's death of cancer.

28 Allusion is to an urban (Jewish) liberal anti-fascist literary group called Urbánusok. Its members were indifferent, even hostile, to the literary movement originating in the countryside; népiesek was a radical peasant literary movement, some of whose members blended social criticism with an "irrational" ideology.

29 Mihály Csokonai Vitéz (1773–1805) was a Hungarian poet of the enlightenment, the author of a still popular comic epic, sensitive lyrical poems, and satirical plays. Attila József (1905–37) was Hungary's leading revolutionary poet after Ady's death until his suicide in 1937. He is still a considerable force and influence in Hungarian poetry.

30 János Erdélyi (1814–68), an influential nineteenth-century democratic critic, was one of the first to popularize Hegel in Hungary.

31 György Bálint (1906–43), a Marxist journalist and critic, was one of the bravest and most talented members of the literary Left in the Horthy era in Hungary. He perished in the Holocaust.

32 Lukács, preface, pp. 18–19.

33 Ibid., p. 20.

34 See the article "Dezső Kosztolányi," in Magyar Irodalom, p. 26.

35 Ibid., pp. 34–36. Quotation is from the article "A Holnap költői" ("The Poets of Tomorrow"), written in 1908.

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36 Mihály Vörösmarty (1800—1855) was the Hungarian author of historical epics and lyric poetry. His works display a powerful romantic imagination and considerable beauty. The work in question, Csongor és Tünde, is actually a philosophical play in verse, based on a fairy tale, written in 1831 but still popular in Hungary.
37 See Lukács, "A magyar drámaról" ("On the Hungarian Drama"), written in 1909, in Magyar Irodalom, p. 38.
38 Ibid., pp. 45 and 51. The article is on Endre Ady, also from 1909.
39 Zsigmond Móricz (1879—1942), Hungary's prominent twentieth-century novelist, was also the author of short stories depicting the misery, tribulations, elementary forces, and dynamics of Hungarian peasant life. He was also the founder of the populist school.
40 See Lukács, "Móricz Zsigmond novellás könyve" ("A Collection of Móricz's Short Stories"), in Magyar Irodalom, p. 60.
41 Lukács, "Kinek nem kell és miért Balázs Béla költészete?" ("Who Rejects Béla Balázs's Poetry and Why?") in Magyar Irodalom, pp. 133—34. The article contains some sharp polemics and was written in 1918.
42 Mór Jókai (1825—1904) was one of Hungary's most popular novelists, whose books are still avidly read today; many of them are being turned into movies. He wrote in a high-romantic vein.
43 Zsigmond Kemény, Baron (1814—75), member of the Hungarian lower aristocracy, was a novelist and journalist as well as politician. He was the author of important historical and social novels. József Eötvös, Baron (1813—71), of the same origins as Kemény, was a novelist, journalist, politician, and important figure in Hungarian public life. His realistic novels were widely read not only in Hungary but also in Victorian England.
44 See Lukács, Magyar Irodalom, pp. 150 and 151.
45 Ibid., p. 158. Written in 1939, Lukács's article is devoted to Ady, the "Great Bard of the Hungarian Tragedy."
46 Béla Zsolt (1895—1949) was a leading Hungarian-Jewish journalist of liberal persuasion, especially influential in the 1930s.
47 Lukács was in this case very perceptive in pointing out this tragic constellation of talents: János Vajda (1827—97), poet and journalist, was a forerunner of modern city-life poets; Lajos Tolnai (1837—1902), novelist, was a bitter critic of contemporary Hungarian life, especially that of the lesser nobility and officialdom; Kálmán Mikszáth (1847—1910) was also a novelist and journalist, whose work is still widely read in Hungary.
48 Reference is to the War of Independence, the armed conflict of 1848—49 between the Habsburgs and Hungary led by the well-known revolutionary figure Lajos Kossuth. The uprising was crushed when the Habsburg monarch called in the armies of the czar. Thirteen generals were executed by the Austrians on October 6, 1849, which has since been one of Hungary's national holidays.
49 See Lukács, Magyar Irodalom, pp. 443—44. Entitled "Egy rossz regény margójára" ("Marginal Note on a Bad Novel"), this piece was written in 1947.
50 Ibid., p. 606. The article is devoted to Ady's significance and influence and was written in 1969.
51 Ibid., p. 609.
52 Ibid., pp. 17—18.
53 Ibid., p. 471.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., p. 473.
56 Ibid., p. 473.
57 Ibid., p. 476.
58 Ibid., pp. 476—77.
59 Ibid., p. 477.
Revolution and Ethics: Lukács's Ethic in 1919 and its Implications for Recent Hungarian Literature

by

Farkas József

By the second half of the eighties, the problems of socio-economic development were on the rise in the world again. The illusions, the promises to abolish poverty overnight had faded away, the high-sounding slogans had given way to the solemn meditation, 'what next?'. The former class struggle had grown into the contest between two world systems, and yet: humanity invariably has to face the alternative between survival and annihilation. In this situation, the human soul turns inward to gather strength, the nation seeks a fixed point in the message of its historical past, and for the working class movement it becomes imperative to look backward, into its past, and search the thoughts reflecting the missed opportunities with the claim of moving forward. If the individual finds the way out of the pressing circumstances by multiplying his will power, and the nation finds the redress of tragedies, imposed on it by historical fate, in the necessity of concerted action, the working class movement can find strength in the revival of ethics which can refresh it and can give it back its faith and trustworthiness, an ethic which was pushed into the background in its revolutionary course.

It is probably no accident that György Lukács, one of the greatest thinkers of our age, was the first among Marxists to point out most vigorously the central role of ethics in revolutionary action, in particular in 1919, during the months of the Hungarian Republic of Councils, when the nation took refuge in revolution after the tragic historical fall in World War I. The eyes which probed into the future could perceive a world on the basis of the Lukácsian ethic, where every individual could find his place and mission after the abolition of classes—an event which, unfortunately, Lukács himself thought to be illusively imminent.¹

It was in the context of, and in the process of outlining, the moral-political and cultural aims of the Republic of Councils that Lukács set up the claim for a new type of man who would be able to realize the full human equality of classless society, and who would be ready even for sacrifice in the interest of this society. He raised the new, intricate problems which the active individual has to face in the praxis of socialist revolution in his fundamental essay, "Tactics and Ethics", and in a number of other writings, too. One of the problems is the inner conflict of the revolutionary type of man between the eternal commandment 'you shall not kill' and the pressure of the armed class struggle. The choice between the two 'sins' is unavoidable: either the individual accepts the class struggle with all its consequences, or he does not accept it, which is also a form of action because it means the betrayal of the people's revolution. As Lukács
stressed, in this question “ethics relates to the individual and the necessary consequence of this relationship is that the individual’s conscience and sense of responsibility are confronted with the postulate that he must act as if on his action or inaction depended the changing of the world’s destiny.”2 As Lukács put it at that time, the active participation in the class struggle, the individual’s conscious acceptance of ‘sin’ are necessary in the interest of the revolutionary transformation of society, but they become justified by accepting sacrifice during the struggle:

ethical self-awareness makes it quite clear that there are situations—tragic situations—in which it is impossible to act without burdening oneself with guilt. But at the same time it teaches us that, even faced with the choice of two ways of incurring guilt, we should still find that there is a standard attaching to correct and incorrect action. This standard we call sacrifice.3

He expressed the ethic of action and sacrifice in another essay, in which he supported the defensive war of the Republic of Councils:

Now we have an unquestionable standard for measuring who is a true revolutionary. Now the struggle of the proletariat has its definite unity of action: the will to defeat international counterrevolution, the international bourgeoisie. It is a will which, in case of need, will gladly sacrifice everything, even life, on the altar of the common cause.4

The acceptance of action and sacrifice, the conscious participation in the class struggle is, therefore, morally both determinant and absolving:

Everyone who at the present time opts for communism is therefore obliged to bear the same individual responsibility for each and every human being who dies for him in the struggle, as if he himself had killed them all. But all those who ally themselves to the other side, the defence of capitalism, must bear the same individual responsibility for the destruction entailed in the new imperialist revanchist wars which are surely imminent, and for the future oppression on the nationalities and classes. From the ethical point of view, no one can escape responsibility with the excuse that he is only an individual, on whom the fate of the world does not depend.5

At the same time, the fact that the individual is ready for self-sacrifice in the class struggle, in the interest of the new world which is brought into being in the bloody laboring of the revolution, will raise ‘sin’—committed in the course of the class struggle—to the level of historical necessity which, according to Lukács, means the absolution of the individual from the responsibility for the act. This is why he quotes Hebbel’s Judith at the end of the essay: “Even if God has placed sin between me and my deed enjoined upon me—who am I to be able to escape it?”6

Judith’s divine mission is, obviously, to kill Holofernes in the defence of her own people. But it is a sin to kill. But Judith commits the true sin—at least in Hebbel’s drama—by refusing to accomplish her ‘divine mission’ after the night she has spent with the leader of the enemy. She decides to kill Holofernes out of a desire for personal revenge after he has mistreated her, and this is a greater ethical offence, morally this sin becomes far more serious. If we place this beautifully expressed thought of Hebbel’s Judith into Lukács’s argumentation, the ‘divine mission’ becomes, obviously, the ‘world historical mission of the proletarian class struggle’ which, in Lukács’s formulation, means the ‘mission to redeem society’, which can find action only through proletarian class-consciousness. In this sense ‘sin’ is committed only when the individual proletarian fighter is unable to shake off his hatred for the exploiters, and in this way individual revenge has a share in his action when he accomplishes his ‘divine mission’. This is
why, as noted above, Lukács stressed individual responsibility for every human being who had been killed, even if it was not he who committed the act.

It is well known that Lukács’s ideological and political development toward the acceptance of class-conscious action in the communist sense was accomplished with striking rapidity; the change from “Bolshevism as a Moral Problem”, in which he repudiated communism, to “Law and Order and Violence”, in which he took a definite communist position, was spectacular. His admission to the communist party had preceded the writing of this latter article. It has been pointed out—for example, by Lee Congdon, who does not see any particular contradiction between these two articles and their ethical contents, and by L. Ferenc Lendvai, who explains Lukács’s quick change in the light of the particular Hungarian situation—that Lukács’s affiliation with the communists followed from his historico-philosophical views, that his deliberation led him to this point in the course of getting acquainted with Marxism. Zoltán Novák has provided the most detailed account of the shaping of Lukács’s ethical views in this period.

If we bear in mind that the young Lukács always formulated for himself the meaning of his life in the triad of ‘I—Work—Sacrifice’, in which the I is the person of the writer-philosopher, the Work is the work of art (the book of essays or monograph study, and so on, which must be written on a high cultural plane), and Sacrifice is the writer’s renunciation of living a full life in order to transpose it into the Work. The fact that he could transpose this triad into his new world view precisely by working out a communist ethic, made it easier for him to become a communist. The I is replaced by the whole and the individual of the class engaged in revolutionary struggle, the Work becomes the classless society to be created, waged by the revolution which will realize full human equality, while Sacrifice is the abnegation or even self-sacrifice of the participants in this struggle. This sacrifice also means the establishment of cultural values, which occurs in the interest of renewing the world culture, or, as Lukács himself put it later in the heat of the debate concerning cultural policy, ‘politics is only a means, the end is culture’. David Kettler has arrived at a similar conclusion in his Marxismus und Kultur.

The other ethical problem for Lukács is the following: although it is true that the new society—as Zsigmond Móricz put it at that time—should mean the flowering of individual liberty, how can it be reconciled with collective action in the interest of the community and, especially, with the involuntary implementation of revolutionary terror? Lukács’s answer to this question is that

class terror has the task: to destroy institutions and ideologies, and to create institutions—not those of classes, but institutions of humanity. It is not a fight against individuals. Individuals appear only as representatives of institutions. We know that this fight against people, even indirectly, is contrary to morals. Our brilliant fate is: to accept terror which we hate, for the possibility of the moral life of humanity, of the life of humanity without terror.

The moral commandment that revolutionary terror should be implemented not against individuals but in the interest of abolishing classes, on the one hand, and that the new institutions must serve the whole of humanity, on the other, finds a more concrete expression in “A kommunizmus erkölcsi alapja” [The moral basis of communism]:

If communism wins definitely, if thereby every class distinction drifts away from social life and together with it from the consciousness of the people, if economic life and together with it the concerns of subsistence cease to play any role in the structure of the people’s life, the question arises: what will support and unite this new society, what will be the most important contents of the life of people living in it? To this question
the answer can be given only from the perspectives of morality. The only way that the radical extirpation of class distinctions will have any meaning whatsoever is if, thereby, everything that divides the people disappears from their lives: all anger and hatred, all jealousy and arrogance. Or in short: if classless society becomes the society of mutual love and understanding. But the changes in society and economic life can only lay the foundations of such a society, can only create its possibilities, because in order to realize it, people themselves have to change.15

Lukács knew quite well that this changed human behavior, which is the basis of classless society, could not be realized before the establishment of its social conditions. Yet he attached great importance to calling attention to this fact in the circumstances of the sharpest class struggle, lest the means—the class struggle—overshadow the end, the establishment of a society that equally admits every individual. He wished to stress this because, as he writes, “the transformation of the economy of society, cannot in itself create this new society. It remains a mere possibility if people are not prepared for it. If, at the same time, the classless society does not become the society of love”.16

For Lukács, it was education that was capable of transforming the people in this manner, which is why he accepted an important and leading role in carrying out the educational policy of 1919. In June of that year, at the Young Workers’ Congress, he stressed the importance of learning, stating that ‘the struggle for culture, self-education, and learning must become the central activity of young workers’. For, by ‘devoting yourselves to cultural tasks’, besides economic work, besides production, ‘you are devoting yourselves to that area of social leadership which will contribute the dominant concern of a future society’. He saw the difference between young workers and adults, their different moral attitudes, as follows:

In the interest of our ultimate objective we are continually forced to compromise. We cannot afford to be particular about the means we adopt [...] Your, on the other hand, are not directly involved in this struggle. Your task is to wage a political struggle free form compromise and to set a moral standard for the wider struggle.17

Lukács advocated unrelenting class struggle in the interest of establishing a new, classless society and, concurrently, the equality of all people at the end of the struggle, which accounts for the dual character of his ethic—or, as he himself put it in 1967—its “disharmonious dualism”.18 As he says,

if we want this class struggle to be truly victorious in the moment of victory, everybody needs to have an inner preparedness for love, everybody needs to have a new orientation at the moment of the abolition of class distinctions (although we are very far from it): an orientation toward love, understanding, and unity.19

He stressed this disharmonious dualism again at the end of his article:

these seeming contradictions unite in the problem of education. Unrelenting class struggle against the bourgeoisie until its total destruction (as a class). Total equality in the field of education. There is no class struggle against children, because in every child we have to see a member of a future society that knows no class distinctions.20

At the end of the revolutionary struggle Lukács envisaged a highly educated, unified society embracing all individuals. One component essential to attaining this goal is the consistent waging of the class struggle together with the future realization of human equality, and the other component is the grueling work by means of which the individuals and masses, who in essence formerly were kept away from culture, can rise to the
state of 'actual taking possession of culture'. Motivated by these aims, the cultural policy
of the Republic of Councils—and Lukács himself, who as commissar of education was
responsible for educational and artistic policy together with Zsigmond Kunfi—accom-
plished a great deal in the practical realm. But Lukács explained this important tenet
theoretically, too in April, 1919: 'Communist society aims at abolishing class differ-
ences.' But, in essence:

It is the question of change of production [...] But the establishment of this new order of production which
the proletariat is now elaborating, cannot end, cannot close down this process. Inner, educational, cultural
prerogatives will not cease to exist merely by virtue of the change of the order of production. This change
brings about only the possibility: the possibility of inner equality, the realization of which is the task of labor,
education.

Today the proletariat has all powers in its hands. And it enforces this power everywhere, in the field of
culture, too. It took into possession all the institutional means that are necessary to the dissemination of
culture, it took into possession all the products of culture through which people can make contact with culture.
Yet all this is only a possibility. The painting, the book or school does not belong to those who actually or
lawfully have it. It belongs to those who draw the most benefit from it, who derive the most enjoyment, the
greatest edification from it. The fact that the works of art, theaters, schools, and so on, are in the hands of
the proletariat establishes only the possibilities of a new culture, its actual taking into possession. Of the age,
in which all the productions of culture become the inner property of all of the workers.

This article also strengthens the inner cogency of the statement that he made in the
course of a literary debate, mentioned above: 'politics is only a means, the end is cul-
ture.'

The third question raised in Lukács's ethic is formulated in the relationship of in-
dividual and class interest concerning the fields of production, economy, and everyday
action, while looking for the common denominator of proletarian class interest and the
universal interest of mankind. Lukács addressed these concerns in his article, "The Role
of Morality in Communist Production". He probably knew Jenő Varga's ideas concern-
ing the interrelations of the Russian Revolution and production, and to some extent,
these ideas had shed light on the interdependence of revolution and production as well
as that of ethics. Lukács, however, was able to draw new insights from this interde-
pendence, which the history of socialism has considerably justified since then. It is no
accident that he himself considered this article to be the most important among his
writings of 1919.

Lukács starts out from the proposition that, in the new society, 'freedom of morality
will take the place of legal compulsion in the regulation of all behavior.' Although he
sees that the proletariat, like every class, wants class hegemony, he thinks that

the consistent implementation of this class hegemony will destroy class differences and bring into being a
classless society [...] by forcing all human beings into that democracy of the proletariat [...] The consistent
implementation of the dictatorship of the proletariat can only end with the democracy of the proletariat ab-
sorbing the dictatorship and making it superfluous. After classes have ceased to exist, dictatorship can no
longer be exercised against anybody.

Lukács—at least in this article—postulates that, in everyday life, 'the gulf between
behavior based on merely selfish interests and pure morality is bridged by class moral-
ity.' He thinks if the proletariat weighs both its individual and class interests it will
voluntarily take part in socialist construction according to its best abilities. Otherwise
the 'proletariat cannot survive; the class hegemony of the proletariat disappears'. There
are two possible remedies for the proletariat:
Either the individuals who constitute the proletariat realize that they can help themselves only by voluntarily setting about the strengthening of labour discipline and thereby raising productivity; or, where they as individuals are incapable of doing so, they create institutions which are in a position to carry out this necessary function. In the latter case they create for themselves a legal order by means of which the proletariat compels its individual members, the proletarians, to act in accordance with their class interests. The proletariat then exercises dictatorship against itself [...] They also, however—and we must not disguise the problem from ourselves—involve great dangers for the future. If, on the one hand, the proletariat creates its own labour discipline; if the labour system of the proletarian state is built on a moral basis; then the external compulsion of the law will automatically cease with the abolition of the class structure of society. In other words, the state will wither away [...] If, on the other hand, the proletariat adopts a different course, it will be obliged to create for itself a legal order which can not be abolished automatically through historical progress. In that case a tendency could evolve which would endanger both the physiognomy and the achievability of the ultimate objective. For if the proletariat is compelled to create a legal order in this way, that legal order must itself be overthrown—and who can tell what convulsions and sufferings will be caused by the transition from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom via such a circuitous path?27

It appears from this argumentation that Lukács can advance toward verifying the basic economic problems of society only from the standpoint of ethics, that is, that in the long run it is production that provides the secure basis for establishing a socialist, classless society.

It is well known that the extensive literature dealing with Lukács’s life work regards his writings in 1919 as messianic-idealistic in character, partly from the standpoint of the philosophy of history, and partly, as viewed from the perspectives of the movement, of politics. Undoubtedly, Lukács himself censured the ‘utopian-messianic’ traits of his thoughts, regarding them as sectarian, in his often inevitable self-criticism. But this is not to say that the messianic ideas toward the end of World War I had been bearers of blameworthy tendencies. On the contrary: when, after a long debate, Gorky recognized Lenin’s truth and that of the Russian Revolution, he applied the idea of messianism.28 In the autumn of 1918, when Lukács had not yet accepted communist ideas, he said that the will of a democratic world order and the struggle for it “make the proletariat the bearer of the social redemption of mankind, make it the messianic class of world history”.29 And it is very interesting that in 1967, speaking of his own Marxist development, he warned that

the writings assembled here do more than simply illuminate the stages of my personal development; they also show the path taken by intellectual events generally and as long as they are viewed critically they will not be lacking in significance for an understanding of the present situation.30

If we look back to the ideological-political objectives of the Hungarian Republic of Councils from a proper historical distance—although this revolution proved to be an experiment that tried to exploit the historical possibilities—it exhibited to the world a striking messianic faith and moral strength, which derived from the perspectives of an imminent world revolution. Lenin, it is true, also shared this strategic illusion, this hope in a new world revolution. Here it is essential to point out that, as at that time Lukács found that the path of development ran from the dictatorship of the proletariat via proletarian democracy and toward a classless society (because “after classes have ceased to exist, dictatorship can no longer exercised against anybody”),31 Lenin—speaking of the Hungarian dictatorship—also pointed out that

the fact that the Hungarian revolution has come into being in a different way than ours will prove to the world something that was not clear in relation with Russia, that Bolshevism is connected with the new proletarian democracy, with the workers’ democracy which will replace the old parliament.32

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Lukács’s revolutionary ethic could rest on this historical basis precisely because he experienced the possibilities offered by history and tried to work out their lessons theoretically. Was it an illusion to reckon with the lasting existence of the Hungarian Republic of Councils? Possibly yes, but this question was not at all decided, and as I have indicated above, Lenin also reckoned with a world revolution upon the outbreak of proletarian revolutions in the countries defeated in the war.

The proletarian dictatorship in Hungary, which came into being without bloodshed in 1919 meant—in Lenin’s words—a 'moral victory' for Soviet Russia, precisely by virtue of its peculiar revolutionary path. The most important differences have been pointed out by József Pogány, namely, that while in Russia the proletariat was 'attacked from the rear by the intellectuals,' in Hungary 'there was no trace of similar resistance. The manpower of engineers, teachers, and civil servants necessary to production, education, and state administration remained in place and subordinated itself to the power and the will of the proletariat.' An even more important difference was that

in Russia the proletariat did not take a common stand when the proletarian masses and the dictatorship came to power. The workers of industry and agriculture were divided into several parties, and by quarreling, they weakened one another. In the decisive moment, proletarian unity was realized in Hungary as if by magic, the two proletarian parties united on the basis of the dictatorship.\footnote{11}

These differences are, in essence, also reflected in the objectives and optimism of the Lukácsian ethic in 1919.

What had led the Hungarian masses, including the intellectuals, to accept the proletarian revolution? Firstly, the decision of the Paris peace conference and the Vyx note, which supported the demands of the neighbor countries on Hungarian territorial integrity in order to change an ever growing part of the country into a base of operations of the Entente powers for their intervention against Soviet Russia. This made the national question into a central problem. Moreover, the revolutionization of the masses of workers played a role in this process because at that time these masses drifted to the left of the policy of the social democrats (the soldiers rushing home, the land-hungry peasants, masses of refugees from the occupied territories), gradually carrying the social democratic leadership itself to the left. And, finally, the advance of the Red Army in Poland, its relative closeness to the Carpathians in March, 1919, awakened the hope of military assistance for a victorious proletarian revolution in Hungary together with the hope of reoccupying and defending the unjustly occupied territories inhabited by Hungarians.

History, however, did not realize these hopes, and for this reason the starting point of contemporaneous, Lukácsian thinking had become an illusion. The Hungarian Red Army, advancing in its defensive war in Upper Northern Hungary, retreated on the strength of the promise of the Entente, thereby causing a feeling of defenseless among the masses. Furthermore, the economic blockade crippled the country and made the supply of the population almost impossible, and—although this was only later recognized as an error in politics—the redistribution of the land failed to materialize, which caused great disappointment in the masses of peasants. The Soviet Army retreated from the Hungarian borders, the landing of Wrangel’s army had changed the center of gravity on the Russian front, and so the expected military assistance did not materialize. By the end of July, the Hungarian Republic of Councils had become a country blockaded and encircled by enemy forces, its territory shriveled, and, at the same time, it was compelled to suppress the unrest of the formerly enthusiastic masses by means of a growing terror.

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The Russian Revolution, which Gorky referred to as a messianic mission, had emerged victorious, but Hungary proved Endre Ady’s prophecy concerning Hungarian messiahs:

More bitter is our weeping,
different the griefs that try us.
A thousand times Messiahs
are the Magyar Messiahs.

A thousand times they perish,
unblest their crucifixion,
for vain was their affliction,
oh, vain was their affliction. 34

Lukács, occupying a firm theoretical position, remained faithful to the idea of a future classless society and continued to explain his political-ethical views in the face of the coming defeat, as proven by his article, “The Role of Morality in Communist Production”, which appeared on July 20, 1919. Viewed from a historical perspective, the one hundred and thirty-three days of the Republic of Councils had far-reaching effects, which, in spite of the defeat of the revolution, manifested themselves in three regards. For one thing, the republic contained the Entente and allied troops for months when they prepared to intervene in Soviet Russia, that is, its mere existence pinned down significant enemy forces. Lenin’s appreciation of this accomplishment can be seen in the fact that he never recognized the Peace Treaty of Trianon. For another, the Hungarian Republic of Councils raised the possibility of establishing proletarian revolution without bloodshed, and, for the first time in history, created its model, making its mark especially in cultural field. Finally, it made possible to work out an ethic for the socialist revolutionary movement, first of all through Lukács’s activity, in which the fate of the individual is built into the democracy of the future classless society, which, in the process of development, will replace the dictatorship of the proletariat and will realize positive relations among people—the ethic of active responsibility.

From the twenties up to the end of the sixties, one could say, two prominent Hungarian writers, József Lengyel and Ervin Sinkó, who began their careers in the 1910s, based their activities on the fundamental ethical views of Lukács, both in their novels portraying the age of revolutions and in their later writings dealing more directly with the questions of the hour. In 1929, for example, in his Visegrádi utca [Visegrád Street], József Lengyel recorded the experiences of establishing the Hungarian Republic of Councils and the revolutionary atmosphere of the previous years. Important historical events, interesting human faces and characters appear before us, as Lengyel revives the age and gives a comprehensive picture with a conscious, mosaic-like technique. He reveals an agitated, formative soul to the reader, objectively expanding and extending the limits of memoirs into literary reportage. With this method he is able to convey faithfully the dynamism of the age, to portray the self-sacrificing resoluteness of the young revolutionists who have as yet barely acquainted themselves with Marxism, and to depict the naivety and pathetic venture of ‘doing something for humanity’. It is no accident, however, that Ottó Korvin's portrait is the most successfully drawn in Lengyel's work. Whenever he speaks of Korvin, his voice becomes affectionate and respectful: in Korvin’s figure he portrays the exemplary type of the communist revolutionary. Sacrifice and modesty, moral courage and thoughtful sagacity, relentless determination and hidden goodness blend in his figure. He is the best embodiment of what
we call—in a Lukácsian sense—the humanism of a revolutionary. This humanism lines up first of all for something, and only later, out of necessity, against something.

At this point I must note that Lengyel displays a bias against the ‘ethicists’ in this work; he draws an ironic portrait of Lukács and his activities in 1919, yet, strangely enough, it is the Lukácsian ethic that manifests itself in his work.

Much later, in 1958, Lengyel returned again to the question of the revolution in his novel, *Prehn Drifting*, which develops his earlier work more broadly. The career of his hero becomes rich in external events, yet he concentrates on describing the inner, mental transformation. Lengyel tries to discover how revolutionary events transform the human soul. This transforming force is, again in the Lukácsian sense, the humanity of the revolution, which pronounces true judgment in the struggle between good and evil. In the novel, Lengyel strives to portray historical events and individual fates simultaneously. In the sequence of chapters, which are enacted in different places, have a message of their own, and contribute to the story as a whole, Lengyel, accomplishes this simultaneous portrayal in a masterly manner.

Similarly, the process of external events and the mental transformation of the personages of the revolution are portrayed simultaneously, in their interaction, in Ervin Sinkó’s novel, *Optimisták* [Optimists], which contemplates the intricate driving forces of the events, the lives of characters, from a basically ethical point of view. Sinkó was an active participant of the revolutionary events, and his primary aim—in 1933—34, when he was writing his book—was to look back upon the magnificent past. Moreover, the writer’s creative mind was fascinated by the ethical aspects of accepting the revolutionary path and the reader of our age—because the book was first published in Hungarian, in Yugoslavia, only in 1953—55—draws from it mainly those historical lessons which can lead to the ethical questions of our time. These are: the conduct of man coming into political power, the possible change of personality occasioned by the possession of power, the question and responsibility of selecting the means by which he wishes to attain the revolutionary aims, and, last but not least, the ‘self-conquest’ of the revolutionary hero, the overshadowing of selfish interests in compliance with the given demands of the struggle. As we can see, Sinkó’s novel touches forcefully on those ethical problems that Lukács endeavored to examine in 1919.

The approach of events from the ethical point of view disrupts the composition to some extent, the inner structure of the novel inducing ‘transmutation’ between the first and second parts, or, rather, as portrayed in the novel, between the struggle that prepared the way for the revolution and the revolution itself. In the first part of the novel, the central problem of the hero is his relationship to the world, his desire to attain perfection in life, a ‘total life’ which includes revolutionary activity and the emotional fullness of individual life, and likewise, the intellectual apprehension, reception, of events taking place in the world, and the indication of immediate tasks. In the second part of the novel, which is set in the period of the ‘realization of dreams’, it becomes clear that the revolution needs an even more perfect man than does the period of preparing for it. For revolutionary commitment, which he has accepted as a token of humanism, sometimes demands ‘inhumanities’ from him, precisely in the interest of the proletariat and mankind, due to the exigencies of the class struggle. Thus, the sequence turns round: the rational indication of tasks will not occur, the intellectual world of the hero will be absorbed by the full acceptance of action that is forced upon him by the events; his inner struggle will come to the fore in order to serve the revolution even through ‘self-sacrifice’.
As a result of this ‘shift’, in the second part of the novel action is always connected directly with the activities of the central figure, with his mental reaction to events, while in the first part an event, which also denotes the passing of time, is seen through the eyes of some of the figures, and in this way outer events appear in the action of the various figures. Thus, for example, it is Lénárt who ‘sees’ the ravages of the editorial offices of Pesti Hírlap, while we gain access to the inner life of the party center in Visegrád street through the distrustful, peasant mentality of the crippled György Kozma, and the meeting of the unemployed in the Municipal Concert Hall, the demonstration against Népszava, and the counter-demonstration of the social democrats the next day are mediated to the reader through the mental reactions of little Rózsi Kozma. In the days of the Republic of Councils, however, it is always the central figure who faces the problems that bear the motives of historical development; his inner, mental reaction to events occupies the center of portrayal. It is in this way that the land hunger of destitute peasants becomes his own experience; in this way he experiences the dilemma of ‘why should I die now when at last our time has arrived,’ which he has left unanswered during his stay among the workers. But the most difficult problem that he has to experience in the dictatorship of the proletariat is to endure the crisis of conscience in applying revolutionary terror, the problem of ‘double conviction’; the seemingly eternal, abstract humanism of ‘you shall not kill’ and the historical command of ‘you must kill’; the dilemma of concurrently accepting both ‘convictions’. The roots of the great effect of the novel can be found in the fact that the central figure faces this problem relentlessly, his soul is candid almost to the point of nakedness. Theoretically it is Vértes, the main ideologue of the novel who can solve this dilemma, but this does not absolve Báti because he examines this question not from the point of view of the proletariat; he knows well that in its revolutionary struggle the proletariat both inflicts and receives wounds, both sacrifices and sheds blood. For him the essence of the questions lies in the dilemma, which shakes him to the bottom of his soul, as to whether revolutionaries like him, who have come to opt for socialist revolution intellectually, convicting capitalism ethically, in the name of mankind, can preserve ethical standards in the face of the historical necessity of revolutionary terror.

It is at this point that the novel almost represents Lukács in Vértes’s figure, who tries to solve this dilemma. The greatness of Optimisták derives from the fact that the motives and interpretations of the actions that are possible on the different levels of revolutionary attitude and can be connected with the events are described by the author as ethical conflicts in the mind of the hero, and it is on the level of this inner conflict where Sinkó represents the response to, and the ‘spiritual image’ of, all those contradictions which are depicted in the course of external events.

Until recently, especially in József Lengyel’s works, the ethical problems of building a new society have been raised in a rather critical mood, describing the mistakes—and the unlawful acts committed in the years of Stalin’s cult—as if they had been directed not against individuals but against the essence of socialist revolution, and had inflicted wounds on its body. In the first place, I have József Lengyel’s Igéső [Enchanter] in mind, a book of short stories, and also his omnibus volume, Elévült tartozás [Lapsed Debt]. These writings are tragic but at the same time beautiful portrayals of human integrity, and the unyielding persistence of his heroes indicates a sense of history which has ‘survived’ the injustices and crimes of the cult of personality. His other works dealing with contemporary life are the manifestations of young heroes who are tossed about between confidence and disbelief, but make their way toward a better future. The
writer applies the self-regenerating ethical fortitude of the working class movement in these writings, he elevates and dissolves, and, in an artistic catharsis, settles and overcomes these tragic historical incidents. The critical response to these works both at home and abroad is well known, and it proves that they were appreciated and accepted by public opinion, and that they exerted an influence on contemporaneous literature.

In the Hungarian prose literature of the sixties—and here I refer to the works of Tibor Cseres, Erzsébet Galgóczi, György Moldova, and other writers, and to some novels or stories that reflect the inner struggles of their heroes—the ethical approach to history came to the fore. This attitude to problems extends to the literature of the seventies; it will suffice to refer here to works such as István Gáll's A ménsgazda [The Manager of the Stud Farm], or István Órkény's Forgatókönyv [Scenario]. All these phenomena are obviously connected with the representational traditions of Hungarian literature, but, to be sure, the question of ethics based on the Lukácsian way of posing the question is a significant driving force in this literature.

(Translated by József Kovács)

Notes

1 See Béla Köpeczi: "Lukács in 1919" in vol. 1, which treats Lukács's ethic in the context of his philosophy of history, and also discusses the Hungarian Republic of Councils and its cultural policy.


3 ibid., p. 10.


5 Georg Lukács: "Tactics and Ethics", in Political Writings, p. 8.

6 ibid., p. 11. Lukács's quote is inaccurate, for Judith's actual words are: 'If you [God] place a sin between me and my deed, who am I to quarrel about it with you and to escape from you', but, as regards Lukács's thoughts, the difference is of no importance.

7 He wrote "'Law and Order' and Violence" in the days following February 20, 1919, when the communist leaders were arrested.


14 György Lukács's speech on the first 'young workers' day', in Forradalomban, pp. 226—27.

16 Ibid. pp. 89—90.
17 Georg Lukács: "Speech at the Young Workers’ Congress", in Political Writings, pp. 39—40.
19 György Lukács: "A kommunizmus erkölcsi alapja", in Forradalomban, p. 90.
20 Ibid. pp. 90—91.
24 Jenő Varga: "A bolseviki uralom jövő kilátásai” [The perspectives of bolshevik rule] Szabadgondolat (December, 1918).
25 See György Lukács’s letter to the editors of Akadémiai Kiadó, dated July 24, 1966. (The original is in the possession of the author—a copy is in the Lukács Archives and Library.)
26 Georg Lukács: “The Role of Morality in Communist Production”, in Political Writings, p. 51.
27 Ibid., p. 52.
28 “Maxim Gorkij üzenete a művelt világhoz” [Maxim Gorky’s message to the educated world] Népszava (December 28, 1918).
31 Georg Lukács: “The Role of Morality in Communist Production”, in Political Writings, p. 49.
33 József Pogány: “Nekünk könnyebb” [For us, it is easier] Népszava (April 13, 1919).

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Realism and Democracy: 
György Lukács after the Liberation

by
István Sőtér

Although Lukács is well known abroad, his role in the recent development of Hungarian culture has remained almost unnoticed. Apart from some synthesizing, longer studies—for example, the writings of Zoltán Kenyeres—literary historiography has not bothered to appraise György Lukács’s activities between 1945 and 1949 in detail, that is, the role that he played in the renewal of Hungarian literature in that period. This task can hardly be postponed now. At this moment, however, we are only at the beginning of the research concerning Lukács’s relationship to Hungarian literature. Some essential elements of this relationship appeared as early as 1919 but, certainly, Lukács dwelt on earlier and contemporary Hungarian literature in a profound manner immediately after 1945, in any case, more profoundly than either before 1919 or during the two and a half decades from the early fifties until his death. We have often heard it said that Lukács somehow held earlier or more recent Hungarian literature ‘in disdain’ as provincial, eclipsed by the literatures of larger nations. When one reads Lukács’s essays and critiques that he wrote after 1945, dealing with Gyula Illyés, László Németh, Tibor Déry, Sándor Márai, the populist writers, or the younger generations, when one thinks of his profound studies on Endre Ady, Mihály Babits, and Attila József, or his article on János Arany’s Toldi, and his short analyses of Dániel Berzsenyi, Zsigmond Kemény, and Kálmán Mikszáth: one can scarcely believe this charge.

Lukács’s career after 1945 deserves attention not only because at that time he dealt with Hungarian literature, but because this period reveals a relieved, active thinker who approached problems with increasing openness. This was the period in Lukács’s career when, moving beyond a rather closed philosophical-aesthetic system that induced to deductive procedures, he had come to recognize the peculiarities of modern Hungarian literature, which, in turn, mitigated this closedness and prepared the spiritual, intellectual mood that enabled him to begin his most important works, Über die Besonderheit als Kategorie der Ästhetik and Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. There are artists and thinkers who do not fully reveal themselves in their writings, and whose spoken words are at least as important as their writings. Lukács was one of these thinkers, and at the end of his life it was possible to record a number of his conversations. It is, thus, all the more regrettable that nothing from among his spoken communications after the Liberation has survived. The writings dealing with Lukács rarely recall his personality, wisdom, or humor, but we ought to sense all these behind his system of thought.

Indeed, the best opportunity to portray Lukács’s character would be provided by his
career after 1945. And it would not be possible to draw this portrait based only on his works: they would rather conceal something that is much needed for the understanding of his role. One can find in Lukács a peculiar combination of confidence in man, openness, and unrelenting judgment; of supercilious forgiveness and a staunch, uncompromising attitude; of unwavering faith and refined skepticism; of practical philosophy and vulnerable sensibility. His reception in Hungary was a cool one, as his discovery, or rather rediscovery, was associated with his *Irásudók felelőssége* [The Responsibility of Intellectuals]. His *Balzac, Stendhal, Zola* served only in part to loosen the inflexibility of the former. His judgments on Lajos Kassák, Dezső Kosztolányi, or László Németh, however unacceptable they may be, must be envisaged in the historical context in which they originated, namely, in the circumstances of emigration, an emigration that conceived of contemporary Hungarian literature as a representative of either 'decaying liberalism', or openly counterrevolutionary, or 'social fascist' tendencies. As is known, he even included Attila József in this latter group. In the light of all this, the way that he recognized Zsigmond Móricz's greatness, or the fact that, in spite of his severe criticism of Mihály Babits, he arrived at some grudging approval of him is not trifling at all, considering Lukács's position at that time. On other occasions, we can feel that Lukács expressed his true appreciation of a given writer through the strictness of his analysis (as exemplified by the critique of Déri's *A befejezett mondat* [The Unfinished Sentence])—but such an assertion is rather risky because the superficial mind is hardly able to recognize such a form of appreciation. Such an analysis is almost an ascetic act, which would therefore scare away rather than encourage many people. Moreover, Lukács's occasionally abstract strictness involuntarily encouraged a dogmatic, exclusive literary policy, which, incidentally, isolated him from cultural life.

Lukács's active and organic participation in cultural life at home after 1945 affected him productively because it promoted the assertion of his true character, that is to say, his disposition toward a subtle and, consequently, fair estimation, combining ideological criticism with the recognition of the author's literary significance. The rigid statements of *Irásudók felelőssége* yielded to a more flexible attitude after 1945. Lukács thought that Kosztolányi's poetry could not be appraised on the basis of his "Pardon" column, but neither can be this episode 'eradicated' from the life of the poet. Although Kassák did not become the 'storm-bird' of the revolution, 'his culturally and artistically refined oeuvre' portrayed the fate of those of his contemporaries who 'have endured the age of the counterrevolution without human and intellectual deterioration'. It would be easy to multiply the number of the examples, in order to prove that it was not Lukács's principles that had changed, but, rather, his relationship to Hungarian literature. Lukács undoubtedly recognized in due time what kind of obscurantism his overstatement would facilitate.

It was the good fortune of Hungarian literature after the Liberation to enjoy the attention and care of the greatest aestheteician of the age. Lukács never became patronizing, and there has not been even one from among the many, often minor critics up to this date, who observed Hungarian literary life as vigilantly and sensitively as Lukács did. He unfailingly responded to all important publications, and even to articles, press controversies, or the appearance of young writers on the literary scene. He reviewed the novels of Déri, László Németh, and Gyula Illyés, as well as the books of Sándor Márai, Ferenc Molnár, and Ferenc Fejtő, and seized the opportunity of debating with Emil Kolozsvári Grandpierre, István Vas, István Bibó, Balázs Lengyel, and others of us. Sometimes his literary criticism occupied only a paragraph in a longer study, but it was
never absent. As a party worker he had to perform these duties, but a party commission could rarely encounter so complete an individual purpose and inclination as his in those years.

Lukács's intensive presence and participation in Hungarian literature and culture after the Liberation have left their marks on the whole period. If we find the years after 1945 to be rich, important, and substantial, this conclusion can be justified because of his contribution and, of course, because of the works that originated at that time. Moreover, in Lukács we became acquainted with the model of a Marxist critic and thinker that has remained unique until this date because this model became effective for the whole of society and, in effect, represented the summing up of the questions of contemporary Hungarian culture. This role of Lukács's in Hungarian literature, however, came to an end in 1949, whereby both Hungarian literature and he himself suffered a great loss.

Our literary historiography will have to give a detailed account of Lukács's views on Hungarian literature, and especially of his critical findings concerning the years after 1945. Although this immense task cannot be achieved on this occasion, we can at least attempt to cast a glance over it.

Even if one is only superficially acquainted with Lukács's oeuvre, one may be familiar with the principles and claims that Lukács set against the literature subsequent to 1945 and employed in the study of earlier Hungarian literature. These were: realism—hence, the refusal of decadence, the isolated ego, and irrationalism; democracy, and herewith an unrelenting coming to terms with past mistakes; the bridging of the gap between urban and populist camps, and so on. Public opinion subsequent to 1945 reacted most favorably to the announcement of the necessity of realism, especially in the essays on Balzac and Stendhal, which offered the model of the dialectic of the appearance of the general in the particular, the presence of the whole in the part, and the transformation of the social into the individual. Lukács explained all this more subtly and openly at this time than in the essays of Probleme des Realismus, which he was later to publish, almost as if anticipating the symbol principle of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, which proceeds from Goethe.

We did not have to be inundated with modernism in those years in order to yearn for clean fountains, and to try to express the reality of a new age with a method that was different from the previous one. Lukács's principle of realism did not mean the imitation of Balzac's or Tolstoy's technique or style—it was the assertion of the idea of democracy in literature. Democracy in literature, as conceived of by Lukács, can materialize only in realism, and, similarly, the condition of realism is democracy—the kind of democracy that, in Lukács's definition, transforms public matter into the inner concern of all men, breeds concord between individual and social being, that is, raises the individual 'case' from its subjectivity. The true examples of this democratism are the great realists, Balzac, Dickens, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky. In this principle of democracy, it is not difficult to recognize the archetype of tua res agitur that he was later to assert so consistently, just as, in the individual concern that becomes public matter, we can recognize the re-qualification of the individual raised to the level of the human race, a concept that is such an important element in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. On the whole, we can say that Lukács's activity immediately after 1945 provided the prototype of a number of works that he wrote in his last period, after Die Besonderheit. This condition also stresses the importance of Lukács's relationship to Hungarian culture in the evolution of his thinking, and whoever wants to understand the creation of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen must have a knowledge of this relationship.
Obviously, the opposite of democracy in this conception is the world of the isolated ego, and, therewith, decadence, irrationalism, and all that Lukács called "anti-realism". The debates about realism from the end of the fifties unfortunately excluded twentieth-century innovating trends from the concept of realism. Indeed, Lukács's own contributions at times increasingly restricted the concept of realism, which, after 1945, was fairly open, and gave these debates a nominalist character. Later, when Lukács acknowledged Franz Kafka's importance, he, in fact, revised his views. Unfortunately, he did not go deeply enough into Proust's work and its basic idea; hence, he actually misunderstood it.

Lukács demanded realism and democracy from Hungarian literature after 1945, and urged the acceptance of these two ideals. In short, this was the ideological content and intention of Lukács's critical activities after 1945, and this intent found application in the sociological method, that is, led to aesthetic evaluation and analysis. Lukács consistently made his way from ideology to sociology and then to aesthetics, never getting stuck at any one of the steps, and never skipping any one either. When analyzing Németh's _Revulsion_ and Déry's _A befejezetlen mondat_, for example, he began with the unfolding of the plot, the portrayal of the figures, and the success or failure of portrayal in the ideological and sociological sphere, before transposing the facts of the two spheres into aesthetic quality. Lukács never acknowledged any kind of 'triumph of realism' either in earlier or contemporary Hungarian literature, and, in this regard, he was not always correct. The announcement of the principle of realism and democracy, however, proved to be fruitful as a purpose, encouragement, and pressing claim.

In this way, Lukács originated not only the new, Marxist criticism, but the new Hungarian literary historiography as well. He blamed earlier Hungarian literature for the lack of both democracy and a consistently accomplished, classic realism. However pertinent he acknowledged the analogue of pre-nineteenth-century Western Europe in Mór Jókai's looseness and anecdotal story telling, he was unable to admit the realist function of Romanticism. The sociological method can be productive only if it is based on proper recognition. Our estimate of Arany depends on whether we accept Toldi as a representative of the peasantry, as does Lukács. Arany's purpose, however, was quite contrary: in Toldi's social position two classes are united, that is, they represent the entire nation. Literature and democracy are more deeply rooted in Arany's career than Lukács believed. Neither is an aversion for the masses the essence of Imre Madách's work: the inertia of the masses in _The Tragedy of Man_ is only the reversal of what Éva and, through her, the natural forces that support humanity, represent. Neither does the _Revulsion_ politically set aside the great questions of Hungarian society, as is summarily stated by Lukács. This novel depicts, symbolically, the decline of a class, a process that had just begun at the time in which the novel is set, but which, at the time of publication, was historically symptomatic. Lukács's statement is, however, to the point, namely, that the writer identifies himself with the sectarian characters of _A befejezetlen mondat_ by assuming a sectarian attitude himself. His critique of _Bűnbelesés_ [Fall into Sin] is correct in stating that the author comes under the influence of the 'mystic day-dreamings' of some figures in the novel (when, in certain cases, we can indeed see only 'day-dreamings' in the work).

More important than these and similar questions under dispute is, however, Lukács's occasional underestimation of the democratism of Hungarian literature in the pre-Liberation period. From Illyés to Miklós Radnóti, a long list of names could contradict his opinion. It is true, Lukács indicated time and again that, in a new period, the forms and
purposes of democracy are subject to change in literature as well, and even if they were beneficial at an earlier time, they cannot be continued in the old way. Moreover, as if refuting his former severity, Lukács wanted to develop the new literature from the actual conditions of Hungarian literature around 1945, and, thus, did not want a takeover, but, rather, an advance which would be freely decided by an introspective and cleansed Hungarian literature. The literary policy of the early fifties, however, rejected Lukács’s conception, for which, in 1956 and even later, both our social system and literature had to pay dearly.

Lukács did not pursue literary policy, but wanted to endow literature with both an exquisite and clear, functional system of thought. We can ponder the question of whether Lukács was able to foresee the turn of events that would demolish this system of thought. Those who struck the chord in the Rudas—Lukács debate almost indicted him, and instead of the world literary ideas offered by Lukács, they chose Azhaev as an ideal to follow. Lukács was neither naive nor cynical. ‘Write the truth!: this is the axiom of every democratic literature’, he professed in his Irodalom és Demokrácia [Literature and Democracy], in January, 1946. He did not want to deceive with the axiom because he knew that the cult of personality would preclude its observance. Certainly, he was looking further, and history has in the meantime vindicated him.

Return to the clear fountain of realism—democracy, that is, the unity of private and public life, harmony in literature—these are the dominating elements in Lukács’s critical activities after 1945. Although in this period he made practically no mention of socialist literature, his program was, indeed, the foundation of a socialist Hungarian literature yet to be born. But even in this conception, it was not a kind of transitory or ‘tactical’ program: such an interpretation of literature and democracy applies also to socialist literature; indeed, applies to it first and foremost, and is inseparable from it. Even at that time, however, it was clear that Lukács wanted to build socialist literature on the autonomy of the creative personality, that is to say, on the voluntary identification of the autonomous mind with the aims and ideas of socialism. One can find this thought in his concept of partisanship, against which the dogmatists protested so vehemently in those days.

During the last years of his life, he blamed us for being too considerate of some phenomena in Hungarian literature that he regarded as problematic—of Madách or Zsigmond Kemény, for example, whom, it must be noted, he also praised several times. His analysis of József Katona’s Bánk bán [Bánk Ban] was a surprise for us because he followed and condemned Pál Gyulai’s and Zsolt Béthony’s interpretation of the work, though all this was alien to Katona. Lukács remained free of prejudices and one-sidedness, but, like everyone, had his affections and aversions. He respected Berzsenyi, Ferenc Kölcsey, and Mihály Vörösmarty—yet, probably not consciously—he sometimes felt an aversion for the class that they represented. We can discover this aversion in his essay on Babits, which is the first to do justice to Babits’s Jónás könyve [The Book of Jonah], while disregarding the social criticism of Haldálfai [The Sons of Death]—by the same author—which is, at the same time, the self-criticism of a class. Our debates with Lukács were necessitated by the fact that we gave a more favorable account of the unity of the nation and progress in the works of the most important Hungarian writers and thinkers of the past century than he did.

After 1949, Lukács interrupted his studies of contemporary Hungarian literature, and this interruption marked the end of a particular age in Hungarian criticism. One could regard this period of this career as but an episode, its lessons not pointed toward his
last and, probably, richest creative period. These were the years that paved the way for
Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, and Lukács had no reason to regard the ground that he
gave up as the ground of failure or vain efforts. For all that he created from the end of
the fifties onward aimed at helping and encouraging, on a more general level, what he
had advocated in Hungarian literature after 1945. This initiative aspired at world liter-
ariness, although it was directed toward one national literature, namely, Hungarian lit-
erature. Lukács’s activities between 1945 and 1949 connected Hungarian literature with
world literature, and what he said in respect of Hungarian literature could be applied
to world literature, too. The time has come to put Lukács’s activities after 1945 into
perspective and confront his statements with the latest achievements of Hungarian lit-
terary scholarship. By so doing, we will fulfil both out national and international re-
sponsibilities.

(Translated by József Kovács)
From the Program of Literary Unity to the Defensive: György Lukács and the Forum

by
Ernő Kulcsár Szabó

György Lukács, who returned to Hungary from Moscow relatively late, in August, 1945, was awaited by tasks of an ideological character. To be sure, he was not given an official function in the party, presumably due to his brief imprisonment, the debates around Literaturny Kritik and/or the supression of the magazine. Still, the leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party (HCP) could have been aware of his international reputation, his unique Marxist training and, especially, his scientifically grounded conception of a popular-front policy in the ideological activities of those years, even if with this latter—as it was to turn out—strategically they did not agree. Lukács accepted this role, and between 1945 and 1949, devoted most of his efforts to ideological persuasion, the promotion of his conception of cultural policy, and the critique of contemporary Hungarian literature. Through several social and public roles, but above all as the editor of Forum, which began in September 1946, he was able to comply with this latter requirement. He published about thirty essays in this magazine, which, until its cessation, was actually under his intellectual guidance. The magazine was published by the Forum Club, a social association of democratic Hungarian intellectuals, founded in the framework of the Independence Front, but it was the coalition-oriented cultural policy of the HCP that asserted itself in the constitution of the editorial board. György Lukács and György Vértés (formerly the editor of Gondolat) represented the Communist Party, József Darvas the National Peasant Party, and Gyula Ortutay the Smallholders Party. In retrospect, the Forum began as a modern sociological review. Its belles-lettres column was not separated from the studies; the magazine was characterized chiefly by rather long essays, approaching the respective problematics analytically and, mainly in the beginning, objectively. With some simplification, we may say that the greatest part of its belles-lettres material (which was not restricted at all to contemporary Hungarian works) served to illustrate the ideological orientation of the magazine, epitomized by left-wing, Marxist ideas. The appearance of such names as Herwegh, Freiligrath, Éluard, Aragon, Tvardovsky, García Lorca, Ehrenburg, Mayakovski, Isakovski, Lajos Nagy, Tibor Déry, Lajos Kassák, József Fodor, Zoltán Zelk, Oszkár Gellért, Bélá Illés, László Benjámin, Tamás Aczél, György Somlyó, and Sándor Nagy may serve to indicate the changing outlook and value domain of this rather broad scale. This concentration on studies, to be sure, served the ideological orientation of the intelligentsia: the essays and articles of the Forum sought contacts with the democratic intellectuals, a reading public

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that approached Marxism "with intellectual curiosity"\(^5\) even if, at first, it received it with certain repugnance.

It is true that the magazine did not want to limit the matter of winning over the intellectuals to the literary-artistic sphere of consciousness alone, but as József Szigeti, Lukács's disciple and closest collaborator at the \textit{Forum} soon admitted:

This ideological struggle started immediately after the liberation, but in the form of partisan actions only. Its main weakness lay in its one-sidedness, in the fact that did not cover all fields with equal persistence and organization; that a consistent and stubborn struggle was carried on only in connection with the problems of contemporary Hungarian literature.\(^6\)

This is not to say that the \textit{Forum}—as the absolutely open, modern magazine that it was—had not made its voice heard in topical questions of the coalition period. Its column entitled "Hungarian Reality", which became wholly unimportant after the 'year of turn', at this time covered—often polemically—such issues as the reform of public administration, the nature of the cooperative movement, the role of the new people's intelligentsia, the possibilities of education in the people's colleges, and, of course, with the greatest emphasis, the definition of the social and political contents of people's democracy. At this time, its theoretical declarations could be regarded as the ideological and cultural political trend of the HCP, as the—rather divergent—views appearing in it were not otherwise published officially, that is, in legal frameworks. These views aimed first of all at the revaluation of literary tradition, of the literary historical and aesthetic conceptions, and of the developmental principles of literary history; besides, they aimed at the interpretation and criticism of the trends manifesting themselves in the works of contemporary Hungarian literature, focusing on (the 'populist' and 'bourgeois' elements of) the world views underlying the works at issue. This policy was due to three factors: first, in it one could perceive the traditional centrality of literature in Hungarian intellectual life; secondly, in the ideological work the HCP itself attributed a prominent role to the literary and artistic forms of consciousness; finally, besides Lukács could hardly be found such a sociologist who could have had an authority he had, who could have looked back on a communist past, and who could have represented the Marxist theoretical conception on a similar level, in terms of several disciplines, as he did.\(^7\)

The reasons for the fact that at that time Lukács turned to scholarly journalism were that the ideological principles and those concerning literary policy that he had brought home from emigration were then relatively unknown in Hungary and that the post-1945 tasks had specific features that prompted him to do so. He generally formulated the structure of his writings by approaching a timely problem from a tripartite point of view. After having given a 'historicizing' (i.e., not explicitly historical) survey of the subject, he exposed the theoretical and philosophical aspects of the problem, and then connected all this (sometimes with doctrinaire immediacy) with the sphere of the given social-political practice. The strong normativity, the realism-centered orientation of his aesthetic principles and his conception, which often judged the work of art according to political categories ('richtung', 'echt', 'wahr', in the original), did not promote the immanent aesthetic approach to literature or the individual works, but rather, in conformity with communist literary policy (which even at that time preferred the elucidation of these relations), the emergence of an openly ideological and sometimes political view of literature. It is not coincidental that, at this time, Lukács scarcely embarked upon a more detailed, complex analysis of individual works. Instead, he examined processes, tendencies, principles of development, historical alternatives, and brought the interpreta-
tion of the textual meaning of the literary work nearer to the 'strategy' of close (direct) reading. Collaterally strengthened by the journalistic genre—Lukács's narrative technique underwent a transformation. In his style one can observe the emergence—as was first observed by Brecht and later by Adorno—of a kind of 'Kunstrichter' attitude, a "professional" tone.8

It is more important, however, that as a result of the aforementioned facts, Lukács maneuvered himself into a contradictory position at the beginning of the coalition period. In his programmatic, cultural and aesthetic essays, he consistently stressed the paradigmatic, the relatively constant, common, and essential motif against the changing one—at that time the party obviously needed Lukács first of all as a theoretician, a strategist—while, in reality, he was a participant in a heterogeneous course of events. As Mátys Rákosi and even József Révai later observed, this period was the phase of tactical struggles, when conditions were always changing, due to the interplay of social and political forces. The crisis of the coalition, the disclosure of the 'plot', and the various interpretations of democracy—changing ever within the party itself—created political conditions that were, in a figurative sense, syntactical in character. Since the Forum could not evade these aspirations because its task was to support them as a "sharp weapon",9 we can conclude from Lukács's position as a theoretician that, in the beginning to a lesser degree, but later more and more obviously, it was a situation 'tuned' to conflict. Hence, in the case of Lukács it is not easy to separate the immediate background and motives of his words and deeds from the (more or less long-term) strategic and tactical issues lying behind them.

This situation tended all the more toward conflict because this affinity for paradigms was not free of metaphysical contents: the ideological factor asserted itself in his paradigms in a restrictive sense. Thus, for example, he considered the French model of historical progress to be the ideal type of social development, and, in comparison, he regarded Germany and Hungary as backward countries.10 Similarly as Zoltán Kenyeres pointed out, his theory of realism in literature omitted "the notion of style and the whole aesthetic sphere behind it".11 On the other hand, it is a fact that, in the later debates, he had to face otherwise well-grounded arguments, in which one could trace the rebirth of earlier personal differences. Furthermore, the very same people who set up the claim to principles were, compared to Lukács, in all ways, nearer to the "syntactical sphere".12 In fact these are the two poles among whose competing attractions Lukács conducted the intellectual guidance of the Forum, and determined the strategic position that explained the inconsistency of his activities.

In the Lukács debate, Révai keenly observed that there was a continuity between "Blum Theses" and Lukács's interpretation of democracy as he conceived it in 1946. Then, as earlier, Lukács saw the actual content of the popular democratic form in 'plebian democracy' based on the unity of democratic forces, but at the same time stressed the difference between this 'actual' democracy and 'formal' bourgeois democracy.13 Later this 'popular-front' conception, which rejected liberalism, became a source of debate. Lukács stated several times—as proven by Rákosi's assertion before the party academy in 1952 that he did not conform to the tactical "scenario" of the HCP (or did not know it?)14—that the establishment of this democratic form would not affect the capitalist bases:

The principle of the People's Democracy, in Hungary especially, and in other countries too, is still barely beginning to assert itself, and even if it realizes its aims, it does not intend to abolish the capitalist mode of production and therefore it cannot aim at the creation of a classless society.15

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For Lukács, this broader and more open principle of democratic form made possible the literary and cultural political united front that he delineated in the programmatic article of the *Forum*. Here he declared indeed that the approval of democracy was the watershed in artistic policy, and declared even ideological differences to be reconcilable:

The unconditional approval of democracy, whatever form it may take, whatever criticism the individual phenomena may evoke: this is the subjective basis of the unity of Hungarian literature that must be sought. No difference in world view, in art, or in style can destroy this unity if the subjective basis corresponds to the objective one.\(^{16}\)

(We must stress this openness because, in the second number of the *Forum*, we can find another interpretation, which is narrower and less favorable to the intended unity.)\(^{17}\)

"A magyar irodalom egysége" [The unity of Hungarian literature] leaves no doubt that Lukács traced the split in the progressive forces of Hungarian literature to the close of the Age of Reform, and concluded that our literature (with a few congenial exceptions), floating on the lukewarm waters of the establishment that was created by the compromise of 1867 and protected by power, evaded the artistic representation of the fundamental contradictions in society. Although we will later encounter this paradigm again, here we must stress that this is not a simple ideological reflection of the populist-urbanist confrontation of the thirties. Lukács formulated this conception of historical development in the background of a model that was different from the Hungarian literary historical context, and, what is more, a model in which he found considerable critical realist, epic prose. Consequently, Thomas Mann became a representative portrayer of the crisis of the old, formal democracy because "his work describes virtually the whole history of this disease and recovery. And it is no accident that in Thomas Mann's work, the history of recovery runs parallel to his return to democracy."\(^{18}\) This sociological understanding is the basis of the equivalence, which, in Lukács's conception, existed between the decadence of the age of imperialism and the introspective, bourgeois (in Hungary: urban) literature of 'inert contemplation': escape into aestheticism, on the one hand, and the middle-of-the-road populist ideologies, the ideas that restricted the concept of the people to the peasantry, and the aesthetic character of populist literature between the two world wars, on the other. As during his time in Moscow—to a certain extent under the influence of the Ady experience and Révai—\(^{19}\) he had regarded the populist left wing as the basis of democratic forces, after 1945, in the program of unity of Hungarian literature, he continued to grant an important place to this trend.\(^{20}\) It is understandable, however, that he intended to make the *Forum*, first and foremost, a magazine that rose above the narrow populist—urban opposition, and to this end, he wanted to win young, humanist, and Europeanized generation represented by István Sóter, Emil Kolozsvári Grandpierre, and to some extent, by Tibor Déry.

Among the aesthetic principles that predominated in the *Forum*, it was his conception of realism that was most closely connected with his theory of democracy. It is no accident that Lukács would have liked to find the basis of a truly new, democratic literature not in the populist left wing, which he considered to be provincial, but precisely in these young novelists (and not in lyricists!). Here again, a paradigm, abstracted from the European development of the novel, was contrasted with the possibilities offered by actual circumstances. This time, however, the policy of alliance and the aesthetic value ideal could hardly be brought into correspondence to one other. Only in part could he bridge this gap with pure gestures.\(^{21}\) But neither Lukács's principles, which aimed at

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compatibility, nor the extent of capability that he thought he perceived in these writers permitted him to bridge the gap in this way, the more so because these debates gave rise to the two kinds of interpretation of the continuity of Hungarian literature.

According to Zoltán Kenyerés:

Lukács, in his theory of realism, generalized in the sphere of aesthetics the experiences that he gained in evaluating the problems of Hungarian society that demanded solution. When he spoke of great realism, he translated his conception of democracy into the language of the theory of art, and searched for those aspirations in 18th-, 19th-, and early 20th-century literature which, according to him, portrayed a type of man ready and able to act. Democracy leads man back to society and ceases alienation, while realism unflaggingly proclaims even if not always the possibility of, but, at least, the sense of action. If socialism is the society of true democracy, then the new, socialist art can also rely on nothing but realism. So that was the ideological train of thought of this theory.22

In Hungarian literary history, it was by no means an easy task to discover such realistic traditions. Not only because the principles of extensive representation of Lukács’s great realism23 were inapplicable even to Zsigmond Móricz’s novels,24 but, first and foremost, because the restrictive conception of the development of literature practically explained and condemned the period between 1849 and 1945 in terms of political and artistic compromise.25 That, the discontinuous element was inevitably thrust into prominence, and Lukács expected the implementation of great realism in fact from the generation of Sóter alone—but the representatives of this generation, while approaching great realism, did not wish to renounce its immediate predecessors, and conceived of great epic of social concerns in a wider, synthetic form of the novel; whereas Lukács and the Forum,26 in accordance with the conception of bourgeois decadence, categorically rejected these immediate predecessors. Nevertheless, in the debate that originated in the June 1947 issue of Magyarok, Lukács—while stressing again discontinuity and pointing out the anti-democratic attitude in the acceptance of the oppositionist tradition—stated more than once that the ‘new reality demands a new attitude’, but at the same time he expressed his expectations concerning the ‘impending turn’ in Sóter’s work as a novelist, although at the same time he acknowledged that the transformation of Sóter’s literary means obviously would require a longer period of time.27 When later, in 1949, Sóter referred to the monumental, epic totality of the Proustian, Joycean world of the novel, he actually analyzed the outlook of the modern novel (Proust as a ‘keystone of bourgeois realism’ [1], the totality of the ‘I’ in Joyce, etc.). In this essay Sóter, accepting the principle of great realism and in effect developing it further, gave voice to an aspect which, as the contemporaries did not notice the restrictive tradition-centeredness of the Lukácsian conception, was recognized by only a few people then:

The doctrine of great realism, when it demands the representation of the total—both the individual and the communal—man, cannot be satisfied with the revival of the Balzacian or Tolstoyan method: it must demand more, even if not in result, but in purpose, in order to make the would-be realism really new.28

This essay, however—this time in the spirit of the program of socialist realism—received a rather negative answer, again from the Forum.29 This, obviously, meant that, in the meantime, Lukács’s concept of realism had also been modified and, undoubtedly, that the Forum had already begun to give up its standpoints on realism. As the question of socialist realism became a point of issue early in 1949 in Hungary, too, Lukács immediately began to fight against its narrow interpretation. He emphasized two essential elements, doing so by means of the modification of his earlier paradigm of realism. Whereas previously he had sensed the perspectives, too, in such works of bourgeois
realism as had preserved the principle, the sense, and possibility of action, now—by doubting the notion of perspective—he brought bourgeois realism into such a relation with the perspectives of representation of socialist realism which might well be conceived of as oppositional. Accordingly, he interpreted the perspectives of (bourgeois) critical realism as utopian, fictitious prospects of representation, as opposed to socialist realism, dominated by a "concrete, non-utopian perspective, which is based on the correct recognition of the actual movement of society". 30 But at the other essential point—after László Rudas's article—he emphasized the continuity between bourgeois epic and socialist realism. 31 When he spoke here about the 'most genuine traditions of the epic', he had in mind in fact a more detailed version of his thesis put forward in his Pushkin study: not only Balzac, Stendhal, and Gogol were realists, but also Pushkin and Goethe because "realism itself is not a style but the common foundation of all truly great literature." 32 When opposing critical realism and socialist realism and, simultaneously, maintaining that their principles of representation are basically similar, Lukács defended the autonomy of the literary work 33 against voluntaristic and schematic distortions (e.g., against the cult of subject matter, which was to appear soon thereafter). 34 Eventually, this principle of realism, which had strengthened foundations and in fact protected quality, but at the same time had blurred outlines, could not be maintained against the offensive of schematicism: it could be less and less concretized by means of works of ideal types, and Lukács, feeling that the channels for making his views public became more and more narrow, did not aim at the detailed verification of his views at issue any more.

As between 1945 and 1949, Lukács wanted to overcome both versions, that is, the right-wing aspirations, which he connected with irrational philosophies, and the growing forces of dogmatism—he wanted to bring into accordance realism (in the field of epic), and the disclosure and the revalued approval of revolutionary tradition (in lyric poetry) with his theory of democracy. Although his interpretation of lyric poetry was more conservative (and more primitive) than that of Révai’s, his task here definitely seemed to be easier compared to his efforts when, in spite of non-existent traditions, he had tried to legitimize great realism. What is more, this genre (i.e., lyric poetry) was seemingly free from the negative qualification (and the ‘negative leveling’ of works) 35 attached to the period between 1849 and 1945. This time it was Révai's theory of the supremacy of Hungarian lyric poetry that gave Lukács the key: according to Révai,

the basic problem lies in the fact that during recent Hungarian developments, the extent and character of the class antagonism in Hungary are combined with the question of Hungarian independence and with that of the nationalities [...] there is no Hungarian social force which, in this network of contradictions, could create unity. Due to the lack of such unity, the great representative genres that describe the totality of society, that is, the novel and the drama, in Hungary were driven to the second line because the objective lack of this unity can gain artistic unity only through the means of lyrics. In my opinion, it is this theory that needs further elaboration, concretization, and extension, if we wish to grasp the basic question of the artistic development of our literature correctly. 36

Its application was made easier by the fact that "our greatest poets, [Sándor] Petőfi and [Endre] Ady, were, at the same time, the most consistent representatives of democratic thought," that is, the characteristic of the development of Hungarian lyric is "the magnificent coincidence of lyrical greatness and of a democrat's steadfastness in the central figures of our literature". 37

For Lukács, the main counterforce to this lyric ideal (and to the approval of democratic transformation) manifested itself in the 'ivory-tower' poetry, which presented
a bourgeois Weltanschauung, excluding action (or, what is worse, it manifested in the rejection of democracy). He termed the irradiation of this attitude into the lyrical subject the poetry of the "isolated self". It is true that he had acknowledged the legitimacy of this attitude in the bourgeois society of the age of imperialism in his earlier writing, but now he deprived it of its more universal (ontological) contents and reduce it to a sort of tragi-comic poetic situation.38 Here he noticed a historical relationship: the more capitalist social formation becomes full blown, the more obviously the attitude of the isolated self becomes a characteristic form of behavior, as a direct parallel to the phenomenon—it is again the French model—in which the former citoyen individualism is distorted into bourgeois privacy. (To what extent Lukács thought this paradigm generalizable is well proved by the passage according to which he recognized similar phenomena in populist poetry.)39

József Szígei's study "A magyar líra 1947-ben" [Hungarian lyric poetry in 1947], which endorsed this conception of Lukács's, was one of the most fully elaborated polemical treatises that ever appeared in the Forum, employing even a set of aesthetic and poetic means.40 Here Szígei interpreted the conception of the "isolated self" also in a rather wide sense, and even more ideologically than Lukács did. His narrow starting point became, at the same time, an arbitrarily distorting wide one, as he treated his subject matter as a series of lyrical answers to the turn following 1945,41 and, in the hopeful moment of evolution which was elsewhere urged by Lukács, he proposed to surpass the "isolated self" as a standard. He, however, exempted György Sárközi (owing to Sárközi's specific position) from the consequences of the attitude of the "isolated self", while in other poets he demonstrated their antipathy toward democratic transformation. Speaking about Sándor Weöres, he stated: "in his poetry the social-political basis of the world of despair is the Hungarian reactionary force."42 In his analysis, one can observe the main characteristics of the procedure employed by the Lukács school in the explanation of lyric poetry: "decoding" the lyric language as epic message, the neglect of lyric tonality that modulates the lexical-semantic layer, the neglect of the individual features of intonation, and a rigid interpretation of the complex poetic system of signs. Consequently, such a precious classic piece of modern Hungarian poetry as Tücsökkene [Cricket Music] was looked upon in the study as the versification of mere "private matters", which conveyed the "confusion of the overall picture", "the lack of human and artistic authenticity".43

Basically the same charge was brought against Gyula Illyés's poetry as against the 'problematic realism' of Zsigmond Móricz: according to Szígei, the basis of the confusion here does not lie in the attitude of the "isolated self", but, rather, in the fact that reality is reflected only partially.44 (It must be noted that the principle of totality originating in the epic has a rather contradictory function in Lukács's work, too, as far as lyric poetry is concerned.)45 In this reasoning, it was not the direct reference of the artistic content to reality, the identification of objective reality with aesthetic reality, the epistemological misappropriation of aesthetic quality involved graver consequences. It was of greater importance that the views of this kind—which provoked a reaction from the Válasz and other magazines—forestalled precisely the idea of the desired unity and, through the incomprehension of the vanguard of Hungarian lyric poetry at that time, considerably increased the distrust of the Forum, which, however, had existed from the beginning.46 As far as Illyés was concerned, Szígei did not share Lukács's views completely, but his opinion inevitably expressed the reservations of the Forum against the conception of Illyés's Válasz. Lukács, too, expressed similar voluntaristic tendencies.
for example, in forming an impatient judgement on the fledgling authors of Újhold: “If Balázs Lengyel wants to renew the individualistic ivory-tower protestation today, it means the ignorance or the rejection of the democratic development of the country as the central topic of the lyric poetry of the ‘fourth generation’.”

As regards the magazines in the coalition period, the principal rival of the Forum was not the Újhold, the Haladás, or the Vigilia. If, in the Újhold, Lukács recognized some literary ‘epigonia’ that evolved on the basis of Mihály Babits’s ‘individualism’ and ‘solipsism’, it did not imply at all that he had to enter into debate with full-blown and well founded conceptions of the development and history of society. Authentic ideas of this sort occurred only in the Válasz, due, first of all, to István Bibó’s conception. Against the Forum, which relied on a smaller reading public, the Újhold, or Béla Zsolt’s Haladás, the Válasz was strengthened even by the fact that it published the best living authors (Illyés, László Németh, Lőrinc Szabó; in the second line: Pál Szabó, János Kodolányi, etc.), and, in particular, that it was bringing out works of classical value (Revulshon, Tücsökzene).

Illyés intended the Válasz as a literary magazine of belles lettres, to be “strengthened” by sociological material which, as he wrote, “was happily fermenting our recent literature”. That, for Lukács, the Válasz was the main controversialist, can be proved by the fact that he timed the appearance of the Forum at the second half of the month in order to be able to reply to the articles of the Válasz, which was due to appear at the beginning of the month. The Forum, which in the beginning raised the question of Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries, would soon stress self-criticism, and in fact demarcated the problem of the peace treaty and that of democracy. Later on it would rather consider the Hungarian and world historical concerns of democratic transformation, and Lukács put aside the national viewpoint of Bibó and the Válasz as if these questions would be automatically solved, regarding them as being dependent on democratic progress.

The main point of conflict between the Forum and the Válasz appeared in the difference between the conceptions concerning the historical development of Hungary. Though Bibó himself did not deny the compromise character of 1867 or question the reactionary consequences of that spoiled moment, instead of explaining the compromise in terms of class compromise, as Lukács did, he explained it in the light of the ‘ideology of fear’. As the Habsburgs had become convinced of their vulnerability (1848–1949) and the Hungarians had lost much of their revolutionary fervor, the situation ended in compromise, so that “each party could save and protect what was of importance for it: the Habsburgs their empire, the Hungarians their state.” Evaluating 1867, he said: “This is a classical example of how the mechanism of fear in politics captivates the mechanism of reason.” Bibó traced the ‘symptoms of the deterioration of public temperament’ back to the middle of the past century and, in essence, considered the ‘ideology of fear’ to be an uninterrupted process. Thus, when sizing up the alternatives of home policy in the evolution of the spheres of interest among the great powers, he took into account this historically developed psychological element, too, as belonging to the questions of the coalition period. Lukács described this ideology as harmful and objectively unfounded as early the first number of the Forum, and took it to be the sign of the refusal or, rather, the rejection, of the new democracy:

There are people who approve the existence of freedom of speech only if it is allowed to proclaim and disseminate any counterrevolutionary ideology. This is a mistake. The freedom of thought and speech in democracy, especially in people’s democracy, does not mean that everybody, or as Péter Veres put it, ‘every
Hungarian man' may, at will, undermine the new Hungarian democracy that is beginning to develop, and which is still weak both organizationally and ideologically.\textsuperscript{56}

In spite of the differences in the points of view concerning the Hungarian reality of the coalition period and in the interpretations of the consequences of historical development, the \textit{Forum} did not launch a frontal attack against the Válasz. On the contrary, it defended the 'plebeian writer of \textit{The People of the Puszta}', and the 'flaming love of the people, the hatred of the upper classes, and the anticlericalism' of Péter Veres against the fulminating articles of the Haladás, indicating certain lines of demarcation in practice, that is, indicating to what extent the Lukácsian principle of 'getrennt marschieren, vereint sich schlagen' was valid.\textsuperscript{57} As regards Bibó, however, it separated plebeian democracy from the national points of view: Bibó—against his will—"gives support to the reactionary, chauvinistic demagogy about the peace treaty", and it is his 'will to influence' that induced him to make such 'ideological concessions'.\textsuperscript{58}

Thus, as can be seen here (and is supported by other examples, too),\textsuperscript{59} Lukács, when applying the policy of alliance, enforced an ethic of effects against the populist writers. In spite of the fact that he declared that his democratic program of unity definitely based itself on the ethic of intents ('no ideological, artistic, or stylistic difference can disrupt this unity, if the subjective basis corresponds to the objective one')—nevertheless, he scrutinized and evaluated the Válasz itself as well as the relationship of those belonging to its circle to it on the basis of the ethic of effects.

All this was not in accord with the idea of literary unity, for within the \textit{Forum} itself there was some polarization of the attitudes toward the so-called 'Móricz, László Németh, and Déry questions', respectively. Obviously, it is not difficult to notice: István Király's evaluation of Németh's \textit{Revolusion} was definitely incompatible with Szigeti's (i.e., Lukács's) picture of Móricz and Németh.\textsuperscript{60} The decisive point of difference was that Király raised to the peak of the Hungarian epic literature of the present century the same "problematic realism"\textsuperscript{61} in which Lukács always sensed some provincialism and did not find suitable to create a true epic tradition. (This difference in outlook was the reason why later Király drifted apart from Lukács.) Probably differences like that were the reason why the \textit{Forum} failed to win the—otherwise considerable—intellectual reading public that had grown up precisely on the writings of László Németh, and turned against the ruling strata of the Horthy regime under the influence of the movement of the populist writers.\textsuperscript{62}

In the last analysis, Lukács and the circle of the Válasz disagreed on problems that lay deeper than the interpretation of literary policy or of the principle of democracy. Namely, it was the interpretation of the development of Hungarian society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in whose respect their debates were now more heated, now more restrained. These debates, however, never came to a rest because Lukács consistently adhered to his paradigm, and never modified it in the way that he did his interpretation of realism or (in connection with criticism) his conception of partisanship (\textit{Parteilichkeit}).

As mentioned above, after 1949 Lukács did not publish in the \textit{Forum}. But his interpretation of democracy was not fully reconcilable with the coalition strategy of the party—as it can be concluded from Márton Horváth's polemical writing\textsuperscript{63}—even at the time that the \textit{Forum} was begun. For tactical reasons, however, the HCP did not demarcate itself from Lukács's conception. And although it is true that the Forum paid unambiguously lip-service to the principles of dogmatic literary policy only after the
famous Lukács debate, this tendency was present in the magazine from the start and, as could be seen, even some statements of Lukács’s were not devoid of sectarian traits. During the debate, Révai not only blamed him for proclaiming the ‘literary united front’, but also declared his theory of democracy—from the end of 1947—to be outdated a ‘middle-of-the-road’ solution:

His literary slogans were not adapted to the increasingly sharp and strong political and esonomic slogans of the Party. In 1948 and 1949 Lukács fought on the literary front for the same aims as he did in 1945 and 1946 [...] All this is connected with Lukács’s false illusions about the People’s Democracy.64

And indeed, it was in December, 1948 that the Forum was for the first time attacked in an article openly—and officially—expressing the differences in outlook, on the part of Szabad Nép, the official organ of the communist party. The article reflected on János Kelemen’s critique of the novel of Tamás Aczél (A szabadság árnyékában [In the Shadow of the Liberty], 1948, which was later to receive the Stalin Prize), in which Kelemen condemned the novel because of its primitive principles of representation—but the criticism in the reflective article was directed against the Forum: “Our disappointed indignation is not addressed to the ungifted and envious critic [...] But it is addressed to the magazine that took on a leading role in the field of democracy, and which thought it proper to publish this formalist nonsense.”65 As can be seen, it was in vain that the Forum made concessions to dogmatic literary policy, for it was impossible to maintain the positions of aesthetic pretension and quality that were otherwise defensible within narrow bounds. In this situation Lukács—as in the case of the Válasz—not only criticized certain phenomena in a way that practically contradicted his program of unity, but also changed tone: indeed, some of his manifestation drew him near to the role of accuser.66 In 1947, fighting dogmatism, he wrote, ‘there is a tendency that demands that the artist should deal exclusively with the daily questions of construction, that he should borrow his whole subject matter from it,’67 and now it was the Forum itself that turned in this direction. An article, published in No. 6, 1948, greeted the volume A fordulat évé [The Year of Turn] with high appreciation and even praised Rákosi’s expressive style; there was also a rapid increase in the number of schematic writings from contemporary Russian literature.

Here we must also mention that some noted representatives of socialist literature, whom Lukács left out of his 1946 program of unity because of his aversion to sectarianism, began to publish in the Forum at this time (Béla Illés, Andor Gábor). Since that time, it was they and the younger generation whose representatives in most instances started out in the spirit of populist lyrical realism or realistic epic (short stories), who determined the literary character of the magazine (Péter Kuczka, Tamás Aczél, Sándor Nagy, Lajos Örvös, Tibor Cseres; while László Nagy and Ferenc Juhász also published a few poems here).

After the well known conclusion of the debate, Lukács did not pay serious attention to the development of the new, socialist literature, and his role in editing the magazine became more and more formal. When the Forum ceased to exist in August, 1950,68 Lukács became member of the editorial board of Csillag, but he hardly assumed any actual task. The cessation of the Forum thus brought to a close the period in Lukács’s career when he had participated most intensively in Hungarian cultural life, when he was arguably at his most profound in dealing with the ideological aspects of our literature. Reconsidering his activities in the Forum today, we can say retrospectively that he failed to realize his literary program of unity based on the democratic development
of literature, on the coexistence and debates of the different trends. Before 1948, this failure was mainly due to the one-sidedness of his paradigms, to the ideological structure of his system of points of view—and after 1948, when even this basic conception was forced onto the defensive, its failure was due to the coercive pressure of increasing dogmatism. The significance of his ideological, aesthetic, and literary historical writings published in the Forum, and the study of the (sometimes contradictory) influence that this conception exerted on our Marxist literary scholarship—all this belongs to the history of Hungarian scholarship in the sixties and seventies.

(Translated by József Kovács)

Notes


3 Véntes was the responsible editor of the magazine, but in this capacity his editorial work was predominately of technical character.

4 For a detailed description of the fundation and history of the Forum, see Sándor Iván Kovács: “A Forum szerepe felszabadulás utáni irodalmunk történetében” [The role of the Forum in the history of our literature after the liberation], Irodalomtörténeti Dolgozatok 36 (Szeged: 1964), pp. 3—9. (Also in offprint.)


7 It must be noted here that Lukács’s principles of artistic policy—obviously for similar reasons—were taken over by some of the socialist press of the neighboring countries: “György Lukács’s writings that have appeared in Hungarian are being translated for the literary columns of Czech and Slovak magazines, for their edification and for the solution of their problems concerning art.” Endre Kovács: “Szlávok és magyarak” [Slavs and Hungarians], Vdlaz (1947) No. 9, p. 239.


10 György Lukács: “A Magyar Kommunista Párt és a magyar kultúra” [The Hungarian Communist Party and Hungarian culture], Forum (1948) No. 5.


12 “Those who are acquainted with the history of the Hungarian Communist movement know that Comrade Lukács’s literary views of 1945—49 are closely connected with his former political views, which he put forward at the end of the nineteen-twenties concerning the political development of Hungary and the strategy of the Communist Party,” said Révai, referring to the “Blum Theses.” József Révai: Lukacs and Socialist Realism (London: 1950), p. 7; see also his “Megjegyzések irodalmunk néhány kérdéséhez” [Notes on some questions of our literature], Társadalmi Szemle (1949) No. 8—9.

13 György Lukács: “Aristokratikus és demokratikus világnézet” [Aristocratic and democratic world view], Forum (1946) No. 3.

demokráciáról" (On people’s democracy), in conformity with Lukács, states: “to specify more exactly, people’s democracy is a certain variety of bourgeois democracy. (I myself profess it.)” Forum (1946) No. 3, p. 262.

15 Quoted by Révai, in Lukács and Socialist Realism, p. 5.— Lukács’s essay was first published as “Szabad vagy irányított művészet?” [Free or directed art?], Forum (1949) No. 4.


17 Mártón Horváth: “Válság vagy egyetértés?” [Crisis or agreement?], Forum (1946) No. 2.


19 It was Révai who, in his Ady essay, connected the lack of literary unity with the specific features of social development, thereby creating the foundation of the concept of ‘lyric supremacy’. At the same time, Révai raised other questions, too (independence, national question), which were given less attention by Lukács. See Lukács: “A magyar irodalomtörténet reviziója” [The revision of Hungarian literary history], Forum (1948) No. 11, p. 872.

20 See the opinion of Sándor Haraszti: “the peasantry and its representatives give, obviously, more help in this that the town-folk” “Urbanusok és népiesek” [Urbanists and populists], Forum (1946) No. 1, p. 95.

21 See József Szigeti: “Sóter István: Játék és valóság” [István Sóter: Play and Reality], Forum (1947) No. 3; György Bölöni: “Déry Tibor: A befejezetlen mondo” [Tibor Déry: The Unfinished Sentence], Forum (1947) No. 6. (When Bölöni raised Déry ‘to the first place among Hungarian writers and to the rank of the best Western writers’, he did not employ realist criteria exclusively.)


24 “Even some representatives of democratic criticism” [this means, in effect, István Király] “think that Móricz can be set as an example before the young literature whom they should follow, similarly to the lyric poetry of Petőfi, Endre Ady, or Attila József [...] But if we do not elucidate Móricz’s unsolved relationship to the proletariat and the artistic problems stemming from it, then we will bring into the fore such problems of the novel, represented by Móricz, as the external, formal quality, the seemingly unproblematic perfection of his realism, simplicity, and clarity.” Szigeti: Útban a valóság felé, pp. 14—15.

25 Although Szigeti, who denied continuity, put it more sharply, undoubtedly, at this time his views were similar to those of Lukács. (When speaking about Hungarian literature, Lukács always stressed the importance of continuity, at least in the form of revaluation.) As Szigeti wrote, it was in 1945 that the Hungarian working-class movement and literary development “created the conditions for the emergence of the great realist novel and drama, the first time since the quick extinction of the revolutionary flame of 1848”. Ibid., p. 14.

26 For example, “The attitude represented by Joyce and the decadents fell, inevitably, into the background with the outbreak of World War II [...] If in the conflict between the artist and reality the revolt stimulates the wish to escape only, then nothing remains but the Joycean solution. From a writer’s point of view this is the greatest lesson of Ulysses.” Tibor Lutter: “James Joyce és Ulysses” [James Joyce and his Ulysses], Forum (1947) No. 2, p. 151.


29 “Now realism must be defined sharply and definitely, and criticism has to stress the importance of recognizing and artistically reflecting today's reality, the socialist society under construction.” István Király: “Prófetikus esztétika, szocialista realizmus” [A prophetic aesthetic and socialist realism], Forum (1949) No. 3, p. 232.


31 György Lukács: “A csendes Don” [Quiet flows the Don], Forum (1949) No. 11.

32 See “Puskin helye a világirodalomban” [Pushkin’s place in world literature], Forum (1949) No. 10, p. 794. (In this Világirodalom [World Literature], Vol. I, it is incorrectly dated 1952.)

33 But while he wanted to strengthen the (realist) work of art in terms of the principles of representation as values, he narrowed down the scope of Marxist criticism: “How tactical one is also belongs to the responsibility of the critic. It is also part of the question that the critic is responsible for the tone of his criticism.” “A marxista kritika feladatai” [The tasks of Marxist criticism], Forum (1949) No. 4, p. 311. (This statement was left out from the essay when it was published in book form.)

34 “Far from Moscow indicates probably better and more directly than the other great works of Soviet literature how the value of the artistic work relies on the value of reality it depicts; how it cannot be explained from the artist’s own, peculiar, and unique personality.” György Somlyó: “Az saját: Tíz év Moszkvadból” [Aszaev: Far from Moscow], Forum (1950) No. 2, p. 141.

36  Lukács: "A magyar irodalomtörténet revíziója", in op. cit., p. 872.
38  Lukács: Magyar irodalom—magyar kultúra, pp. 247—70.
39  "This problem of the old, nobiliary Hungary [i.e., the death of the nation] was expressed in the shocking voice of Vörösmarty a century ago, but now, after the influx of European decadence, does not create anything but the arrogance of flinting with death." Ibid., p. 487.
40  Forum (1947) No. 10.
41  He spoke about the volume of György Sárközi, which was published posthumously, about Gyula Illyés's Szembenézve [Facing], Lőrinc Szabó's Tücsözkézene [Cricket Music], and Sándor Weöres's A fogak tornáca [Portico of Teeth]. (All appeared in 1947.)
42  Ibid., p. 219.
43  Ibid., p. 211.
44  Ibid., p. 191.
46  "Illyés's magazine, the Válasz, and especially the importance and the influence on public opinion of its ideological articles, surpass the standard range of magazines." Márton Horváth: "Válasz Bíbó István cikkére" [Answer to the article of István Bíbó], Forum (1947) No. 1, p. 48.
48  Gyula Illyés: "Az idő kérdéseit" [The question of time], Válasz (1946) No. 1, p. 3.
49  Verbal communication of István Király. This may be supported by the fact that in No. 1 of Forum, 1947, Márton Horváth refers to an article that appeared in the January issue of Válasz.
50  See Gyula Ortuzy: "Békékeothet előtt" [Before the peace treaty], Forum (1946) No. 1.
51  István Bíbó: "A Békesszerződés és a magyar demokrácia" [The Peace Treaty and Hungarian democracy], Válasz (1946) No. 1.
52  In the Forum József Horváth's article reflects this conception in a more direct political sense: "A romániiai magyarság és a választások" [Hungarians in Romania and the elections], Forum (1946) No. 4. 53  István Bíbó: "Ellorzult magyar alkotó—szakutódás magyar történelem" [Distorted Hungarian psyche—Hungarian history with a deadlock], Válasz (1947) No. 4.
54  Ibid., p. 297.
55  Ibid., p. 300.
56  Lukács: "A magyar irodalom egysége", in op. cit., pp. 3—4. Originally, it was read before a writers' summer conference in Debrecen, in 1947. (This is why the text in the Forum refers to Péter Veres's comments.)
58  Ibid., pp. 180, 181.
60  Characteristically, instead of choosing the Forum, Király published his essay on Móricz in the Válasz in 1947.
63  Horváth: "Válasz vagy egyetértés?" [Agreement or agreement?]
64  József Révai: Lukács and Socialist Realism, pp. 4—5.
65  "Demokratikus kritika" [Democratic criticism], Szabad Nép (December 22, 1948). Later József Darvas, too condemned him for it: "It was one of Lukács’s mistakes—and I argued with him about it several times—that, when in his critical activities he was concerned over decline of the standards of our literature, he showed certain literary aristocracy in setting up excessively high standards of demands for our new literature, which was only beginning to germinate." "Irodalmunk kérdéseiről" [On the questions of our literature], Forum (1950) No. 3, p. 227.
66  When in 1947 he reviewed the book of Béla Hamvas and Ernő Kallai—"Az absztraktili művészet magyar elméletei" [Hungarian theories of abstract art], Forum (1947) No. 9—he attributed any form of irrationalism to fascism. One year later, however, he spoke about 'myth-makers of smaller caliber as Hamvas'. "Az élődiség tázdása" [The revolt of parasitism], Szabad Nép (December 25, 1948).
67 György Lukács: "Szabad vagy irányított művészet?" in Irodalom és demokrácia [Literature and Democracy] p. 135. An unusual transitory situation is reflected in an article of the Forum in 1948, which reports on the resolution of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party concerning formalism in music: "Formalism is not a peculiar illness of Soviet music—and, probably, the ideological fight against it will not remain an isolated movement within the boundaries of the Soviet Union [...]'Let us learn from the classics,
let us profusely draw on the rich material of the music of the people, away from formalism, superfluity, [make] music expressive, unsophisticated”—are such slogans which every student of musical composition has to burn deeply into his mind.” At the same time, it goes on, the resolution of the CC is “unfit for heralding the age of controlled art”. András Mihály: “Harc a formalizmus ellen” [Fight against formalism], Forum (1948) No. 3, pp. 237—8.

68 For further details, see Kovács: “A Forum szerepe felszabadulás utáni irodalmunk történetében”, in op. cit., p. 16.
Aesthetics without any tenet on the work of art: isn't it a paradox? Yes, it is. Even a double one. First, it is the paradox of the great synthesis, of the summarizing work. Secondly, it is the paradox of the torso, of the unfinished work. The paradox of the summarizing work is methodological, and it is connected with the order of development. The medium of art is brought into being by the work, but the work exist in the medium of art, in a wider sense, in the medium of the whole of the aesthetic, naturally. If the development starts with the examination of the aesthetic or of art, it will speak about the medium, without the work that brings the medium into being, without the center of the medium. If it starts with the examination of the work, it will speak about the center that brings the medium into being, without the medium that was brought about. The feeling of incompleteness is unavoidable. In the examination of the aesthetic and art, the work has not yet been mentioned concretely. In the examination of the work, the aesthetic and art have not yet been mentioned generally. One can develop only from the other, but one can follow only after the other. The paradox of the unfinished work is 'physiological'. It is connected with the finiteness of being, with the fact that there had not remained time for the accomplishment. The bases and pillars of the work are complete, and in some places, even the arches, but not all of them, and so the inner spaces could not take shape. Almost all the concepts necessary to the examination of the work of art had lined up, but they were not followed by the actual examination of the work. Only its place is marked out, the place of the work in the topography of aesthetic phenomena, and the place of the examination of the work in the topography of concepts that interpret aesthetic phenomena. This is the famous line of thought on the work of art as a thing for itself. It is indeed a junction. All the chief lines of thought converge in it. But Lukács does not explicitly say what will become of these lines of thought. Furthermore, he defines the nature of the work at the level of philosophical generalization, but not the characteristics of the work at the level of art theoretical concretization. He defines what the work is, what outer notions determine the work, and what happens outside the work as it is coming into being. But he does not define what the work is like, what inner motions determine it, and what happens in it after coming into being. That is, the place of the work is determined in the aesthetic-artistic sphere. But the formation of the aesthetic-artistic qualities in the structure of the work is undetermined.
At this point, the two paradoxes, the paradox of the synthesis and that of the torso approach and strengthen one another. After all, *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen* is a synthesis, in which, after the examination of the aesthetic and artistic media, there would have followed the examination of the artistic work that brings aesthetic and artistic media into being. But it is a synthesis that remained a torso, a synthesis in which, after the examination of aesthetic and artistic media, the examination of the artistic work that brings them into being has not been accomplished. This—as is known—would have been, together with the examination of aesthetic attitudes, the subject matter of the second part. In a similar fashion, the third part would have disclosed the socio-historical processes of art. But here there is something striking. It is not only art in general that is a socio-historical phenomenon, but also the concrete artistic work. More precisely, the work in its reality, in its concept, and in all its metamorphoses, and in all the metamorphoses that preserve and modify its concept, can be discussed on this socio-historical basis alone. Thus, the accomplished first part sketched the whole conceptual environment of the work and marked out its place, but this place was left void and blank. It is all the more striking because the place marked out is a central one. It is a theoretical space that absorbs the chief lines of thought converging in it. It is an existing, though invisible center. The unwritten second part would have begun to fill in this space by developing a theory of the work of art, thereby replacing the invisible center with a visible one. But this process would have been finished only in the third part, in the discussion of the socio-historical processes of art, proving that a synthesis cannot develop purely linearly, but only lineally and concentrically at the same time. Hence, the first part would have become complete only gradually, in the light of the second and third parts, that is, retrospectively. The logical and historical, the logico-historical, or, rather, the historico-logical theory of the work would have been built into the structure of the first part in this way. But without this, as an interplay of the paradox of the synthesis and that of the torso, the theory of the work of art in the first part remained a fruitful anticipation, a blank, invisible and imaginary center. Still, there are two other points of view that give almost the appearance of predestination to the theoretical space that came into being in the first part, to the invisible and imaginary character of the center and, at the same time, to the unaccomplished and torso-like quality of the whole great synthesis. One is an ethical, the other, an ontological point of view. Both are connected with the theory of the work of art and, eventually, with the possibility of the continuation of the synthesis. One of them, the ethical point of view, refers simply to the unaccomplished second part, and the other, the ontological point of view, refers to the unaccomplished third part.

Lukács was well aware of the fact that the theory of work of art, the planned subject matter of the second part, cannot be solved without ethics, and that the historical nature of arts, the planned subject matter of the third part, cannot be solved without ontology. For one of the key issues in the theory of the work of art is the relation between the ethical and aesthetic. That is, how from the material of life that, outside the work, is not aesthetic but ethical—and, of course, many other things besides—there will become, inside the work, not ethical but aesthetic—and, of course, many other things besides. That is, what processes take place concretely in the work, which convert the ethical meaning into aesthetic meaning; and what processes take place in general in the aesthetic sphere constituted by works, which transform ethical values into aesthetic ones. And insofar as one of the key issues of the historical nature of arts is the socio-ontological basis. What the relation between the social law of existence and the artistic law of
existence is like. The way in which the history of society turns into the history of art. Starting out from the point that the two, the social and the artistic factors, are not separate, but they are together. In that it is not simply the case that art as an aesthetic phenomenon exists in society and is realized in society, but that, intricately, art as an aesthetic phenomenon is at the same time a social phenomenon, too. Since art is not aesthetic and social, but aesthetico-social. That is, it is aesthetic only in its social nature. Social quality is not an outer-transcendent, but an inner-immanent law of the aesthetic, it is precondition of the latter’s coming into being, as well as of its existence. It was these two factors that rendered the development of a systematic ethical and socio-ontological line of thought the basic precondition for the possibility of continuing the great synthesis and, in it, for that of developing the theory of the work of art.

Of course, as has already been mentioned, the place of the theory of the work of art was already marked out in the first part, and this place is a real theoretical junction. It is the meeting place of important categories and pairs of categories, where the outlines of the unelaborated tenet are—rather explicitly—given. Thus, it is embedded in the whole monumental composition of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. Four components of this embeddedness can be clearly distinguished. First: it is built into the most important concepts that determine the nature of art. Secondly: it will be the most important element in the interrelationship that outlines the new conception of the qualities of artistic reflection. Thirdly: it becomes a sensitive point in the construction of the structure of the whole aesthetic sphere. Fourthly: the most characteristic determinants of the chief aesthetic attitudes, of creation and reception, converge in it. Beyond all that, the invisible center, the missing theory of the work of art, also opens the way toward the examination of the work, in that it marks out the focuses of tension and undetermined-unsolved components, around which the creator’s construction of the structure of the work and the recipient’s construction-reconstruction of it can be correctly imagined.

The determination of the nature of art as well as its relation to the theory of the work of art begins with the problem of homogeneous medium, with the fact that the work—and the genre and the branch of art that can be abstracted from the work—is realized in a sensuously homogeneous sphere. More precisely, the work reduces the sensuous multifariousness and heterogeneity of the world to sensuous unicity and homogeneity. Still more precisely, it represents the imaginary presence and realization of the other sensuous spheres by the real presence and realization of one sensuous sphere. In order to accomplish this, of course, it is necessary to deepen and intensify the sensuous medium being realized. This reduction to a sole sensuous medium, intensified and heightened, is, in the first place, an obvious restriction. Yet this restriction is only a transitory phase, and not a final result. For the basic propensity of the works of art and of art in general is that they aim at reflecting the world in its totality; what is more, in its sensuous and perceptive totality. That is—to borrow a by now classic phrase—in the place of the non-perceptive world they create its perceptive image. But this—because of the sensuous and perceptive multifariousness of the world and the perceptive unicity of the work—is apparently an unresolvable contradiction. But only apparently. For the sensuous and perceptive unicity is sensuous and perceptive unicity intensified and perceptive unicity intensified and heightened. And precisely in its intensified and heightened character, it also evokes the sensuous qualities that are not present. That is, it transforms the restriction appearing in the first step into an expansion in the second one, it converts sensuous partiality into sensuous totality. Thus, the narrow and the wide, the partial and the total are dialectical pairs of opposites, dissolving in each other and being transformed
into each other, which is one of the most important components of the transformation of the work of art into a self-enclosed world, of its world-likeness. Just as generally, the real part bears the imaginary whole, the actually fragmentary bears the symbolically total alike in the formal structure of the work of art. This is how, from the category of homogeneous medium, there develops the category of intensive totality, which is closely connected with the real restriction of the world, given by the homogeneous medium, and with its non-real expansion that follows from the real restriction. There are two more controversies, with which the opposing unity of the narrow and the wide, of the partial and the total are connected: the controversy between the individual and mankind, that of self-knowledge and world knowledge. Furthermore, the work always expresses only the basic human dilemmas of the individual, and it is these alone that it can express. At the same time, the work always serves the basic self-knowledge of the individual, and it is this alone that it can serve. For, it is borne by the deeply individual process of creative activity and it will carry real artistic value only if it bears the unmistakable hallmark of individual-lyrical authenticity. But, ultimately, everything depends on what the individual, whose basic human dilemmas are expressed by the work, and whose basic self-knowledge is served by the work, is like. For, if he—to use the Goethean-Lukácsian terminology—is a ‘shell’, that is, if his self is a self-enclosed one, which is out of contact with the vital human and historical questions of the age, then the expressed basic human dilemma and the served basic self-knowledge will become the dilemma and self-knowledge of the ‘shell being’ of the self-enclosed self. But if he—to use that terminology once again—is a ‘core’, that is, if his self is in contact with the vital human and historical questions of the age, if it is a representative self, then the expressed basic human dilemma and the served basic self-knowledge will become the dilemma of the ‘core being’ of the representative self, that is, the dilemma and self-knowledge of mankind, namely, its world knowledge. Of course, here—beyond the resolved controversies—yet another unavoidable question becomes clear. It is not only the most important determination of the theory of the work of art and the nature of art that overlap with each other, but also the most important determinations of the theory of the work of art, of the nature of art and of the theory and nature of the personality, too.

It is the determination of the nature of art that leads to the circumscription of the qualities of artistic reflection. Hence, this kind of determination of the nature of art leads to the novel-like circumscription of the qualities of artistic reflection, which first makes its appearance in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen; this, of course, from the point of view of the missing theory of the work of art, from that of the invisible center. Here, there also appears a basic contrast that is and can be resolved in this line of thought alone: the contrast between the point-like nature of work of art, its monad-like closedness, and the world-like nature of the work of art, its quality that it involves the world in itself. A point, in which the whole world is included; a monad with no windows, which is directed to the external world. From the point of view of traditional logic, it is logical nonsense; from the point of view of the traditional theory of reflection, it is aesthetic nonsense. But here the point is not traditional, but dialectical, not the traditional theory of reflection, but a renewed theory of reflection.

This renewed theory of reflection has two basic concepts: the self-consciousness-like character of artistic reflection and the being-for-itself character of the work of art. The logical order apparently leads from self-consciousness-like reflection, from the universal characteristic of the whole of art to the being-for-itself character, to the concrete characteristic of the particular work of art. But only apparently. Because in reality the universal
characteristic of the whole art does not exist without the concrete characteristic of the particular work of art. It exists in the latter and by the latter alone; it comes into being in the latter and functions in the latter. Therefore, the nature of self-consciousness-like reflection can be explained by the nature of being for itself alone, just as genre, branch of art taken in general exist only in the particular works and can be explained only by them. Such is the case of the for-itself character of the work of art, that is, the character of the thing for itself, as separated from the pair of categories of 'in itself' and 'for ourselves', directed to them and determined in the face of them.

It is well known: the matter in question is a Hegelian category, fully elaborated in logic. Being for itself is a strong negation of every being for others, but at the same time it bears a strong relation to every being for others. It is the kind of being that determines its qualities in the unity of the repulsion and attraction of being for others, in the unity of demarcation from and binding to it. The self is the best example, which finds its essence in precisely that identity and contrast with that otherness. A monad, which is building from the outer world, but breaks off and will be directed to itself, a self-like monad or monadic self that comes into being from the unity with—differences from the world, which is self-aware. It reflects its being in identity and contrast, in the identity of contrast. Such a being for itself is the work of art. Such is its relation to the world beyond its boundaries, to the objective reality that exists independently of it, in which it itself is realized, and which, in turn, is realized in it.

In this determination, the most important element, from the point of view of new conception of artistic reflection, is consciousness directed to itself, the reflexion of unity and autonomy of its own, that is, self-consciousness; and, in addition, the self, as the chief example. Thus, a parallel can be drawn between the work and the human self which is self-aware and reflects—in the unity of identity and difference—the world in itself in the world. From this follows: the subject of the work and of art that can be abstracted from the works is not the world as it is, but the world as it is for man. That is, it is not simply the world, but, in a complicated way, the world of man living in the world. Such a world that has been created also by man, and such a man who has been created also by the world. What is more, in history. For, the world is fundamentally a historical product, and man is originally a historical being. Thus, the self-like work of art that reflects itself is the historical product of man's consciousness of himself, of his self-consciousness, is the memory of man, in which he fixes and records, at the level of experience, the memories of his historical path. At least two important issues follow from this. First, that the essence of artistic reflection is not naturalistic and copy-like reflection that abides by the the present and surface form of the reflected object, but memory-like and self-consciousness-like reflection, directed to the historicoc-essential form of the reflected object. Secondly, that the reflected object is not an objective one, independent of man, but a subjective object dependent on man, which includes man even in a double sense, as mankind and as individual man.

The whole of the aesthetic sphere, together with all its contradictions, is constituted in the work of art and in the theory of the work of art that had been left blank and has remained invisible. For, the homogeneous medium is realized in the work and by the work. And the unicity of the homogeneous medium is the basis of the homogeneity of the aesthetic sphere, just as the multifariousness of homogeneous media is the basis of the heterogeneity of the aesthetic sphere. This sphere is homogeneous outward, in the face of non-aesthetic phenomena. Homogeneous, inasmuch as it is sensuous in quality, it is directed to man in content, and ontologically it presupposes a subject, and so on.
But this sphere is heterogeneous inward, in the face of particular aesthetic phenomena. Heterogeneous, in that it contains phenomena different in quality, which are based on other kinds of principles, but which are of the same value, and so on. The unity of the homogeneous medium and the multifariousness of the aesthetic sphere, as well as its inward, plural and heterogeneous character, are postulated in the individual work of art. Like all higher generalizations, the genre, the branch of art, art taken in general, and even the aesthetic itself, are postulated in it, in that it is only the works that exist actually and individually. It is their point-like and monadic character in which they create around themselves a sphere in which the complicated relationships that make higher generalizations possible are realized. Thus, the relation between the work and the higher generalizations is the relation of the individual, the special, and the universal, in which the special and the universal exist in the individual as its special aspects, as its determined elements. It is not the case of the interrelationship of genus, species, and the specific, which is realized and can be interpreted deductively, ‘downward’, but the interrelationship of the special and the universal, which is realized and can be interpreted inductively, ‘upward’. Or, more precisely: this interrelationship and its interpretation are not simply inductive, but, at the same time, deductive as well. Insofar as higher generalizations are postulated in the work, and can be brought into being—inductively—only from it; but works can be interpreted from the direction of higher generalizations and they are given—deductively—full explanation only from them. Of course, in this unity of deduction and induction, the stressed element is induction.

In this, the interesting and novel thing is the fact that the decisive element between the work and the higher generalizations is not the relationship of subsumption, but that of inherence. And also that the discontinuous as well as the continuous character of the whole aesthetic sphere develops from the work—and solely from the work. For, the aesthetic sphere is discontinuous, as every important work renews and breaks the laws characteristic of genre, branch of art, art, and the aesthetic. But, at the same time, the aesthetic sphere is continuous, as every important work not only renews and breaks, but also fills out and confirms the laws characteristic of genre, branch of art, art, and the aesthetic. This permanent renewal and filling, breaking and confirmation gives the aesthetic sphere its constancy and flexibility, flexible constancy and constant flexibility. And also its historicism. For, from the way the individual work inserts into or suspends continuity, the historical dialectic of the shaping principles of art are eventually outlined.

And, finally, the work and the theory of the work of art articulate the processes of the most important aesthetic attitudes, those of creation and reception, and determine their chief characteristics, too. The basic concept—also from this point of view—is the homogeneous medium. This, as has already been pointed out, restricts and expands the world in one and the same act. In the first stage, it actually restricts it (the world), and, in the second, virtually expands it. From partiality it brings totality into being, from the intensity of sensuous description, the intensive totality of the world being described. But, in the homogeneous medium and through the homogeneous medium, parallel with the restriction and expansion of the world, another process also takes place: the restriction and expansion of man. Here, too, actual restriction is followed by virtual expansion. And restriction, in this case as well, is intensification, which is a possibility for the intensive artistic comprehension of the totality of the world.

This process is circumscribed by the famous pair of categories, the whole man and the totality of man. The former is the man of the everyday sphere, as yet neither touched nor influenced by the homogeneous medium, while the latter is the man of the aesthetic
sphere, already touched and influenced by the homogeneous medium, the man in whom the actual restriction and apparent expansion have already taken place. This is the man who has been also intensified by the intensity of the homogeneous medium, who concentrates with all his sensual and intellectual powers and capacities on the solution of the task before him. In this moment—in the transformation of the whole man into the totality of man—at least three points are significant.

In the first place, the whole motion is begun and carried out through the homogeneous medium. The imperative that enforces sensuous intensity as well as mental concentration that come into being in man, is the sensuous intensity and mental concentration that come into being in the homogeneous medium. And the homogeneous medium is the medium of the work, more precisely, the medium created in and by the work. That is, the transformation of man is a transformation caused by the work, the transformed man is the product of the work. This is the thought that—of course, in another context—appears even in the Heidelberg manuscripts of Lukács's youth. But the point here, more concretely—and at the same time, more generally—is not the homogeneous medium, but form. Form, on the one hand, is indeed more concrete than the homogeneous medium, as it is beyond the sensuous sphere and material object of the work, and marks the tangible elements of realization. On the other hand, form is indeed more general than the homogeneous medium, as it is on the inner side of the work of art and the whole of art, and marks the moral qualities of spiritual attitude, of the soul. What here, in the late aesthetic, is the totality of man, man concentrating on the task, is there, in the early aesthetic, the spiritually poor man concentrating on self-fulfilment. But the terminological difference would not change the fact that in both—in the totality of man and in the spiritually poor man alike—there takes place the restriction and intensification caused by either the homogeneous medium or form, which is at the same time expansion and completion as well.

In the second place, the concentration on the task is also of a dual nature. It means concentration on both creation and reception as a task. The creator finds himself confronted by the homogeneous medium of the possible work starting from the experience given by life, and that is what transforms the whole man into the totality of man. The recipient finds himself confronted by the homogeneous medium of the realized work starting from the experience given by the work, and that is what transforms the whole man into the totality of man. It is qualitatively that same as the processes of creation and reception, but the direction is reversed because one achieves the work from experience, through the homogeneous medium; the other achieves experiences from the work through the homogeneous medium. And one is of a constructive nature, it constructs a work; the other is of a reconstructive nature, it reconstructs a work. The quality is, however, the same because the process of transformation, the metamorphosis of the participating personality, takes place in both.

In the third place, the interesting thing is that this whole transformation, concentration on the task, which takes place in creation as well as in reception around the work, under the influence of the homogeneous medium, sets in motion—starting from the theory of the work as invisible and unelaborated center point—the most important and constitutive categories of the aesthetic sphere that presuppose each other. More precisely, pair of categories. In creation and in the transformation borne by reception, it is the category of catharsis. But the question is far from being this simple because mimesis cannot be attached exclusively to creation, and catharsis cannot be attached exclusively to reception. In the first place the cathartic effect is evoked by the mimetic elements of the
work, that is, the cathartic process is called forth and controlled by the mimetic process. In the second place, mimesis realized in creation is also preceded or can be preceded by catharsis realized in an experience given by life. That is, it is not only mimesis that calls forth and controls catharsis, but catharsis also calls forth and controls mimesis. In the third place, even in the cathartic experience of reception, mimetic elements are—seemingly—present, in that one of the components of the cathartic experience is the experience-like interpretation of the mimetic phenomena realized in the work. From this it is fairly clear that, centered around the work, the most important components of creation and reception are set into motion and bring into being a merging, living, and organic interrelationship that can be separated in its elements.

The unelaborated theory of the work is not only an invisible center, in which all the decisive lines of thought of the great aesthetic synthesis converge, but also, to some extent, an opening into the problems of work structure. It does not outline processes taking place in the work, but it renders discernible some junctions, around which the actual theory of the work should develop. Such junctions can be recognized in the theory of catharsis, in the analysis of the relation between the parts and the whole, and also in the thesis of undetermined objectivity. The theory of catharsis is of basically ethical conception. At one point, however, Lukács makes an attempt to transform the ethical character into an aesthetic one, and, at the same time, to draw it closer to the characteristics of the work structure. There he says that the cathartic effect is aesthetic only if it is called forth by the formal elements of the work. For a number of reason, it is a significant insight.

First, he marks the most important point where the ethical meanings outside the work become aesthetic meanings inside the work (even if he does not analyze the process of transformation). Secondly, he finds the most important point in form, namely, in the work of art, in its structure, that is, precisely in its characteristic as a work of art. The marking of the relation between the parts and the whole already refers to the tension that come into being inside the work, to the fact that the parts and the whole alike strive simultaneously for the maximum individual and the maximum universal. In this relationship, on the one hand, one realizes that in the individual, actual element of the aesthetic, there is the universal, abstract characteristic of the whole aesthetic sphere, that it approaches the universal through the individual, in the strictly, concretely true, the broadly and abstractly valid. On the other hand, it becomes clear that the structure of the work comprises a network of tensions: within the part that is simultaneously individual and universal, between the parts that are simultaneously individual and universal, and between the parts that are simultaneously individual and universal and the whole. Thirdly, it can be discerned that this complicated system of tensions is part of the form taken in a broader sense, which renders the cathartic effect touched by ethics a cathartic effect touched by aesthetics. Undetermined objectivity is perhaps the most important structural element. Lukács deduces from the essence of determination that certain elements in the work of necessity remain undetermined. More precisely: certain elements in the work, more or less out of necessity, are determined, while others, more or less out of necessity, remain undetermined. That is, from the aspects of determination and indetermination, the incompleteness of the work, a certain—regular—openness of the work’s structure is expressed. An unavoidable conclusion. For the work involves the recipient in its existence, in its completion. Since reception, naturally, starts out from seemingly determining the actually undetermined, from seemingly closing the actually open. In this regard, two points are worth mentioning. First, as regards the determination
of the undetermined, closing the open is not in the least an arbitrariness on the part of the recipient. For what is determined in the work circumscribes how and in how many ways the undetermined can be determined, and, what is closed in the work circumscribes how and in how many ways the open can be closed. Hence, reception is not simply passive reconstruction, but also an intricately active construction, though the creator's construction articulates the process of the recipient's construction and marks out its sphere of motion, its sphere of validity. Secondly, the recipient's participation in the completion of the work is ontologically determined. The famous thesis of *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen* is well known: in the aesthetic sphere, there is no object without subject. Although this, in itself, in its generality concerning the whole of the sphere, is convincing, it cannot be proved. It becomes provable only in the work of art that brings into being the whole aesthetic sphere, in the theory of the work of art. The proof takes place around the invisible center, even without rendering it visible or filling it, and, from the angle of the subject of the creator, as well as of the subject of the recipient; even from the point of view of the object of the work of art, too. The thesis on the work of art as a thing for itself proves that the subject is irremovably included even in the object of the work of art. The thesis on the self-consciousness-like reflection proves that the subject is irremovably included in the creator's construction of the work of art, too. Finally, the thesis on the undetermined objectivity proves that the subject is also irremovably included in the recipient's construction and reconstruction of the work of art.

One might continue these proofs, but perhaps this will suffice. Around the theory of the work of art, all the chief categories of the great synthesis are indeed set into motion, all the pairs of categories that presuppose each other or restrict and delimit the validity of each other, for instance: mimesis and catharsis, homogeneous medium and intensive totality, ontological object–subject relation, the aesthetic and the pleasant, the everyday and artistic spheres, the whole man and the totality of man, world-like and non-world-like, and so on. And, in all these and through all these, there remains an unresolved duality: the relation between the ethical and the aesthetic. This unresolved duality might also be analyzed in the pairs of categories listed above, but that would be beyond the purview of his text. Actual resolution, the synthesis of the two would have been achieved through the development of the theory of work of art. It was not completed. There remained unresolvedness, stressing the highly fertile torso-like character that stimulates further thoughts and further questions.

Further thinking and further questioning raise two unavoidable dilemmas even for a first 'reading'. For one thing, there is the question of competence. What are the limits of validity for the unelaborated theory of the work and the invisible center? For another, there is the static character of the theory of the work, which exists only in outlines. And, then, there is its completeness and closedness, which, in spite of the thesis of undetermined objectivity—elsewhere and with other characteristics—powerfully assert themselves.

In the first place, there is the question of validity, and the dilemma can be delimited rather precisely. The model of the point-like and monadic work, self-enclosed and for itself, generalizes the varieties of the work of art of the classical age—so to say, the golden age—of bourgeois art. It concerns those types of work that came into being in the European development, after the Renaissance and before the avant-garde, subsequent to the secularization and relative autonomy of art, and preceding the questioning of secularization and relative autonomy. Before and after it, other types of work had and have existed, and Lukács's work model does not apply to them (these have been ex-
amined by Lajos Németh). Before, there was—to simplify slightly—a sacral type of work, deeply embedded in mythological outlook and cultic practice, thus, not point-like and for itself. Later on—to oversimplify once again—there was a subjective type of work, deeply embedded in the communicational pressure of individual self-expression, thus, once again, not point-like and not for itself. Of course, Lukács’s work of model preserves something of the earlier sacral character. For example, the type of work the classical age of bourgeois art—which he generalizes—also preserves something of the earlier sacral character, what Walter Benjamin—in an expression that has become paradigmatic—called the ‘aura’ of the work of art.

It is a complicated concept, for there is even the magic enchantment of the former cultic function within, as well as the non-recurrent quality of the closed and delimited realist work, the piety of the church that surrounds the object housed in a museum, as well as the petrified and faded classicity of alienation from life. That is what ceases to exist in modern artistic culture. For—to cite but one of several reasons—the multiplied experience of the reproduced work irresistibly breaks into everyday life. Benjamin both approves of and regrets the process. He approves of it because the breakthrough into everyday life brings with it the expansion of artistic culture and, instead of imbuing politics with the aesthetic, it promises that aesthetic will become imbued with politics. He regrets it because the expansion of artistic culture is equivalent to its desacralization as well, and this anticipates the decay of traditional values. But both in the approving sorrow and the sorrowful approval, there is the admission of the unchangeable fact: the position and the fate of the work and of art have been modified in the world, since the position and fate of the world have also been modified in history. Lukács’s work model preserves Benjamin’s concept of the aura, and opposes the thesis on the cessation of the aura. He preserves the concept in the presupposition of the individuality and non-recurrent quality of the work, and he opposes the thesis on its cessation in the definite separation of the artistic and everyday spheres. The famous theory of catharsis serves this end, too, in that catharsis—both in creation and reception—is concentration on experience that can be formed or has already been formed, the transformation of the whole man into ‘man totality’, the radical transcendation of commonness—even if it is only a temporary transcendence.

Hence, it is not the non-classical types of work of the twentieth century that Lukács’s work model abstracts, but the classical or classicizing types of earlier centuries. And even here, he does so only to the extent that he eventually postulates harmony. The disharmonic is, in the end, transformed into harmony; and the ugly, when contrasted with beauty, is transformed into a component of an equilibrium with beauty. To this extent, Lukács’s view is in accordance with Hartmann’s aesthetic (which proceeds from another direction, still a harmonizing and classicizing one). And it conflicts with Adorno’s aesthetic, which proceeds from a direction that is neither harmonizing nor classicizing. For, Adorno also starts from the monadic character of the work and from the fact that the monad still takes the outer, non-aesthetic elements up into the inner, aesthetic formation. He inserts them in the work and tries to harmonize them. The attempt is, up to this point, similar to Lukács’s, but it is a failed attempt. Unable to achieve harmony, the attempt creates tension, and the essence of the work—that is, the essence of modern work—lies in precisely this tension. The modern work exists in the tension of the attempt at harmony, of the promise of harmony, of the concentrated force directed to harmony—and dies, becomes a rigid framework, as soon as it has achieved it. Ultimately, then, this scheme is completely different from Lukács’s.
For the second place, there is the problem of the static, completed and closed character. As we have seen: the relation between the parts and the whole reveals a certain tension, and the thesis of undetermined objectivity makes some openness felt, while the essence of the monadic work is harmonized static and closed completeness. This is how it continues to exist in history: with a meaning that came into being at a given point and continues to be valid. And this is how it contradicts the other important aesthetic conceptions of the century. The examination of the contradiction demands further research in the history of aesthetic theories. Here, a few examples may suffice to highlight some characteristic tendencies. Ingarden postulates the stratification of the work, of the literary work. The work exists in four strata, and these strata—naturally—are open toward one another. They do not parallel each other, but are open, in that they are realized in one another and by one another. In this way, motion becomes the essence of the work structure, a motion that leads one stratum into the other and brings the other stratum into being in the former. This moving organism, creating and resolving tension, exists in history with its unfilled spaces, provoking ever newer and different kinds of filling and concretization. In Hartmann’s aesthetic, too, the essence of the theory of the work is again stratification and motion, motion between the strata, even double stratification and double motion. An ontological stratification divides the work into a sensuous and tangible—that is, material—foreground and a non-sensuous and non-material—that is, spiritual—background. And an aesthetic stratification further differentiates the two ontological strata, dividing them—according to the properties of branches—into other strata, on a scale that spreads from the sensuous surface strata to the deepest spiritual strata of ideals. In these—between the surface and the depths—there is a dual motion, determining the life of the work, its dynamic existence: from the surface toward the depths, where in every upper stratum we glimpse the one beneath it, and from the depths toward the surface, where each lower stratum breaks through on the way to the upper. Adorno also relies on the unresolved tensions and non-ceasing motions, on the tensions and motions inside the work, between the aesthetic and non-aesthetic, between the outer and inner elements; and in addition, between the part and the whole, and between the historical core and the timeless aspect alike.

Naturally, all these dilemmas are open. To close them, or at least to disclose them more deeply, requires further meditation. One thing, though, is certain: the unelaborated tenet on the work of art in Lukács’s incomplete synthesis is an unavoidable direction for all further research; and even in its incompleteness, it ranks as one of the greatest attempts of the century.

(Translated by Matild Gulyás)

Bibliography


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Two Contending Principles in *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen*: An Epistemological Critique of Lukács’s Aesthetics

by

József Szili

*Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen* begins with a proposition, namely, that artistic reflection is not identical with cognition proper, being a specific mode or sub-type of the latter; it is not an anthropological or ontological trait of man, but the product of a long socio-historical evolution,

"ein Produkt des gesellschaftlichen Seins, der auf seinem Boden entstandenen Bedürfnisse, der Anpassung des Menschen an seine Umwelt, des Wachstums seiner Fähigkeiten in Wechselwirkung mit dem Zwang, ganz neuartigen Aufgaben gewachsen zu sein".

György Lukács’s great unfinished aesthetic work makes rich and varied use of its basic principle, social practice. Yet, in an important aspect, it seems to treat with a certain vagueness the status of science and art as concrete forms of cognition. We get the impression that the problems of practical cognition are not distinguished at all from those of cognition as such. It is not easy to make this matter sufficiently clear and unambiguous, for *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen* itself does not make its points clear and unambiguous in every respect. Obviously, its argumentation is based on the practical character of the specific modes of reflection when it limits the range of the problematic concerning the validity of aesthetic judgment, or when it tells us that authentic reflection should not be identified with any one type of reflection (e.g., with mechanical, photographic reflection) because this would mean that all the other types were distorted forms only:

Wäre eine solche die Grundlage, aus welcher die Differenzen herauswachsen, so müssten alle spezifischen Formen subjektive Entstellungen dieser allein 'authentischen' Reproduktion der Wirklichkeit sein, oder die Differenzierung müsste einen rein nachträglichen, völlig uns spontanen, nur bewusst-gedanklichen Charakter haben.

Authentic reproduction is available, however, in other than photographic forms as well, and these, too may serve as a base for generalization. Lukács does his best to prove that artistic reflection is capable of some kind of objectivity, that is, adequacy or authenticity. Within the sphere of this problem, he discusses the various functions of art in such organic unity and complexity that no doubts remain: here all preconditions, elements, and phases of art as reflection have been taken into consideration and made to appear as constituents of an integrate system. It is all the more remarkable, then, that
at each stage, scientific reflection is referred to as 'cognition proper'. This means that for all the reservations that Lukács has as regards the range of scientific abstraction, he ultimately resorts to an identification of scientific cognition with cognition as such. This is, in all probability, a consequence of the problematic distinction that he makes between the 'plain' thing in itself ('einfaches Ansich')\textsuperscript{3} and its other, derivative types, and also of his hypothesis that reality is one and the same, regardless of the different facets that it offers to science and art.\textsuperscript{4} According to Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, the reality that art is concerned with is not, however, independent of the human race, untouched by the externalization of subjectivity, but is, rather, to some extent, reality internalized. Although Lukács points out that art reproduces this aspect of reality in a more profound, integrated, sensuous, and effective way than science does, theoretical complications arise because, in a definite sense, this reality is not 'one and same'. It is certainly not identical with the Ansich of nature, nor with the Ansich of social objectivity in a form accessible to science.

That scientific reflection seems to be describable simply in terms of the subject-object relationship that characterizes cognition as such, that is, as cognition in general leads to yet further complications. It is a common illusion that the basic epistemological situation coincides fully with the subject-object relationship in the scientific mode of concrete, practical cognition. In a study of ontological problems, Lukács emphasized that it would be undialectical to recognize the world of things only as matter or as objective existence, and to discern a supposedly independent, active functioning of consciousness in all other forms of objectivity (relations, connections, etc.) and in such reflections of reality as appear to be directly the product of thought.\textsuperscript{5}

The statement is aimed at nominalism, but it also attacks positions that "arise from an abstract and antinomic contraposition of material and spiritual, or natural and social existence".\textsuperscript{6} The introduction to Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen points out that, in materialism, the priority of being to consciousness has no hierarchical character: "Es ist ein weit verbreitetes Missverständnis, wenn man glaubt, dass das Weltbild des Materialismus—Priorität des Seins dem Bewusstsein, des gesellschaftlichen Seins dem gesellschaftlichen Bewusstsein gegenüber—ebenfalls hierarchischen Charakters wäre."\textsuperscript{7} Nevertheless, there are passages in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen that are not exempt from the consequence of such hierarchization. (There is, of course, a hierarchy to be seen, not as a gradation of reality or realness, but as a variety of the foundations and the mediating systems of different forms of motion.) Thus, for instance, when Lukács defines the subject—object relationship in art, stating that—in contrast with the plainly and purely an-sich-seiendes Objekt of scientific reflection—the object of aesthetic reflection is pervaded by subjectivity, he seems to be worrying about an eventual conflict with the hierarchical concept of reality and, carefully, in the spirit of the recognition of a hierarchical arrangement, he proceeds to justify the realness of this type of reality, its an sich character and its objectivity. Albeit, the subjectivity integrated into the object cannot be the same as the subjectivity of the cognitive subject in the act of cognition, for that subjectivization takes place at a wholly different level, namely, in the material exchange between nature and society, in the cultural adaptation of instincts, and so on. All this is clearly stated in the text of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen:

Die Entwicklung der Menschheit ist ein objektiver Prozess [...] hat also in dieser Hinsicht unzweifelhaft den Charakter eines Ansich [...] die so entstandene und sich entfaltende Wirklichkeit eine selbstgemachte im
weitesten Sinne des Wortes ist […] Dieser Prozess hat deshalb einen doppelten Aspekt: den objektiven, in welchem alles, was das Bewusstsein der beteiligten Individuen betrifft, bloss Motor oder Material ist […] daneben aber auch den subjektiven, den des am Prozess beteiligten Individuums, das diesen Prozess — bewusst oder unbewusst — als seinen eigenen mitmacht, dessen eigene Existenz, vom kleinsten bis zum größten nur im Zusammenhang mit ihm als dem Selbst zugehörig begriffen werden kann. Ein solches Begreifen muss aber die Züge des Selbstbewusstseins an sich tragen.⁸

We cannot but agree with this analysis and realize that the subjective aspect (the view, approach, or attitude) of the individual participating in that process has real existence and that, furthermore, as such, and as a component of an objective process, it is objective. It may achieve objectivity in an epistemological sense, too, as the adequate reflection of the objective process. Moreover, the ‘subjective aspect’ may appear as objective in still another aspect: in the very aspect that makes it conceivable as an object of artistic reflection. In that case, the subjective aspect is no longer (in the sense of inadequate reflection) objective or subjective, but a ‘legitimate’ aspect of an objective process. It is different from the objectivity inherent in plain identity with the objective process (‘bloss Motor oder Material’) and different from an objective mental reflection (objective, as it is usually meant, in the sense of scientific reflection) of an objective process. In plain language, a humanly legitimate aspect of the objective process of human evolution is involved here, but, to put it more accurately, following the formulations of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, we should say that this aspect is legitimate because, in a special way, it is identical with the ‘self-consciousness of the evolution of humanity’. And what is true of consciousness is also true of self-consciousness: it is to be conceived of as having objective existence except when defined as an antipode to existence. Thus, its legitimacy or special identity (also equitable with the category of ‘inheritance’) is nothing but objectivity because the self-consciousness of the evolution of humanity objectively exists and, as such, it is the object of aesthetic reflection. If this object is described as ‘subjective’ or ‘pervaded by subjectivity’ (and yet, presumably, not contaminated by it), we may suspect that the terms ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’ are not used in any strict sense at all, as well defined terms in well defined contexts, but, rather, in senses gliding from one level of abstraction to another, with connotations of various theoretical (ontological, epistemological, socio-historical, psychological, etc.) dimensions.

Eventually, in certain passages of the book, these terminological liberties do not lead to confusion, for, within a limited context, there is some chance to arrive at an unequivocal meaning. Nevertheless, confusion is inevitable when the task is to elucidate the functions of basic categories in the context of a comprehensive system. For instance, Lukács underlined, and, by his proposition that there are two kinds of Ansichsein and objectivity, reinforced the view that the object of artistic reflection, an object pervaded by subjectivity, should be seen as having an objective character. Yet, due to a confusion of the terms ‘subjectivity’ and ‘objectivity’, and a lack of distinction between different levels of abstraction, his terminology became so inconsistent that the object of artistic reflection might be described as ‘objectivity pervaded by subjectivity’ (i.e., subjective in some way), or as ‘subjectivity well grounded in objective reality’, enjoying objective existence and validity. Lukács was not always convinced that his concept of the objectivity of subjectivity was philosophically well grounded. This explains his renewed efforts to amend or substantiate the objectivity of the object of artistic reflection with the requirement of the truest possible reflection (in effect, representation) of an-sich-seiende

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things. The outcome involved (aside from consequences responsible for his ungenerously narrow conception of art) a patent concession to the hierarchization of objectivity and reality.

**Two Contending Conceptions**

Further complications arise from the fact that there are actually two totally divergent conceptions contending in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. This is, of course, not the consequence of a deliberate program, but, rather, an outcome of the author’s wavering awareness of the ambiguous foundations of his approach concerning, on the one hand, the basic structures of his ontological and epistemological categories, and, on the other hand, his qualitative preconceptions about the range, corpus, function, and value of artistic phenomena. Naturally, on the pages of the book, the two conceptions do not appear as absolutely distinct ones. Although now the one, now the other comes out on top, and although on such occasions the outlines of one of the two conceptions are fairly well discernible, they generally mix, pervade one another, so much so, incidentally, that they jointly give an impression of unity and cohesion. But that impression dissolves as soon as the apparently unified conception is submitted to analysis as a supposedly coherent logical system. It is, therefore, perhaps more practical to refer to them as to two tendencies, acknowledging that they, at times, display a genuine propensity to unity and that, if we are prepared to make certain concessions, their interpenetration seems to be quite considerable.

One tendency implies that the objectivity of the object of aesthetic reflection is of the same nature as the objectivity of objects existing in their plain Ansichheit, independently of consciousness. A contextual reading usually reveals that this type of objectivity is based on that hierarchical concept of objectivity that forbids consciousness, or anything belonging to or created by it, to be considered as having a veritably an-sich-seiendes (i.e., objective) character. This position implies that they are, as it were, by definition dependent on consciousness, and always and in all ways (or, at least, in some way) identical with the subject and subjectivity. This tendency appears to be in genuine harmony with some tenets of what is usually referred to as ‘mechanical’ or ‘metaphysical’ materialism (tenets with which, had they been recognized as such, Lukács would not have sympathized at all) and with tenets of realism, as they appear in the conventions of a certain line of the Marxist tradition (tenets with which he sympathized fully by taste and by theoretically inclined aesthetic preference).

The other tendency (associable with a dialectical materialist attitude and a relatively generous view of artistic phenomena) paradoxically bases the adequacy of aesthetic reflection on the objective character of aesthetic subjectivity and on the concept of ‘adequate subject’, leaving no doubt that, in the final analysis, the object of reflection is an adequate subjectivity well grounded in the objective world. Defined more closely, this is the self-consciousness of the evolution of humanity, that aspect of the evolutionary process of the human race that Lukács presents in terms of the subjective aspect, in contrast with the objective character of the process. Of this, however, it is ascertainable that, due to its foundation and validity in the objective world, it is wholly objective, especially so in the framework of a non-hierarchic order of objectivity. Theoretically, it is no simple problem that this objective self-consciousness participates in the structure of aesthetic reflection not only as the object of reflection, but also as its subject: as the subject that alone is qualified to act as subject in this kind of reflection. This quality,
a readiness or capacity to become one with the self-consciousness of the evolution of humanity, characterizes the adequate subject and adequate aesthetic subjectivity. This dichotomy and internal quarrel in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen is discernible in several relations. In the first of the two tendencies, comparison with the basic epistemological situation and its use as a point of departure leads to its identification with the basic structural situation characteristic of scientific cognition. The basic epistemological situation, the subject–object relationship in cognitive reflection as such, is either the same as that of scientific reflection in every respect, in which case aesthetic reflection (or, indeed, any other form of reflection) is an instance of redundancy, or it is as different from the basic structure of scientific reflection as from that of aesthetic reflection. Then their common features are revealed in the ultimate categories of cognition only, the assumption of some kind of subject–object relationship, the assumption concerning the ontological status of being and consciousness, or matter and mind. In many passages of Lukács’s work, cognition as such is presented as identical with scientific cognition. In such cases, the adequacy of aesthetic reflection is explained by analogies with cognition proper, that is, with scientific cognition. It is no surprise that, despite these analogies, aesthetic reflection will be the loser in this competition (cf. the much-emphasized presumption that the basic categories of reflection are the same and that only their structuration and relative proportions are different in different modes of reflection, or the declaration that, to some extent, the tendency of disanthropomorphization should be present in aesthetic reflection—an unbalanced claim, as there is no hint that scientific cognition, the model example of disanthropomorphization, would be less complete without a dose of anthropomorphization, the fundamental characteristic of aesthetic reflection). Certain passages of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen make it clear how doubtful it is whether art is better able to offer pure knowledge than is scientific knowledge: “das vom Kunstwerk Gebotene kann zugleich mehr und weniger sein als Erkenntnis.”9 Lukács concedes that art has a certain preparatory function, which thereby justifies the use of the word ‘cognition’: “Sicher kann die Erkenntnis nur in der Wissenschaft ihre ganz angemessene Methode finden. Sie erscheint aber auch dort, wo vorbereitend Probleme oder Forderungen aufgeworfen werden.”10 Lukács also attributes a quasi-cognitive effect to the ‘defetishizatory’ mission of art.11

This tendency is also revealed in passages that accentuate the requirement of the representation of objective factuality in art. It is true, however, that this requirement is amended, occasionally, with references to definitions basic to the other main tendency or conception in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. Accordingly, on such occasions, the ‘truest possible reflection of objectivity’ needs reinterpretation. Instead of the reflection of external reality, it should refer to the reflection of the Ansich of species character (Gattungsmässigkeit). But, then, it is part of a broader view, of an effort that seems more suitable to substantiate the universality of a comprehensive aesthetic system, whereas the aforementioned tendency, in which the palm is yielded to scientific reflection for its adequacy, is the expression of a more or less ‘spacious’ realism-centered aesthetic conception. Its propositions aim at an extension of the requirements of realistic representation to universal validity and restrict aesthetic reflection to a limited sphere by means of stylistic and generic criteria. Within this tendency, the reflection of the thing in itself means, if not the reflection of physical objects alone, at least the reflection of facts, relations, and contexts also accessible to science. This external world will, of course, include human, psychical and social facts and relations as well, but not the subjective aspect that opens the way to reevaluating the status of art as a form of the

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self-consciousness of humanity. This must be so if Lukács is to remain faithful to this statement that science and art reflect the same object, that is, objective reality, implying that the Ansich pursued by science cannot be different from what art is to deal with. For the broader view represented in the other tendency of the book, the latter contention proves to be untenable and is tacitly dismissed. Then the object of aesthetic reflection is introduced as an aspect of reality in the context of what is, in Lukács’s phrase, a subjective aspect, inaccessible to science. Nevertheless, in the narrower view, the reflection of the external world (including social and psychological phenomena) is the main issue and the prevailing demand. In this context, the literary examples that Lukács cites testify fidelity to social history only, demonstrating that

die künstlerische Gestaltung, die ihr zugrunde liegende, die in ihr verkörperte, sowie die von ihr ausgelöste Subjektivität diese Struktur der objektiven gesellschaftlich-geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit, ihre wahren Proportionen bewahrend, jedoch mit gesteigerter Intensität, wiedergibt.\textsuperscript{12}

It is, however, important to realize that, even in passages where this narrowing tendency prevails, no concession is made to gross vulgarization and simplification. On the contrary, Lukács takes every opportunity to point out such errors. He remarks, for instance:

natürlich hat eine historische Einzelforschung als solche methodologisch durchaus das Recht, etwa Kunstwerke auf ihre Treue der Geschichte gegenüber zu untersuchen, und solche Forschungen können mitunter sogar zur Erkenntnis künstlerischer Probleme beitragen. Der Forscher ist jedoch aus der ästhetischen Sphäre herausgetreten, er schaut die Kunst von aussen, nicht von innen an.\textsuperscript{13}

Nevertheless, in such context ‘truth’ or ‘fidelity to reality’ refer to truth or fidelity to given socio-historical and psychological depths in the depiction of the external world. Time and again Lukács resorts to temporary solutions (on the analogy of the use of the natural sign in music), but they cannot point directly and positively to what seems to be the fundamental and ultimate object of aesthetic reflection according to the other, broader tendency of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. He emphasizes that “die Gegenstände in der Literatur nicht in ihrem einfachen Ansich vorkommen dürfen, sondern als gegenständliche Vermittlungen der menschlichen Beziehungen, der sie verwirklichen Handlungen”.\textsuperscript{14} Phrased more accurately, as a universal proposition, as a requirement encompassing the total sphere of the aesthetic quality, this means that

die ästhetische Mimesis strebt jedoch, obwohl sie die Objektivität möglichst treu zu reflektieren verpflichtet ist, einen anderen Ziel zu: solche Zusammenhänge als Taten und Leiden, als Erfolge und Niederlagen, als Aufschwünge und Verzerrungen der Menschen (des Menschengeschlechts) erlebbar zu machen.\textsuperscript{15}

It is remarkable that here objectivity, as an object of reflection, is contrasted with another aim, which seems to be situated, in the phrasing of this passage, outside the sphere of objectivity. But even this other aim is not necessarily identical with what is postulated as the ultimate object of aesthetic reflection in the broader and more analytic tendency that, however, seems to come nearer to universal validity. Although neither the accurate denotations of such terms as ‘Mimesis’, ‘reflektieren’, ‘erlebbar machen’ nor the fine distinction between the object and the aim of mimesis is made very clear in this respect, I have the impression that not even that other aim would transcend the Ansich of the socio-historical sphere. Other formulations also reveal that, in this work, there is a tendency, in which the fundamental factor is considered to be the immediate
fidelity to reality—in the sense of the notion of objective scientifc truth—which truth is then only modifed, under the pressure of special aesthetic requirements, different from the demands of objectivity. This is how aesthetic reflection is supposed to operate, for example, in the following description:

die Objektwelt nicht nur in ihrem Wesen, sondern auch in ihrer unmittelbaren Erscheinungsform fixiert und sinnfthlig gemacht wird, dass die Dialektik von Erscheinung und Wesen nicht nur in ihrer allgemeinen Gesetzmthigkeit zur Geltung gelangt, sondern gerade in ihrer Unmittelbarkeit, so wie sie sich dem Menschen im Leben darbietet.\textsuperscript{16}

(Lukács does not seem to be aware of the historicity of the spontaneous conventionalism inherent in any \textit{unmittelbare Erscheinungsform}, due to the meditation of our humanized senses.) Had we doubts, supposing that here ‘essence’ stands for species character, and that art is not obliged to explore those features of objective necessity or its essence which belong to the competence of science, certain formulations must convince us that we are in error and Lukács truly means that it is art’s duty to take on itself the tasks of science, too. For in the world created by works of art, “nicht nur die objektive, gesellschaftlich-geschichtliche Notwendigkeit wird aufgedeckt — das vermag die Wissenschaft oft noch besser zu bewerkstelligen.”\textsuperscript{17} Consequently, in these formulations the word ‘objective’ suggests that the ontological structure of reality is strictly hierarchical. This tendency of \textit{Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen} makes the objective world appear not merely \textit{an sich} and objective in a more definite way than species character, but uniquely \textit{an sich} and objective, the sole manifestation of objectivity. Accordingly, in such contexts species character and the self-consciousness of humanity appear as subjectivity only. And, indeed, from Lukács’s assertion that the aim of mimesis is other than the truest possible reflection of objectivity, it follows that what is conceived of outside the sphere of objectivity must be conceived of as subjectivity, if the distinction with the term ‘objectivity’ makes any sense at all. This means that what appears to be deeply problematic in this tendency of Lukács’s aesthetic is not the assumption that two kinds of objectivity exist, but, rather, the fact that there is apparently no sign of awareness of such an assumption in the exposition of this conception. Had it been the component of a deliberate theoretical maneuver, there would have been ample oppurtunity to set up these two tendencies or conceptions as two phases of a single theoretical process, or as two levels or aspects of a common, complex structure.

In the narrow tendency, the orientation of the theoretical system seems to be subordinate to the tasks of proving that a comprehensive theory of art can be based on an adequate systematization of the requirements of realistic representation. Confronted with that task, a narrow realism-centered preconception of art is pressed to answer the ultimate philosophical questions of aesthetics. One such question is the following: is the object of aesthetic reflection objectively existent? We have seen that the answer is positive, but restricts the sphere of objectivity to what can be described in terms of the external world. That this is not adequate answer is also apparent from the fact that these theses cease functioning as soon as, in order to demonstrate how comprehensive this aesthetic conception is, they are applied to grotesque and fantastic representations and utopian attitudes in art. In those cases, the object of aesthetic reflection could be conceived of as objective only if the meaning of the latter were not confined, denoting the external world alone. But this is precisely what Lukács means by ‘\textit{Sein und Wesen des Objekts}’ when he discusses the two poles of realism in art:
These are the bonds of realistic representation. They will remain unchanged even if this type of objectivity is, in some way, transformed into inner objectivity: "Diese ist aber — und das ist der Sinn der Rücknahme ins Subjekt — in allen Poren ihrer Gegenständlichkeit von Subjektivität, und zwar von einer bestimmten konkreten Subjektivität durchdrungen." The rub is that the question, "Is the object of aesthetic reflection objective?", is straight and demands a straight answer. And it is due only to a narrow conception of objectivity if one who answers 'yes' is obliged to prove, by all means, that this restricted type of objectivity is present and active in reflection, although what is veritably functioning as object is not that, but something else, namely, the subjectivity that is latent in it and pervades all its pores. That being the case, the object of aesthetic reflection is subjective rather than objective, and no ground is left to question the adequacy of reflection. (We may have realized, of course, that in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, terms like 'subjective' and 'objective' have alterable meanings.)

Lukács makes a special effort to explain why mimesis necessitates representational truth along the lines set by the claims of scientific or disanthropomorphic type objectivity. In his opinion, this necessity arises from the fact that man is obliged to act correctly in real life and "so muss er trachten, die objektiven Tatsachen so unverfälscht wie möglich in sich aufzunehmen, ihre Widerspiegelungen, so wie sie objektiv sind, möglichst treu zu apperzipieren". With similar argumentation, Lukács justifies a 'fruitful contradiction' of the disanthropomorphic and anthropomorphic tendencies in literature and poetry, and proceeds to prove that this contradiction is inherent in all arts capable of producing an independent universe of their own. Inevitable exceptions are fantastic and grotesque representations and utopian artistic attitudes (Lukács's terminology). We are told that, in such cases, the adequate subject, due to its objective socio-historical foundation, acts as the sole determinant of 'similitude' latent in the 'dissimilitude' characteristic of such representations. This is a rather feeble realization of the disanthropomorphic aspect of the fruitful contradiction just mentioned, but it lets us suppose that, in any case, an adequate subject is able to determine the measure of similitude. Otherwise, what is enabled to determine the truest possible (disanthropomorphic) reflection of objects or the condition of representational faithfulness? It becomes clear that, if the realism-centered tendency is forced to appear as a universally valid aesthetic conception, virtually all categories whose function is to guarantee the objectivity of reflection will turn into their opposites. In order to avoid this logical trap, the narrow concept of objectivity has to be replaced by a broad concept of objectivity pervaded by subjectivity and, instead of similitude and disanthropomorphization, dissimilitude and anthropomorphization have to be emphasized. So much so that the objectivity of the object of aesthetic reflection and its adequacy may ultimately depend on an adequate subject, or on adequate aesthetic subjectivity.

The other basic tendency in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen fully asserts Lukács's criticism of conceptions that confuse scientific reflection with its objektives Ansich: "Zumeist verwechselt man einfach die wissenschaftliche Widerspiegelung durch die Kategorien mit ihrem objektiven Ansich. It quotes Aristotle to demonstrate how well he approached the problem by pointing out the difference between pure knowledge and the categories of the aesthetic. Consequently, this tendency of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen is more comprehensive and less dependent on analogies with scientific
reflection and the demands of realistic representation. It also differs from what I call
the ‘narrow tendency’ in the work, in its contention that both types of reflection are
equally true to reality: "beide Widerspiegelungsarten [sind] gleich wahrheitsgetreu." It
The problem of the adequacy of reflection is solved unambiguously: "Die gediegene
Wahrheit der ästhetischen Widerspiegelung in den einzelnen Kunstwerken entspricht also
genau der Substanz jener ansichseienenden Wirklichkeit, die von ihnen abgebildet wird." Here we have contextual evidence that the gist of the matter is the relation of works of
art to their ultimate object, the evolution of the human race ("zu ihren letzhinnigen
Gegenstand, die Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts"), or a fusion uniting the self-
consciousness of the human race with that of the individual in a dialectical contradiction.

This conception is in fact based on the specific character of aesthetic reflection. It
implies that aesthetic reflection has a specific object different from that of science, and
that works of art are capable of reflecting it faithfully, in a manner adequate to its
substance. We should concentrate our attention on this aesthetic conception if we wish
to see Lukács’s aesthetic oeuvre in the light of his final and finest achievement. It
deserves attention because in it, in its structure, the fundamental philosophical principles
of a comprehensive Marxist aesthetic are given.

We have seen that the problems are rooted in a dual, contradictory conception, in-
cluding basic ontological and epistemological principles. This contradiction finds direct
expression in the unintentional supposition, philosophically and terminologically inco-
sistent, that two kinds of objectivity and Ansich exist. Complications increase with
Lukács’s renewed efforts to expand a narrow, realism-centered concentration of art,
dating in fact from an earlier period of his activity, into an all-comprising aesthetic
theory. This enterprise proved to be preposterous, but it was closely related to the ques-
tion: is aesthetic reflection capable of grasping objective truth? At earlier stages of his
career, as a Marxist thinker, his answer was decisively positive. His position was sup-
ported by references to works of art of a certain class: for the most part with such
features (e.g., the ‘prophetic figures’ of Balzac, the socio-historical grounding of the
novel of manners, as well as that of the historical novel and drama) which, according to
the universal propositions of the broader tendency in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen,
fall, wholly or partly, outside the proper scope of the aesthetic. The next phase began
when—as is shown by the inconsistence of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen—the claim
of realistic representation to objective truth (and the disanthropomorphic tendency
therein implied) could no longer be equalized with the consistent disanthropomorphic
tendency of science. In that phase, the proposition that art was a kind of cognition had
to appear, at best, as a paradox: “Das vom Kunstwerk Gebotene kann zugleich mehr
und weniger sein als Erkenntnis.” The final phase is represented by the broader ten-
dency of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. In the system of aesthetic propositions belong-
ing to this tendency, the claim of aesthetic reflection to truth is vindicated by the rec-
ognition of its paradoxical status as a form of self-consciousness. This implies an un-
conditional renouncement of the prerogatives of realistic representation and realism-
centered aesthetic. Or, if such bonds happen to be forced on this conception, they cannot
be attached to it organically, nor do they follow from it.

An extreme variety of the aesthetic conception of art as cognition would place artistic
cognition above all other possible forms of knowledge, first and foremost above scien-
tific cognition. Examples may be found, among others, in the works of the representa-
tives of the American new criticism, most characteristically in J. C. Ransom’s ideas. In
Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, Lukács categorically rejected the exaggerated claim of

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aesthetic cognition to objectivity in its absolutist version, which makes art the only 'proper' form of cognition:

Die emphatisch-evokative Wesensart der künstlerischen Wirkung, die in den Werken erreichbare Höhe der Abbildung der Wirklichkeit, ihre Steigerung zu einem Vollkommenssein, zu einer Kompletheit, zu einer unmittelbaren Evidenz des Existierens, können leicht die unkritische Verallgemeinerung hervorbringen: hier äussere sich — wahrer und gleichzeitig unmittelbarer als auf irgendeinem anderen Gebiet des menschlichen Daseins — das Wesen der Welt.  

Nevertheless, the realism-centered artistic conception of Lukács implied that cognition would attain its proper method only in scientific reflection. Similar conclusion have been offered by various other, so-called ‘epistemological’ aesthetic conceptions with realism-centered bias and of Marxist pretensions, more or less independently from Lukács's theoretical work. Most of them accept the priority of scientific cognition as an axiomatic principle, conceiving of works of art as illustrative of socio-historical tendencies explored by the social sciences. When the fiasco of these epistemological aesthetic conceptions (they are epistemological only in a narrow-minded, one-sided, and philosophically unstatisfactory sense) became apparent, any claim that art would have to cognition became suspect. Yet, whatever functions are assigned to art, the problem of their adequacy and the problem of what they are adequate to will arise. The epistemological problems of art cannot be avoided unless epistemology itself is avoided.

The conception that, in my view, represents the main and non-restrictive trend of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen offers, on the whole, a statisfactory solution to these problems and also reckons with such aspects of art as are explained by other aesthetes as mere components of a complex function. Lukács points out conclusively how a series of intricate mediations (which, according to his keen observation, assumes the form of direct immmediacy in art) makes aesthetic reflection an approximately adequate reflection of its proper object. As to the structure of this mode of reflection: the veritable an-sich-seiende object of reflection is species character, the reality of human existence and evolution: all shapes of extra-human reality play a role in it so far as they are integrated in the human condition. The representation of the object of the external world, the similitude or dissimilitude of representation, are entirely dependent on what is required, what kind of fidelity or distance is demanded by "das ästhetische Vordringen zum Wesen, zu den Gesetzen des menschlichen Lebens, zur Substanz des Menschseins". Species character, although an abstraction, does not represent an abstract essentiality in Lukács's conception. Nor is it simply what is common or typical in people. Rather, it is a potentiality; more precisely, a necessity conditioned by the socio-historical and natural circumstances of human existence in the actual fates, vital problems, and sensual and spiritual make-ups of individuals, the sole participants in and makers of this type of existence. The freedom of art lies in the recognition of that necessity, in the particular media of creation. In aesthetic reflection—Lukács lays little stress on this idea, but it is present in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen and follows logically from its principal conception—cognition and creation form a unity and it is a supreme quality of the adequate subject that it is enabled to bring about that unity. "Hier ist sowohl das Was wie das Wie das Wahrgenommenen und erst recht des Gestalteten unlösbar mit dem hervorbringenden Subjekt verbunden. Die Echtheit der ästhetischen Objektivität ist eine direkte Funktion seiner Breite und Tiefe."  

In this mode of reflection, the subject, the cognitive agent, is not simply consciousness as such in its abstract universality, nor any concrete consciousness. There exists a faculty
of sensibility (which comes into being and undergoes evolutionary changes in the concrete and objective historical process of the evolution of mankind), which is capable of reflecting the totality of that process from an angle excluded from the province of scientific reflection. This faculty of perception belongs to human beings as individuals, as sensually conscious and active beings, as discrete existences in nature and society. As one of their qualities, capacities, or concerns, it represents the actual reality of the continuity between nature and society. Therefore, this faculty of perception is not simply a subjective aspect of the historical process, but a capacity for objectivity appropriate to particular sphere of objective reality. Neither is it merely a perceptual or intellectual faculty. Although, in its immediate form, it appears as a faculty of the individual concentrated in a 'homogeneous medium' of perception and awareness, it is, in fact, a capacity enabling one to focus, from an aspect of one’s participation in the evolutionary process of humanity, one’s whole being on a communicative and cognitive medium, involving the actual conditions of creation by its homogeneity which, though unifacial, is suggestive of endless variety and even a kind of totality.

In all of the preceding, picturesqueness, fiction, appearance, and, in Lukács’s inaccurate wording, the 'suspension of practice' have a constituent role, not only as far as concrete depiction is concerned, but also in every other respect. There is a trait of picturesqueness in the way one’s whole being is focused on something and also in the way variety and totality are understood. And art is not alone in attaining objective validity through a manipulation of appearances. Logical thinking is also in connection with the operation of imagination (cf. picturesqueness) and attains its particular objectivity by obeying objective laws. Similar laws of objective validity are activated in the course of artistic creation, and, thus, its homogeneity, sensuous in its genesis (even though its sensuous quality is mediated, e.g., by conventional signal systems), also involves abstraction from the immediacy of sensory perception. The senses are confronted with specific tasks, adequate to their utmost qualities and potentials, and appearing in such a manner that an infinite continuity is set up between sensuous perception and the so-called 'spiritual senses', an endless series of interactions that transform the matter-of-course unity that actually exists between them into a living fusion, a unity moving, unfolding, and enriching itself through setting up and solving a series of contradictions. By means of the properties of a specific object, the work of art, art cultivates a whole universe of inward sense and emotion, for example, musical emotions by the cultivation of the 'musical ear'. The 'other nature' thus created is not alien to nature proper nor to the nature of man—that specific part of nature which was not created by him—man is, indeed, one of nature's creations, who is enabled to participate in the continued creation of himself. Nevertheless, this other nature is alien to man, by virtue of the necessity that sustains it, by virtue of its nature-like quality, although the works that we create appear to indulge in greater compassion and pity for our worries and ourselves than that perennial one which, had it ever had worries about us or itself, could never have sensed or expressed it without us.

All these points are implied in the problem of the subjective aspect, which, according to Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, is active in the objective process of the evolution of humanity. This problem is one of the most relevant and basic discoveries of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. This must be made unmistakably clear, even if, due to its indefinite use of the terms 'subjective' and 'objective', the ontological and epistemological qualification of the actual situation is far from unequivocally expressed. If, however, we see clearly that the subjective aspect does not represent a description of epistemological
subject—object relationships, but a system of relationships that belongs, as a whole, to an objective sphere (including, due to its objective ontological foundation and validity, the individual’s personal point of view as well), this state of affairs may be conceived of as an explication of the fundamental aesthetic situation, which justifies the objectivity of all its components and contexts. This means that the type of subjectivity that alone may be taken into consideration here (e.g., what appears as creation) is, in fact, not subjectivity, but objectivity. In the final analysis, this is admitted by Lukács, too, when he explains that a reflection of the external world by means of similitude or dissimilitude is only a means of reflecting the ultimate, decisive object. We may thus conclude that the veritable object of aesthetic reflection is this ultimate, decisive object; and the fact that, in the course of its reflection, reflective activity also takes place on all other necessary levels of mediation, does not imply that the objects of any of those intermediary, particular, and, subordinate reflections are comparable to that ultimate decisive object. Complete with the subjective aspect as its constituent, the ultimate, decisive object behaves as an objective existence, a thing in itself. The various aspects of its substance are revealed by individual works of art, as if we created, by means of a work of art, an essential aspect of that ultimate object for ourselves.

This idea is latent in Lukács’s argumentation, even when he makes it clear (or at least likely) that he assigns the rank of reality proper to objects to the external world, as if the Ansich of such objects were the object of aesthetic reflection, and as if that ultimate, decisive object of aesthetic reflection had lacked the degree of reality or Ansichsein found in the object of scientific cognition. We may, of course, cling to the possibly vulgar conception of artistic reflection, according to which fidelity to reality means that one may proceed by objects depicted as representations to what is, in a scientific or sociological sense, their ‘pure’ essence, or, in Lukács’s phrase, their Ansich. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the non-realism-centered tendency of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen implies that the non-representational features of an artifact, or a non-representational artifact, may refer to the bearing of the evolutionary process of humanity on a single individual. Hence, it follows that the truth of representation is to be measured, in the final analysis, by the adequacy of the reflection of that substance. In other words, the tendency of disanthropomorphization does not pertain to that substance. Instead, we must conceive of and theoretically codify a special kind of anthropomorphization as an objective reflection of reality, equivalent to, yet not based on the disanthropomorphic mode of cognition. This means that the mimesis of external objects has no bearing on the adequacy of aesthetic reflection unless the realistic features of a work of art coincide with an adequate reflection of the ultimate object. This ultimate, decisive object is also reflectable in an adequate way by means of a coherent system of objects, related to the former as appearance to essence; an appearance which, while representing the specific substance of the self-creative activity of the human race, has been produced by the creative act of an individual human being.

The Object of Aesthetic Reflection

Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen does not analyze in detail the contradiction between self-consciousness-like reflection and the reflection of external objects, but it, nevertheless,
implies that the former presupposes some sort of identification between consciousness and its object:

Diese untrennbare Vereinigung von Einzigartigkeit und Verallgemeinerung des Subjekts drückt sich darin aus, dass das hier entstehende Bewusstsein primär nicht ein subjektives Bewusstsein über eine von ihm unabhängige, ihm gegenüberstehende Objektwelt ist, vielmehr eine ganz eigenartige Form des Selbstbewusstseins.  

The terms ‘primär’ and ‘vielmehr’ seem to allow an eventual fusion of consciousness-like reflection (scientific cognition) and self-consciousness-like reflection (aesthetic reflection). This step is necessary because Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen—to some extent independently from and in contradiction to the theorem of self-consciousness-like reflection—sets forth, as we have seen, a conception identifying aesthetic reflection with the depiction of the objective world, explaining its objectivity (adequacy) by a disanthropomorphic tendency inherent in it and establishing a ‘fruitful contradiction’ (“fruchtbare Widersprüchlichkeit”) between the anthropomorphic tendency, its primary condition, and the disanthropomorphic tendency. A similarly hesitant attitude may be responsible for the cautious formulation of the relationship between consciousness and the objective world (whose self-consciousness it is) when, instead of philosophically decisive or distinctive terms, such as ‘identity’ or ‘unity’, vague phrases, such as ‘inner human concern’ and ‘inner relation’, occur in an important passage:

beim Exotischen steht man einer Wirklichkeit gegenüber, zu der man, bei allen Interesse und eventuellen Wissen [...] keine innerlich menschliche Beziehung hat, während das Selbstbewusstsein—auch wenn das sachliche Wissen fehlt—gerade auf einem solchen innerlichen Verhältnis basiert. 

In Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, the problem of the identity of subject and object perhaps finds its most adequate representation in the category of the continuity of human evolution. This befits the human condition all the more as it involves its historicity. This historical formulation of identity also implies the contradictory identity of man and nature, or (as Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen repeatedly defines the object of aesthetic reflection), the material exchange between nature and society. In his terms Lukács rightly stresses that inner human concern is not equitable with identification or identity:

Das beinhaltet keine Identifikation, da ja die Verschiedenheit des erlebten Objekts an Inhalt, Struktur etc. vom erlebenden Subjekt eine der Voraussetzungen der das Selbstbewusstsein hervorrufenden Beziehungen ist. Trotzdem oder gerade darum wird aber das Zentrum der Menschlichkeit aufs tiefste getroffen, als von etwas, das irgendwie zur eigenen Vergangenheit gehört oder mit deren Subjekt irgendwie nahe verwandt ist.  

This means that, by means of a structural difference, somehow (‘irgendwie’) some sort of identification is assumed to take place, if only in our imagination or consciousness (as, e.g., we are somehow identical with things or happenings belonging to our past).

The problem of identification is certainly not a secondary problem, as far as the definition of self-consciousness-like reflection is concerned. Self-consciousness is, of course, not the consciousness of an objective world confronted with it, nor the self-consciousness of an objective world in the sense of being intimate or sympathizing with it. The objective world, as confronted by self-consciousness, can by no means be separated from a self functioning as subject. The dialectical solution lies in Hegel’s idea of the differentiation of the undifferentiated. Self-consciousness-like reflection of the external world cannot be conceived of other than as in a dialectical framework ultimately based
on the unity of the material substance of the world, and on the prominence of sensual and perceptual qualities in art, a fact to which aesthetics owes its name.

The process of identification that provides self-consciousness with an objective foundation is described in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen in the Hegelian terms of 'externalization' ('Entäußerung') and 're-internalization' ('Rücknahme'). In the exposition of what seems to be presented as another solution to the problem of identification, the process is described as the pervasion (Durchdringung) of the object with the subject or with subjectivity. Pervasion remains vague, the more so because Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen does not define a basis for deciding whether (and how) the objectivity of the object is influenced by its being pervaded with the subject or subjectivity. At any rate, this symbiosis (or identity?) of subject and object (or subjectivity and objectivity) represents the principle of self-consciousness-like reflection in passages equating aesthetic reflection with the representative surface of a work of art. Thus, for instance, when Lukács describes the close unity of externalization and re-internalization ("die enge Einheit von Entäußerung und ihrer Rücknahme"), he refers to the represented object world as identical with the reflection of reality: "Das Zusammenwirken der beiden Bewegungen ergibt also etwas Einheitliches: eine gestaltete Objektwelt als Widerspiegelung der Wirklichkeit." He emphasizes, however, that in this objectivity the subject surrenders itself to reality, and the represented object world is pervaded with subjectivity:

Die Hingabe des Subjekts an die Wirklichkeit in der Entäußerung, ein Aufgeben in ihr bringt auf diese Weise eine innerlich intensiv gesteigerte Objektivität hervor. Diese ist aber — und das ist der Sinn der Rücknahme ins Subjekt — in allen Poren ihrer Gegenständlichkeit von Subjektivität, und zwar von einer bestimmten konkreten Subjektivität durchdrungen.

Here, for example, is another passage on the need of a thorough pervasion of the object by the subject (subjectivization?):

Denn das Geradessein aller mimetisch dargestellten Gegenstände, die Art ihrer Verbindung miteinander, also das allgemeinste Prinzip der hier entstehenden Gegenständlichkeit überhaupt, basiert auf der vollendeten Subjektdurchdrungsnheit der Objekte als Folge der Rücknahme der Entäußerung ins Subjekt.

Here, again, we should see clearly that 'die hier entstehende Gegenständlichkeit' and, perhaps, 'die Objekte' do not refer to objectivity or objects, as the counterpole of cognitive subjectivity or subjects—a fact that makes us feel that the problem is blurred, since it remains undecided which subject or subjectivity is at work in the process of externalization and re-internalization, in the operation of the represented object world, and so on. Nevertheless, the purpose of these passages is to demonstrate that, in the course of the re-internalization of externalization, another act of externalization is taking place, and on a higher level. The pervasion of the object by the subject (and the former's transformation to the inner object of self-consciousness, i.e., an object suitable to become identical with its substance) also expresses the creative aspect of the process.

An important task of the aesthetician is to describe the specific factors of the aesthetic reflection of reality as they affect (or are revealed in) the represented object world in the representative arts. Representation is not, however, identical with reflection, as the latter expression is used to refer to an adequate mode of cognition. The object of aesthetic reflection is not that segment of the world which may be regarded as the original imitated by the represented object world, or the representational surface of the work of art. The relationship between such an original and its imitation or representation should
not be denoted by ‘reflection’ in the sense of the epistemological substance of an aesthetic act. Unfortunately, in many cases the term ‘reflection’ is used in this inadequate meaning in *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen*. What I described as a broad tendency of the work, namely, the striving for universal appeal, is also characterized by a more adequate use of the term ‘reflection’ and a more precise definition of the object of aesthetic reflection. This, more precise, definition locates the object, or rather, its ultimate object in the realm of the substance of humanity, that is, in species character.

If we wish to demonstrate a clear example of the state of an object being pervaded with subjectivity, we could hardly find a more perfect case than that of any human being functioning at once as an objective existence and as a subjective agent. A similar unity of objectivity and subjectivity may characterize only such objects as function in close unity with the life functions of a human being. This seems to be an absolute sine-qua-non condition of any unity of objectivity and subjectivity. According to *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen*:

indem nämlich die Welt des Menschen zum letzten, ausschlaggebenden Gegenstand der ästhetischen Abildung wurde, ist schon im erreichbaren und zu erreichenden Objekt der Kunst ein untrennbares Ineinander und Zusammen von Subjektivität und Objektivität gegeben.39

This description of the object of aesthetic reflection meets the structural requirements of self-consciousness-like reflection. Viewed from another angle, this interfusion and union of subjectivity and objectivity seems to presuppose the existence of a work of art as an objective system, by means of which the act of aesthetic reflection is performed when it is connected with the human personality. By this contact or union, the work of art, as an aesthetic object, is constantly being created and recreated, realized and activated, appearing as a living creature, a mobile and abundant totality, the identity of subjectivity and objectivity, as revealed in an endless act of integration. But then, again, the question is: which objectivity and which object, or which subjectivity and which subject is active in this integration?

On the one hand, *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen* declares that the object of aesthetic reflection is the same as that of scientific reflection, that is, objective reality. On the other hand, the object of aesthetic reflection is also defined in the book as a specific object, adapted to the specific character of aesthetic reflection (or of artistic production). This implies, however, a surrender of the unambiguous use of the term ‘objective reality’ (or ‘objectivity’). Thus, Lukács is obliged to differentiate between true objectivity and an objectivity pervaded by subjectivity. Further complications arise because Lukács describes as subjective anything that is related to man as an individual, to humanity as an agent of its history, or to human consciousness. Neither does he differentiate between human consciousness as the psychological make-up of an individual human being, human consciousness as a sociological fact, and human consciousness as a philosophical generalization (a universal that may or may not be identical with still another concept of human consciousness, the cognitive agent, the subject active in the reflection of the object of its reflection).

*Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen* uses various phrases to define the object of aesthetic reflection, but they are reducible to one or two common denominators. There is a passage in the book referring to the evolution of humanity as the object of aesthetic reflection: “Der Grund liegt offenbarerweise im Objekt der ästhetischen Widerspiegelung: in der Menschheitsentwicklung.”40 Meanwhile, it is evident that the evolution of humanity is also the object of the cognition of the social sciences: self-consciousness “mag
freilich, wie auch das objektive Bewusstsein über die Menschheitsentwicklung als Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, richtend oder falsch sein". 41 From these words we learn that self-consciousness is not necessarily objective consciousness, although it may be correct, too, just like objective consciousness. It is, however, difficult to see why consciousness is not subjective, too, or why self-consciousness, if it is at least as well suited to be correct as is objective consciousness, could not be described as objective. At any rate, here again, the object of aesthetic reflection is shown to be identical with the object of the social sciences, and, consequently, the scope of aesthetic reflection is not as general as that of scientific reflection. The setting of these passages reveals that Lukács's attention is focused on the historical process. His contention is that the subjective aspect of the individual participating in that process, and the particular existence uniting the individual with the totality of that objective process as with an evolutionary course belonging to his own self, necessitate a specific type of comprehension, a comprehension that bears the traits of self-consciousness. Obviously, this explanation distinguishes the aspect of the validity of the object of reflection thus defined from the aspect that validity of the object of the (social) sciences is to be examined from. But the evolution of humanity (or the continuity of human evolution) may also be interpreted in a similar manner as the definition of species character, which, in the final analysis, appears as a potentiality, yet it is a distinctive feature of each individual and each human community, due to the fact that their humanity is not a definite, established state, but, rather, a mode of existence to be maintained both socially and individually in each particular case. This means that Lukács's expressions, such as 'human evolution', or 'human substance', represent a comprehensive conception of historical materialism concerning the dialectical contradiction between—and the unity of—the socially existing human individual and society composed of real, particular human beings.

In Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, the material exchange between nature and society is also mentioned as the object of aesthetic reflection: "dass wir immer wieder den 'Stoffwechsel der Gesellschaft mit der Natur' und nicht diese selbst [Natur und ihre Gesetzlichkeit] als den Gegenstand der ästhetischen Widerspiegelung bezeichnet haben." 42 The exchange of material means, primarily, an exchange of physical matter:

Dieser ist selbtstredend zuallererst ein materieller, eine den Bedürfnissen der Menschen entsprechende Umgang der Erdoberfläche [...] Der Umkreis dieses Stoffwechsels ist jedoch viel weiter als das materielle Durchdringen und Verwandeln der konkreten Natur durch Arbeit und Kampf der Gesellschaft. Denn dieser Prozess hat ja den Menschen nicht nur geschaffen, sondern vielfach umgemodelt, bereichert, erhöht und vertieft. Auch diese Wandlung ist ein Anderswerden der Wirklichkeit, äußerlich wie innerlich. 43

This means that the living unity and contradiction between nature and society, an exchange that takes place on all possible levels of the physical and social functioning of human beings, but which is ultimately based on its physical substrata, is responsible for the self-creative evolution of mankind and the creation of all things, qualities, and relations that express and maintain humanity. At any rate, we find here, in one set, all the ontological constituents that help us to explain why the general traits of creation are active in the very process of aesthetic reflection. Lukács goes on to prove that the intense union of nature and society also determines basic categories of life that engender various literary species: "Von der Idylle bis zur Tragödie umfasst dieser Stoffwechsel der Gesellschaft mit der Natur alle Lebensphänomene der Welt der Menschen, ihre Umgebung, die Naturgrundlage ihrer Existenz und deren gesellschaftliche Folgen." 44

More graphic varieties of the same definition of the object of aesthetic reflection refer to the world of human beings, to their relations with nature and one another: "der
Gegenstand der ästetischen Widerspiegelung [ist] die Welt der Menschen, ihre Beziehungen zueinander und zur Natur."45 This may be regarded as the most fundamental aspect on which the verification of the validity of aesthetic reflection can be based (and this is what happens in that tendency of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen which opens a much wider perspective than Lukács’s earlier statements on aesthetic reflection); it may also be regarded as a base on which to explain the subjective character of lyrical and musical reflection (and this is what happens in the passages that explain why the external appearance of the physical objects of the external world are not the object of lyrical and musical reflection). These facts show that, in these succinct definitions, the conception of aesthetic reflection as representation still haunts us. It is accompanied by a literature-centered conception of the object of aesthetic reflection, reducing the universality of its historicity to events and circumstances dealt with by ordinary pragmatic historiography. This is underlined by reminiscences of literary terms (cf., e.g., ‘von der Idylle bis zur Tragödie’). Consequently, these definitions and descriptions do not bring out the decisive marks engraved in the object by the self-consciousness-like quality and inherent reciprocity of aesthetic reflection.

That dynamic structure is better represented by descriptions explaining that, in artistic reflection, “wo nicht nur die Welt des Menschen im allerweitemsten Sinn gesagt — die Natur kommt in ihr auch bloss in dieser Verbindung vor —, sondern sie selbst unmittelbar auf den Menschen zurückbezogen wird”.46 Interpreting this passage, one should not conceive of nature’s relatedness to people and the human aspect of the world thus revealed as a fixed state or a stable achievement. The constant counter-movement expressed by the prefix of the verb ‘rückbezogen’ cannot be ignored. Without a back-and-forth movement, the opposition between object and subject becomes rigid. Yet it remains a problem if ‘Rückbeziehung’ refers to relatedness to single individuals, to humanity in general, or, as we would like to see it, to a subject active in the process of reflection. Certainly, a subject active in the process of aesthetic reflection may also stand for a particular individual and for species character, available through certain dimensions of one’s personality. This is an explicit message of the broader tendency of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen.

The ambiguous use of terms like ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’ is confusing indeed. In the book, at least two types of objectivity and, in parallel fashion, two modes of an sich existence appear. In some passages, the objectivity identical with reality as it exists in itself is brought into contrast with the objective existence of the human world, or, more precisely, the world as it is objectively given in relation to human beings:

Jedenfalls ist es auch hier sichtbar, dass die Verallgemeinerung der Zielsetzungen, die infolge der Suspension des unmittelbar praktischen Interesses im Ästhetischen entstehen, nicht die Wirklichkeit an sich zum Gegenstand hat, sondern die menschliche Welt, die Welt, wie sie in bezug auf den Menschen objektiv vorhanden ist.47

We may agree with the effort made in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen to regard the evolution of humanity and the world of human beings as instances of an sich existence, but we may also regret that we do not witness a similar effort to solve the problem arising from positing various types or grades of objectivity. This hierarchization of reality also finds expression in distinctions between a pure Ansich and a less pure one: “nicht das reine, von jedem subjektiven Eindruck unberührte, ja unberührbare Ansich der Natur.”48 Certainly, it is explicitly stated that this type or grade of objectivity and an sich existence would also contain a portion of subjectivity: “in ihm ein Element der Subjektivität enthalten ist.”49 Moreover, subjectivity is conceived of as an organic and
fundamental component of this type of objectivity in certain circumstances: “das subjektive Moment ist hier eine organische, fundamentale Komponente der spezifischen Objektivität gerade dieses Objekts.” But, certainly, this fusion with subjectivity does not endanger the **an sich** status of this kind of objectivity. *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen* repeatedly emphasizes the objective, **an sich** character of the human world and human evolution: “Die Entwicklung der Menschheit ist ein objektiver Prozess.”

Lukács set himself the task of finding in this kind of objectivity a type of subjectivity that is not imposed on it arbitrarily, a subjectivity that is inherent in it, a part or an aspect of it. Therefore, he strove to demonstrate that all the efficient subjective factors (the anthropomorphic aspects, the evocative character) of the aesthetic Füruns are rooted in reality as it exists in itself: “ein derart beschaffenes Füruns nur dann und dort möglich ist, wann und wo seine anthropomorphisierenden Aspekte, seine evokative Wesensart im Ansich selbst objektiv begründet sind.”

These explanations are acceptable on their own grounds, including the distinction between a genuine and a derivative type of objectivity. The problem is that basic terms are given different meanings. ‘Subject’ and ‘subjectivity’, or ‘object’ and ‘objectivity’ have, in fact, several denotations at different ontological levels and in different epistemological functions, yet in *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen* these differences do not seem to have been consciously realized, still less indicated. Obviously, an ‘active subject’ that is ‘not individual’, but ‘collective’ (“die jeweilige Gesellschaft, und durch sie vermittelt die Menschengattung”) cannot be regarded as subject in a context in which (e. g., in the very act of reflection) only the unique and actual activity of an individual agent enables it to function as subject. Here and there, transiently, reference is occasionally made to this indispensable condition of the exact dialectic of the subject—object relationship, or the objective character of the world of humanity when it is confronted with individual consciousness; for instance, when it is stated explicitly that “diese Welt ist für das Bewusstsein der Einzelpersonlichkeit eine ansichseiende, eine von ihm unabhängige Wirklichkeit.” The explanation given for the perfect interfusion and togetherness of subjectivity and objectivity (“ein untrennbarem Ineinander und Zusammen von Subjektivität und Objektivität”) simply is that objectivity is due to independence from the individual, and subjectivity to the fact that it is a product of humanity (“Sie ist aber, untrennbar von dieser Objektivität, zugleich das Produkt der gemeinsamen Tätigkeit aller Menschen, der Menschheit”). The world of humanity may, of course, represent the perfect interfusion and togetherness of subjectivity and objectivity in a wide variety of contexts (as a matter of fact, with a similar logic we may assume the presence of potential subjectivity in the physical world, too), but it cannot be real except through the activity of reflective consciousness. In the consciousness-like (scientific) mode of reflection, special means and tactics serve to eliminate the influence of the subject or its traces from the object as it is to be approached and presented as an objective existence. We may assume that, in what Lukács calls ‘self-consciousness-like reflection’ or the aesthetic mode of reflection, it is reflective consciousness that creates or establishes an interfusion and togetherness of subjectivity and objectivity on some suitable ground, namely, the objective basis of its own concrete subjectivity, that is, its validity in reflection. This interfusion and togetherness statifies, on the one hand, a basic requirement of self-consciousness-like reflection, and, on the other, it is itself a precondition of the growth or expansion of self-consciousness (i.e., of the subject of reflection). This process involves an external objectivization of the subject and the recognition and acceptance of a part of objective reality as a part of its own self.
A correct interpretation of *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen* demands that such phrases as the 'subjective moment of objective reality' or an 'object being pervaded with subject or subjectivity' should be understood as indications of latent potential subjectivity, or, rather, as an objective quality that is accepted by a consciousness active in the process of aesthetic reflection as an organic constituent of its relations to external reality. The illusions and appearances and their necessary and inevitable manipulation in this mode of reflection would be utterly disturbing in scientific cognition, whereas, in aesthetic reflection, paradoxically, they lay the foundation of an adequate mode of cognition. It is motivated by a need to reach objectivity (i.e., fidelity to the object of reflection) similar to that of scientific reflection; there is no difference between them in this regard.

We have to emphasize, then, that aesthetic reflection takes place, in its totality, in the context of objective reality as a part of that context. This type of objectivity and realness characterizes the subject of aesthetic reflection, too. Meanwhile, the subject as self-consciousness is so fully one with the object that the latter, in its entirety, comes into existence as subject in the very process of self-consciousness-like reflection. Consequently, relatedness to people has to be conceived of as the establishment of an objective relationship between objective existences. Relatedness to das Menschheitliche is to be conceived of in a similar way. This relatedness is established, however, through living contact with a real, genuinely competent, and effectively active subject in the act of reflection, and, thus, this relatedness and other similarly objective (and only latent subjective) elements do, in fact, imply subjectivity; or, what is more, they become the very factors of identification with or transformation into the subject.

Here the human species, as subject, is an object, too. The consciousness of the species, too, has objective existence and, in the course of self-consciousness-like reflection, it becomes the object of reflection. It is also the self-consciousness of the species because, within the very act of self-consciousness-like reflection, the substance of humanity and continuity of human evolution can be reflected without reflecting self-consciousness, this most substantial element of a human mode of existence and potentials of humanity. Thus, self-consciousness, which is inseparable from the species character, appears simultaneously as the subject and the object of self-consciousness-like reflection: it is creating and reflecting something other than itself, precisely by creating and reflecting it as its own substance.

Potentially, as a whole, reality appears as an extension of the self in this mode of reflection. From among the possibilities latent in universal coherence ("diese objektive Verknüpftheit von allem mit allem"—I shall not enlarge here on the awkward limitations of this hypothesis), a contextual system is actualized and rendered palpable in each individual case, reaching a type of completion by its actual relations with the self. The limits of expansion are set by the actual competence of the subject, although this expansion represents the potential, rather than actual reality. In other words, the actual expansion of the subject is only a virtual annexation of provinces in which species character is inherently included.

**The Adequacy of Aesthetic Reflection**

Consequently, the object of self-consciousness-like reflection is potential reality actualized in the act of reflection. Reality in this specific ontological status (existing through
the creation and reflection of the object and the self-creation and self-reflection of the subject) is inaccessible to non-self-consciousness-like reflection.

The two modes of reflection are, in principle, mutually exclusive. Neither one could substitute the other without deforming it and without surrendering its own substance. The object of consciousness-like reflection tends to be entirely independent from the reflecting subject, while the object of self-consciousness-like reflection tends to be identical with it. Scientific cognition would endanger its fidelity to reality if it posed its object as the subject of cognition. An *uno actu* reflection and creation of an object, which is, simultaneously, somehow the self-reflection and self-creation of the reflecting and creating subject, too, is, from the angle of scientific reflection, a travesty of epistemology.

When, in *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen*, György Lukács came to such and similar problems, he had no doubt that self-consciousness-like reflection might reach full adequacy, although no valid model of reality recommended itself as a test of its truth. This implies the possibility that, as far as aesthetic reflection is concerned, it is meaningless to resort to the *sine qua non* conditions of adequate scientific reflection, that is, the exact indication of relations between the contextual whole produced by reflection and its overall correlations in reality. Objectively, the former is a part of the latter, and, therefore, in scientific reflection, the objective relations of facts should not be disrupted or altered. The attention focused on them "die Aufmerksamkeit, die sich auf den betreffenden Teil richtet, [darf] niemals die wirklich, objektiv vorhandenen Beziehungen der Tatsachen gänzlich zerreißen und dadurch vergewaltigen". 58 The two types of reflection appear in sharp contrast to one another, except in passages that do not give prominence to the self-consciousness-like quality of aesthetic reflection. At times, there is a definite insistence on emphasizing the consciousness-like features of aesthetic reflection, and, in such cases, there is no clear distinction between the requisites of aesthetic reflection and the objective extension of the external world. This is, in my opinion, due to inclinations to justify realistic styles of representation and a mechanical distinction between the objectivity of the external world and the presupposed subjectivity of the inner reality of people. On such occasions, Lukács, running the risk of incoherence, repeatedly insists on fidelity to the existence and essence of the object as a basic requirement of aesthetic reflection: "die Treue zum Sein und Wesen des Objekts, seinem jeweiligen Zusammenhang, seiner jeweiligen Totalität", 59 a requirement that is contradictory to the essence of self-consciousness-like reflection unless it is made clear that the two types of reflections do not aim at the same object, or that the object of self-consciousness-like reflection is not a part of the external world. However, this requirement is in accordance with the assertion that there is also a tendency of disanthropomorphization in art.

From certain passages—in which the emphasis is laid not so much on realism—it seems to be clear that the ultimate object of aesthetic reflection is not based on the ‘fidelity to the features of some immediate model’ ("Treue zu den Einzelzügen des unmittelbaren Modells"). 60 Eventually, the adequacy of aesthetic reflection is due to the fact that, despite the suspension of similitude to the immediate, original model, a reflection is produced which uncovers in people the objective existence of species character. This means that an essential element of that existence is reproduced correctly:

bei Aufhebung der 'Ähnlichkeit' des Abbilds mit dem es unmittelbar auslösenden Reiz aus der Aussenwelt, also mit dem unmittelbaren Urbild, doch eine Widerspiegelung entsteht, die auf das Wesen der objektiven

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Existenz des Menschengeschlechts im Menschen auffriift, d.h. eines ihrer wesentlichen Momente richtig reproduziert.\textsuperscript{61}

In Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, the adequacy of self-consciousness-like reflection is, in the final analysis, related to significant elements of the evolution of humanity. This is described as the real sphere of the essence that has to be truly reflected by a work of art:

Denn das durch die künstlerische Evokation wachgerufene Selbstbewusstsein wäre eine Selbsttäuschung, eine leere Phrase, ja ein Betrug, wenn sein Inhalt — letzten Endes — nicht ein für die Menschheitsentwicklung bedeutsames Moment wäre, und zwar geradezu, wie es an sich war oder ist.\textsuperscript{62}

This significant element, although a human aspect, is a thing in itself, and, thus, becomes the object of aesthetic reflection.

If there is such a radical difference between aesthetic and scientific reflection, one should not expect the one to verify or disprove the other. In any case, Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen does not recognize the legitimacy of any such verification or refutation, although it displays a very definite disinclination to counterpose the two types of reflection too rigorously to one another, and to draw attention to translational modes. It is certainly not easy in certain traditions to accept that the adequacy of the aesthetic reflection of reality may not be verified by comparison with models of reality explorably in other ways. Undoubtedly, certain strata of meaning in certain works of art betray some correspondence with certain achievements of the (social) sciences in comparable spheres of reality, or indicate how far they harmonize with certain notions or impressions of scientific conceptions. But a work of art as a whole does not exist because it is able to reflect an object reflectable in other, non-self-consciousness-like modes of reflection. It represents a special mode of reflection, the procedures of which are not characteristic of scientific cognition; indeed, they are diametrically opposed to it. It cannot exist without changing its object, even the object-like character of the object, transforming it into a constituent of the reflective subject, which, in turn, also appears in the role of the object of reflection.

Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen set forth a theory of universal claims, the theory of self-consciousness-like reflection, the theory of the reflection of a substance related to the evolution of self-creating humanity. This theory does not recognize any ‘short circuit’ between artistic and scientific truth. Consequently, measured by scientific criteria, the adequacy of self-consciousness-like reflection appears in the form of a tautology or circular reasoning. Therefore, Lukács arrives at the logical conclusion that the supreme criterion of aesthetic reflection is endurance, that is, the fact that the object of reflection is transformed into a part of the evolution of the consciousness of human species:

Die [Kriterien] der objektiv wissenschaftlichen Wahrheit sind uns bekannt. Das Begreifen des eigenen Schicksals, eingebettet in das der Gattung, vermittelt durch sie, entsteigend aus ihr, mündend in ihr ist aber ebensowenig subjektiv-willkürlich, wie […] das Aufgenommenwerden in die Bewusstseinsentwicklung der Menschengattung. Alle Gefühle, alle Gedanken, alle Gesinnungen oder Taten, mögen sie gut oder böse sein, haben vom Standpunkt dieses Selbstbewusstseins ihre Wahrheit, wenn sie nur in diesem Fluss nicht spurlos untertauchen, sondern zu Momenten seiner Modifikation werden.\textsuperscript{63}

However strange it may seem that the conclusive evidence in this crucial matter is based on circular reasoning (durable is what proves to be durable in the course of times), this is nevertheless the logical conclusion arising from a monistic materialistic epistemo-
logical definition of the specific character of aesthetic reflection. This conclusion is in accordance with the historical experience of mankind: the greatness or truth or immortality of works of art is shown in its true light only by historical perspectives. The artist or critic takes aim at that belated evidence offered by history. A creative artistic sense, which is also a sense of some aspects of history, combined with experience in history and the history of art, may prevent total failure, but there are no means of conscious effort to guarantee complete success. Lukács points to a serious theoretical difficulty concerning conscious ideological attitudes and the artistic representation of human beings:

Das — mögliche — Fehlen der Bewusstheit bezieht sich hier darauf, dass kein Zeitgenosse mit apodiktischer Sicherheit voraussagen kann, welche Eigenschaften der mit ihm lebenden Menschen — im positiven oder negativen Sinne — blos zeitbedingt-vorübergehende sind und welche von der Zukunft in den entstehenden 'corpus' des Gattungsmässigen einverleibt werden. Gerade hier kann es kein weltanschauliches Sicherstellen für das künstlerische Gestalten geben.64

Der entstehende 'corpus' des Gattungsmässigen is, however, a remarkable notion, not only as regards the selection of realistic human figures for representation, but also in a universal sense, concerning the human personality active in artistic creation, the adequate subject for self-consciousness-like reflection.

The work of art provides, by its perfection, by the evidence of its being, a proof of its authenticity, its qualification to be incorporated into the corpus of humanity. Therefore, that tautology is not as vague as it appears at first sight. It expresses the fact that the objectivity of self-consciousness-like reflection that deals with and serves as a norm in judging the adequacy of reflection is established, as it were, posteriorly. This is another instance of the paradoxes whose domain we enter when we adopt the view that art represents a kind of self-consciousness and is a kind of reflection of reality. The infinite reciprocity of self-reflection is not simply an abstract metaphor of art: its enlivening force frequently embarrasses people who prefer a world enclosed in rounded definitions, well-trimmed, and set in unalterable order.

Notes

2 Ibid., pp. 22—23.
3 Ibid., p. 723.
4 See ibid., p. 22.
5 Magyar Filozófiai Szemle (1973) No. 3—4, p. 264.
6 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 513.
11 See ibid., p. 514. and "Die defetischisierende Mission der Kunst", in ibid.
12 Ibid., p. 606.
13 Ibid., p. 608.
14 Ibid., p. 723.
15 Ibid., p. 604.
16 Ibid., p. 565.
17 Ibid., p. 527.
18 Ibid., p. 566.
The Reconstructible Chief Work: 
Notes on Lukács’s Late Aesthetic Synthesis 

by 
Dénes Zoltai 

It is a late work, a Spätwerk. This word once again enjoys a good reputation in the scholarly literature. Nowadays, though, the works produced by prominent artists and thinkers in their old age are not treated as examples of classical perfection of form, or as proof of having reached the zenith of one’s career. It is neither the romanticizing psychology of personal fate, nor the presentiment of approaching death awaited with dignity, on which interest has been focused. The adjective ‘late’ has recently begun to become a term of metaphysical dimension, a key word. The hopelessly retarded, which thus has no future—that is what allegedly gives aura to the Spätwerk. Adorno, however, when speaking of the late style of Beethoven in 1937, believed to gather the anticipation of catastrophes from the rune signs of the final style of the greatest representatives of the bourgeois epoch. 

Here, one possible misunderstanding should be cleared up: in Lukács’s oeuvre the search for the marks of this kind of ‘late style’ would be in vain. Of course, there are stylistic characteristics, from which it is not difficult to detect the advanced age of an author. It was an old scholar who wrote Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen (begun in the 1950s and continued until 1962) and made up a composition of the topics of The Ontology of Social Being. Haste is apparent in the style, as is the search for the convincing formula, for the legendary meilleurs of Beethoven’s notebooks: the lack of refinement, and the elementary desire that does not scruple at self-repetitions; the need to tell, to utter, to imprint something important onto the mind of the reader. The preface (dated 1969) to the ‘selected philosophical papers’ that was published in 1971 under the title Mein Weg zu Marx, reads as follows: ‘However paradoxical it may sound, today, at the age of over eighty, I still await the writing of my works of truly decisive importance.’ And the article published in the December 15, 1966 issue of La Quinzaine reads: ‘I began to write my true life work at the age of seventy.’ These remarks provide a slight explanation of the stylistic characteristics at issue, perhaps, but the paradoxical character of these statements has little to do with the psychologizing self-stylization of the private personality, and least of all with the ‘anticipation of universal catastrophes’. Here the thinker’s attention was concentrated on a cause, a purposeful life, the future, Marxist thinking that can be and is to be renewed, the world situation burning in the fever of constant changes, with its alternatives that cried for newer and newer decisions. This attitude manifest itself even in his late aesthetic synthesis. The peacefulness of ‘it is not late’ and the restlessness of ‘what to do.’ The firmness of principle and the passion of
asking questions. Only in this context will the question bear any sense: is a philosophical aesthetic that—to use Nicolai Hartmann’s passing remark—will not ‘result in a disappointment’ possible at all in our time? Philosophical: the adjective here does not refer to the ‘academic’ concept of aesthetics, but to its (to use Kant’s term) ‘world concept’ in a wider sense, to one of the ideological forms, characterized by Marx (in his Preface to the Grundrisse), which, like its prominent subject, art, itself enables people to ‘achieve consciousness’ of their conflicts and ‘fight them out to a finish’. Philosophical aesthetic: systemized theoretical consciousness of self-consciousness, as it came into being in art, in the world of aesthetic objects. As regards its method, such a philosophy of art will ‘result in a disappointment’ unless it avoids the two most dangerous extremes of such enterprises. The Scylla: the passively contemplative and autotelic analytics that cannot and does not even reach the synthesis of the aesthetic world of phenomena reflected by it. And the Charybdis: the enthronement in the ever more dilapidated citadels of pure speculation. It cannot conceal the fact that its thoughts are deeply embedded in a scientific and systematic world view and that its organs are sound for sharp-eyed outlook, for the survey of the whole foliage of the aesthetic. It was able to mix art with what is called ‘artistic experience’ (‘Kunstefahrung’) with the scrutiny of creative and receptive attitudes.

There is no denying one fundamental admission: the whole of Hungarian scholarship has until recently been unable to present any enterprise that would aspire to fulfil such demands. In this sense György Lukács’s late aesthetic synthesis is an attempt to break out of the provincialism of thought, it is a breakthrough to that certain ‘world revolution’ of aesthetics. Its worldwide effect is a proof of this breakthrough even in itself, but an irregular proof. It has nothing to do with fashions, with manipulated-fetishized trendiness. Eventually, this relationship of the effect, as the index of the breakthrough to the ‘world concept’ of philosophical aesthetic, becomes recognizable at a time when the dernier cri is at the point of dismissing even the demand for synthesis itself as outmoded or begins to produce substitutes for synthesis on the large scale. It is a fashionable opinion today that the demand of philosophical aesthetic is an unfeasible wish-fulfilment, that it would like to unite inherently divergent elements, moreover, elements that, according to the present trend of modern ‘scientific’ progress, are utopian even in themselves. At these times, reference is made to the shock of the idea of the systematization of philosophical demand, to the breakthrough of system theories of new—logical, mathematical, cybernetic, and so on—types, or, more prosaically, to the old positivist topos, to the impossibility of surveying the cumulative particles of knowledge. To convey a sense of the change that has taken place, we need cite but one symptom, for it is a characteristic one. At the turn of the century the market of scientific books was flooded by ‘introductions’, the propedeutic demand of which remained unfulfilled at precisely the decisive point: the only missing thing was the subject that the author wanted to introduce! Today, by contrast, we live in the age of the flaw of fragments. The Siegfrieds of today’s aesthetics are unable to forge together the pieces of the broken sword, and where is the theoretical blade that, at one time, incited to cut Gordian knots! There is no longer any organ—so reads the diagnosis in Nietzsche—for catching the Whole in a network of thought, since even the Whole itself has broken into pieces. And if we accept the further premise that whatever puts itself forward to us as a Whole is nothing but sheer deceit and self-deceit, then Wittgenstein’s paradigm appears at once as the inevitable conclusion: ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.’ Sooner
or later it will seem 'modern' and 'scientific' that philosophical aesthetic—philosophical because it is able to bear conflicts—must also fall silent.

Lukács, however, in his Marxist period, always spoke of the asylum of 'the rest is silence' with aversion. He was actually in his element when he was speaking up, either pro or con, even at the risk of error. He was swimming, in this respect, too, against the lukewarm tide of sham 'modernity', of fashion. Of course, he knew the fashionable attractive force of fragmentariness, and far too well, for he knew it from self-experience. During his career he several times felt the temptations of this tendency toward mental self-comfort and he coped with them. At any rate, one thing had never been a feature of his career: resigned acquiescence to the fragmentary character. In fact, even his pre-Marxist period proves that he felt the framework of the essay form to be too narrow. His essays, even the best of them, fulfill the function of the outpost, the preparatory work of exploration, suggesting that the best part of the fight is yet to come. As a matter of fact, one of the determining marks of his Marxist period is the pursuit of completeness—in the ethical sense of the word as well as in that of the theory of science—that he learned from Goethe. Lukács's Heidelberg manuscripts, dating from 1912 to 1918, but only recently published, constitute a vast youthful endeavor of aesthetic synthesis that closes the early essay period and seems to anticipate that completeness. Here it suffices to mention but one of their characteristics, the never flagging will to think things over. On account of the same ethos, the well-known part of a monograph, The Theory of the Novel, which is interpolated in the manuscripts, could found a school even in itself, and not only for Lucien Goldmann.

It is known from the preface to Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen that Lukács did not regard even this lengthy summary as truly complete. In it, he was aspiring only at the general philosophical foundations of the aesthetic postulation, at the introduction of aesthetic categories, with a Marxist orientation to reality, from the highly heterogeneous sphere of everyday human practice. He wanted to postpone to a planned second part the theory of the work of art, and to a third part the full disclosure of the socio-historical nature of art. Behind this plan of the arrangement, the widespread distinction between dialectical and historical materialism can be discerned—but, at the same time, also the nascent critique of the rigid separation of these two 'branches'. As early as in the great preliminary study to the synthesis, in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, Lukács stressed that such a distinction can be only much too relative. So Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen expressly aspired to ground aesthetics on homogeneous philosophical foundations. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the magnum opus is incomplete; the planned second and third parts of the synthesis were never written. How easy it is to pronounce the verdict is such a case. If even the Marxist Lukács could not fulfill his youthful dream of a complete philosophical aesthetic, is not the dream itself unrealizable?

We must abide by the facts. Lukács indeed began a new enterprise after closing the first third of the synthesis. The resultant wide-ranging monograph, published only after his death, The Ontology of Social Being, became the final chapter of the oeuvre. Many are misled by Lukács's declaration, arising from subjective conviction, which stated that this work of his was in fact to be a prolegomenon—to a yet to be written systematic Marxist ethic. It is true insofar as he, as a mature thinker, held in sovereign contempt the scholastic mentality that dominated German academic life at the end of the past century: the academic classification of the sciences, and within that, the sharp separation of ethics and aesthetics, also fashionable in neo-Kantianism. Lukács who was an investigator of the true properties of the aesthetic (and who, incidentally, did not ignore
Kant's genuine contributions to the history of aesthetics) did not think highly of such a 'purity'. That is the reason why I dare to venture the conjecture that the inspiration of the new work, of the Ontology was at least to that extent the aesthetic system itself, with its loose threads, and with its immanent laws of construction that enforced the repeated control of the foundation. Declarations by Lukács like the following, in his above-mentioned preface to the Hungarian edition of Mein Weg zu Marx, deserve marked attention, too: 'Aesthetics with me becomes an organic part of the ontology of social being.' To put it briefly: the aesthetic synthesis of old age can be interpreted correctly, according to the objective dynamics of construction, only if we do not stop at the last sentence of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. We do not not know the planned conversion of the cathedral of Siena, in which the extant structure of today would have been only the transept of the new one, would have been realized, as the grandiose plan was interrupted due to the plague epidemic. Still, we can extrapolate the lines of the archways with our eyes, and we can build the new nave with the aid of our imaginations. In similar fashion, we can comprehend Lukács's late aesthetic by studying the blueprints and foundations that he provided. The interpreter cannot recoil from the work of the restorer. What is complete should be viewed from the perspective of an intended future.

First of all, the system of pillars stands complete and steady. At the level of subjective intention, of the political decision, their place was in fact given as early as 1918, when the already famous author of The Theory of the Novel, turning back from the threshold of the bourgeois career of the Privat-Dozent, attached his life to the revolutionary working-class movement. This foundation became manifest only gradually, in the course of a development that was anything but uniform, in the twenties and thirties, in the emigration, in a process not lacking in dramatic elements. The tortuous nature is precisely denoted by the title cited above, chosen by Lukács himself: Mein Weg zu Marx. Thus, Lukács did not appropriate Marxism by a sole act, by a Paulian 'revelation', but by studying it over and over again, in his words, 'in a motion of two directions', backward to the original aesthetic and philosophical conceptions of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and forward to the even deeper theoretical elaboration of the conflict-laden essence and inner problematic of the present age—of the problematic quality of reality, including reality as reflected by art.

To repeat: it was as a Marxist that Lukács aspired to the development of a philosophical aesthetic. In fact, he followed an old Marxist tradition when investigating the humanizing value of great art, and this basic pillar of his world view bears most of the weight of the theoretical archway. Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, from the preface to the last chapter and even its reconstructable continuation, was to be a committed vote: 'for art, against religion', as the preface announces; for self-consciousness against alienation, against false consciousness that reproduces alienation directly or indirectly. It is a resolute and laudable stand in favor of the fundamental humanistic trends—humanistic since they promote the universal emancipation of mankind—of every great art of the past as well as of the foreseeable future. Hereby Lukács gives special emphasis to the basic principles of his own view of art, as outlined in earlier works. While creating an integral whole from concepts of the years of emigration, such as the artistic reflection of reality and the anthropomorphic character of formation, he at the same time discusses in detail the more general aesthetic laws of revealing and appropriating reality. In particular, he stresses the 'defetishizing mission' that enables great art to raise genuine self-consciousness. As Lukács points out, it pertains to the indisputable characteristics of great art that it is realized in the 'point-like' and microcosmically closed work of
art. But what is it that renders this microcosm really 'world-like'? What is the secret of the work as an 'intensive totality'? Its particular formation, its teleology, which, last but not least, indicates the problem of form. But not only that and not primarily that. Neither the genesis, nor the structure, nor the functioning of the work as an intensive totality could be understood if an epistemological aspect, usually approached by the metaphor of 'image'—since the age of Shakespeare and Leibniz, if not ever since Plato and Aristotle—were abandoned. The very first and, at the same time, the very last secret of works of art lies in their verisimilitude, more exactly, in their adequate relation to social existence. Whoever cuts through the real, connecting threads between the work and the world will break off the chief circuit of authentic comprehension. Epistemology and ontology merge here into a materialistic dialectic. That is the pillar of the principle of humanizing mission, which Lukács, in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, treats as a synonym for defetishization.

For, Lukács points out, every work of art that carries true aesthetic value demolishes false fetishes, in order to protect, to affirm the great issue of mankind, human totality and integrity. That is what Homer does—Lukács often cited with pleasure the great scene between Priamos and Achilles—and the same is done, only in a radically different historical situation, in Semprun's Le grand voyage, by, among others, the character of the Jewish communist, who, in Lukács's interpretation, does not 'obey' existentialism and does not choose 'Jewish death', but, instead, the fate of the heroes of armed resistance. Humanistic art affirms what is historically accumulating and, eventually, an irrevocable value of species character (Gattungsmässigkeit). Pars pro toto: it affirms the Ninth Symphony that the desperate Leverkühns would withdraw as well as the philistines who feel well in their self-initiated alienation. It affirms what is endangered in its bases by exploitation and repression, altogether by the negativity of world historical progress that moves in a contradictory form, by alienation. Great art is at all times a historically concrete contra-variant of this alienation, it is the anticipation of liberty and universality, even in the most alienated circumstances. If the first place it is that due to which works are 'great'. That is the partial truth in the classicizing conception of aesthetic 'perfection', the partial truth, which is exposed by the ontological criticism of harmony which is free from tension, of the theory of beauty which is degraded to a 'school-bookish' concept. For great works 'destrukt' in order to construct; they negate the negation in order to affirm the accumulation of human values, the deep current of progress, the process that approaches the individually human as well as the universally human, the species character. That is the reason why they tear asunder the veils of everyday illusions about reality, of false perceptual conditioning, and of shallow and distorted views. Their true sphere of motion is the perceptive evocation of the historically concrete human essence; therefore, they describe the external world as a matter of fact as the world of man's own—as the field of fatal actions and passions. In such an artistic formation, man, supposed to be either a divine creature or the prisoner of Nothing, can lay bare his true essence. He proves to be the maker of his own fate in the strict sense of the word, and the same time, to be a 'social being', whose inner core, whose human substance is shaped by his active attachment to the higher units of mankind—to his historically given communities, to the class, to the nation, to the progressively human.

Thus, enabling the otherwise 'mute' species character to speak—that what is at stake in art, and Lukács can justifiably refer here not only to Marx, the social theorist, but also to Goethe, the poet, who made the following confession in his "Marienbader Elegie":

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Und wenn der Mensch in seiner Qual verstummt,
Gib mir ein Gott, zu sagen, was ich leide.

It was given to him and his fellow poets, Lukács stresses, by the ‘god’ of art, of the art that utters in the articulate language of self-consciousness what is essential for man at all times, representing perceptively the pains and pleasures of all times of the world. It gives voice to what in everyday life would remain ‘mute’, incomprehensible, and unintelligible; what religion—both in its traditional and in its modernized forms—transposes from the medium of the real existential relations of immanence and historicity to the inarticulate world of the experience of transcendence that paralyzes self-consciousness. That is why Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen is a plea, a Plädoyer in defence of art, against religion. It makes the right and duty of choice manifest. One of its most captivating expositions concerns the ‘war of independence’ of the arts which is, by the way, the closing chapter in the synthesis.

Of course, the thesis proclaiming the humanistic-defetishizing mission would remain a hollow declaration, if it were not supported by further pillars of thought—by a whole system of new categories. They are not, however, brand new. Lukács had already laid down the foundations of most of them during his emigrant years in Moscow. But there are recomposed ones among them as well. Nevertheless, the organizing center of the whole aesthetic sphere, in many respects the central concept of the whole ‘table of categories’, does belong to them. Specificity (‘die Besonderheit’) was the basic principle of the synthesis already in the prolegomenon completed in 1955. At any rate, Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen no longer describes a purely logical or epistemological category when explicating this concept, but, eventually, an ontological one characteristic of social being. ‘Categories are existential determinations’—this remark of Marx’s (at the beginning of his Grundrisse) throws new light on the question in the case of particularity. For the point at issue, even in the sphere of everyday being, is the unity of the singular and the universal, that of the individual and the species. The characteristic feature of art here is nothing but rendering that unity an ‘organizing center’, and, on the basis of this mediating field, it makes the heterogeneously special relations of everyday being homogeneous. Hence, it is not the case of a ‘point’, but that of a field: in its sphere of motion the different branches of art, genres, trends of the history of art, and, after all, the concrete works themselves, as ‘individualities of works of art’, are placed at various points and, as a result of fruitful mediation, take their final and definitive shape between the two extreme boundaries. Thus, the aesthetic is not a lone and established point that comes into being in the spirit of particularity, rather, its sphere is of a pluralistic character. Art has always found several kinds of solution for expressing the problems of ages rendering perceptible the prevailing image of maq and human essence.

Thus, one can justifiably speak about the multi-colored nature of the branches of art and of particular works, about the polyphonic co-existence of modes of formation, provided the deadlocks of interpretation that nowadays obscure the concept of aesthetic pluralism are seen clearly. Such is, on the one hand, normative regulation, according to whatever principles should that be done. Canonical law in philosophical aesthetic would inevitably ‘result in a dissapointment’; it falls within the scope of authority of theology. At the same time, the complete relativization of aesthetic value, which is so fashionable today, is no more able to lead us out of the deadlock of normality. Certain advocates of pluralism serve only unfair purposes when they seek to obliterate the boundaries between great art and (apologetically naturalistic or negativistic) pseudo-art. Lukács did
not interpret the pluralism of the aesthetic sphere in the manner of common liberals. It was not mere prejudice, but, rather, the objective characteristics of the aesthetic sphere that inspired him to stress that the sphere of motion of particularity is wide, but not boundless. If it means the field of the growth of values, then—also following from its very concept—it must be the scope of upward and emancipatory motion. For example, every mode of representation that chains the work to everyday specificities or fills it with semi-scientific generalities, remains problematic in terms of value or just pseudo-aesthetic in character: naturalism and non-sensuous abstraction. So there are shores, and the river does have a direction as well. Particularity is not a static condition in the work, not a pseudo-harmonic ‘reconciliation’ free from tension, but a movement oscillating between the particular and the universal. Eventually, its teleology aims at the species character, without breaking loose from the sensuously concrete.

At first glance, this theory of particularity seems to be a construction of logic. The fact that how much it is not the case with Lukács is proved the best by a feature of the late synthesis, which has not been stressed enough so far—though true: nor is it elaborated completely. Lukács stressed the problem of aesthetic receptivity, that of the efficiency of works, more strikingly in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen than in any previous work. And he did so in the spirit of the dialectical unity of abiding value and the historical mode of being. He gave an answer to what was already posed as a question in his youthful attempts at synthesis and to which Marx provided a methodological key in his analysis of the exemplariness of Homerian epics. At any rate, to highlight the effectiveness of the work, he had to mark out the boundaries of a purely epistemological approach and recognize the appropriateness of putting the question in a socio-ontological way. Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen already anticipates that recognition:

der Satz 'kein Objekt ohne Subjekt', der erkenntnistheoretisch eine rein idealistische Bedeutung hat, ist fundamental für die Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung in der Ästhetik. Natürlich ist an sich auch jedes ästhetische Objekt etwas unabhängig vom Subjekt Existierendes. So aufgefasst ist es aber nur etwas materiell Seiendes, kein Ästhetisches. Tritt seine Ästhetische Gesetzheit in Geltung, so ist damit simultan auch ein solches Subjekt gesetzt, denn seine ästhetische Wesensart besteht ja, wie wir wiederholt dargelegt haben, gerade darin, vermittels der Mimesis, einer spezifischen Art der Widerspiegelung der objektiven Wirklichkeit, im rezeptiven Subjekt gewisse Erlebnisse zu evozieren.\(^1\)

This effectiveness (and, along with it, the subject—object relation) is involved in the articulated structure of the work itself. Of course, its actual realization depends not only on the work, but also on the recipient—we do not enjoy works of art, stand before paintings, read novels, and watch films with minds that are tabula rasa. The alienated and manipulatory trends hidden in present-day mass culture oblige us even in themselves to reckon with the possibility of inadequate reactions. And yet, Lukács, who is aware of the fact that the domain between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic, between adequate and non-adequate reception is large, and that this domain is not no man’s land, but belongs to man, at the same time points out that the structure of the work is animated by its directedness to the actual or potential recipients. It is precisely the subject—object relation that renders adequate the mode of reception that Lukács calls ‘catharsis’ and elevates to the rank of a general aesthetic category. The point here is neither the principle of ‘empathy’, nor the ‘objectified self-pleasure’ (Lipps), nor even the sentimental identification which was suspected—and rejected—in the concept of catharsis even by Brecht, but, rather, a shock—a ‘purification’—the essence of which, according to one of the pregnant Lukácsian formulae, is: owing to the experience evoked by the work, the ‘whole man’ can be transformed into the totality of man. In other words: the recipient
of the great work breaks loose from the prison of particularity, of purely private character, to which he would otherwise be condemned by alienating ordinariness. By experiencing 'alien' fates and passions, however, he now becomes capable of identifying himself with the great world historical contents of the class, of the nation, and of humanity creating itself; so as to live his life henceforth as a fuller man, as one who understands his own world and age, and shapes them actively; so as to rise to the historically possible height of species character. It is in this way that art becomes the champion of real and universal emancipation, the parable of the riot against senseless and distorted conditions of life. It is in this way that art becomes the guardian and augmenter of inner Wholeness, of human integrity and meaning.

A new aspect of the ethical problem denoted by the word 'completeness' appears here; a novel explanation of what is meant by the qualifying epithets, so far implicitly attached to works of art, 'great', 'exquisite', 'perfect'. They mean, in all certainty, one of the aesthetic consequences of 'world-likeness'. In this interpretation, the work refers to the formed content of necessity, to content as meaning and formation, resulting from its being directed to reality, to content as 'point-like' closedness. 'Open' form, if it consistently excludes from itself all the elements of closedness, will evoke the danger of the inarticulateness of the meaning of the work. But if closedness is to be interpreted in the sense of the windowless monad, à la Leibnitz, and all the more à la Adorno, then the chief thread that attaches the work to the subject, ensuring its receptibility, will wither away. The 'great' works by Homer, Dante, and Beethoven are referred to by that very adjective because they are formed evocations and cathartically efficient mirrors of human fates.

At this point, we encounter one of the fundamental issues in the long-lived debate over Lukács's work. Here, the matter in question is realism, admittedly, with a new emphasis. From the start, the Marxist Lukács sharply criticized the subjective interpretation of the appropriation of reality that comes into being in art, and along with it, the decadent art of bourgeois apologetic. Naturally, his conception of realism was connected from the outset with the criticism of naturalistic methods. Then the socio-ontological foundation added theoretical depth to the two-front struggle. For the subject—object relation in Lukács's late aesthetic does not mean a simple unification. In great works, this relation is an involution in advance: the subject appropriating the object—the recipient as well as the creator—rises above his own particularity. The object, although embedded in social existence, gains its meaning and efficiency from the universally human contents of species character and comes into possession of aesthetic surplus. It grasps the objectivity that has social meaning and is embued with historical practice. In his late synthesis, Lukács uncovered the principles of ontological foundation without sacrificing the theory of reflection in aesthetics. When he established the key concept of adequate efficiency, catharsis, as a generally valid category, it was inseparable from mimesis.

Mimesis, the principle of imitation in aesthetics, is perhaps a greater stumbling block in present-day bourgeois ideology than realism itself, which has been disputed from the start. Still, as we noted earlier, the innovations in the establishment of categories during the later phase of Lukács's career were not subject to fashion. In the present case, the enlargement of the terminological range of aesthetic does not aim at winning the gratitude of academic citadels, but, rather, at capturing objective states of affairs in the broadest possible conceptual network. Lukács's theory of mimesis has nothing to do with the revival of the mechanical theory of imitation, just as mimesis had nothing to do with that in the original conception of classical antiquity either. In the Aristotelian
tradition, mimesis meant the representation of the inner characteristic features of the ethos of the citizen of the polis, and so it is understandable that a passage in the *Politics* calls music the most directly mimetic art, comparing it with plastic art that undertakes the ‘imitation’ of ethos only indirectly. Lukács, in principle, also regards every ‘world-creating’ branch of art as mimetic, from literature through music, to architecture. Here, any sort of ‘imitation true to nature’ is out of the question. All the more because, according to the expositions in *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen*, the work of art is a teleological mode of postulation—and it was such even when it still bore the mark of ancient magical forms of consciousness. The unity of content and form, which, of necessity, is aesthetically organic, is also partly attributable to that fact. For similar reasons, form can become content, and content, form. In principle, an ancient work song was built up just as ‘cadentially’, from the intended end, as say, Beethoven’s *Ninth Symphony*. Both are examples of mimesis of a teleological nature.

The idea of the interdependence of catharsis and mimesis also belongs to the system of bulwarks of Lukács’s late aesthetic synthesis. It is interesting that these elements attain an almost perfect homogeneity but once, in *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen*, although the text earlier refers to the realistic nature of every prominent art at several points. It is one of the points considered to be the most sensitive, namely, music, that the critics of Lukács’s so-called ‘literature- and novel-centeredness’ have thus far tried to hold up as the great counter-example of refuting power when they contest the general validity of the doctrine of realism. (Incidentally, this in itself is a compliment to the scientific method and attitude of the aged thinker.) At any rate, here he definitely extends the concept of realism to music and, moreover, to the new music of the twentieth century, which is allegedly, ‘by nature’, of an anti-realistic character. Specifically, Lukács refers to the art of Béla Bartók.

Music in discussed in *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen*—perhaps not under a most appropriate rubric—as one of the ‘boundary questions’ of mimesis. In Lukács’s line of thought, the great works of music confront us with ‘double mimesis’. When objective reality has been reflected primarily in human inwardness, that image will be transformed by music into a special ‘secondary’ image, into an image that is characterized by an individual language of expression, a particular homogeneous medium, and by the ‘undetermined objectivity’ of meaningful inwardness. Music produces cathartic effect taken in the pregnant sense of the word by means of evocation that joins conceptual ‘incognito’ with emotional unambiguity, in short, through a whole chain of mediations. Thus, it is neither the similarity to singular-objective phenomena, nor the conceptual generality that gives music its existential element; in the sphere of musical particularity, the undetermined objectivity of the meaning of works mentioned above is emphatic for this reason, too. But here Lukács no longer leaves any doubt as to the fact that music is not some sort of deviant, ‘non-mimetic’ art; whoever inquires into its essence will find something that is essential even from the point of view of the aesthetic. For realism is also a general aesthetic category in the later thought of Lukács. The more deeply we penetrate its concretization in the various branches and genres of art, the more clearly the common, the lawlike, and the universal hidden in the deep layers of phenomena will reveal themselves. Hence, with respect to the work of art.

Sein realistischer Charakter entscheidet sich danach, wie tief und treffend, wie umfassend und echt er die Probleme seines persönlichen und historischen Entstehungsabgucken in der Perspektive seiner dauernden Bedeutung in der Menschheitsentwicklung zu reproduzieren und zu erwecken imstande ist. Natürlich sind alle konkreten Momente, durch die diese Prinzipien in den einzelnen Künsten, ja letztendes in den einzelnen
Kunstwerken zur Revelation gelangen, struktiv wie inhaltlich qualitativ voneinander verschieden. Jedoch gerade in diesen Verschiedenheiten setzt sich, der oft behandelten pluralistischen Wesensart der ästhetischen Späre entsprechend, die ästhetische Einheit der letzten Prinzipien durch. Und in diesem Sinne, den weitbreiteten Anschauungen scharf widersprechend, glauben wir, dass man berechtigerweise von einem Realismus in der Musik sprechen kann.\(^2\)

According to Lukács, it is the representation of the problems of the present age on the level of species character that in the aforesaid sense renders cathartic and, along with it, realistic, for example, Bartók’s *Cantata Profana*. The reasoning speaks for itself:


I have quoted this passage from *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen* at length because it can perhaps dispel several myths, for example, concerning the so-called ‘literature-centeredness’ of Lukács’s conception of realism or the—to say so—confirmed conservativism of his artistic experiences. Those who hope—and with reason—that philosophical aesthetic should not ‘result in a disappointment’ are often thrown into great confusion by these myths, even today.

Therefore, the important building and binding material of the late synthesis, reconstructed above only in their outlines, should be treated as a summary: the restructuring of artistic experience taken in its strict sense. *Pars pro toto*: the aged thinker wrote one of his most instructive works, entitled *In Memoriam Hanns Eisler*, in 1964. In this article he pays homage to the memory of the former partner in discourse, to the vehement opponent in the expressionism debate in the late thirties, to the staunch German communist and antifascist. It is, at the same time, an implicit admonition: the old disputes must be thought over again, among others, the remarkable Lukács–Brecht controversy, too. Passing time and novel experiences can yield new stresses as well as prompt corrections of earlier evaluations for those who—despite their physical age—do not suffer from mental sclerosis. Thus, if one or the other of Lukács’s value judgments has been modified, today’s reader must take the trouble to identify the nature and direction of that shift. Perhaps the present brief piece will at least serve to underscore the fact that it is not the artistic alternative of Adrian Leverkühn, of the musician hero of Thomas Mann’s Faust novel, that is supported by those modifications; for Lukács, contradictory principles cannot be reconciled, even in old age. Precisely for that reason, the closing sentence of his *Spätwerk* deserves our attention: ‘Only honorable searches will find, and only those who escape in the right direction will reach their true homeland.’ Lukács first set down this sentence in an article entitled *Aktualitás és menekülés előle* [Actuality and escape from it], in *Új Hang*, a Hungarian periodical published in Moscow, in 1941.
at a time when Lukács, like Eisler, Bartók, and Thomas Mann lived in exile. The date is not without interest. Fascism had brought half of Europe into subjection and was posed to invade the Soviet Union. The old article deals with the meaning of the search and the secret of finding the true homeland; its evocation in 1964 is embued with the quiet pathos of an ongoing process of search and rediscovery. Are they merely subjective marks of attitude? Hardly. The guiding stars even of the old Lukács were search and discovery. Eventually, he built his aesthetic synthesis under that constellation, the light of which has yet to fade.

(Translated by Matild Gulyás)

Notes

2 Ibid., Bd. II, p. 395.
3 Ibid., Bd. II, p. 394.
Lukács's Ontological Turn: The Ontology of Social Being

by

Miklós Almási

The fate of a genuinely important theme is almost unpredictable: it usually follows its own path. Having completed Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, and considering unexplored spheres of Marxism in the sixties, György Lukács decided to make preparations for writing a comprehensive ethic. In its first chapter he had planned to discuss the forms of being of social relations, a problem that is indispensable for an analysis of ethical norms, that is, moral principles, and prohibitions that direct the conduct of the people from within—provided the analysis was to be materialistic. What, however, was to have been the first chapter of the planned work had assumed an unscheduled dimension: it became a full-fledged field of research. Moreover, it has grown into a posthumous synthesis of his life work.

That the theme developed in this unforeseen direction was, of course, due not just to its inherent characteristics. István Hermann pointed out that the mid-1960s witnessed the last major polemic of members of the Frankfurt School with advocates of positivism (cf. the ‘positivism debate’), which once again—and, in bourgeois philosophy for the last time since then—pushed questions of dialectics and ontology to the forefront of interest. Lukács, who had been aware of the increasing international importance of the issue, and had known the negative consequences of the neglect of that issue by Marxists, braced himself to work out an intellectual summation—a philosophical legacy. And, finally, consultations with his disciples convinced him that a comprehensive reinterpretation of ontology was then the most important question. Hence, he was busy working on an ever more bulky manuscript of what had originally been meant as a “brief” introduction. By the time he had got to the last volume, he developed a fatal illness. It was due precisely to his rigorous self-discipline and puritanic devotion to work that he could carry on. The work has still remained in torso.

With this work, Lukács opened a new perspective in the development of modern Marxism: he directed attention to the primary significance of questions of being in contrast to the epistemological, logical, and scientistic approaches, prevalent throughout the history of philosophy (and present-day thinking). Below I shall sum up Lukács’s premises, outlined in part in Conversations with Lukács,2 and in the Prolegomena of the Ontology:

(1) Back to things, the categories of being, in order to replace the predominantly epistemological approach of modern philosophy. It is imperative to find the categories

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that can be separated from the epistemological tendency and describe the genesis and motion of inorganic and social structures.

(2) All three major groups of forms of being (inorganic, organic, and social) are process-like and characterized by historicity, a fundamental Marxian principle. Ontologically, the supreme law of this historicity is temporal irreversibility: once events and acts are objectified, ‘they cannot be undone’, for they have launched causal chains. Furthermore, Lukács contended that totality, made up by complexes, forms structures. In other words, in a radical break with the practice prevalent in everyday thinking and philosophical thought, in which ‘discrete entities’ are treated as basic concepts of a naive ontology, Lukács argued that genuine ontology must devote itself to the exploration of structures in process, which exist in greater units of being. In close connection with this point, genuine ontology must break with the philosophical misconception that ‘things’ are superior to relations (and that relations can function only as conceptual tools). As a matter of fact, the first priority of the analyst of social structure and human practice is to shed light on the being-like nature of relations, on their ontological ‘being so’.

(3) Marx’s statement that “categories [...] express the forms of being, the characteristics of existence,”§⁵ that is, that the concepts of ontology are descriptions of developing sources of being, one based on the other—is a methodological guideline for Marxist ontology.

Here Lukács’s method is similar to that followed in his Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen: namely, he aimed at reconstructing Marx’s ontological and philosophical thoughts. In that work, Lukács evolved the foundations of his aesthetic theory relying on Marx’s scattered remarks on aesthetics, the theory of art, the general problems of everyday life and intellectual activity, and on his methodological analyses. In this work, employing a similar method, he made an attempt to reconstruct Marx’s philosophy of society and of history, as it appears in Capital, Grundrisse, and Marx’s early works, and he challenged the mainstream of philosophical development since the 18th century. (He, of course, paid adequate attention to the thinkers whom he considered as allies and who, however inconsistently, had striven conceptually to grasp the relations of being: first of all Aristotle, then Hegel, and, among philosophers of the modern era, Nicolai Hartmann.) The Ontology, of course, presents a philosophical conception in its own right, and does so by proclaiming a turn in philosophy: ‘back to being’. It is complete, even if, as I have mentioned, its author had meant to continue it; and the central and most voluminous part, entitled The Most Important Problems, discusses only four basic issues: (1) “Labour”; (2) “Reproduction”; (3) “The Realm of Ideas and Ideology”; and (4) “Alienation”. The major part of the text is in final form, while certain passages have remained in draft and in the form of references; Lukács did not live to develop and polish them—or reject them. The reader can, however, find the draft-like passages especially intriguing, as they offer quite a few pointers for further thought. (The description of the dialectic of objectification and ‘externalization’ is an example of such a fragmentary theory.⁴ Other examples are the attempt to give a concrete form to species character (Gattungsmässigkeit) in historical terms in the Prolegomena,⁵ and the discussion of the historical function of the “negative development of values”.⁶)

Lukács had a critical opinion concerning the very use of the term ‘ontology’, which means theory of being. As he put it in the Conversations:

We are using the fine word ‘ontology’, and even I have gotten into this habit, although one should really say that one is discovering the forms of being that new movements of the complex produce. The fact that new phenomena can be genetically derived on the basis of their everyday existence is only one aspect of a
general relationship, namely that being is a historical process. There is certainly no Being in the strong sense, and even that which we call everyday being is a specific and extremely relative configuration of complex within a historical process.  

Lukács, with this formulation of the problem, dissociated himself from both medieval forms of ontology, and the ontology of Hegel and the phenomenologists (cf. the theories of being in Edmund Husserl and Roman Ingarden). He confined himself to the examination of concrete historical and social forms of being and their categorial interrelationships, and rejected 'being in the strong sense' (i.e., 'pure being').

On the other hand, he incorporated in the specificity of the most developed form of being, the social one, the ontological function of consciousness, that is, that of teleological thought. This was a novelty relative to traditional ontologies (which did not discuss anything but 'tangible' being), and to vulgar and dogmatic Marxist doctrines, too. (I shall discuss this problem in more detail in the next section.)

"Reality thus has an intrinsic order of priority," Lukács is quoted as saying in the Conversations. He stressed the priority of the ontological discussion of phenomena over sociological, anthropological, psychological, or philosophical approaches. He defined as the most important task of his Ontology the clarification of the categories of social being. However, in many places of the work, he also discussed other forms of being, that is, inorganic and organic. (The joint discussion of the 'philosophy of nature' and 'philosophy of society' have raised questions from several points of view, first because Lukács's philosophy of nature differed from the traditional—simplifying—Marxist approach and, secondly, because he was not consistent in his examination of the fundamental question, namely, the being-like nature, the 'being so' of social relations.)

It is obvious that his starting point was the natural forms of being: first because social being can appear only subsequent to physical and organic development—that is, it can appear as a qualitatively new structure of being historically, too, only as built on the latter development—secondly because the 'raw material' or medium of social practice, namely, man, as regards both his biological construction and his 'metabolism with nature' (Marx), emerges from this physical and organic background.

Still, as is indicated in the title of the work, he concentrated on the description of new ontological patterns that are produced by society: man's products which, by drawing the spontaneously working laws of nature into a new, teleologically shaped relationship, create new patterns, and which also have as their result the emergence of the human species. (The wheel, Lukács argued, is not a product of nature. When it was invented and put to use, as a unity something radically new was brought into being, even though several existing laws of nature were applied. Furthermore, nature lacks mental objectifications, as, e.g., norms of behavior that direct human decisions; norms that, however, determine the course of action for man with almost the same compulsion as the way animals are directed by their instincts and impulses of the environment.)

Throughout the Ontology, Lukács concentrated his attention on the genesis of new patterns that are called into existence by social being. The issues that he considered include the genesis of the simplest examples of social relations, such as, for instance, early forms of kinship and division of labor; furthermore, the ontological sources of the concept of value and of the act of evaluation, and how the above mental objectifications arise from material activities; and where to find the ontological sources of alienation. His main concern was not the analysis of the advanced forms of being of existing formations; instead, he attributed decisive philosophical importance to their origin in human practice. It is precisely at that level, Lukács contended, that these categories—
which in their fully developed form almost entirely resist inquiry into their origin—show that they are ultimately connected to being.

The same consideration marks his challenge to what he saw as erroneous tendencies in earlier philosophies. He claimed that Hegel and Nicolai Hartmann had failed especially to shed light on ontological genesis, on the process of emergence in general, and that was the reason why their attempts came to a deadlock. They started out from the analysis of patterns that had been fetishized in their full-grown form, which necessarily led them astray.9 With his ontological investigations, Lukács wanted to provoke a radical turn in philosophical thinking. To use the expression that he had borrowed from Hartmann and was fond of using, he wanted to encourage a shift from intento obliga (epistemological starting point) to intento recta (thought oriented to reality, to being). It is too early today to gauge the impact of his attempt at provoking this turn. I shall confine myself to mentioning three aspects of the results of the work:

(1) By reconstructing Marx’s views, he opened the way for the elaboration of a unified materialistic theory of society. Lukács superseded a latent discrepancy between processes of being (social relations) and ideological moments, regarded merely as ‘products of being’. In his conception of social being, he presented a unified philosophy of practice, in which the ‘ideological moment’ is ‘anchored’ to being.

(2) He was convinced that, in the overall development of philosophy, today the clarification of problems of being assumed decisive importance; considering the most varied disciplines, ranging from economics to anthropology, political science, and the theory of categories, philosophy has to face the particular, new phenomena, issues, and forms of motion of the present. By placing an almost single-minded emphasis on granting priority to questions of ontology, he transformed what was an implicit general mode into a declared aim of theoretical research. (Hence, e.g., his recurrent demand for the writing of a Capital of our era, which he described as the most urgent duty of today’s Marxism, was closely connected with that turn, and so was the current crisis of reorientation in sociology—which has become explicit upon the disintegration of the Frankfurt School, the representative of the last great bourgeois system of thought.)

(3) Contrary to the conceptual shallowness as can be seen in today’s philosophy, Lukács brought back categorial richness, which can be further developed in the spirit of great philosophical traditions. He opened new perspectives especially for the examination of historical and social processes, as well as researches on ideology, and provoked the current debates on the concept of species character. These achievements—even though the Ontology has remained in torso—are expected to exert a stimulating effect especially on the ‘renaissance of Marxism’, for which he called on so many occasions, and on a future renewal of the general progress of philosophy.

Below I shall discuss three sets of problems of the Ontology, which I consider of pivotal importance: the analysis of social relations as phenomena of being; the problematic of the genesis of the category of value, and the peculiarities of the development of values; and, finally, whether the ontological approach can be applied to the sphere of aesthetics.

The Form of Being of Social Relations

Ancient concept of philosophy that it is, ‘relation’ has always been considered as ‘floating’, escaping definition, and even suspicious in quality. For a long time—as was pointed
out by Nicolai Hartmann—it had been considered as a 'thing': for only things were regarded as 'tangible' reality, while relations appeared to be the irradiations, potential effects of things. The 'thing-centered' approach of the natural philosophy of old was borrowed for analyses of both social relations and mental constructs. This approach is meaningful, at least in a concrete sense, as long as it is restricted to simple physical and chemical processes: for instance, acids corrode metals, hence, the chemical reaction—the relation—is inseparable from the thing. The duality and inseparability of the relation and the thing can also be found in natural phenomena. (We know today that even this wording lacks precision.)

But this outlook became problematic already when applied to physical phenomena, after the cognition of, for example, gravitation among stars (cf. the discovery of 'action at a distance'), and magnetic and electric phenomena, where the relation is a dynamic effect on two distinct 'things', a kind of effect which could not be described by the thing-centered concept. To an even lesser degree was this concept applicable to the description of sociological phenomena, for example, marital bonds, which are honored by both parties, not to please the partner or obey his or her instruction, but rather obeying the 'relation' itself—that is, the norms legitimizing it. And when it comes to the description of even more subtle phenomena such as, for instance, interpersonal relations, motivated by respect or pity, this concept could not be used at all. It became obvious that relation is a category which, although it directs the individuals from within, also has a certain power of compulsion from the 'outside', which covers the parties concerned like a 'shell' and is binding on both sides. (Take the case of respect: in vain perhaps does a respected person try to persuade his partner to call him by his first name; respect may function as a limit, inviolable for both.)

That is the category of relation by which the general structure of interpersonal relations can be described: here again, the primary phenomenon is the relation that affects the individuals, and in which the subjects of the relation are merely the other pole, the subjects who actually 'make' this relation. To use Goethe's words, this relation is both of an outer and inner character: it is built from within, but it also assumes objective form as an outside determinant, while it often obeys laws different from the subjective desire of its makers. Where social relations are concerned (sub- and superordination, the relation between the capitalist and the worker), this relation is created by objective motions of institutions, that is, of capital. And, although it may allow for some internal room (maneuver), it is not easy to cross its boundaries.

Lukács started out from this social category of relation, from the specific objectivity of social relations. He posed the following question: how does this relation exist, one that possesses the same mercilessly objective features as 'things', for whoever comes into conflict with prohibitions of these relations can feel the 'hardness' of this intangible medium. At the same time, the relation itself can still exist in the consciousness of individuals as invisible and floating. Lukács made the category of relation a starting point for his ontological investigations because his original aim was to lay the philosophical foundations of ethics: he was convinced that moral laws, and especially interpersonal moral relations, and the norms that regulate them constitute the primary medium. And it is also true of these non-material objectifications that recurrent or drastic violations of these norms may lead to serious, even tragic cosequences, just as when 'things' are treated against the rules. (The 'measure of hardness' of ethical relations is, obviously, different, yet they, too, can assert themselves. Think, e.g., of politically motivated suicides, in which the individual finds himself between the hammer and anvil.
of the moral and political sphere.) Here we can see the reoccurrence of questions that Lukács had formulated decades before: relations exist, but how are they possible as such?

The strength and objective existence of social relations can thus be seen most clearly when the individual is punished for violating them. In this train of thought, for Lukács, the model was Marx's idea that whoever violates economic laws, perishes, as these laws assert themselves 'on pain of destruction' ("bei Strafe des Untergangs"). Hence, it is this possibility that makes obvious the objectivity, the compulsory force of relations: the individual first 'singes his wings' (or learns about the rigorous effects of the relations from the example of others), and then he will know the confines of his room for maneuver. But this raises a new problem for the probing into ontology: subordination to relations, or their remoulding and modification. In general, the individual's conduct according to relation presupposes the role of some elementary moment of consciousness, too. Consequently, the individual's consciousness—or false consciousness—is also a part of the process in which social relations are asserted: human consciousness mediates the objective force of relations. To put it in simpler terms, no ontological analysis, that is, one devoted to the study of being, can overlook social consciousness, or consider consciousness a mere secondary circumstance superimposed on the sphere of material practice. Consciousness is, therefore, a vehicle for being-like relations. But if that is the case, the traditional conception of ontology should also be enlarged: consciousness must also be placed in the context of the ontological; consciousness which all former schools of ontological thought either refused to study, dismissing it as non-existent, or stylized it into a mystical-irrational concept of 'genuine being'. But how can consciousness be an active component of the construction of categories of social being?

At first sight, Lukács's answer is simple: provided that we proceed from the study of only complete mental objectifications—for instance, from the medium of a field of art or of an ethical system—then this feedback can only be described as the extrinsic interaction between two considerably independent spheres. There is, however, a society-constituting moment of human existence, in which consciousness is interlocked with being: labor, a teleological activity. It is because in labor the moment of consciousness—the definition of the aim and selection of tools—is inseparably integrated into the cause-and-effect chain of material-physical reality. Teleology is not, as claimed by traditional philosophy, an opposite of causality. Rather, studying, testing, being confronted by, and coming to know the causal connections extant and working in nature, it applies them in another relationship. Teleology postulates new causal chains, and the positing of goal and its realization follow that course. It is precisely here that we can grasp the fundamental phenomenon of the being-like nature of social relations, that is, consciousness mediating relations of being. In fact, ontology can be enlarged even by elaborating the concept of teleological practice, in that this central concept can define a new sphere of being, the scope of relations created by social practice.

Hence, that was the background that led Lukács to ontological investigations: namely, the philosophical foundation of the ethical sphere, the demand for grasping the category of relation, and, together with the latter, his aim to highlight structurally the Marxian category of social being. At this point it is clear what the Marxian methodology—"categories are determinants of being"—meant for Lukács. (For example, labor as a category comprehends the 'secret' of a form of being.) On the basis of this theoretical standpoint, it is easier to understand the structure of the Ontology and certain contradictory parts in it, and to follow the recently started creative discussions of the work.
How can labor, then, be such an ‘ontological model’? The answer is offered in "Labour", the opening chapter of _The Most Important Problems_, the second volume of the _Ontology_. (Assuming that the reader is familiar with the work, I shall confine myself to outlining its fundamental idea, touching on some relevant general philosophical problems.) In labor, as I have already mentioned, man uses causal chains working in nature in a new relationship, in teleological activity. The product resulting in this way is qualitatively new even from two viewpoints. First, its starting point is an idea, a goal or purpose formulated in the mind. Postulation (goal positing) is a conscious directedness to something, which, as a result of labor, provided it is successful, is realized. "Realization as a category of the new form of being has a further important consequence. With labour, human consciousness ceases to be an epiphenomenon in the ontological sense" because the activity of man "gives rise to a specifically new, more complicated and complex level of being, i.e., social being", in which consciousness has a constituting function. Human consciousness both posits goals and chooses or creates the tools necessary for their attainment. This presupposes a relatively precise cognition (reflection) of objective processes and the appearance of the moment of choice, that is, the role of alternatives. (Elsewhere Lukács defined the capacity to choose between alternatives—and the ontological possibility of such a choice—as a source of freedom.)

Secondly, teleological postulation does not stop at the man—object relation, that is, it does more than shape and elevate elements of nature to a higher level of being by means of labor. The same teleological relation is effected in the direction of other people, and society in general: labor becomes the model of social coexistence. Here Lukács imparted an extended meaning to the concept of postulation, in that he discusses ‘secondary goal positing’. While in the case of labor, teleological postulation (the ‘teleological project’) is directed to an object, in the second case, the aim is “the attempt to bring another man (or group of men) to accomplish specific teleological posittings”.

The target is, therefore, to influence the goal positing of others. (For example, in the case of the division of labor between hunters and beaters, the original purpose, the shooting of animals, can be realized only by means of a secondary teleology, i.e., provided the beaters have been persuaded to carry out the required team work. The same pattern applies also to other cases: making someone interested in accomplishing something, and using coercion to have him do something represent qualitatively different forms of postulation.) In secondary goal positing we can thus see labor teleology create interpersonal, social relations. Lukács gave a detailed discussion of the preconditions of society-constituting goal positing: for instance, of the evolution of language, and the separation of social roles. The _Ontology_, however, includes only an outline of the discussion of postulation that is to influence the goal positing of others. (Let me indicate already at this point that it is this theme that has stimulated fruitful further research, e.g., by the West German philosopher Jürgen Habermas.)

However, labor has an impact not only on objects and the postulations of others, but also in the reverse direction, on the shaping of the subject. In labor, man has to do his job accurately; repeat the correct movements, use the adequate tools in a uniform manner, be unerring and able to overcome any instinct-like impulse that would hinder work. As time goes by, these features are interiorized, and become secondary objectifications. Moreover, in the course of development, the steadily working, precise, and diligent man is bound to become an end in himself. Hence, the human subject itself is being shaped in the spirit of these values. This is man’s progress from the 'mute species character' of a natural being to his evolution into man, to become a social being.
The adequate procedures, rules, and expertise in general are also to become 'internal objectifications', which will be, sooner or later, fixed by social consciousness as universal patents (usable everywhere and at any time). Repeated usage is one aim, while another is to pass on the 'patents' to other people engaged in labor. To make these elements (tools, procedures, material characteristics, and shapes of objects) transferable, they have to be fixed in the social mind in the form of general concepts:

Since experience gained in one concrete labour can be used in another, this experience gradually becomes [...] autonomous, i.e., certain observations are generalized and fixed, so that they are no longer exclusively related directly to one particular performance, but acquire a certain universal character as observations about natural processes in general.14

An eloquent example is a linguistic sign. Encapsulating a portion of generalized experience, it is separated from its origin, and turned transferable to and receivable by people working under different conditions. A concept is, therefore, separated not just from the concrete physical context it comes from, but also from the subject who created it in reflection. It can also be used by others.

Internal objectifications (e.g., discipline) and language assure a measure of steadiness to interpersonal relations and relations of social being, and guarantee that fellow laborers be reliable partners; and that the commonly used linguistic forms be constructed as the same 'command' everywhere (command: instructions for the use of tools, and requirements of a community). Let me mention in passing that this steadiness of the public spirit is manifested in external forms of objectification, too, which take shape concurrently with the internal ones; namely, religious and cultic institutions, norms, and customs.

Let me complete this outline of the fundamental idea of the Ontology. What has been said so far shows, I hope, that this road leads, on the one hand, to the autonomy of the sphere of science, insofar as the object is separated from the interests as dictated by immediate practice and specifics of individual goal positing, and man becomes capable of describing phenomena in themselves, considering also their general characteristics and regularities. On the other hand, it leads to the emergence of the independent sphere of ethics—in which binding norms appear as internal regulators of simple relations—and of art, in which elementary forms of life and community are given objective form. But let us return to our opening problematic: how could Lukács answer in his work the question of the form of being of interpersonal relations, the social relations? We could already see two of Lukács's answers to this question: (1) the potentially definitive character of these relations: their effect is asserted 'on pain of destruction'; (2) the extension of the teleological relation to 'influencing the goal positing of other men'. Occasionally Lukács also spoke of a third concept: 'progressive socialization'. By this he meant that, in the course of labor, the elementary moments accumulate into and create ever more complicated forms of interaction which, as a network of relations, are constituted from the activities of both individuals and the whole community—retrospective correction on the part of all society, selection fulfilled by all society—that is, by means of the feedback of totality.

Lukács borrowed the idea from Marx, who said that individuals do not simply come into contact with one another; rather, their relations are influenced by motions of the whole community. (The ultimate evaluation of the output of the individual is undertaken by the community as a whole, and it has an effect on the successful or unsuccessful performance, on the teleological activity, of the individual: the work may be a success
on the part of the individual, while the community dismisses it as a failure.) Labor, so deeply rooted in material and communal life, will be the fundamental relation-creating principle. Its material roots and embedment in community are the very aspects that lend primary importance to relations in their capacity to be the 'motive force' of acts of individuals.

Lukács confined himself to outlining the starting point, concentrating on aspects of economics and labor. The discussion of the basic social reproduction (i.e., what Engels described as the reproduction of family, the rise of kinship systems, and the ontological features of the primitive division of labor—that between man and woman) is missing. It can be concluded that Lukács failed adequately to expound the differences between the man-to-object and man-to-man relation in labor teleology. It will be the task of future research to make a thorough analysis of the new categories evolving from interpersonal relations, of the realm of interactions, and the genesis of socialization.

The first thinker who attempted to carry on the baton was Jürgen Habermas. He wrote Technik und Wissenschaft als "Ideologie" before the publication of the Ontology, but after having read the Conversations. His main aim was to challenge Herbert Marcuse's conception of technology, although the intellectual basis of the work indicates the attempt to continue the discussion of the specificities of social interactions. Habermas started out from the discussion of two complementary categories, which are, however, destined to independent development: labor, which he defined as purposive action in a manner similar to the Lukácsian model, and what Habermas termed "interactions mediated by symbols". However, both teleological activity and communication are products of labor and human evolution which, in the course of development, became separated from each other. According to Habermas, interaction is guided by compulsory norms, which also have an effect on the response (the reaction of the other man). (For example, 'insult' provokes 'vengeance', but the man who made the insult could already at the outset expect this response.) It is clear that Habermas followed—and modified—Lukács's train of thought, applying the above-mentioned conception of 'beim Strafe des Untergangs'. He contended that the violation of communal rules incurs different consequences (punishment) in labor and interactions, respectively. In the case of labor, failure incurs 'punishment' (in reference to Lukács's wording) because this objective reaction is built into the natural causal pattern of labor. Yet in the case of interactions, violators of norms face specific sanctions. Habermas drew up two tables to sum up the differences between the two models. Labor presupposes technological rules and a language independent of speech situations or context. On the other hand, interactions presuppose social norms and a language in which the 'overtones' and other aspects of speech situations are also significant. In labor, skills are attained, while in interactions, roles are interiorized.

It is undoubtedly to Habermas's credit that he discussed the ways and laws of socialization, which Lukács only outlined (in terms such as "increasing sociality" and "society's coming to be social"). Habermas attempted to give a philosophical and sociological description of this field. It is clear that in his approach there arise several non-purposive (non-teleological) forms of activity; for example, the above-mentioned 'insult—vengeance' relation can upset, or even ruin, the 'rationality' of teleological labor. Prestige, courtship, and conspicuous dressing (display) suppose similar, purely social relations. Some of these social modes of action appeared very early in the history of mankind. After ethnological researches, it was Karl Polányi who, from an economic and sociological point of view, recognized them and described them as non-economic
modes of behavior. On the other hand, it was the researchers of family structures, for example, Claude Lévi-Strauss, who pointed out the importance and society-constituting function of these relations. But these non-economic and purely social modes of behavior also include fundamental relations that originate from labor. Reciprocity, for instance, which both Polányi and Hebermas underlined as a non-purposive relation, is an important moment of elementary sociality, in spheres ranging from love and friendship to cultic acts. Yet reciprocity dates from the appearance of the exchange of equal values, where 'I am entitled to get as much as I give'. Reciprocity, then, is none other than the reappearance of a principle of labor in another form. This principle is accepted as a norm in a definite moment of history, and it originates in purposive activity. To take other examples from different forms of activity: the interaction-related concepts of competition, rank held in a sociometric network (which can be independent of one's social or financial status), or pity lack any direct purposive (teleological) fundamentals, but indirectly they have their origin in the model of labor. (See, e.g., the parallel between competition and success in labor.) Habermas characterized a medium whose laws are indeed different from concepts of the model of labor, and gain autonomy as qualitatively new forms. Still, their genesis appears to be close to labor and, at least, the absence of a common origin would be open to doubt.

Habermas has, moreover, pointed out that language and its associative spheres—a complex medium that is used in the first place in lyric poetry to express 'inexpressible' interconnections—are an integral part of interactions. He referred to this medium as 'symbols', for he believed that it was made up both by linguistic and metalinguistic signs (like gesture and grimace). Hebermas has thereby paved the way for research on a little-known though extensive medium, ranging from the first hello ('the first word is decisive...') to higher forms of social intercourse.

Lukács was, notwithstanding, justified at more than one point in his attempt to find the origin of social relations in labor teleology. First, historically: the fact that the sphere of labor is the source of social relations can be proved in any stage of the process whereby these relations gradually have become independent (cf. reciprocity and competition). But it is true that the ultimate motivation of competition (i.e., that winning can be posited as an end in itself) cannot be derived from purposive activity, perhaps neither from successful labor performance: here we are faced with a type of behavior that has gained independence. Yet the basis of comparison remains even here success, labor performance measured by the community.

Secondly, Lukács was right philosophically, too, when he traced back the two forms of action (teleological activity and communication) to labor, finding their genesis therein. For, Habermas failed to consider the philosophical consequences of his double-model view of labor and communication (interaction). Provided communicative action had an autonomous origin, it would be impossible to relate the evolution of labor to anything; in this case labor might be regarded as an accidental accompaniment of social relations, which does not lead of necessity to the emergence of purposive activity. Ethnological research has, however, established that labor is the source of purposive activity. Moreover, advocacy of the theory of independent genesis makes it impossible to explain how the values of all society are used to assess acts: how, for instance, a rational activity is found to be merely of mediocre value. (For instance, the propagation of crop by cuttings can be valuable, yet it cannot compete with farming with the plough, even if the latter is in an underdeveloped form.) Consequently, what is value in itself and what is a socially precious asset can coincide, but do not necessarily do so.
In Habermas, furthermore, norms that determine interaction have a presupposed existence and nothing is told of their genesis. In Lukács’s *Ontology*, however, the becoming, the nascent state that precedes separation, is the focus of attention. I shall explain below that, in Lukács, the values—and norms that compel man to adhere to values—come from labor, insofar as a solution or object suitable to the attainment of a goal assumes worth and becomes a norm, and as such gains independence and becomes conceptually generalized. In case values and norms are not traced back to an ontological origin, then the realm of norms are no more attached to being, and become stylized as a ‘spiritual sphere’. In order words, the dichotomy of being and consciousness reappears. Habermas, of course, did not proceed in that direction. He interpreted the communicative interaction of a community as a material medium, in which norms arise, yet he did not clarify how and why norms come into being. It was these particular questions that Lukács attempted to answer. His ontological starting point was correct, but he did not live to elaborate his conception fully. So we have yet to wait for an answer to these questions.

**Ontology of Values**

The problems of value and their ramifications, that is, the structure of the choice and accumulation of values and that of the objectifications of values are discussed in the *Ontology* in a sporadic manner, in the form of scattered remarks throughout the several chapters. And yet, in a decade’s time, by the late 1970s, Lukács’s thoughts had become important stimuli for further philosophical investigations.

Lukács paid special attention to two moments in the genesis of value: the practical testing of whether an object is suitable or unsuitable to an end, and the possibility of related alternative decisions. To use Lukács’s example: a primitive man lifts a stone and examines it to find out if he can make an axe from it. Provided it looks suitable, it is ‘valuable’, and if it does not, he throws it away and looks for another. This act introduces a new category relative to the realm of natural forms of being. For, when stones are rolling down a hill, neither their quality nor form matter: the process is taking place without inner differentiation. It is labor that creates differentiation of values here, by goal positing. Simple as this development appears to be, it involves numerous philosophical problems: is it the stone that is valuable in itself, or does it owe its value only to the act of evaluation, that is, choice? Evidently, no object of nature is valuable or valueless in itself; the question, therefore, should be formulated as follows: what determines its value? Furthermore, provided value derives from the act of choice, how does the object become valuable for others, namely, gain objective worth? Lukács found the answer in the ‘if ... then’ model of teleological thinking. The model is as follows: if the goal is given, an object can become valuable in view of the goal, as certain objectively existing features render it suitable to be means for the attainment of the goal. (It is, of course, first necessary to come to know—‘to reflect’—these features relatively well.) Value, therefore, does not originate from the act of choice, but, instead, first, from the necessity of finding adequate means to be chosen ‘backward’ from the goal (and these means ‘prescribe’ certain possibilities), and, secondly, from the collateral consideration of the objective features of objects and those that can be used in the new relationship. The process of selection ‘backward’ from the goal includes evaluation as well because it is continuously necessary to weigh the possibility of right and wrong
solutions—that is, of future success—and the quality of the object relative to this point of view and because, meanwhile, the search for new and better means has to continue. Lukács considered the act of choice as the source of the category of freedom and, what is more, the motor of social development: the 'great whole' is made up by the sum total of individual instances of choice, undergoing social selection, which is the basis of social development.

The elementary category of value, therefore, originates in the spirit of utility. But what about the mental, ethical, and artistic values of a higher order, where the criterion of utility matters mediately, if at all? Where scientific and scholarly research is concerned, Lukács had no difficulty in tracing back the category of scientific truth to labor. In labor, man forms an abstract image of the object of labor in his mind; but the same object displays a number of aspects for the man who finds it. In research, the object is separated from the immediacy of individual use, and it becomes available for study 'in itself' and to be grasped conceptually. It becomes possible to examine objects and their laws independently of the immediate needs of practice. (On the other hand, of course, there emerges the subject as distinct from the object world, who fulfills this examination and can treat himself as an object, too.) Hence, it follows that labor is the source of scientific thinking and truth.

In the case of human, ethical, and artistic values, the case is more complicated. Lukács made it clear in the chapter entitled "Labour" that the value of every objectification is determined in relation to the goal. The process of determining the relations to the goal involves several selections. As far as man's individual practice is concerned, the criterion of selection is success; in social practice it is utility and worth for all society. (On a higher state of development, this selection is executed by exchange value.) Whether an objectification is suitable or not is determined after relating it to a variety of goal complexes; namely, individual, group, class, national goals, or those belonging to all mankind may be the balance where some objectification is evaluated. The standard for mental assets of a higher order is the development of all mankind or, to use Marx's term, species character.

‘Species character’ has been a widely used and debated category. Some analysts claimed that Marx used it only in his early works, written under the influence of Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach. This view has been proved wrong, as Marx used it repeatedly in the Grundrisse and Theories of Surplus Value, often in important statements about economy and philosophy of history.22 The concept owes its philosophical relevance to the continuity of the development of mankind, to the fact that in the course of class struggles cultures are brought into being not in isolation, but we can witness a progressive development which, in its several stages, precisely as a result of these inward struggles, also gives rise to values that characterize not only the formation in which they emerge and determine not only the norms of the given formation, but, furthermore, have an impact on subsequent developments, too. (Lukács discussed the historically vivid meaning of species character in concrete terms in his analysis of everyday life, class struggle, and the gradually evolving social integrations, in the Prolegomena, the third volume of the Ontology.)23 An example of such key values came into being in the development of all mankind in ancient Roman society: namely, virtue as a moral imperative. Virtue in the Roman sense has outlived the empire and has been integrated into the universal system of ethical values. Or let us think of individualistic love, which appeared between the 11th and 13th centuries and has become an inherent part of the emotional life of subsequent ages. Finally, the values of eminent works of art of different
ages can be revived again and again, especially because they reflect decisive stages in the development of mankind and have, therefore, become part of the self-consciousness of all humanity. The teleological content of these values is constituted by postulates concerning the human species, even if the men who create them are unaware of it (cf. 'they are not aware of it, nevertheless they do it').

Marx, however, described the development of mankind as a process full of contradictions, in which, during its 'prehistory'—that is, in class societies—the evolution of individual values and that of the values of human species in general exclude one another, or coincide only in exceptional individuals. Lukács inferred from this Marxian statement that the evolution of values is also subordinated to the process of alienation in human history. Values, due in part to their inherent tendency to become general, and in part to the fact that individuals cannot appropriate them in a direct and spontaneous way, tend to become abstract mental values. A set of abstract values, which occasionally play a role in individual practice, and without which the individual could not solve his conflicts; nevertheless, they constitute a medium that as such exists independently of the individual, in the form of a relatively independent sphere of objectification: as the 'secondary objectification' of social consciousness. Lukács explored the ontological sources of this sphere of values, finding them in the production of values of the historically determined community. He described the difference between immediate everyday activity and this abstract sphere of values as a constant and potential interplay of the two. (In an aphoristic statement written before the Ontology, Lukács stated that in the world of the 'coercive paths' of bourgeois society, directed by material interests, the individual who wants to remain honest, i.e., abide by ethical norms, must become an athlete of morality. It happens rarely in everyday life, yet in times of crises—revolutions, for instance—it occurs more often. At such junctures, there is greater scope for reviving values or opting for them when it comes time to choose.)

Lukács argued that the idealist theorist of value are mistaken in that they deduce the abstract values from a fictitious, spiritual substance and can conceive of the 'form of being' of the sphere of values only in an ideal form. Alternativity and the integration of values into everyday life therefore remain highly problematic for them. Lukács, on the other hand, described the individual's opportunities to choose among values and, hence, his improvement, as an inherent concomitant of the objective course of socio-historical development. The course of this improvement is hindered and, at times, set back by characteristics of class societies, yet never brought to a standstill. (The individuals explicitly select values at times of social upheavals or special moments in their careers.) Lukács described the dialectic of general historical development and the improvement of the individual—which takes place in a suppressed form—as the interaction of objectification and 'externalization' (the concept referring to the internal enrichment of the individual; Lukács discussed it only in the space of a few pages and has, therefore, left it as a concept to be elaborated.)

Lukács failed to make an exhaustive analysis of the structure and operation of 'secondary objectifications' (norms, the 'afterlife' of ethical and artistic values in the history of mankind, and the unwritten rules of the morality of customs), and the scope of this paper does not allow me to elaborate the theme. Yet the aforementioned passages must have made it clear that certain forms of value guide individual practice 'on pain of destruction'. (In a close-knit community, for instance, the violator of custom can be punished with expulsion. Sociological studies in the United States have proved that such punishment can be seen even today.) When more abstract value norms are violated,
it is conscience or consciousness of guilt that can veto. In that case, the values of the human species are asserted in man’s psyche, though not with a material force. Finally, the most abstract values assert themselves in conflict situations. (When, e.g., an army commander must choose between two bad options: he has to sacrifice a minor unit to save a major one, the latter being essential for the success of the operation.) Lukács did not follow through his analysis of the assertion of these value possibilities, for here, too, he was anxious to study their genesis.

Lukács’s ontological studies of value—sketchy also because he had meant to elaborate certain issues in a planned ethic—leave a problem open. He described, on the one hand, the objectivity of value, the socially reified form of value.

Value does not have its origin in value posit ing [i.e., action], but, instead, in objective reality; from the objective life function of value as the indicator of successful labor, there arise those subjective evaluative reactions which, depending on whether they prove to be successful or mistaken in practice, as a process lead to success or failure.  

In that respect value, even if it is process-like, exists as reification. On the other hand, Lukács repeatedly stressed the alternative of individual action in value posit ing. He declared that it is an ontological fact that man makes his choice in the plural medium of values. This refers per definitionem to both the options of good or bad and the plurality of values. Striving to solve a problem, man is confronted with several value possibilities, which, by and large, have equal chance of success. (An insult can evoke a violent response, sophisticated vengeance, ironic comment, stoic non-response, etc.) Although each of them can solve the problem with roughly the same efficiency, measured on an absolute scale of values, they would fare differently. Lukács discussed two interpretations of the concept of value (value as reified thing and as choice) side by side, apparently to encourage the reader to resolve the dilemma on his own.

Ágnes Heller has developed one of the two interpretations into a systematic theory of values. She contended that value is realized in the selection among values, that is, in preference. As if continuing Lukács’s train of thought quoted above, she elaborated her hypothesis as follows:

The question whether the act of evaluation of the value is the primary category is similar to the paradox about the priority of the hen and the egg. The act of giving preference to one value over another and the result of such selection are two poles of the same process. There is no value without evaluation, and there is no evaluation without value—they emerged simultaneously and have always been in correlation.  

There is a problem wrapped in the issue outlined above. Lukács considered the category of value an ontological fact inseparable from labor and sociality. Since his discussion of sociality remained sketchy, however, it cannot incorporate value categories of a higher order and the modes of their choice and application. For that reason, Lukács was compelled repeatedly to relate the category of value to full-fledged sociality, even though it has a measure of autonomy. The distinction ‘suitable—unsuitable’ can be used adequately only on the level of utility and true or false values, whereas it hardly lends itself to application in the case of ethical and artistic values. Yet this was the very area Lukács strove to characterize. As he put it in the Conversations: “Here, in my opinion, is the ontological origin of what we call value, and from this antithesis of the valuable and not valuable, a completely new category now arises, which is basically what it is in social life that is meaningful or meaningless.” It should be pointed out, however, that meaningful life as a category of value is richer and of a higher order than the
distinction between suitable and unsuitable. The mediations to 'meaningful life' are assured by sociality, class conditions, historical traditions, revolutions, and species development. Heller stressed the importance of these missing mediations. She operated on the assumption that value is an ontologically given ultimate fact of socialization, which does not need to be 'deduced'.

Iván Vitányi has studied the other aspect of value, namely, the interrelationship of utility, economic value, and communal value. Elemér Hankiss has investigated the problem in a pure medium of values, but did not discuss the question of genesis. It is to the philosophical credit of the Ontology that—in response to today's chaos in the realm of values—it has encouraged sociological surveys of value objectifications and value systems, of the ideological background of 'secondary objectifications' (encouraged especially by the chapter "The Realm of Ideas and Ideology"), and the description of the plurality of values. On the other hand, the problem of value positing has been eliminated from philosophical investigations after Nicolai Hartmann's major attempt failed. By shedding light on the being-like nature, genesis, and function of values, and their embeddedness in social practice, Lukács found the missing link of the Marxist theory of value. As Lukács did not live to add the final touches to the Ontology, the draft-like parts readily offer themselves for further elaboration.

The Ontological Structure of Artistic Objectifications

The ontological setup of the theory of art is unique from several standpoints. When years before the Ontology, Lukács was working on his Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, he stated that there is no artistic object without a recipient subject. In art a new form of objectivity arises, which is not identical with either the objectivity of the reality depicted or the physical components of the work of art (e.g., a sculpture is not identical with its material, stone). This objectivity 'carries information' for human subjectivity about the world and mankind. (I am using the term 'subjectivity' in the same sense as Lukács did, i.e., man free from his peculiarities or biases.) A sculpture transcends its physical existence (that, e.g., it is made of stone), if a subject comprehends and appropriates its contentual and formal message, which the sculpture's physical mass only mediates. However, a sculpture is nothing more than a piece of stone until someone goes up to it and senses its 'message'. It is here that the existence of aesthetic objectivity 'depends' on the subject. The role of the recipient subjectivity, the subject who comprehends the 'message' of a work of art is, of course, just one—albeit the most eloquent—of the aspects of the objectivity of a work of art (as it is the existential condition of the latter's objectivity). The same kind of 'dependence' works when the artist creates a world, too: a picture of reality comes into being in the creative mind, and gains objectivity as such, as a 'created world'.

This idea establishes a law of major importance. Lukács's Aesthetic is often regarded as a work that discusses reflection on the basis of 'epistemological' methodology. In poit of fact, however, Lukács, apparently without being fully aware of the ontological interest of his investigations, already superseded the epistemological approach, that is, the confines of bourgeois aesthetic schools, in that work. Aestheticians with an epistemological approach strive to maintain the superiority of object (matter) over consciousness (subject). But as they do not start out from the specific dialectic of subject and object that is characteristic of aesthetic postulation, they are incapable of giving an adequate
description of artistic objectifications. For example, Nicolai Hartmann attempted to overcome this contradiction by stating that works of art are ‘layered’: hence, representation (shaping) ‘covers’ the material layer (stone or paint), which is in turn ‘covered’ by the emotional and rational content. By effecting a radical turn in the relation of subject and object, Lukács resolved the problem in a noteworthy way. He contended that, in art, an ontologically new form of objectivity is called into being, which differs from the natural form of objectivity, in that the recipient subject is a condition of its being and effects, while its internal motor is a mimesis of reality as experienced by mankind. A sculpture has potential being when, for instance, it is deposited in an underground cave, while it has genuine being only if it becomes available to viewers, in the act of reception.

In the case of a literary work, the problem is more complicated. Unlike in the case of a painting or sculpture, here the subject cannot comprehend the work with a single glance. It has to be read until the end, for the work itself is in this ‘text-being’, and it is the world appearing and evolving in the process of reading in the reader’s mind that lends the work its objectivity. A literary work, therefore, does not have the form of objectivity of, for instance, the stone of a statue. The letters in a literary work first dissolve into linguistic mediations, parallel to an internal, subjective reproduction: this process is completed by the understanding of deeper layers of meaning, by the comprehension of the ‘message’ implied by interrelations. Moreover, every reader will picture the world enclosed in the same linguistic medium in different ways. (Every reader’s image of, e.g., Anna Karenina or Adrien Leverkühn is different within, of course, certain limits set by the text, depending on the reader’s structure of mind and his memories.) And reading the same work in different periods, additional meanings and implications also become attached to it as a result of the events of contemporary history; the occurrences of the time in which the recipient lives also shape and color the work, even modifying its accentuations.

Artistic value is created, then, by the subject on the side of both creator and recipient. (By subject I mean, let me repeat, man who has transcended particularity and become sensitivite to the pivotal questions of mankind.) As Lukács once put it, the author/artist ‘rises’ to the level of the history and self-consciousness of the human species. But the meaning of the ascent remained implicit philosophically until he made it possible to render it explicit in the Ontology. Lukács contended there that the ascent is not an extraordinary achievement attainable solely by great personalities. Instead, it is a ‘force motrice’ of human history. There has been, Lukács argued, an incessant endeavor in the course of class struggles throughout the stages of history to assert values of the human species in the life of individual men. Lukács generalized Marx’s concepts of ‘class in itself’ and ‘class for itself’ to depict the process. He introduced the terms ‘species character in itself’, by which he meant a stage in which values for all mankind are created and used, but not yet made conscious; and ‘species character for itself’, where man is aware of these values and strives to assert them in his own life and in those of others. The two stages—more precisely, the evolution of individual values and of those of all mankind—will not coincide until the end of what Marx termed the ‘prehistory’ of mankind. In the meantime, there will be no end of attempts to attain the second stage. As Lukács wrote:

Humanity’s development from the species in itself to the species for itself is a process that takes place in men, ultimately, in every man, insofar as the purely particularist man is transcended by the one in whom [...]
the species for itself strives to prevail [...] The process inevitably materializes in acts of objectification in which man consciously calls into being sociality, perhaps unaware of doing so.35

This is, in Lukács’s view, a suppressed tendency in the history of mankind, which is supposed to find full expression under communism, where individual being and species being for itself become one. The artist (in the broad sense of the word) is an exponent of the endeavor. His works make the striving for ascent conscious, and he is an advocate of the struggle both with his works and in his ego. He is, at the same time, under the influence of the process in everyday life. He is sensitive enough to feel it and find in it encouragement to break with his own shallow, particularist considerations. With this interpretation Lukács stripped away the myth about the special character of artists, and answered the question where the artist borrows those models of conflict in his works in which the protagonists strive for the species for itself. In the Ontology, Lukács outlined the other side of the background of the effect of works of art, namely, the social and being-like conditions on the receiving end of works. The values of the works of "world literature are to be found precisely in the fact," Lukács wrote, "that they elevate human existence to a higher level by enabling man to grasp reality in a more complex manner, and thereby render his personality more individual and at the same time draw him closer to the species character".36

In the Ontology Lukács attempted to answer the reoccurring question how and why works of art of the past lend vital energies to the shaping of the consciousness and practice of subsequent ages. He analyzed the ontological status of the "past"—by which he meant both works of art and past events—and attempted to grasp the particular character of the objectivity of the intangible (past) dimension of time. He came to the conclusion that the present is formed, among other things, by the experiences and accumulated values of the past, and that the man of the present is always 'on the way' to the future. Hence, it follows that the past should not be considered as an aggregate of fixed and unchangeable facts. On the contrary. It is, first, made subject to a constant selection: mankind keeps reinterpreting its own past where emphasis, facts, or values are concerned. Now this, now another element is considered a model. Often long-forgotten things are revived in order to justify a present development. In sum: mankind's picture of the past is not rigid, but rather transformed into ideology, in which selection is performed according to present requirements. Past events are often reinterpreted or even rewritten, depending on the present or the future (set as an aim or desired). (An unfinished historical tendency displays a picture different from that of a finished one, when the fully developed formations are also present; and a retrospective analysis is again more complete—when, at the same time, details are seen in a new light.)37

Individual memory has the same selective nature, but social selection in further motivated by class-related and ideological considerations. It becomes understandable against the background of this ontological peculiarity of the past how complete and almost mythical literary figures, such as Antigone, Don Quixote, or Hamlet undergo untold qualitative transformations. The revitalization has its source in the fact that the past is ontologically there in the present, and that these great artistically constructed types have acquired a quasi-autonomy in social consciousness—people who have not read these works also know them. For that reason, the possibility of the revival of such a type with a new content is, to a certain degree, subject to preformation, which makes its way to the recipient more smoothly. Yet here, too, the ontological fact of the 're-writing' of the past is the philosophical background to the aesthetic phenomenon of reinterpretation.

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Conclusion

There is, perhaps, no conclusion at all. Although I have mentioned just a few problems in Lukács's final work, which he considered a synthesis, I hope to have pointed out that the intellectual substance of the unfinished work is being further developed. In fact, Lukács made it a task of future thinkers to evolve it further. The work has already started, but the bulk of it has yet to be done. The Ontology has been left open to the future.

(Translated by Iván Sellei)

Notes

5 Ibid., III, pp. 44 ff.
6 Ibid., II, pp. 80 ff.
8 Ibid., p. 17.
9 See Lukács’s discussion of works of Nicolai Hartmann in A társadalmi léti ontológiájáról I, pp. 155 ff.
12 Ibid., p. 21.
13 Ibid., p. 47.
14 Ibid., p. 51.
16 Habermas has since evolved the idea into a sociological-philosophical theory: see his Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 2 vols (Frankfurt a. M.: 1981). I referred to his earlier study, for it is closer to Lukács's in time.
17 Jürgen Habermas: Technik und Wissenschaft als "Ideologie" p. 62.
18 Ibid., p. 63.
19 See György Lukács: A társadalmi léti ontológiájáról, III, p. 70.
22 Karl Marx: Grundrisse, p. 243; Theories of Surplus-Value (Moscow: 1975) Part II, pp. 118 ff.
25 "although at first the development of the capacities of the human species takes place at the cost of the majority of human individuals and even classes, in the end it breaks through this contradiction and coincides with the development of the individual; the higher development of individuality is thus only achieved by a historical process during which individuals are sacrificed." Karl Marx: Theories of Surplus-Value, Part II, p. 118.
34 See Nicolai Hartmann: Ästhetik (Berlin: 1953) pp. 84 ff.
36 Ibid., p. 545.
37 Ibid., III., pp. 79—80.
I. Lukács and Problems of Law

It is a little-known fact that György Lukács obtained his first degree in law and political sciences. After his studies in Budapest—and of these we know only that he was a student of Gyula Pikler, who already enjoyed a considerable reputation for his work in philosophy of law, psychology, and ethnology—he took his doctorate in political sciences at the University of Kolozsvár in Transylvania in 1906. His studies here led to his friendship with Bódog Somló, a friendship that was to last for more than ten years. Their relationship came about because it was for Somló, a philosopher of law and a committed bourgeois progressive, that Lukács wrote his thesis, the title and text of which remain unknown to this day. They met and corresponded frequently, the result being that Lukács was one of those who helped prepare the way for the publication in Leipzig of Somló's *Juristische Grundlehre*, the work that brought the latter's lasting fame.

The years spent in Heidelberg before and during the First World War led to new friendships. Above all, I think of Max Weber who, of course, also produced great work in the sociology of law, and was Lukács's chief supporter in the latter's ambitions to acquire a University chair in Heidelberg. Others come to mind, such as Emil Lask, Georg Jellinek, and Hans Kelsen, all of whom had an interest in jurisprudence and had already produced their great pioneering works in both constitutional law and in the philosophy and theory of law. His closest relationship, however, was with Gustav Radbruch, whose lectures he attended as a friend. Their discussions concerning the philosophical premises of Radbruch's philosophy of law, which was then taking on more systematic shape, had such an impact on Radbruch that he dedicated his first work, *Grundzüge der Rechtspolitik*, to Lukács, the man who had encouraged him to publish it.

This list of names is in itself enough to suggest that Lukács, in the most sensitive stage of the formation of his intellectual ego, was able to acquire the neo-Kantian concept of modern formal law from a direct source, i.e. through friendships and debates in Heidelberg. It is well known that these friendly contacts all ceased as a result of Lukács's intellectual change in 1918. But this in no way altered the fact that the basic source of Lukács's theoretical ideas about law remained, to the end, this circle of Heidelberg intellectuals on whom the influence of Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert had been so marked. Whether we think of the early works, i.e. the studies that were written about the time of *History and Class Consciousness*, or *The Destruction of Reason*, or of the *Ontology* itself, the same names crop up, the same works, indeed, the same
quotations, whenever law is discussed. In fact, I could go so far as to say that in the course of time, Lukács's interest in law did not so much broaden as become clearer and more classical: Radbruch and Somló are gradually lost to oblivion, whilst he grasps Weber's and Kelsen's more recent works, in order to acquire a fuller picture of law insofar as it accorded with his own earlier stock of knowledge and experience. (The only significant exception perhaps being The Destruction of Reason, where, for cogent political and ideological reasons, he simply had no alternative but to take cognizance of Carl Schmitt's expositions on the philosophy of law.) This, by and large, covers the sources, influences, and limits of Lukács's legal culture. I could note, by way of supplementation, that Lukács's otherwise unbelievably rich and varied personal library is strikingly bereft of other legal volumes. For the most part, it does not even contain contemporary Hungarian works, which he must certainly have received in this capacity as a member of the Academy.

My remarks are slowly beginning to revolve around the question of what kind of relationship with problems of law Lukács actually had. Briefly, I can say that he did not espouse the discipline of law of his own volition. It appears that he chose to study law and political sciences for want of anything better, and it was, of course, in line with the general practice of the day. Even in his relationship with Somló, it was presumably the attraction to the radical bourgeois thinker that was the dominant factor, just as with Radbruch it was not so much the lawyer that attracted him as the conscious pacifist in times of war, in whom social conscience was extraordinarily well-developed. And during the Heidelberg years, those philosophers of law were not isolated figures, but rather situated in a circle of philosophers, sociologists, historians, etc. who were of a similar grand stature. I could include amongst them such persons as Marie-Luise Gothein or Ernst Troeltsch.

To put it briefly, then, Lukács was not very interested in law as law. It is generally known that in his work in the field of literary criticism, too, what primarily interests him in the work in question is not so much the literary creation itself as its political-social environment or, more precisely, the picture of this environment presented by the creative work. In the majority of Lukács's expositions, law really has a purely illustrative role. It is frequently just a case of returning, for example, to the neo-Kantian opposition of pure morality to pure legality, whereby he always points to the necessity of transcending this opposition but, in the absence of any detailed analysis, hardly ever manages more than a merely verbal solution. However, when he found it useful for some other purpose, he made copious use of law as a means of illustration.

The most classical example is to be found in the study "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat", published in History and Class Consciousness in 1924. After the collapse of the Hungarian Council Republic, which had held out the promise of being the Day of Judgment, he erected a monument to the movement, a monument that depicts the moribund present as a negative Utopia. Here this present is characterized by the aspiration to predictability, formal rationalization and, in order to achieve the latter, the alienation from human qualities and the disruption of natural processes. The outcome of all this is reification in the Hegelian sense, a concept, which, however, is distorted by Lukács into alienation understood in the Marxian sense. Thus, modern formal law is identified with capitalist law, the transcending of which was demanded by the socialist revolution. So the negative Utopia leads to a positive one, i.e. the dramatized conception of the present leads to the vision of a socialism which does not even know or recognize socialism in its specific, technically constructed, and bureaucratically
guided institutional structure. This practical legal nihilism, which Lukács, setting out from ideological presuppositions, embraced even as late as the mid-twenties, tallies neither with the Soviet reality of the time, nor with the aim of the Hungarian Council Republic to build a legal system, in one hundred and thirty-three days, endeavors in which Lukács himself played an active part as a commissar in the revolutionary government.6

As far as the contrast between formal legal enactment and practical legal enforcement is concerned, extremely important statements of principle are to be found in the pages of The Destruction of Reason as well. I mention this here since all this is occasioned for Lukács by the circumstance that the path taken by Carl Schmitt led from sociology to fascism. At the same time, it is characteristic of Lukács’s primarily ideological-critical viewpoint that his conclusion was not dictated at all by a calculation based on principle and concept but by the political and ideological context of the attitudes treated. So the Lukácsian reaction was different when Schmitt formulated a theoretical thesis as a critique of neo-Kantianism in general, and different again when he used this same thesis in 1934 to justify the brutal liquidation of Ernst Röhm’s Sturmbteilung, the S.A.7 8

Thus, Lukács’s attitude toward legal problems is, at root, determined by the fact that, for Lukács, the prevailing total context remains the decisive factor, i.e. in the field of social-political events, the question of the power that fundamentally directs these relations. When formulating policy, however, he does come up against the law, although this does not go beyond the bounds of the occasional. Consequently, in these expositions, law always figures as the combination of more powerful entities (as an instrument of politics), and Lukács is interested precisely in the context of these larger entities and not in the specific inner world and workings of the law.

As for his starting-point, not even the exposition on The Ontology of Social Being goes beyond such a level of interest. Still, in it the sketch of legal problems assumes a radically different aspect. A decisive question in the Ontology concerns the character of social mediation: it presumes a specific functioning of relatively autonomous complexes of being and is constructed in an unprecedented fashion. Lukács could not have found a better example than law, for it is at one and the same time a formally independent structure and yet organically integrated into social activities. So now law does not appear simply in its functional subordination to the prevailing totality (politics, economy, etc.), but precisely (1) in its enacted nature and in its specific inner working according to its own normative postulates, and (2) in the dialectical contradiction that breaks through the logic of its specific workings in the course of its practical implementation, and by means of a number of manipulations pushes towards practical solutions, which then result in compromise solutions.

II. On the Ontology in General

The final version of the Ontology has been passed down to us in typescript form, corrected in the author’s hand. Although the text is complete, it is still a fragment. The three volumes are not constructed consecutively, but rather express the author’s ideas in parallel. Their edition in this form is not the outcome of Lukács’s original conception but is rather the result of his death before completion of the work. Thus it is not simply the possibility of contradictions and changes of emphasis within it that is of interest,
but chiefly the circumstance that the author's illness compelled him to complete the manuscript in such a hurry that he had insufficient time fully to marshal his arguments and organize the network of conceptual and other interrelationships into a well-proportioned, rounded system. So far, the full text of the German work has only appeared in Hungarian and Italian translations (a German edition is in preparation, in English only three chapters have been published, less than one fifth of the whole text); however, philosophers in Hungary and in the scholarly world, apart from academic criticism bearing on the manuscript itself, have still not treated it with philological and critical rigor. They have merely taken appreciative cognizance of it.

In order to develop the Ontology's view of law in conjunction with a number of basic questions, I must sketch out some methodological reflections and category definitions that decisively determine the direction and character of Lukács's thoughts on law and their place in his system of thought. With this in mind, I am, of course, unable to aspire to completeness or logically sufficient consistency here.

(1) According to Lukács, the relationship between the ontological and the epistemological approach is determined by the fact that social existence is only acquired by a phenomenon if it actually exerts an influence on its environment and performs an actual function. Since social events take place with the prevailing consciousness of individuals, active in society, in the medium of the objectifications of consciousness being reproduced in society and with the interacting of their organizing influence, the various structures, ideologies, etc. of consciousness play an active role, independently of whether they turn out to be true or not. The assessment of phenomena as reflections, therefore, the evaluation of their reflective adequacy, does not lead to an understanding of the actual influence they exert. Indeed, the opposite is the case: the analysis of the reciprocal influences at work in social processes can lead us to a revelation of the role of factors of consciousness participating in these processes, their true or false content, indeed, the socially presumed facticity of their true or false content.

(2) The ontological approach thus does not simply comprise the search for connections, but the recognition that these connections can only be understood within the prevailing totality, as elements of the latter. Thus the world cannot be constructed from nothing but a stack of constituent components, for it is precisely the prevailing totality, the overall social-historical movement, that provides the inquiring intelligence with the basis for its separation into components and for the demonstration of their specificity. Lukács's adherents and critics agree on one point. It is that the methodological claim to the totality approach accompanies the whole Marxist phase of Lukács's career. To quote the powerful formulation given in the Ontology:

the total context of the complex in question takes precedence over its individual constituents. The latter can only be understood from their concrete interaction within the complex of being involved, whilst it would be futile for us to try theoretically to reconstruct the complex of being itself from its constituents.10

(3) By attempting to separate the individual components from the movement of the prevailing totality, from the reciprocal influences taking place within it, and to determine the position and function they occupy in the totality and further to determine the specific quality of their movement, the totality approach makes possible the historically concrete dialectical interpretation of the individual categories. This is, for Lukács, the often-voiced hope and possibility of the tertium datur, the third possibility of a good choice between two evils, which avoids forcing all social processes into the Procrustean bed
of an abstract, *a priori* conceptual-systematic hierarchy, and which avoids all the vulgar Marxist explanations which endeavor to replace dialectical philosophical analysis with a mechanical construction relying on some fundamental categories.

(4) One of the most important categories in Lukács's work is that the ontology of complexes treats the prevailing reality, i.e. the total complex, as a complex consisting of complexes. This novelty in approach is far reaching to such an extent that it appears simply to replace the Marxian category of social relationships. But if we look at it more closely, it transpires that it is not a question of recasting the latter. The total complex consists of complexes which are themselves complexes of part-complexes. Thus, reality is made up of the reciprocal influence of various kinds of composite structures, a reciprocal influence in which the quality of the individual complexes is derived from their relative autonomy, but whose direction and parameters are fixed by the interplay of these structures as realized in the total complex. It can easily be seen that we are here dealing with the question of the ontological expression of the totality approach, an expression in which reality is none other than the concrete totality of the movement of the part-complexes as given at any time. Unfortunately, Lukács did not provide a definition of the category 'complex'; neither did he bother to separate it theoretically from social relationships. Without going into their analysis in any greater detail, I must nevertheless mention the following characteristics: the ontology of the complexes is based on the dialectic of interactions within the given totality; their existence is characterized by their irreversibly progressing continuity; they embrace all objectivations brought about in the course of man's social praxis, as well as all subjects that cannot be separated from these, and effect and reproduce the objectivations in question; or, in other words, features and definitions that barely fit into the category of social relationship with conceptual rigor.

(5) Returning to Marx, Lukács asserts that categories are nothing but forms of defined existence, determinations of existence; and existence is identical with irreversibly progressing process-like continuity. To quote Lukács's expression: "existence is composed of the endlessly reciprocal relations of continually progressing complexes, relations, which, both in their parts and (relative) totalities result in concrete, irreversible processes." 11

(6) Since existence essentially means self-reproduction, and since this is increasingly accomplished under conditions that are absent from nature but brought about by men themselves in the course of their social praxis, Lukács attributes pivotal importance to the phenomenon of socialization. This means that, in the reproduction of social existence, purely social relations, mediations, and determinations increasingly come to the fore. Social complexes turn into increasingly complicated structures, so that their relative autonomy continues to grow, the specificity of their functioning becomes more marked, and their reciprocal interactions lead to syntheses creating interconnections of a more and more composite nature, which then not merely enhance the cohesive powers of the social, but bring in their wake the growth of unforeseen consequences.

(7) It is clear from the category of mediation what kind of processes socialization accelerates. The former is an extraordinarily general category in Lukács's work. In general, it can be said that mediation is a continuous medium in which the interaction of the complexes is effected. When I talk of socialization and of reciprocal interactions growing more complicated, we must think of their network as being so intricate that that which is mediating itself becomes mediated. In a highly socialized existence, mediation is so mediated that, not only do unidirectional and extreme determinations fall

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outside its dialectic, but a variety of intermediary forms mediate in such a way that, in the process, they themselves, in their reciprocal interactions with other complexes, will be mediated.

(8) Lukács saw the model of all human activity in the basic ontological structure of labor. In labor he formulated the possibility of the transfer from natural existence to social one, precisely through the dialectical and mutually dependent relation of teleological and purely causal processes. "On the one hand, teleology is only possible under the dominance of causality, while on the other hand new objects, forms and connections arise in society only as a consequence of teleological projects." As is shown by the example of the wheel, the teleological projection is able to project onto reality new connections that are not given in and cannot be spontaneously developed from it, and which are then realized by bringing causal progressions into motion, in such a way however, that, in line with their specific workings, they tend to exceed the original projection and, in the end, produce more than, or something different from what was the original intention. If we regard the act of labor from the point of view of mediation and socialization, it is immediately apparent what universally significant changes are brought by the development Lukács had in mind. For in the elementary act of labor, the ontological project is immediately related to labor activity. However, with socialization, all further mediating projects are wedged in between them, all the more clearly with the formation of purely social (economic, political, religious, moral, legal, etc.) structures, the object of whose specific projects is another project, which is itself only mediating in the series streching between the project of the act of labor and its actual implementation.

III. The Relevance of the Ontology for Marxist Legal Thought

The significance of the Ontology's view of law can only be truly evaluated if we see it together with the role that it proves itself capable of performing in the present development of Marxist legal thinking.

Nowadays it is almost a banality to assert that the intellectual preparation of socialist revolutions did not demand the elaboration of a genuinely legal theory of Marxism. The overriding point of a revolution is to seize power, and this, as one can see, for example, from Lenin's The State and Revolution and from his lecture "On the State", only leads to raising problems concerning the state. At the same time, the ascendant stage of the victorious revolution was already fostering a flood of ideas and, thereby, a certain utopianism. The first Soviet attempts at a theory of law by P. Stutshka, M. Reisner and E. B. Pashukanis followed upon each other in such a way that at first, hoping for the imminent withering away of law, they annihilated law; then they rated it as a transitional phenomenon, the bourgeois remnant par excellence; eventually they recognized the simultaneous existence of socialism and law, although they only understood it as a kind of forced co-tenancy. With the consolidation of the socialist revolution, it clearly became necessary to go beyond these concepts and to lay the theoretical foundation of socialism's specific constitutional and legal arrangements. However, as a result of the historical peculiarity of Soviet development, this task coincided with the coming to power of Stalin and the methods and structure termed by the later party critics the "personality cult", and became the expression, composite and also theoretically heterogeneous, of
these two tendencies. This is the trend that the literature of today calls socialist normativism.\textsuperscript{15} As far as its essentials are concerned, it did not go far beyond the theoretical formulation of prevailing legal policy, based on the requirement for a smoothly operating and centralized legal apparatus designed for the practical implementation of prevailing central political decisions. Correspondingly, it made a strict notional and institutional distinction between law-making and law-application, and for the description of legal phenomena and their workings it paradoxically relied on the exclusive, formal concepts of legal validity, legality, and law and order, not allowing the question of sociological point of view to be posed at all.

The first to attempt a critique of A. Y. Vyshinsky's normativism\textsuperscript{16} was A. Stalgevitsh.\textsuperscript{17} Then, with the integration of legal relationships into the very concept of law around the time of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, the work of S. F. Ketshekyan and A. Piontkovsky is to be mentioned.\textsuperscript{18} However, it took a long time before there was any progress in the theoretical field, and this did not come until the acknowledgement of the sociological point of view, on the one hand,\textsuperscript{19} and the social-theoretical renewal of Marxist legal philosophy, on the other.\textsuperscript{20}

The least I can say, therefore, is that Lukács's \textit{Ontology} came along at the very best time for the development of Marxist legal theory. It provided the philosophical-methodological basis and lent momentum to tendencies that were, from the very beginning, latent in the aforementioned efforts at progress.

\textit{IV. The Ontology's Concept of Law}

As can be seen from the tremendous variety of cross-references and interconnecting analyses, but most coherently from the chapter in the volume \textit{The Most Important Problems} concerning "Reproduction", the \textit{Ontology}'s approach to law points in the direction of an incredibly broad and ramified spectrum of problems. In the following I shall attempt to introduce the most important of these with reference to a number of fundamental questions.

(1) For Lukács it is the most general of conclusions that law is, above all else, a practical category, and, as such, must be treated primarily ontologically and not epistemologically. In the final analysis it is praxis itself that is its judge. As far as law is concerned, any question raised and any view held, ultimately hinges on the answer to the following question: Does it prove capable of functioning? If so, from the ontological approach, the criterion of whether or not a given phenomenon is to be qualified as law cannot be purely internal, defined by the law itself. In other words, the question, "what is law?" is, in the final analysis, not decided by its being formally enacted or postulated as a law, but rather, by its practical realization as such.

(2) The character of the practical realization of law and also of the significance of socialization is most eloquently highlighted by the dialectic of the use of force as one of the vehicles of the specificity of the mediating role of law. In other words, according to Lukács, the legal organization of society represents the admission of a contradiction whereby the ultimate guarantee of the integrity of society is invariably naked force, although it is impossible for society to be based exclusively on it. To this extent, law is the medium of the homogenization of divergent interests, which helps the "constant facticity" of coercion to turn into a "predominantly latent possibility".\textsuperscript{21}
This social contradiction is expressed in the internal contradictoriness of the construction of law as well. The rules of law are formulated in such a way that, in the event of their not being observed, formally, full sanctions should follow. In contrast to this formal project, in practice, the rules can still only be maintained for as long as the necessity of these sanctions actually being applied arises exceptionally, against a mere fragment of society. Thus, coercion is necessary. But since it is impossible to rely on it alone, it only serves as an ultimate guarantee. At the same time, this ultimate guarantee can only be applied against an otherwise insignificant minority.

The paradoxical consequence is that law can only exercise any influence at all if its rules are, at least in an external way, observed 'voluntarily' and on a mass scale. Such a mass scale and spontaneously 'voluntary observance' of the law, however, is only possible as long as a number of other institutional and ideological factors that move in the same direction as the law also exercise an influence. This has two further consequences for theoretical generalization. First, the fulfilment of the mediating function of the legal complex is by no means independent: it depends on the ultimately identical stimulation of the total movement of the total complex. Secondly, what the strictly juridical viewpoint is inclined to regard as "law-observance", i.e. the practical effect and realization of the law, is, in the majority of cases, none other than a summation of the total movement of the total complex, including a great variety of non-legal influences (political, economic, religious, moral, etc.). This is a summation whose only legal feature is that, externally, it fulfils, i.e. conforms with, the law. Therefore, the numerical growth of patterns of behavior evaluated as being positive from the point of view of the law can in itself in no way be equated with any growth in the influence of law.

(3) It follows from the methodological basis of the Ontology that, in its social existence, the legal complex must also be regarded as an irreversibly progressing process. However important a vehicle of independent functions law-making becomes as an unavoidable sign of socialization, it cannot basically alter the position that it occupies within the legal complex. For the relationship between the making and the application of law is always historically concretely determined; correspondingly, a changing yet definite balance between them must always evolve. Thus their relationship is based on the dialectic of a contradictory unity, which also includes, as its inevitable components, legal objectivation and its actual practical functioning. This is synonymous with the assertion that, ontologically, law-making cannot be isolated from the application of law, for the actual practical working of the law continues to be the vehicle of the function of the legal complex as a whole. In the actual practical exertion of influence, however, law-making plays a mediating role, too, for its primary task is to ensure that the legal solution of social conflicts be effected, directed into the appropriate channels, and standarized to the highest degree possible and desirable.

Ontologically, a legal enactment can be assessed to the extent that it leads to practical influence. Whether we think of classical principles of the rule of law (nullum crimen sine lege in criminal law or the parliamentary mandate in the fixing of taxes), or whether we think of the question of human rights, which is being raised with unprecedented urgency nowadays, it is obvious that we can hardly overestimate the importance of the mere existence of written rules. And still less may we underestimate the truth of the statement that they can be ontologically evaluated and fulfil an actual function only in the totality of the legal complex, i.e., when its norm-structures are realized in practice.

It is also a consequence of this complexity of law that, when talking of the class character and continuity of the law as a superstructure, it is an inadmissible simplifica-
tion to relate the formulation of questions not to the legal complex in its workings, but merely to its individual forms of objectivation, for example, to the individual norm-structures.

(4) Traditionally, Marxist literature treats law, the system of enacted norm-structures, mostly as the reflection of social relationships. Then, however, it often remains unclear whether or not it is a question of reflection in the epistemological sense.

Lukács related every element of goal-setting to the cognition of reality, although it did not follow, for him, that cognition was mixed up with the teleological project. Quite to the contrary: here it is a question, as he puts it, of "two heterogeneous types of approach to reality".22 Heterogeneity means incongruence; and with incongruence, as in Marx's examples of the incongruence between property relationships and their legal conception, congruence is, in principle, impossible.23

Lukács's resolute position does not in the least, of course, affect the truth of the fact that every activity of consciousness expresses a living reciprocity with reality. If I make reflection a general category that transcends epistemological meaning, then I am merely establishing the materialist Weltanschauung, which, in connection with existence and consciousness, properly refers to the preponderant element, but is not capable of specifying the peculiar nature and content of the structures of consciousness. In this very general sense, one can also understand the teleological project, e.g. the legal norm-structure, as a reflection. Nevertheless, I must add that the ontological specificity of these types of reflection is precisely that they cannot be grasped epistemologically.

The creative character of legal enactment is already revealed at the level of the individual norm. With its goal-project, the norm projects into reality a connection that was not given in it and could not spontaneously have been developed in it. Seconded, the goal-project is only present in the legal norm in a latent form. In the definition of the conduct that the legislator considers instrumental and appropriate to the realization of the goal in question, it is no longer formulated. Thirdly, in order that the legal norm should, in an exclusively relevant way, define this behavior conceptually and, on this basis, make the qualification of real patterns of behavior irrefutable, it describes the instrumental behavior in its external features and in such a way as can be discerned from the formal assessment of the facts of the case. This one-sidedness leads to the opposition of legality and morality, to the possibility of legal correctness being associated with extreme hypocrisy.24 Fourthly, the description of instrumental behavior becomes a legal norm when the legislator imposes a defined sanction in the event of its being proven or not proven.

Legal norms, however, do not exist independently of each other; they are established as organized into a system with each other. The creation of a coherent, consistent, and contradiction-free system assumes, at the time that the individual norm is formulated, a further detachment that is heightened still more by its interpretation as a component of the system and shares its prevailing spirit. In the shaping of the system, a role is played by purely practical considerations, colored by professional traditions. It is "an abstract and conceptual homogenizing manipulation [...] of reality", the accomplishment of which at a given moment "is not anchored in social reality itself but only in the will of the ruling class to arrange social praxis according to its intentions".25

If I am to apply Lukács's analysis to the historical changes in the legal concept of things,26 then in the end I have to come to the following conclusion: the legal concept is a fiction of reality. In essence, the question of which content one attributes to which legal concept is a conventional one. One cannot treat it as a scientific concept that is
in itself a reflection of reality. It should rather be treated as a conventional idea, e.g., as the axiom of an axiomatic system produced as a conceptual construction, which directly reflects itself and, through itself, the theoretical and practical considerations concealed behind its emergence, and not the exterior reality. In other words, in the historical changes of the content of the legal concept it is not, in the final analysis and in the long term, the claim to an epistemologically adequate reflection that is decisive, but the fact that the concept, organized within the context of a given system as a practical instrument, is expected to contribute to the actual functioning of the legal complex.

(5) Every complex in the service of social regulation exhibits a specific internal contradiction in its functioning. As an instrument of mediation and in its relationship to other complexes, it can obviously play only an instrumental and subordinate role. At the same time, its mediating task has to do enough formally to assert its own laws in the process. That is, "the social task requires for its fulfilment a system whose criteria, at least in a formal sense, can neither be derived from the task itself nor from its material foundation, but must be specific, internal and immanent". 27 It is the technical-organizational consequence of what I have termed an incongruence in section (4).

The formally formulated requirement for a specific system for fulfilment receives a greater emphasis in the case of law than in case of other devices for social regulation. And this, of course, is natural: the most polarized conflicts of societal interest are, in the final analysis, settled by the law, by the use of institutionalized coercion, by means of a mediation that is accomplished by the extraordinarily ramified organizational apparatus, set in motion as dictated by legal norms. Thus, when law is described ontologically, one cannot ignore the question of how its actual operation can be reconciled with satisfying its specific system for fulfilment, i.e. with the principle of lawfulness, legality, and the rule of law.

The dilemma of actual functioning and/or rule of law is not an artificially extreme posing of the question; it springs from the quintessence of law itself. Incidentally, it is suggested by the totality approach. For we have to recognize, at one and the same time, the ultimate determination by the total complex and the heterogeneity of the legal complex within this determination.

Translated into the language of law, this is a self-contradictory requirement that finds expression in the duality of legal enactment analysed above. Namely: law attempts to achieve the realization of the originally set social-political goal in such a way that, in the process, it realizes itself, i.e. through its own instrumental, teleological project; for the observance of the rule of law is an official and formal requirement, made of the functioning of law.

But one cannot forget that this is a principle that only operates within the legal complex. It is socially desirable, on the one hand, and of purely instrumental significance in the relationship between the total process and the legal complex, on the other. Ontologically, this means that the principle of the rule of law is itself mediatory and not of a determining effect. In case of extreme situations, the specific system for fulfilment embedded within the legal context can in no way prevent the total process from eventually crushing purely legal principles in order to enforce directly social determinations. The observance of the principle of rule of law depends, therefore, on the extent to which it enjoys the general support of the social total process. Within this basic definition, the question of what degree of socialization society has attained, or to what degree the relative autonomy of the legal complex is developed, can only be considered a subsidiary factor.
(6) The possibility of a confrontation between actual functioning and the principle of rule of law also raises the possibility of a duality in their ideological reflection.

Lukács, retracing the steps of Max Weber, accepts the historical appearance of the claim to predictability and the fact that this created a formal rationality in all areas of social organization. In the *Ontology*, unlike in *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács does not evaluate formal rationalization as a specific sign of capitalist development. Indeed, discussing all this in the context of socialization, he comes to the clear-cut conclusion that it is a component of development, one that is universal and points even beyond socialism. Formal rationalization assumes a particular type of formation and implementation of the legal norm-system. It is, above all, necessary to regard law as a regulating power, sufficient into itself. Secondly, it is necessary to take the organization of the system of legal norms to its logical end. Thirdly, in order to satisfy its specific system for fulfilment, it is necessary to conceive of its implementation as a logically determined operation.

An ontological examination demonstrates that all this is an illusion. But it is an illusion that has its source in the ontological essence of the phenomenon, because a real social claim stands behind it.

The ephemeral transition between illusion and reality can also be observed in the case of one of the most basic organizing concepts of law, validity. Validity is the concept by aid of which we distinguish between what is to be considered legal or non-legal. Formal rationalization also formalized the concept of validity; as a result, the legal complex became formally differentiated from all other complexes. Validity determines what is to be treated as belonging to the legal system; its acceptance as an axiom is, therefore, a natural starting-point for any sort of preoccupation with the law, be it theoretical or practical. Validity, however, is only an organizing principle within the legal complex. Thus it shares all the illusory and conditional features that I have established concerning the logical organization and working of law. It is breached by the *de jure* invalid practice of state organs (which is nevertheless *de facto* enforced as permanent legal practice) in just the same way as it is breached by revolution. Therefore, it can be evaluated ontologically only to the extent that it is associated with effectiveness in the actual process of mediation. To put it another way: effectiveness defines the circle within which validity can be at all intelligibly propounded.28

Earlier, I have suggested that law, as a specific object, presumes its own specific conserving-implementing-reproducing subject, i.e. the qualified and specialized profession of lawyers. Lawyers also have, ontologically speaking, a necessarily dualistic relationship to law. On the one hand, they operate and reproduce it as a system of norm-structures and, on the other, they are the vehicle of, and, in their own professional praxis, realize optimally, the ideology that I call the jurist’s world view.

To describe the whole process once again: as the natural concomitant of socialization, law has to emerge as a mediating complex of being. Its relative autonomy has to be unravelled; the social goals that it serves must be achieved through the realization of its own instrumental projects. To this end its specific system must be formalized. And finally, the claim of the rule of law must be developed as an internal operative principle, guaranteeing the possibility of formal control. Formally, therefore, law appears as a closed structure, feeding on itself, sufficient unto itself, and moving according to its own workings. For a while, i.e., in his early years, there is no doubt for Lukács that this not only raises the problem of subsumption, but also generates specific discrepancies. For the ultimate determinant is the conflict of class interests, and logical subsump-
tion is only deposited on it as a phenomenal form. Logic is in this way exposed as an illusion, although this only affects it in the function of the determination. It is not the illogicality, and still less the alogicality, of reality that crops up behind the logical illusion. First, in law, systematic and logical consistency is not an uncovered requirement, but is really an aspiration to optimal effectiveness. Secondly, if its self-assertion meets with obstacles, then this merely means that the content contexts come to the forefront instead of the purely formal ones. Thirdly and finally, the specific logic of law is not eliminated here, since it exercises a controlling function to the very end.

Lukács's ontological rigor is startling for traditional ways of thinking because it retains law, in the final analysis, as an object of action rather than as its director:

The operation of positive law is based on the following method: to manipulate a maelstrom of contradictions in such a way that the result is not only a unified system but one that is capable of regulating contradictory social occurrences practically and with a tendency towards the optimal, and also of moving flexibly between [... antinomic poles, in order to produce and influence the decisions of social praxis, most favorable for this society at any given time, in the course of the constant shifts of balance within a class rule that is changing more or less slowly. It is clear that this requires a very special manipulative technique, and this is sufficient explanation of the fact that this complex can only reproduce itself if society continually produces the requisite specialists (from judges and barristers to policemen and executioners).

According to traditional usage, manipulation means an unlawful operation performed with or within the law. With Lukács, however, it becomes a category lacking any such valuation: it signifies the practical medium that guarantees the social existence of the legal complex: its irresolutely progressing continuity. In his letter to Conrad Schmidt, written on 27 October 1890, Engels already raised the possibility of an antagonism between the economy and law, the critical situation in which the economy and law confront each other and in which the question of which one of them will temporarily be subordinate to the other is one of total determination. With Lukács, it is not the recognition of the possibility of such an antagonism that is the new element, but rather the uninterrupted sequence of diverse intermediary paths of this antagonism as the basic ontological characteristic of the actual workings of law. Accordingly, the practical life of law is the continuous practical manipulation of the legal norm-system, which first recasts social conflicts and turns them into conflicts within the law and then, complying with the formal requirements of the principle of the rule of law, refines them into illusory conflicts. It is not in any way necessary for this to be spectacular in day-to-day legal routine. In individual cases, it can be overlooked, indeed, it can even be unrecognizable. It assumes no more than what is desired by a mediation of the social movement via a static objectivation. The components of the process can still add up to significant changes in direction. As Lukács notes: "Naturally, at certain primitive stages the deviation might be quite minimal, but it is quite certain that the whole of human development depends on such minimal displacements."

The withering critique by Marx and Engels of the juristic world view in The German Ideology and elsewhere was directed at the alleged autonomy of the legal complex and demonstrated the superiority of the total determination. As an ideological critique, it therefore fulfilled its role, although it did not provide an ontological explanation. Yet the particularity of the problem is concealed in the fact that the legal complex not only develops its relative autonomy but, by virtue of its formalization, is expected to institutionalize operational principles and a corresponding professional ideology that allows the legal complex to appear as autonomous. To put it another way: the task of the legal profession is to recognize and solve real social conflicts. At the same time, however,
these must be brought to expression not in their dialectic diversity and constant flux, but in the closed conceptual stock of the valid legal enactments and in a rigid, homogenizing fashion. It is not the task of lawyers to reflect reality in its own multifariousness, but to assess it as the realization or non-realization of one of the formally predefined facts that constitute a case. Thus their professional ideology invites them to grasp reality through the filter of this specifically distinct system and to influence it by keeping to the internal operation principles of the system.

At the same time, the jurist is fully aware of the ontological status of his own existence and knows that his ideology suggests illusions and requirements that cannot be verified epistemologically. A sort of dualistic consciousness comes about which could be called double talk. It is not a glossing over of this duality, but rather, the awareness of it that makes the jurist someone who has a conscious and active influence on social processes. The source of this recognition is that the duality in question is rooted not in the professional ideology, but in the internal contradiction existing within the instrument at the disposal of the lawyer. This is the reason why he must be in the service of both society and the law: to serve law in such a way that he is simultaneously serving society.35

V. Lessons for a Marxist Theory

In Lukács's life work, the ontological analyses of legal phenomena owe their specific color to two circumstances. For one thing, Lukács was possessed of a definite legal erudition, which made him capable of displaying the appropriate sensitivity vis-à-vis the internal movement of law and its workings. For another, he obtained this erudition without ever having come into direct touch with the legal profession. He was in no way influenced by the ideology of the jurist's profession, he was not affected by prevailing official legal policy requirements, he was able to analyze law rigorously and with the cool detachment and objectivity of the thinker who was on the outside and yet sensitive to its problems. Thus the totality approach of his Ontology came together with impulses which made him see law not through the embellishing filter of the normative Ought-elements of the whole structure of law, but in its practical realization and actual functioning.

In conclusion I should like to sum up the numerous issues that Lukács's work raises for Marxist legal thinking in a single question: is due distinction made between Marxist legal theory, which aims at being a general, social-scientific theory of law, and socialist theory of law, which is called upon to provide law in socialist societies with a theoretical foundation in accordance with social requirements and principles of legal policy? I suppose that the only answer that I may formulate in line with the Lukácsian methodological stand is that Marxist legal theory can only become a general theory of law (1) if it assesses the present as a transitional and particular product of development (the historical view); (2) if it sees the variety of socialist legal set-ups and arrangements on the European continent as one of many developmental alternatives, as historically concretely issuing from the conditions and peculiarities of the respective countries and from the international impetuses of the past and present under the pressure of which they were to develop (the comparative approach); and finally, (3) if it describes the actual movement of law and its workings, and not its purely desired and/or formally enacted principles (the sociological analysis).
In the absence of any such differential thesis, it is not guaranteed that the evaluation of law at the level of the total complex and its approach within the legal complex leads to an adequate theoretical synthesis. In consequence of powerful professional and ideological restrictions, it easily runs the risk of becoming not a theory of law so much as a theory of an ideal type of law, which views any divergence from what is accepted as desirable not as the objective characteristic of actual functioning but as a negligible defect which, it is believed, can be eliminated by a stroke of the pen.36

Notes

1 Felix Somló: Juristische Grundlehre (Leipzig: 1917).
4 See, within the context of a case-study, Miklós Lackó: “Politika, kultúra, realizmus—Lukács György a 100% idősszakában” [Politics, culture, realism—György Lukács in the period of the periodical 100%] Új Írás, XVIII (1978) 2, pp. 87 and 93.
9 See, e.g. Ferenc Fehér, Ágnes Heller, György Márkus and Mihály Vajda: “Notes on Lukács’s Ontology”, Telos (Fall 1976) No. 29.
22 Lukács: Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins, p. 36.
25 Ibid., p. 218.

Lukács: Marx’s Basic Ontological Principles, pp. 126—27.


Holz, Kofler and Abendroth: Conversation with Lukács, p. 18.


For the author’s attempts at interpreting Lukács in a jurisprudential context, a kind of synthesis is given in his The Place of Law in Lukács’ World Concept (Budapest: 1985). As to the Ontology, his previous publications include “The Concept of Law in Lukács’ Ontology”, Rechtstheorie, X (1979) 3 and “Towards a Sociological Concept of Law: An Analysis of Lukács’ Ontology”, International Journal of the Sociology of Law, IX (1981) 2, the present essay being a thoroughly revised version of the latter. On the sole basis of the Lukácsian methodological thought, without any textual analysis, a systematic exposition is being essayed in “Towards the Ontological Foundation of Law: Some Theses on the Basis of Lukács’ Ontology”, Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto, LX (1983) 1 and also in Filosofia del derecho y problemas de filosofía social: Memoria del X Congreso mundial ordinario de filosofía del derecho y filosofía social, coord. J. L. Curiel B., vol. X (México: 1984).
Problems of Religion and Irrationalism in György Lukács's Life and Work

by

József Lukács

At a cursory glance it may seem as though delving into the problematic of religion and religiosity was not a concern of particular significance in the œuvre of György Lukács. And indeed, although Lukács wrote an important work on the destruction of reason, and devoted profound critical analyses to the interrelationship of religion, art, and science, as well as to the nature of religious utopias, the fundamental orientation of his œuvre was under the auspices of positive categories as, for instance, totality, history, realism, dialectics, the characteristics of artistic reflection, labor, reproduction, and the social alternatives.

When, however, instead of looking at the titles of chapters in Lukács's books, we consider the course of his intellectual development, the seminal importance of the question of religion is bound to emerge. In the first place, the precondition of Lukács's conversion to Marxism-Leninism was his efforts to acquire the Marxist scientific approach to problems and Marxist consciousness, shedding the naive and belief-like interpretation of the most important questions of world view and, later on, of socialism. Secondly, as Lukács was a committed advocate of the revolutionary working-class movement, he considered it imperative to subject the irrationalism of the era of imperialism to radical criticism, and, just like Marx, he regarded the sagacious and competent analysis of religion as a key precondition of all social criticism.

To avoid any misunderstanding: he could differentiate between entering into a political alliance with the religious representatives of progress, and assessing the ideology that these personalities stood for. On the one hand, he rejected the convergence of Marxism and religious belief and, on the other hand, he appreciated that, for example, Simone Weil, a religious thinker, had an affinity with the left wing. Such an attitude on Lukács's part could only be the result of the full recognition of the lessons of a strenuous life, one that György Lukács devoted to the struggle against the inhumanity of capitalism and the creation of mankind's genuine history: socialism and communism.

It will be recalled that, as early as 1905, the young Lukács was profoundly aware of the crisis of a decadent bourgeois culture. He rejected positivism and bourgeois rationalism, which, in his view, had degenerated into the apologia of an alienated world. His

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critical attitude notwithstanding, he was far from identifying himself with the ideas that marked social democracy in its Hungarian, German, or Austrian variants at the beginning of the century. Under the circumstances of what can be described as a social and intellectual vacuum, Lukács, like many other prominent figures among the contemporaneous intelligentsia of Europe, appears to have professed forms of religiosity without God. As he put it in a study of the time, the profoundest ambition of man was "to come to know himself in the reality of his dreams". It was precisely the "religious force infusing the soul in its entirety" that, he claimed, was missing from the socialism of his era. Early and medieval Christianity possessed it, and so, Lukács argued, did the 'prophetic faith' and 'missionary veto' of the great Hungarian poet of the time, Endre Ady, and the subjective mysticism of the poet and playwright Béla Balázs.

At that time, György Lukács was not familiar with any work of Lenin's. He is unlikely to have read any writings of Lunacharsky who, in what is usually referred to as his 'god-creating' period, contended that the 'theory of social myth' was applicable to the examination of the 'proletarian religious consciousness'. Lunacharsky stated that God was nothing but 'humaneness at the pinnacle of potential'. Neither is he believed to have encountered Gorky's Confession, which included the declaration: 'God was created not by man's weakness, but by the abundance of power. He is not outside, he is within us.' For all that, Lukács and the above authors started out from the same conviction: totality had been shattered, and the forces striving to bring about change were weak. The shared illusionary compensation boiled down to the subjective desire for a new totality and form, and an order that needs to be reconstructed.

"Forms arise from a yearning for substance", Lukács wrote, "so that they could promote the redemption of substance from lie to truth"; when ascending to God, "all difference disappears. All doubt falls silent here: only one redemption is possible." Earlier, this redemption took the form of a personal fusion with totality, a sort of neo-Franciscan unio mystica, like a song that guides the soul toward God in a god-forsaken world.

Later, during World War I, at a time of deepening crisis, Lukács had the whole society of the time in mind when he raised the question whether "we are really about to leave the age of absolute sinfulness." And he was searching for a solution with an almost apocalyptic obsession:

totality, as the formative prime reality of every individual phenomenon implies that something closed within itself can be completed; completed because everything occurs within it, nothing is excluded from it and nothing points at a higher reality outside it; completed because everything within it ripens to its own perfection and, by attaining itself, submits to limitation.9

For the subject of this paper it is a question of secondary importance that in that period Lukács saw the force capable of bridging the gap between totality and the object world in form, which he considered as an active principle operating in art. For Lukács, the decisive turning point in art was expected to take place when the novel would be replaced by the new epic. Already at that time, however, Lukács had the power to transcend this narrowly aesthetic wording of the problem when he sharply confronted what he described as the age of absolute sinfulness with the new redemption, the revolution of the soul, the prevailing of the ultimate values, and paradise in its true form.

For the time being, the only means that Lukács could see to supersede this evil dichotomy of Sein and Sollen—mean reality and the aspiration for a better reality—was religion and myth, which he used to respond to the fact that the bourgeois system of values had slipped into relativism. He relied on these two forces in his search for the
possibility of a radical turnabout. When Lukács spoke of his age as fully pervaded by sin and alienation, he gave expression to the mood of intellectuals who were incapable of associating themselves with the social force, which, though itself the chief victim of the burdens of alienation, was, at the same time, the paramount component in the struggle against alienation, namely, the working class of the modern era. Lukács was shifting from the mysticism of Francis of Assisi and of Master Eckhart to the ideas of Joachim of Floris and Thomas Münzer, partly under Ernst Bloch's influence. From what can be referred to as Lukács's 'Waldensian' period, he was moving toward what could be described as the 'Albigensian' heresy. He was freeing himself from Kirkegaard's influence and came to identify himself with Hegelian tenets. Lukács yearned for order in the objective reality, wished to see the 'new polis', and desired to come close to the Absolute. At that time, however, the sphere of changes was confined for him to the inner self of individuals. Decisive in this process were, to his mind, the great Tolstoyan moments that rock the universe, moments that, he claimed, enable the individual 'to experience nature in its essence'. Consequently, as Lukács later said of this stage in his career, he was in search of immediate access to nature and man in a romantic anti-capitalist manner. If, in his view, that period was the age of 'absolute sinfulness', then the only redemption might be the realization of order in absolute perfection.

In 1918—19, however, the same social tension to which Lukács at the beginning of the century could only respond with a quasi-religious belief in the redeeming power of form, demanded not religious, artistic, or philosophical solutions, but a polical one, not the divine irresistibility of forms, but the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Hungary.

It is well known that, on becoming a people's commissar of the Republic of Councils, Lukács did not hesitate to transcend the political confines of his younger years. Nevertheless, where ideology was concerned, it took a long time for him to come to grips with his earlier self. For a rather long time, his Marxism remained embedded in the framework of Hegelian utopia. In fact, the solution that he arrived at by the early twenties—he wrote in retrospect—indicated that he had 'out-Hegeled Hegel himself'. Yet, when objectively assessing History and Class Consciousness, we should speak up against that subjectivist glorification of the work (put forward mainly on the part of the New Left) against which Lukács himself protested—with the acknowledgment of the work's genuine values and lessons.

History and Class Consciousness undoubtedly bears some traits of messianism, of which Lukács spoke in clear terms in his "Tactics and Ethics" (1918): "the ultimate objective of socialism is utopian [...] The Marxist theory of class struggle, which in this respect is wholly derived from Hegel's conceptual system, changes the transcendent objective into an immanent one."¹ In the course of studying the forms of alienation under capitalism, Lukács, for whom the only means of overcoming the domain of sin had previously been recourse to sin—class violence, which he saw as a collective sin—thought that he had found the formula to resolve this poignant moral dilemma. The formula that he proposed was, however, idealistic and messianistic, since he expected the ultimate, decisive turnabout to take place in the form of a single major act, in which the proletariat would come to its consciousness, when subject and object would merge into one. Con-
sciousness’s coming to its own self can be considered only as an end to history, just as when Hegel’s absolute idea comes to recognize itself when reaching the stage of the absolute spirit. At that time, Lukács’s conception of revolution resembled some form of secular redemption. The vehicle of revolution that Lukács had in mind, the proletariat, was somewhat reminiscent of the sea of workers whose faces were like Christ’s, as depicted on Lajos Szántó’s famous poster of 1919 (subtitled ‘Proletarians! Forward! You are the saviors of the world!’), or the ‘red god’ that Árpád Tóth was describing in his fine poem as the proletarian rebuilders of ‘our sinful and stale planet’.

No doubt, Lukács was not the only thinker of his age to express messianistic ‘leftism’. It spread in many parts of Europe, especially due to a widespread desire for a world revolution. Some of Lukács’s former comrades-in-arms retained an atheistic religiousness throughout their life. In the case of Lukács, however, the situation was already more complex at the outset. In the early twenties, he was apparently not aware that what he had created to replace old myths did not exclude a new mythology. Unaware of the objective content of his conception, he brought mythology under sharp criticism, and stressed its failure to penetrate the object.6 Lukács took up the argument of Marx, who had found the origin of the world historical calling of the proletariat not in its divine mission, but, on the contrary, in the fact that the working class was divested of its human character. Furthermore, Lukács opposed the overemphasis of the anthropological aspects in the study of man, for, in that case, “man himself is made into an absolute and he simply puts himself into the place of those transcendent forces he was supposed to explain, dissolve, and systematically replace”.7

He declared that the Absolute should not be interpreted as a state or substance, but, instead, “treated as an aspect of the process itself”.8 He pointed out that “mythologies are always born where two terminal points, or at least two stages in a movement, have to be regarded as terminal points without its being possible to discover any concrete mediation between them and the movement”.9 In order to find a solution, Lukács argued, the stance of reified immediacy had to be abandoned (a stance that had once been represented by Master Eckhart and, in the twenties, by Ernst Bloch), and the stance of the isolated individual soul replaced with the aim of grasping man’s concrete being in the concrete totality of human society, with the ultimate objective of assuring the possibility of the genuine transcending of immediate (estranged) reality.10

It is clear that, in the passage quoted above, Lukács repudiated the quasi-religious features of his own former approach with a devotion that always marked the critical evaluation of his own work. “In fact, the criticism must be the more severe,” Lukács wrote a quarter of a century later, “the greater the value that others attributed to the works that in my view were erroneous and have been transcended in my development”.11

As Lukács’s approach to the relation of subject to object was idealistic and he identified alienation with objectification, his resolution of the contradiction between subject and object could not stop at overcoming alienation, and slipped into the error of losing sight of the innate material nature of objects. Apparently, he could not as yet disentangle himself from the messianistic tenet concerning the ‘last judgement over all things’.

Lukács confronted proletarian consciousness, which he had come to recognize through theoretical reasoning, with the immediacy of religious utopianism. However, by identifying the subject with the object in the consciousness of the proletariat, his theoretical conclusion was bound to coincide with that of religion itself, at least according to Gramsci. The Italian thinker argued that religion is ‘utopia in gigantic form or, in other words,
“metaphysics” of the greatest dimension history has ever seen, for this is the most ambitious attempt at reconciling the real contradictions of history.

Let us pause for a moment here. If utopian socialism is to be acknowledged as a source of Marxism (the works of Saint-Simon, Weitling, and Moses Hess prove that utopian socialism could never shed all traces of its religious origin), then we have to admit it to be true that a road from religious utopia toward Marxism exists. In other words, certain religious and utopian movements can be guided by social ideals similar to, or even identical with, those followed by the movements associating themselves with scientific socialism. The difference does not necessarily lie in the ends, but, rather, in the choice of the ways and means.

Genuine Marxists have no alternative to rejecting what is abstract, speculative, messianistic, and metaphysical in utopianism. Lukács, too, came to transcend the messianistic utopianism of *History and Class Consciousness*. But he did so in a dialectical way: he dissociated himself from positivism, which absolutized the narrow horizons of the time, while retaining his desire for a change in the status quo. He was aware that utopianism could not be superseded, except through the strength of the praxis of the socialist movement and the joint struggle of the working people; while the two groups may be of different outlook, they have common aims. The utopia to be superseded was not confined to that of others—it could be our own. However, as Lukács stressed in the postscript to the Italian edition of *History and Class Consciousness*, he himself relapsed into that immediacy when he regarded all epistemological contrasting of the object and its reflection as the product of alienation. Such a procedure was correct in stressing the class character of Marxist theory, although it challenged its cognitive endeavors. As Lukács himself pointed out in one of his late works, without accepting the objective dialectical character of nature, it is not possible to evaluate correctly the material sensuous activity that mediates between man and nature, man’s appropriation of nature, labor, and production. It is impossible to give a materialistic interpretation of the aforementioned mediations without accepting the objectively dialectical character of nature.

At the end of the twenties, on coming to understand Lenin’s works more profoundly and having had the opportunity to read Marx’s previously unpublished *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Lukács broke with his earlier philosophical position. Already in his study on Hess, he challenged, under the auspices of a ‘true dialectical realism’, the abstract utopianism that derived its definitions from sources other than historical reality and, therefore, had to have recourse to mental constructs in order to fabricate images of reality. Hess, Lukács wrote, failed to recognize in moments of the world around him the real motive power of the overcoming of the world in its form at that time. He discussed Hess’s view against the background of the Marxist-Leninist method of criticizing political economy, a criticism based on the analysis of the historical categories of mediations, pointing out the concrete historical genesis of social phenomena.

To reveal the roads in the present that lead to the future—this anti-utopian self-critical approach was to become dominant for Lukács. He carried this approach so far that a sort of conservative classicism and indifference to the future were attributed to him not
just by his bourgeois critics, but even by some of his comrades-in-arms, such as Brecht and Eisler. That this criticism was rather groundless can be proven both by a thorough investigation into the development of his treatment of the category of realism, and the analysis of his major works written between 1930 and the mid-fifties. For it cannot be accidental that, in The Young Hegel, Lukács discussed precisely that early phase in the philosopher's career in which his progressively critical observations on society could be seen in their full vividness, and Hegel—especially by realizing the mediating function of the tools of labor—could, to a certain degree, anticipate historical materialism.

The way that Lukács treated Hegel in that book was diametrically opposed to that in History and Class Consciousness. Its true significance cannot be gauged, however, unless we also consider what he said in The Destruction of Reason. This latter work was once dismissed with the following criticism: prompted by the political considerations of antifascism and opposition to cold war, it glorified rationalism in all its forms without reservations, while it rejected every form of irrationalism. Although there might be some truth in that argument, it must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that, in that work, too, Lukács's treatment of rationalism and his emphasis on the mediating function of scientific thinking were meant to counterbalance and correct the one-sided conception that he had voiced in History and Class Consciousness, in which he had condemned rationalism as having only apologetic functions. His emphasis on the dialectical, Marxist-Leninist approach to reflection constituted a similar attempt to rectify earlier errors.

It would, however, be an oversimplification to confine the assessment of The Destruction of Reason to discussing its self-critical and political aspects. It was not Lukács's aim to defend rationalism in the abstract sense. He strove to emphasize that tendency of cognition which aimed at making 'purely rational thinking', the rational exploration of reality by the natural and social sciences, the starting point of dialectics, the 'start and course' of the further development of thinking. On the other hand, Lukács intended to warn the reader that the reverse of this progressive process could also come to pass. He described that process historically, using the example of the disintegration of the Hegelian school, and logically, through the analysis of the process of cognition (which can approach but never fully reach its object) and of the crises that arise in the wake of the acceleration of scientific cognition:

The source of the discrepancy lies in the fact that the tasks directly presented to thought in a given instance, as long as they are still tasks, still unresolved problems, appear in a form which at first gives the impression that thought, the forming of concepts, breaks down in the face of reality that the reality confronting thought represents an area beyond reason [...] What if [thought] hypothesizes the inability of specific concepts to comprehend a specific reality [...] and rational perception in general to master the essence of reality intellectually? What if a virtue is then made of this necessity and the inability to comprehend the world intellectually is presented as 'higher perception', as faith, intuition, and so on?15

Such an irrational tendency can gain ground wherever social history displays a leap that resists interpretation with notions adapted to the characteristics of a former state of affairs. Suffice it to refer to the embarrassment of most of the social democrats when they found themselves confronted with the emerging imperialism. (Another example: new achievements in the sciences call for novel interpretations by philosophy, which is, however, an insuperable task for some scholars.)

The Destruction of Reason discusses the disintegration of Hegelian dialectic. On the one hand, this dialectic was the source of Marx's dialectical materialism, through the mediation of Feuerbach's anthropological materialism. On the other hand, precisely be-
cause Hegel's idealist dialectic—due to its internal but necessary inconsistencies—could not fully transcend its religious and theoretical antecedents, it became the source of intuitionism, which even fascism made use of, and of open irrationalism, through the mediation of Schelling, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and life philosophy.

Yet The Destruction of Reason is not a work with interest only for historians of philosophy. First and foremost, it is a declaration of adherence to what is of lasting value in the philosophical legacy of the age, especially the achievements of dialectics, materialism, and dialectical reason. It is a declaration of opposition to the myth of the immediacy of cognition.

It should be stressed that Lukács's emotional affirmation of what was progressive in the philosophical legacy of the era showed that, acting in the spirit of Lenin, he emphasized the importance of conviction, consciousness, and theory, which were superior to spontaneity and to immediacy derived from and verified by belief; the latter, resting either on traditional religious-theological or on 'modern' religious atheist foundations, create only new exclusive myths, "the eclectic unity of nihilism and mysticism". He was aware that the new myths could spread as they conformed only too well to certain tendencies of everyday thought that attribute fetishistic power to appearances, fail to differentiate between theory and practice, and regard scholarly and scientific abstraction of any sort as suspicious.

There is no point in denying that in The Destruction of Reason Lukács made no distinction between the various shades of irrationalism according to their social functions. Hence, he overlooked the very path that he himself had traveled, a road that led from irrationalism through atheistic religiousness and Hegelian dialectic to Marxism, and not the other way around: from dialectics to irrationalism.

Today it is especially timely to pay attention to the path of thinkers in either of the two directions. Certain forms of contemporary bourgeois rationalism can serve conservative or even retrograde ends: one thinks, for instance, of certain positivistic tendencies. The analyst of The Destruction of Reason must bear in mind that irrationalist relapses can occur at any time, as it is illustrated by diverse tendencies of 'left-wing' and 'right-wing' messianism, or retrograde utopias.

The critical analysis that Lukács offered in that work is now of especial topicality, as a fanatically anti-communist, neo-conservative, and anti-intellectual myth of immediacy and spontaneity has become prevalent in the capitalist world in general, and in the United States in particular since the late seventies—while, in a manner somewhat similar to that of the thirties, another global catastrophe is threatening us. If we also take into consideration the fact that Lukács made his final break with his earlier messianism in this work, and—let us repeat—defended rationality, which he had formerly interpreted merely as the apologia of capitalism, with a single though resolute objective (i.e., to promote its development in the direction of dialectics), then it becomes clear that the work is not only of political, but also of philosophical significance.

Having proceeded along this road, untiringly developing and correcting his former views, György Lukács, in the last one-and-a-half decades of his life, following the twentieth congress of the Communist (bolshevik) Party of the Soviet Union, found it imperative to create syntheses. The result of that effort are his Über die Besonderheit als
Kategorie der Ästhetik, Die Eingengart des Ästhetischen, and The Ontology of Social Being. Incomplete as these works have remained, they are indicative of the immense intellectual power of their author, his unceasing capacity to update his views, and his endeavor to present Marxist philosophy and aesthetic as tools and vehicles of social development.

In his Aesthetic, Lukács described the ascent of the arts and sciences from the naively empirical, emotional, belief-ridden, and anthropomorphic bounds of everyday thinking, and the process whereby the arts and sciences gradually separated themselves from religion, and became opponents. Religion, Lukács argued, transcends everydayness only within the bounds of everydayness.

Das religiöse Verhalten hebt sich auf den ersten Blick durch die emphatische Betonung des Glaubens vom gewöhnlichen Alltag ab. Glaube ist hier nicht ein Meinen, eine Vorstufe des Wissens, ein unvollkommenes, noch nicht verifiziertes Wissen, sondern im Gegenteil ein Verhalten, das allein den Zugang zu den Tatsachen und Wahrheiten der Religion eröffnet.\textsuperscript{17}

However, in religion belief is superior to verification, and subjectivity is more important than objectivity of any sort, factual, scientific, or artistic.\textsuperscript{18} Revelation remains an evidence similar to the empirical facts of everyday thinking. The anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism of religion evoke the patterns of everyday thought in the form of a transcendent 'other', and on both levels the employment of immediate analogues dominates: parallels are made between the human and the trans-human, the subjective and the objective.

Religion, naturally, differs from everydayness, for example, in its institutions and dogmas. Another difference is that, at variance with everyday belief, the content and practical consequences of religion affect man's existence in his entirety. Religion appears to be a force that is destined to affect man's entire fate, and in that capacity it represents some kind of universality, in contrast to the particularism of daily life. Religion is the imaginary realization of the human essence, the realization determined by the given standards of the time.

Es muss nur darauf hingewiesen werden, dass im Gegensatz zur Wissenschaft selbst, deren Ausgangspunkte und Folgerungen stets verifizierbar sein müssen, die Theologie notwendig jene Objekte und Zusammenhänge, die vom Glauben anthropomorphisierend gesetzt werden, prinzipiell ohne Kritik sich zur Grundlage macht und bloss gedanklich verallgemeinert und dadurch—ohne den Willen und die Fähigkeit ihre anthropomorphisierende Wesensart aufzuheben—sie als Dogmen fixiert.\textsuperscript{19}

These processes take place on the basis of the immediacy of the relation of theory and practice, which in turn has its source in the undifferentiated relationship of subject and object, in the last analysis, in the backwardness of the level of production.

In his Aesthetic, Lukács did not intend to create a comprehensive theory of religion. Yet what has been quoted from the work thus far can inform the reader of Lukács's attitude to religion, his description of the relation of religion to everyday consciousness and to science, his analysis of the objective conditions and mental patterns that give rise to and sustain religion, and of the forces that can be employed objectively to supersede religion. In History and Class Consciousness, Lukács offered a critical analysis of religion in fact only on the basis of subjectivity, describing religion as an alienated form of consciousness. In The Destruction of Reason, he ascended to a higher stage: starting out from objectivity, a materialistic scientific methodology, and social consciousness, he expounded the causes that pushed thinkers who faced crisis in their cogni-
tive activity back to irrationalism. In his Aesthetic, Lukács made a comparison between various stages of cognition that has developed on the basis of man’s productive activity in the course of history, and outlined the possibilities of grasping religion in theoretical terms.

The ultimate goal, Lukács argued, is to attain a genuine nature- and man-centered world view. This is not regression to ‘back to nature’ and man in the abstract; on the contrary, the achievement of man’s dominance over mediations, over the objectifications of the object world. That is the objective precondition for proving the nonsensical character of tenets alleging that man is the product of creation, and that he is dependent and exposed. This striving is the precondition of redirecting human energies, which are frustrated in this-worldly efforts, and are seeking refuge in religion and the overcoming of particularity in the other world, in activities that can render life meaningful. As he wrote:

Das Wesentlichste dabei ist das Fundament des religiösen Bedürfnisses im Alltagsleben, der Wunsch, dass der vom menschlichen Bewusstsein völlig unabhängig funktionierende Kausalnexus der Ereignisse eine teleologische Wendung erfahre, die den elementarsten und echtesten Lebensbedürfnissen des jeweiligen partikularen Individuums entspricht.20

Yet this development presupposes that the anthropomorphic world picture and the ethic substantiated purely with emotions should be replaced with a coherent, but dialectically open, scientific world picture. A positive world view should be attained, so as to enable man to understand and optimally realize the objective possibilities of social progress, and to consider himself both the self-conscious author and actor of history. In that development he cannot only discard the myths concerning the conception and formation of history, but those of his own fate, too. A new world picture is required, which awakens people to the consciousness of totality. And this totality is no longer the restoration of the identity of subject and object; instead, a historically given and internally structured unity of being, whose different spheres, precisely due to their manifoldness, concrete richness, and contradictory nature, make possible the many-faceted and free development of individuals.

Lukács was fully conscious that no change in the relations of production can directly bring an end to religious needs. He knew that while capitalist development was itself demolishing long-established myths and divesting religion of its anthropomorphic character, capitalism witnessed the appearance of new, ‘reified’ myths in the vacuum left by historical religions. Lukács pointed out that secularization, the decay of traditional values, the process of ‘disideologization’, the decreasing prestige of religious revelation, the growth of formalism in religious rituals, and the spread of the atheistic myth of anguish should not be interpreted as indicating the decline of religious needs. (Let us add that this development can have negative consequences as well.) Religion—as Kierkegaard said—is becoming a simple postulate, but, as such, it will persist for a longer time. In this complex situation, forces that are opposed and devoted to the maintenance of religion are existing side by side and the Marxist theory of religion is as yet far from drawing all the necessary conclusions from this situation. True, in his Aesthetic, Lukács described religion as a form of compensation that the individual seeks in exchange for the failures, insecurity, and futility of his life. At the same time, religion, nevertheless, reflects the individual’s striving to introduce a measure of order into what he sees as chaos, and to impart sense and support to spheres that lack them, to use transcendence to turn even suffering into a tolerable and sensible activity.
Yet the decision between this world and the one hereafter is not a theoretical and individual question, Lukács wrote. The outcome of the choice depends on ob es ihnen [Menschen] gelingt, ihre tiefsten Lebensbedürfnisse irdisch zu erfüllen oder wenigstens für deren zukünftige Erfüllung einen Kampf zu führen, der ihrem eigenen Leben einen inneren Sinn zu verleihen imstande ist [...] die Art [ist], wie dieses Bedürfnis sich ausbildet, sich entfaltet oder abstirbt, von den eben skizzierten gesellschaftlichen und weltanschaulichen Entwicklungen sehr wesentlich bedingt.\textsuperscript{21}

These conditions, Lukács continued, concerning the concrete relation between everyday life and science, are, in principle, different under socialism and under capitalism. But Lukács warned that even under communism everyday thought will not be fully absorbed in science, and science and art cannot win an absolute victory over daily life: "eine Welt der unmittelbaren Reaktion auf eine noch nicht bearbeitete Wirklichkeit wird darum noch immer übrigbleiben."\textsuperscript{22}

Consequently, religion is to persist for a long time to come and, in fact, various social and political tendencies are expected to appear under the aegis of religion. In World War I, Lukács wrote in a letter to Renate Riemarck, the church and the believers in most countries concerned gave their blessing to the weapons of the imperialist forces of individual countries. However, in World War II,

there appeared a Karl Barth and the Confessing Church with its martyrs. We are all aware that war, a third world war, the destruction of our globe in a nuclear catastrophe, is a real danger, but one that can be avoided. What prevents the Marxists and the people of religious persuasion from putting aside basic differences in their outlook and joining forces in order to find a solution worthy of mankind, and jointly to strive for the purpose? [...] Problems arise in the life of society day by day, for the solution of which Christians and Marxists act together. Furthermore, questions arise whose humanist settlement should be regarded by every Marxist as his duty. (Think of the right to marry someone belonging to another denomination, the right to divorce, the right to abortion, etc.) Where the theoretical aspect of the question is concerned, this world, and the hereafter continue to be in antagonistic opposition. But the people [...] on both sides of the camp who have the courage to speak honestly of the differences that divide them, can, by all means, find the forms of cooperation in several issues that are posed by reactionary inhumanity and man's alienation caused thereby.\textsuperscript{23}

In this letter, Lukács remained faithful to his Marxist conviction and the materialist assessment of religious transcendence, just as to Lenin's view that people of differing persuasion can and should put aside their differences in order to join forces on the front of political class struggle for progress and socialism.

In solchen Bemerkungen von Lenin zeigt sich bereits die Einsicht, dass in der gegenwärtigen Lage das Zentralproblem weniger in der Widerlegung der Wirklichkeitsaussage der Religionen liegt, als darin, wie die Menschen infolge der Änderung der gesellschaftlichen Basis ihrer Existenz, infolge ihrer dadurch entstehenden, andersgerichteten Aktivitäten, infolge deren seelischer Bewertung etc. die religiösen Bedürfnisse in sich überwinden.\textsuperscript{24}

By way of a conclusion, Lukács added: "Da aber ihre seelische Basis—der Nihilismus, der Irrationalismus, die Angst und die Verzeihung—sozial-psychologisch schwer erschütterbar ist, kann ihre Überwindung nur den von Marx und Lenin bezeichneten Weg gehen, den der Umwälzung jener Lebensformen, die sie produzieren und reproduzieren"\textsuperscript{25}

In his The Ontology of Social Being—in accordance with the particular subject matter of that work—Lukács offered a more detailed and thorough analysis of those 'ways of life'. As he put it:
religion is a universal social phenomenon: in the beginning—and often even later—it is a system that regulates the operation of all society; its principal assignment is to satisfy the social need for the regulation of everyday life. It is expected to do that in such a form so that it can exert a direct influence on the life of every member of society.  

For that very reason, any critique that is confined to deploying only theoretical arguments against the real sources of religion, alienation, and reification, is committing the error of ignoring “religion’s real relationships to the individual of the present society” and losing sight of the fact that man has to respond precisely in his practical activity to the questions that for the religious thinking appear to be solvable only through reference to transcendence.

In his *Ontology*, in the spirit of Marx’s views, Lukács named reification and alienation under capitalism as the chief sources of situations in which all the tangible things of everyday life strengthen the tyranny of ‘objectified apparitions’ and of the ‘sensibly trans-sensible’ commodity and money world over man. At this point, the dual tendency in the development of labor is reaching its climax: in the prehistory of mankind, labor assures the development and wealth of civilizations, but it also gives rise to alienation. At the same time, it facilitates the conservation of the appearance of the independence of the individual as a thinking being.

Lukács saw clearly that there can be no analysis of the modern forms of alienation without the examination of the history of Christianity. After the decay of the Greek polis, the relationship of the individual and the human species (*Gattungswesen*) gradually slipped beyond the grasp of even the brightest minds of the era. It was that very situation that created the conditions of a new type of relationship between the individual and transcendence, the one that is so characteristic of Christianity. Lukács wrote of the attractive features of Christianity in vivid terms: by believing in the salvation of the soul, man can imagine to be capable of overstepping those concrete mediations of the human species that can enable the individual in reality to attempt (though alienation is bound to frustrate his attempts) to overcome his particularity, and, thereby, to bring his life to fulfilment. Hence, it may follow—as exemplified especially by sectarian religiosity—that “alienation is rejected personally, in a direct manner.” It is not accompanied by the real rejection of those mediations that are its social vehicles. This is how they find their way, subjectively, to the human species—which, considered individually, has always been possible.

In this mental process, however, the essence of man becomes transcendent for even man himself, and, hence, his particularity is no longer the manifestation of ‘species character in itself’, in which the possibility for its development toward “being for itself” is given as a sphere of motion. On the contrary, this human essence is degraded and refixed “to become something that can be freed only with the help of transcendence” from this predicament. This situation is aggravated by the typical attitude of the historical churches, in which the realization of lofty ideals is postponed to some remote future: this practice “is, in effect, support for species character in itself at all times”. Lukács is, on the whole, correct in his conclusion, although, historically speaking, he gave a somewhat simplified interpretation to the relationship of sects and the churches. However, it is a fact that sectarian tendencies could be integrated, one way or another, in the framework of the churches. We also have to admit that the churches regard themselves as the this-worldly representatives of transcendence, and, as such, they have often opposed the regime of the day. And, though it seems certain—here Lukács referred to Dostoyevsky’s Great Inquisitor and the personal example of Tolstoy—that the actual
assertion of the moral imperatives of Christianity is incompatible with the civilization of which the church is part; relying on liturgical, theological, and philosophical devices, the Christian churches have usually been able to bridge the gap between the teachings of Jesus and the social needs of the time.

Perhaps the most important part of Lukács's analyses of religion in his Ontology is his discussion of the religious consequences of the overcoming of alienation in capitalism. "Only those efforts that are oriented to the future, that is, ultimately, to socialism, can possess the capacity genuinely to overcome reification and alienation." This is not to say that "social transformations could automatically put an end to the alienated character of religious consciousness." As Marx put it, the structure of everyday life must be transformed in a 'long and tortuous process of development'; only that can assure a situation in which mental forms of a higher order—science, philosophy, and art—can permeate ever broader spheres of everyday life and consciousness.

But Lukács was not content to arrive at this conclusion: he knew that, for objective and subjective reasons, alienation can persist, even under socialism. At this point, Lukács laid emphatic stress on the importance of the decisions and acts of individuals within the framework of the transformation of society as a whole. Although the development of the personality depends, in the long run, on the development of society as a whole,

each and every individual, who is in direct contact with other people, has to make up his mind whether he wants to break with his forms of alienation. That is the very reason for which consciousness, as it is ontologically founded, derives from, and has a definitive influence on praxis, and plays such an important role. The question is whether man himself shapes his life and personality within the framework of his society, or whether he places the decision in the hands of transcendent powers.

Although, subjectively, it has always been possible to overcome alienation to a certain degree, we have to stress the importance of conscious, personal decision in that act: the real social possibilities can be translated into reality only through action that is based on those decisions. Lukács's critical analysis of religion reflected the general endeavor of his last period: to define a materialistic and social ontology that, instead of ignoring, stresses the significance of subjective striving, the conscious moment, in the activity of man—the maker of his own history.

All this sounds like a challenge—which it is in the best sense: a credo, calling attention to every individual's cultural, ideological, and public responsibility at the crossroads that mankind is now standing at. It is, obviously, not just the polemic with religion that is at stake. As Lukács wrote:

The power of reification and alienation is perhaps greater today than ever before. However, ideologically, these powers have never been so claptrap, vacant and uninspiring. Therefore, society is facing the perspective of a protracted, tortuous, and involved process of emancipation. It is blindness not to see it, but it is illusion to hope that a handful of happenings can turn this perspective into reality overnight. Reality, in its attainable details, in its ever-changing though unchangeable totality, is the real object of human praxis, and man is not to expect from it anything else but what he (and society) can retrieve from it.

Struggle against the this-worldly foundations of human misery, the conscious commitment to the strenuous struggle for socialism in the course of polemics with people of other conviction: this was the communist György Lukács's creed throughout his rugged career. Lukács committed errors in the course of his fruitful and eventful life. But what is more important than these mistakes—many of which he himself brought
under criticism—is the exemplary struggle of this outstanding Marxist thinker of the century consistently to amalgamate materialism and dialectics, to shed light on the interplay of social development and cognition, and to keep Marxist–Leninist theory abreast of the great social and scholarly problems of his age.

Polemizing against the religious overemphasis of the importance of death, Lukács asserted:

Es ist evident, dass eine harmonische Abrundung, eine diesseitige Perfektion im Leben des Individuums nur auf Grundlage des Zusammensimmmens seiner Aktivität, der diese auslösenden, der von ihnen ausgelösten Emotionen, Gedanken, mit ihrem Lebenskreis möglich ist; es versteht sich von selbst, dass dieses Zusammenstimmen immer nur relativ sein kann [...] ja selbst die Niederlage der partikularen Persönlichkeit in solchen Kämpfen kann eine Harmonie, die hier gemeint ist, ins Leben rufen [...] Gerade hier wird aber sichtbar, dass in einen solchen sinnvollen, sinnvoll abgeschlossenen Leben steis Kräfte wirksam waren, die die betreffenden Menschen—mehr oder weniger bewusst, mehr oder weniger entschieden—über die unmittelbare Partikularität ihres gegebenen Daseins hinausgeführt haben.80

Assessing his lifework, we can justifiably regard György Lukács’s life and theoretical legacy as a progression of outstanding Marxist scholarly achievements, which have overcome particularity. It is a set of achievements and dilemmas that inspires all those devoted to the study of the problems that he raised to work hard, all those who are duty-bound not just to preserve for posterity his achievements, but—in the same way as he himself would do—to develop them in a creative way to respond to the new challenges of life.

(Translated by Iván Sellei)

Notes

4 Ibid., p. 34.
8 Ibid., p. 188.
9 Ibid., p. 194.
10 Ibid.
12 Lukács: “The Standpoint of the Proletariat”, in History and Class Consciousness.
18 See ibid., p. 124
19 Ibid., p. 123.
21 Ibid., pp. 801, 803.
25 Ibid., p. 862.
27 Ibid., p. 637.
28 Ibid., p. 694.
29 Ibid., pp. 667—68.
30 Ibid., p. 696.
31 Ibid., p. 737.
32 Ibid., p. 736.
33 Ibid., p. 735.
34 Ibid., p. 739.
35 Ibid., p. 734.
György Lukács and Hungarian Musicology

by

József Újfalussy

At first glance it may seem strange that György Lukács, whose oeuvre had been developing in the medium of philosophy and literature, of aesthetic and literary political studies and polemics, devoted much of the last decade of his career, which he spent at home, to the study of the aesthetic aspects of music and, especially, of the development of Hungarian musicology. The references to music in his principal aesthetic works are widely known, as are his later works on music, for example, the essays on Béla Bartók, Aladár Tóth, and Bence Szabolcsi, and his aesthetic debate with Ernest Ansermet. Lukács offered a flattering, appreciative opinion of the recent results of our musicology, which stem from the application of the Marxist view and method. People know, too, of his personal contacts with musicologists of various generations, especially his friendship with Bence Szabolcsi. It is almost symbolic that, at his last public appearance before his death, he addressed an international conference of musicologists in 1971 devoted to the life and art of Béla Bartók.

The encounter of György Lukács, the philosopher of art, with Hungarian musicology, and his ever closer relationship to the latter, have their historical precedents on both sides. Probably it will not be unnecessary, even from the point of view of our twentieth-century cultural history, to cast a glance at this dual background.

It is Lukács himself who gives us the key to understanding, in his preface to the selected critical writings of Aladár Tóth. For the first time, he expounds the view that the results of Marxist musicology have been connected with “the specific and fruitful development of Hungarian musical culture since Bartók’s appearance, under Bartók’s influence”, that “since Bartók’s appearance, the democratic spirit, which turns to the people, has manifested itself in the field of music more definitely and consequently than elsewhere”. He declares Kodály’s pedagogical method and its results to be a “unique, international, cultural revolutionary act”, which also “make their—profoundly democratic—influence felt in the whole of Hungarian musicology.”

From among the principles of Bartók and Kodály in folk-music research, he emphasized three:

Bartók and Kodály have always closely connected the search for genuine folk art with revealing the essence of highly refined art [...] In the second place, it has to be stressed that, in our country, laying emphasis on the value of Hungarian folk art has always been an explicit declaration of war on the Hungarian gentry culture with its bourgeois habits. As a consequence of its radicalism, the revolution in music pointed far beyond the literary declarations of Nyugat.
In the third place, he refers to the international aspects of Bartók's interest in folk music, and also to the fact that hence, with him, "in discovering genuine Hungarian art, we never encounter nationalistic overtones."5

While reading the above-quoted preface, experiencing the suggestive style of writing, it is not difficult to identify the writer with the cultural revolutionary György Lukács. He himself was the spiritual child, the pupil of the first decades of this century, a younger contemporary of Bartók's and Kodály's, their personal acquaintance and comrades-in-arms. Ady called this age the time of 'Herculean cradles', which witnessed the incredibly productive, springlike youth of the great generation of our progressive-minded intelligentsia. It is beyond the scope of the present essay to deal with the intellectual movements of the period and with their interrelations, which have been studied in many respects. Suffice it to mention the characteristic example of Béla Balázs, the subject of an interesting essay by Lukács, the companion and friend of Kodály in the Éötvös College, a writer whose life from Bluebeard's Castle to Cinka Panna was spent, even in emigration, under the impact of Bartók and Kodály.

The anti-war movements of the intellectuals both at home and abroad radicalized Bartók, drew him nearer to the circles of 'The Eight' and Ma. Hence, it hardly came as a surprise that, in 1919, in the cultural revolution of the Hungarian Republic of Councils and in its administrative institutions, both he and Kodály joined Lukács in their everyday work. Lukács's recollections drew a vivid picture of its atmosphere when, on one occasion, he gladly expatiated on the experiences of their common work in a conversation at a meeting of the Association of Hungarian Musical Artists.6

When speaking about the striking and growing sympathy of the aged György Lukács for our music and musicology, we must not forget the common point of departure of the young Lukács and those who initiated the musical revival, or the common experiences of their youth.

Ady compared Hungarian reality to the life of the European bourgeois metropolises, especially to that of Paris, and chose this method to uncover and plough the 'Hungarian fallow'. In his practice, however, and, inspired by his example, in the practice of Bartók and Kodály as well, this comparison postulated the radical surpassing of the models. The characteristics of the revolution in music that we have just referred to can be traced back to the following central attitude: the demand for the deep democratization, high artistic quality, and international importance of musical culture.

It was on these examples and in this attitude that an even younger generation grew up, joined their elders, and appraised the international importance of their creative and scientific activities even at that time. A generation that drew their psychological, sociological, and aesthetic orientation from the intimate acquaintance with the new European movements. Among this generation were Géza Csáth, a musical expert of Nyugat, and Dr. Sándor Kovács, an erudite teacher of music and psychologist. To the great detriment of further development in music, we lost both of them in their youth, in 1918. But another member of this generation was Antal Molnár, who laid the foundations of Hungarian musical aesthetic tending toward philosophy, sociology, and ethics.

Following Word War I and the suppression of the democratic revolutions, Hungary became isolated from the world. The emigration of several outstanding scholars and illustrious musicians, and—paradoxically—the unfolding of Bartók's international career, the diversion of his activities to an outer sphere were symptomatic of the dwindling of our world. The new circumstances demanded and brought about change in the
approach to and practice of music and, especially, musicology: a certain concentration and, of course, narrowing of interest.

The counterrevolutionary era between the two wars could not, of course, totally eradicate the social and cultural aspirations that were revealed and systematically put into practice in the revolutions of 1918—1919. They existed, just as before, but in another way. Music could assume an especially significant role in their transmittal, as always in the course of history, through its ‘coded’ mode of communication (Zoltai) and, simultaneously, through its exceedingly intensive and lasting influence.

With regard to the content of the cultural revolution, its popular and democratic orientation, as well as its social character—in which, in the second half of the thirties, political issues became increasingly emphatic—were only strengthened by the oppositionist position of this revolution. The new means of its realization was decided by the fact that the counterrevolution liquidated the network of institutions of the Republic of Councils, which had assumed responsibility for accomplishing the cultural revolution. Thus, inevitably, the aspirations of music lingered on the form of the political movement. This emphasized the concomitant practical, didactic objectives of these aspirations: Kodály definitely directed the interest of his students with that goal in view.

Musicology, too, conformed to these circumstances. The main task of the period was to arrange and publish the collections of folk music, and to infiltrate them into the channels of the working-class movement, both by means of new compositions and popularization. The resulting scholarly generalizations strengthened the ideological basis of the plan of cultural policy. All these—especially in Bartók’s activities—worked toward international comparison, the idea of the ‘fraternity of nations’, and the linking of our culture with a democratic, international solidarity. Kodály’s views and example contributed to the recognition of the unity of folk music and the history of music, and stimulated the search for the written and unwritten sources of the history of music.

Undeniably, this spirit of scholarship brought forth certain dangers. The revisionist propaganda of the age recalled the danger of chauvinism, especially in the field of folk-music research. Official organs attempted to enmesh this driving force in the service of propaganda, but the progressive-minded intelligentsia, which had been imbued with Bartók’s democratic internationalism, proved to be strong enough to preserve the movement and its basic tendencies from this temptation.

At that time, the other danger, the overemphasis of practice seemed to be smaller, yet proved to be so prolonged that public opinion concerning music has not been able to free itself from this tendency to this day. The aesthetics of great bourgeois philosophies had already been regarded with skepticism, and the explication of music, which other disciplines—psychology, sociology, and acoustics—tried to divide among themselves, was surrounded by disbelief and disinterest. Our peculiar conditions did not help to overcome it. The personal example of the leaders of our musical revolution, for one thing, and their inspiring creative and public activity, their scholarly disposition, which had been reared by positivist methods, for another, did not attract the activists of the movement to the reflective mentality. The initiatives of the period before 1920 were long relegated to a side-track, and Antal Molnár was rather forsaken in guarding this branch of the tradition, as he watched the international development of the disciplines in question, and quoted György Lukács with hidden references.

Through the more detailed presentation of the preliminaries, we wanted to shed light on the right and wrong side of the strange paradox that ‘the extension of the peasant democratic initiatives of Bartók and of (the politically rather conservative) Kodály had
led to laying the Marxist foundations of Hungarian musicology.' György Lukács accentuated his statement by adding that 'Bartók himself was far from the conscious political commitment of Ady, and even more so from that of Attila József's', yet, in his wake Aladár Tóth was more consistent in criticizing 'both the backwardness, false culture, and nationalism of the Hungarian ruling classes and the manipulated commercialism of the West, which is opposed to art', than were contemporary literary critics. Lukács finds the solution in the fact that 'with Bartók and Kodály a new—and from the viewpoint of art—democratic movement has evolved which, in our days, culminates in the Marxist theory of musicology'.

György Lukács's statement needs completion in a thing or two. First of all, in our opinion, we cannot speak of the 'evolution' of the democratic movement, but, on the contrary, its continuation. Music, which gave rise to the idea of what Lukács called 'undetermined objectivity', is especially suitable to reflect the continuity of human development—as the development of the 'species character' ('Gattungsmässigkeit')—in its great coherence. This idea applies especially to the musical branch of the historical continuity of our centuries-old democratic movements.

Furthermore, while analyzing the activities of Bence Szabolcsi and Aladár Tóth, Lukács himself stresses that the firm basis of their scholarly and/or critical works is the true presentation of the 'being so' of historical phenomena. This true presentation could be realized only by means of their historical consciousness, their experiences, and the tendencies determined by their masters. Especially in the oeuvre of Bence Szabolcsi, it led to a social-historical sensitivity and consciousness, colored by the 'intellectual sciences' ('Geistesgeschichte'), which could pass the heritage on to students thinking and searching in a Marxist way.

Finally, when searching for the 'being so' of the world of folk music and history of music, Bartók and Kodály came to know the 'being so' of the peasantry, which, in reality, meant the people in this country. Moreover, music represented for them—and we can safely assert that afterward for every Hungarian composer and musicologist—the natural manifestation of human existence. We see virtually the 'triumph of realism', as the 'ontology of social being' unfolds itself in music before their eyes—which were directed at the essence of historical processes—but practically without their knowledge and intent. We see how the surmise of the 'ontology of musical being' anticipates and enables the theoretical completion by György Lukács, their equal, who revealed the essence of aesthetics from the everyday existence of man. Perhaps it is no exaggeration to refer back to the experiences of the common departure, and also to some parallels, even convergencies, of different, yet conspicuous conclusions, which originated in one side or the other.

After the Liberation, the cultural revolution in this country again entered its open and sweepingly active phase. Day by day, the historical moment expected quick, sensitive political decisions and measures considering art and music. We were snowed under with a mass of unsolved tasks, we had to face the problems of realism, populism, and national character in art; the question of tradition and innovation; the dialectic of content and form; the problems of serious and light, vocal and instrumental music; the problems of national tradition in music. In the meantime, we learned day by day that our theoretical training was insufficient to guarantee correct decisions; in the critical moments, it was our subjective sympathy or antipathy that interfered in our opinion.

The contemporary debates in the Soviet Union concerning musical aesthetic and musical policy acquainted us with both the intonational approach and method of Marxist
aesthetic as represented by Asafev, and with those discussions and declarations that, tied up with Zhdanov’s name, were given publicity on the pretext of Muradeli’s opera, The Great Friendship.

The direct and vulgar application of the latter theories in our musical policy soon led, among other things, to presuming an ‘innovative’ and a ‘populist’ side in Bartók’s legacy, which elicited astonishment and open or hidden resistance in musical life.

The first attempts at applying the intonational method of analysis—naturally enough—originated among Bence Szabolcsi and his disciples.

The debates over and events in musical policy, the scholarly experiences of various origins directed the first generation that, on the solid footing of a materialist outlook, they polish the initiatives of Marxist aesthetic in music according to the characteristics of the musical medium. They were to surpass the materialist traits of those initiatives, and elaborate a sensitive reliable scholarly method, capable of lending itself to both historical and aesthetic analysis.

It is at this point that the convergent lines of development were brought to fulness by the salutary assistance of György Lukács and his disciples. From the beginning it was remarkable to what an extent Lukács’s students were interested in the aesthetic aspects of music. It is worth remembering Dénes Zoltai’s essay on Wagner and its discussion in the presence of Bence Szabolcsi. It is also worth remembering that the first fruitful examples toward understanding and unfolding the phenomena of the history of music from the sphere of everyday existence were given by János Maróthy, who, as a student of György Lukács’s, was also a participant in the occasionally heated debates in Szabolcsi’s seminar.

While the consistent Marxist understanding of the peculiarities of music and the elaboration of the historical and aesthetic methods of this understanding were maturing ‘from below’, in the field of music it became inevitable that György Lukács, a living contemporary of Bartók’s and Kodály’s, since his homecoming a witness to and participant in the debates about them, should have turned his attention once more to music. He left his most familiar field, the study of literature, and sought to realize the dialectic of the general and the particular in general aesthetics, which also reckons with the differentia specifica of the genus proximum within the individual provinces of art. When, in the early sixties, he handed over to musicologists (first of all, to Bence Szabolcsi) a chapter of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen dealing with music, for comments, and, as was his habit, frankly and openly, almost excitedly waited for the critical remarks, the unfolding of the theoretical problems initiated ‘from below’ and ‘from above’—that is, from musicological and philosophical generalizations—met in complete harmony.

It would require another essay to recount how musicology and, particularly, musical aesthetic, have profited from the works of György Lukács, even in the seeds of inherent, fruitful discussions. Moreover, how Marxist aesthetic has gained that the first time it has been organically and creatively expanded with valid explication of music in his works. It is due to Lukács that, in the reflection of Marxist philosophical generalizations, our musicology could check the results that had originated in and grown out of the traditions of the history of music and, furthermore, it could regain both the democratic, artistic, militant, and also the progressive, aesthetic-sociological branch of this tradition, including its theoretical-philosophical consciousness and status. This is how Lukács discovered that behind the often alien philosophical surface of the works of Antal Molnár, the 85-year-old musicologist of great erudition, one can find observations and litigations that directly anticipate our aesthetic concepts.
Finally, Hungarian musicologists are indebted to György Lukács for his patient, thoughtful, and wise advice and for the fact that, in his direct and indirect disciples, we have excellent companions for our theoretical endeavors. We are delighted to see that this mutual understanding and cooperation continues to live in the youngest generations of philosophers and musicologists.

(Translated by József Kovács)

Notes

2 Ibid., p. 5.
3 Ibid., p. 6.
4 Ibid., p. 6.
5 Ibid., p. 6.
Lukács and the Renewal of Comparative Literature

by

József Kovács

It is a characteristic of truly great thinkers that their thought exerts an influence even on those disciplines whose questions have not, or have only casually, been dealt with by them. This applies especially to Lukács, who is generally never referred to as a comparative literature scholar, but, rather, as a sociologist of literature, in spite of the fact that his theoretical and historical works rest on a wide, world literary foundation. This popular notion of Lukács's career has tended to obscure the fact that in Hungary the methodology of comparative studies is, for the most part, based on principles that were expounded by him for the first time. In comparative literature, Lukács's principles have been absorbed quietly, almost unnoticed, and, in contrast to other fields of literary scholarship, without protracted or spectacular debates. Yet when one tries to probe into the question of what comparative literature owes to Lukács, one is faced with a misconception or myth.

When surveying the eight decades of comparative literary studies in Hungary, György M. Vajda gives the impression that Lukács's presidential address at the 1948 congress of the Society of Hungarian Literary History,¹ together with the then prevailing political intolerance, led to the ban of comparative literature. According to Vajda,

In the atmosphere of the cult of personality, these words of dogmatic tone—to use József Révai's favorite expression—threw out the baby with the bath water. For years they put a stop to the systematic study of the foreign relations of our literature, to the explorations of foreign archives, etc. Cautious corrections and explanations were of no avail.²

As if echoing this statement, in his essay on the reception of Hungarian literature in Victorian England, Lóránt Czigány refers to Lukács's above-mentioned address³ and to Tibor Lutter's essay on the state of English studies in Hungary,⁴ as having decisively and peremptorily put a stop to comparative studies. Yet, today, one would sooner agree with Péter Nagy, who did not fail to observe, in connection with the publication of Lukács's volume of selected essays, a number of which had originally been published well before their republication in the work at issue, Magyar irodalom — magyar kultúra [Hungarian Literature—Hungarian Culture], in 1970:

Nothing better indicates the soundness and rightness of these [i.e., Lukács's] principles in the long run than the very fact that those studies and lectures which at that time were the stumbling blocks of the anti-Lukács campaign can also be found in this volume. Rereading them today, one can scarcely understand what objections could be raised against them.⁵
Before returning in more detail to the myth created by György M. Vajda, it must be admitted that both Lukács and Lutter dismissed a great part of earlier reception and influence studies as uninteresting and unproductive, and as such, having very little to do with the questions of literary history. Incidentally, upon the publication of a collection of essays dealing with the different aspects of Russian–Hungarian literary relations in 1961, critics charged that some authors juxtaposed influences and parallels rather mechanically, the very same argument that had been directed against earlier studies. But it must also be admitted that Lukács spoke about the revision, and not the ban, of comparative literature. Similarly, Tibor Lutter did not urge the discontinuation of studies in English and Hungarian literary relations, but merely the designation of a specific field of research in English studies, where Hungarian scholars could say something new for the scholarly world.

György M. Vajda asserts that Lukács’s criticism, as far as the positivist stage of development in Hungarian literary scholarship is concerned, was correct in principles: it was belated historically because the ‘intellectual sciences’ (‘Geistesgeschichte’) school had passed judgment on positivism, and the core of its criticism was directed against the study of influences and sources. Moreover, he continued, Lukács had not touched upon the comparative method of the ‘intellectual sciences’ with ‘due emphasis’, forgetting that a great part of the presidential address was in fact devoted to the criticism of the ‘intellectual sciences’. István Sóter’s warning, however, was very timely, when, a few years later, in his The Dilemma of Literary Science, he stated that, in the guise of the lack of ideology, positivist thinking was able to survive against such ideology-oriented scholarly methods as the ‘intellectual sciences’ or Marxist scholarship.

The positivist approach to literature of the last century, which demanded the exactness of science, having discarded its historical-ideological and sociological masks, continues with a clear conscience to survive in our day and to consider its uncompleted tasks of unchanged importance.\(^6\)

Another part of the myth is connected with what Vajda regarded as ‘cautious correction and explanation’, and this is exemplified by an essay by Endre Kovács, who tried to draw the consequences of Lukács’s methodological statements for studies in comparative and world literature.\(^7\) Endre Kovács’s assertion is hardly to be questioned, namely, that the comparative approach to literature, the study of influences, or of what he calls an ‘even higher concept in comparative literature: relationship’, is not alien for Marxist literary history: indeed, just the opposite: where the relationship was prolific and decisive for the development of literature, it would be wrong to conceal it. He cited the example of József Révai’s essay on the poet Ferenc Kölcsey, in which Révai had treated the relationship between German sentimentalism and Kölcsey’s poetry, without overemphasizing the importance of influence over native components. Endre Kovács was right in pointing out that, as a result of Lukács’s intervention, the methodological questions that had previously received modest attention developed into the central question of the discipline, as the unavoidable concomitant of the efforts that served for the renewal of literary scholarship.

But why was the Magyarok, a monthly magazine of the Ady Society in Debrecen, the organ in which it was possible to unfold Lukács’s views in great detail, in spite of the fact that, in 1949, Lukács himself became the center of dogmatic, voluntarist debates? It is almost certain that the editors of the magazine took active interest in Lukács’s theoretical works, in his efforts to promote Marxist literary scholarship, and that to this
end they published, for the first time in Hungarian, Lukács’s essay, “Leo Tolstoy and Western European Literature”, which, as regards the adoption of the comparative method, is probably of greater significance than his presidential address of 1948.

Lukács’s role in the renewal of literary scholarship was appropriately summarized by Gábor Tornai:

György Lukács gave us guidance in the criticism of the ‘intellectual sciences’ of the prewar era. He was the first to call our attention to the necessity of cooperating with the other historical sciences, at the same time, to request literary historians to explore the social and economic facts independently, and, in this way, to lay the foundations of the literary approach. He was the first to stress the necessity of fighting subjectivist, formalist aesthetics [...] he made it self-evident that the old type of literary historian, the narrow-minded specialist type, should be done away with.9

These statements were not prompted by way of compliments, or out of respect for the philosopher of international reputation. As far as comparative literature is concerned, the basis of these statements can be found in Lukács’s frequent references to world literature in his theoretical writings, and in such methodologically important essays as “Unser Goethe” (1949—also in Hungarian), or “Puschkins Platz in der Weltliteratur” (1949—in Hungarian: 1951).

In surveying Lukács’s theoretical-methodological conceptions, we have to start out from the fact that, for him, the due revision of literary historiography did not mean the ‘conclusive’ rejection of all earlier works. But, as he put it:

It means the objective, relentlessly severe, and at present, democracy- and socialism-oriented, critical appraisal of what has been produced in Hungarian literary historiography. Certainly, in the process, or as a result, of this revision, the image of Hungarian literary history will undergo substantial changes. And, certainly, in the course of this work we will discover predecessors of whom we have hardly or never thought. And there will be a number of idols to be shattered, personalities to be criticized severely [...] This criticism should not refrain from anything, not even from established facts. There are a number of so-called facts that actually hide some deep-rooted legends, for example, by disregarding the complementary, modifying, or refutatory facts. We know more than one case where facts, devoid of all foundation, have been taken to be indisputable. Therefore, criticism should show no forbearance.10

Presumably these were the so-called ‘dogmatic phrases’ in Lukács’s address, though it must be admitted that his criticism was aimed at conceptions of non-Marxist ideologies.

According to Lukács, the renewal of Hungarian literary historiography depended on certain preconditions, such as the discontinuation of its isolation from other historical disciplines, the introduction of international aspects into Hungarian literary studies, the rewriting of the history of world literature based on a Marxist approach, and the fight against subjectivist-formalist aesthetics. Whereas each of these conditions may concern national, world, and comparative literatures alike, it was first of all in comparative literature where his conception concerning the introduction of international aspects could be applied, a conception that was—unfortunately—liable to misunderstanding and misinterpretation.

The root of the misunderstanding lies in the fact that Lukács identified comparative literature with the fortune littéraire-type studies of the French school, characterized by the interest in literary relations and influences. According to Lukács, in order to establish a new type of research, the old methodologies had to be discarded.
We have to break with the old-fashioned comparison of Hungarian literature with foreign ones, had it been either of chauvinistic or defeatist spirit. We must get rid of the old, so-called comparative literature, and we have to recognize the unproductivity of mechanically searching for influences and parallels.\textsuperscript{11}

He was rather explicit in stating what the new type of research meant for him:

Comparative literature must concentrate not only on the vital Hungarian problems, but it also has to take into consideration that every genuinely literary phenomenon, be it a writer, a trend, or a genre, rests on the basis of national, social needs, on the contemporary social structure, the developmental directions, and the class stratifications of the country. These are the factors that explain why and how a foreign movement or author influenced Hungarian intellectual life.\textsuperscript{12}

It is quite natural that nowadays the study of influences does not occupy such a central position in comparative literature as it did in the French school, or as Lukács’s assertion might imply; however, this does not mean at all that this kind of research could be eliminated from the scope of comparative studies. In fact, it was Lukács who made it evident that a number of literary phenomena could not be explained without the method of comparison, since the study of interrelations and influences could lead us to the better understanding of literary phenomena and processes.

In Lukács’s use of the concept of influence there is some continuity or coherence between his pre-Marxist and Marxist periods. As early as 1910, in his “Megjegyzések az irodalomtörténet elméletéhez” [Notes on the Theory of Literary History],\textsuperscript{13} he made a distinction between adequate and inadequate influence, or, to use Leo Popper’s term, ‘misunderstanding’. In this view, adequate influence is a direct influence, the outgrowth of the content of the literary work, while inadequate influence is the result of not seeing, or of badly seeing, the artistic form, that is, an influence caused by accident, as far as form is concerned. Therefore, it is this inadequate influence or ‘misunderstanding’ that helps to uncover the major correlations in the internal history of literature. In Lukács’s words:

Here, just with the aid of the concept of ‘misunderstanding’, we shall see the history of literary correlations as more regular, following more closely the inherent laws, than we would do without it. Because in this way we have grasped the mental root of every productive influence: the longing for a new art, which is not strong enough to stand on its own feet, and inflicts itself tyrannically on everything that is looking for support everywhere, for predecessors and stimulators. And it will find them because it falsifies them according to the image of its own desires; in such cases, those works can exert an influence which endure—under certain and, in most cases, incidental conditions—that their very novelty be ‘seen into’ them, that their impact be falsified by it. In this way many developments, apparently due to external causes or to seemingly rapid changes receive their deep, intellectual necessity.\textsuperscript{14}

Examples of such inadequate influence or ‘misunderstanding’ were the reception of Shakespeare by the Sturm und Drang, or of Ibsen by the German naturalism of the 1880s; in both cases, a movement ‘against composition’ drew inspirations from works of, in fact, strict composition—projecting their points of view onto their models and, hence, regarding them as uncomposed. Following Lukács’s thoughts, the transformation of French symbolism in the poetry of Eastern European nations can be considered a similar example of inadequate influence.

Lukács’s concept of influence differed radically from the practice of the Hungarian positivists of the age. Whereas the latter searched for adequate correspondences in literature, first of all on the level of the text, Lukács conceived of influence as an inadequate trait, as misunderstanding or misinterpretation; or, to put it more correctly, as

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change—assuming that only such works can exert influence which can tolerate change, falsification, and even transformation into their opposites. But while he found in this conception the precondition of influence in intellectual constituents, in his Marxist period he thoroughly redirected the aims and motives of the acceptance of influence, replacing the subjective, idealist constituents with objective and, therefore, more readily recognizable, social factors.

"Poetic immortality is nothing but the ceaseless rebirth of influence," Lukács wrote in his essay, "A mi Goethénk" [Our Goethe],15 in effect indicating that the contradiction between temporality and living world literariness, that is, the difference between the obsolescence and survival of a literary work, can be explained only by the concept of influence. The medium of influence is, however, not content because it, in its immediate, crude reality, may easily become obsolete: a great part of Dante's, Shakespeare's, and Balzac's content and the respective historical facts have become obscure, or turned into seemingly unnecessary and unimportant details for the modern reader. The work of art is materialized in the form, which, in this way, also becomes an objective element. Thus, the source of influence, in the sense of world literature, is form.

In the comparatist sense, however, the concept of influence pales, becomes uncertain. It is more accurate to replace it with the term 'assimilation', which indicates the activity of the recipient literature, in molding and transforming literary phenomena in accordance with its own inner requirements, for its own purposes. For the purpose of literary historical cognition, this process becomes more important than the source (emitter) of the influence. But the line of development of the native literature that puts influence into its service must, in turn, be superimposed on studying the reasons why and how influence has taken place. Thus, the phenomenon that we call 'influence' in comparative literature is the embodiment of a curious contradiction; namely, that a literary phenomenon which exerts a real influence in a foreign medium never helps to create—to use Lukács's original wording—'adequate correspondence'. Therefore, in this sense, we cannot speak of emitters and recipients in literature. As Lukács pointed out in his "Leo Tolstoy and Western European Literature":

It should, however, be stressed once more that the primary determinants of such influences are the literary requirements of the recipient country. All truly great literature, however much foreign elements it may absorb, keeps to its organic line of development, determined by the social and historical conditions in the country that gave birth to it.16

The characteristic trait of influence is its ability to keep the literary phenomenon passive, so that it does not resist the efforts toward change, toward appropriation.

In order to distinguish false impacts in literature (e.g., imitation, literary vogue) from genuine ones, instead of influence we should, again, speak of assimilation and, besides, reception, explaining the phenomena under examination in these terms, which are better suited to measure the duration and intensity of the presence of a foreign phenomenon. Furthermore, the necessity for the parallel use of these terms is indicated by the fact that reception (which, according to Lukács, is destined to satisfy the 'magnificent selfishness of national literature') does not necessarily lead to influence. And, while reception can be regarded as both a sociological and a literary process, assimilation, in the sense of transformation or appropriation, is almost exclusively a literary phenomenon.

Reception is, in the first place, a sociological factor, being affected by social and political needs and aspirations, by the standards of education, and even by preference for a certain national literature over another. In the national literatures periods of isola-
tion may alternate with periods characterized by an opening of the gates to world literature. Literary reception can be a short- or long-term, a single or a recurring process, which, in part, prepares the way for assimilation, and, in part, indicates which artistic features of the phenomenon are suitable for assimilation. Relative to this role of reception the foreign literary phenomenon seems to be passive, the emitter loses its priority against the recipient. Reception, however, is always an active process: it never means the mere acceptance of a given phenomenon. On the contrary, the phenomenon that is to be received is transformed into a socially or sociologically existing entity at a relatively early stage of the process, as a precondition for changes in meaning or even in form. The passive role of the foreign literary phenomenon may be explained by the fact that, as far as reception is concerned, every preceding work appears as contemporary, and, while selecting from among them, it may prefer one literature to another, depending on where it draws the boundaries of world literature.

The most spectacular change that the literary phenomenon is subject to in the process of reception is the change in language. In general, reception and assimilation take place only in the language of the recipient. This, at the same time, implies the existence of some adequate artistic form, as well as that of idiomatic and stylistic means of expression. Thus, reception may be accomplished with a single act, or, rather, with a series of acts. The latter case occurs more often, as each new translation represents an effort to restore the form and style of the original work more perfectly, and to uncover some essential traits that have remained hidden or have not received the required attention in the writer’s own culture. At this point, we may mention the literature of the age of the Enlightenment in Hungary, when there existed two parallel tendencies, which may superficially be characterized as having been under foreign influence, and yet in their own age both represented the contemporary line of development. One line of poetry utilized classical Latin metric in order to adapt Hungarian language to poetic diction, producing some fine pieces of work; for example, Dániel Berzsenyi’s poetry. The other line stressed the need for poetic translations, asserting that, while in an original work of art, the liberty of the artist might allow one to avoid the crucial points of form, translation would encourage the polishing of poetic skill. (However, in that age, the ideal in poetry did not appear in artistic perfection, but, rather, in proving the applicability of Hungarian language to artistic expression.)

In addition to the change in language, the literary phenomenon may be subject to a change of meaning in the process of reception. This is not to say that the content of the individual work means something else for the recipient because in this process the role of content, if it has any, is negligible. The work of art may gain new meaning in a sociological sense. It is precisely in this sense that symbolism was different in France than in the Eastern European literatures.

A rare exception, and the most spectacular example of what Lukács called ‘inadequate influence’ or ‘misunderstanding’, is the change of the genre in the early phase of reception. Here we may cite the prose translation of Milton’s Paradise Lost by Sándor Bessenyei at the end of the eighteenth century, and the role of Shakespeare’s dramatic works in the emergence of Hungarian dramatic literature. Before the appearance of the first poetic translation of Julius Caesar in 1839, Shakespeare could be thought of in the Hungarian theater as a writer of prose dialogues. Those who could read English or German were, of course, aware of his poetic abilities, but for the general Hungarian reader, Shakespeare first became a dramatic poet through the translations of Mihály
Vörösmarty, Sándor Petőfi, and János Arany, who considered it imperative that his works should be translated in poetic form (verse). Having undergone the process of change in language, the literary phenomenon gains a place in the foreign literature, becomes assimilated. Lukács cited the example of Schiller’s Russian reception, and remarked: “But his literary significance undergoes a change in this new sphere of influence, in this new connection; his own national character is sublimated in the union with a new culture in which it becomes effective.”

It is in the process of assimilation that a literary phenomenon shows its only active trait: it resists total assimilation. Against every attempt at appropriation, it retains its national identity, that is, ‘a literary work of international effect is always both a native and a stranger in a foreign culture’.

In studying influence or assimilation, we have to keep in view certain facts. First of all, influence cannot be forced, it cannot be created artificially. As Lukács pointed out: “if the attempt is made to adapt a foreign poet completely to the recipient national culture and thus denationalize him completely, no fruitful influence is possible.” Even if we are aware of this fact, we have to admit that the recipient’s conception of national character in a foreign phenomenon is never identical with the real national character. Similarly, in the case of influence, it may be unproductive to arrive artificially at a scientific-historical appropriation (wissenschaftlich-historische Aneignung) of another national literature. This policy prevailed in the early fifties, when, for political reasons, works of so-called ‘progressive-minded’ writers were translated into Hungarian. In respect of reception, this policy was doomed to failure and proved to be unfruitful, not to mention the fact that—in that wider context—it distorted the image of the literatures thus adapted.

Furthermore, influence, if once accepted, is not necessarily permanent. The received work must show great adaptability in order to ensure lasting influence because every national literature, in its historical process, is inclined to forget phenomena once it has assimilated them, as it is inclined to forget its own writers and works, too.

It is in assimilation that the needs and selectivity of a national literature are reflected in a specific manner. Only those phenomena whose tendencies have already been present may infiltrate into a national literature through assimilation. Or, as Lukács wrote: “it is certain that a really deep and serious impression (Wirkung) cannot be made by a work of foreign literature unless there are similar tendencies in existence—latent at least—in the country concerned.” This means that the recipient literature may have a hidden control or perceptive system, which prevents the infiltration of elements unknown or alien to the national culture. Even if this is so, it does not exclude the possibility of mistakes. They may be responsible for the emergence of temporary literary influence or literary vogue, which may be characterized by rapid diffusion and an equally rapid descent into oblivion.

When we acknowledge that literary reception and assimilation are possible only in the national language of the recipient and that there is no such thing as total assimilation, then we accept a very important principle for the study of comparative literature. For, in Lukács’s thesis, a phenomenon originating in a national literature becomes international through its transformation into part of another national literature. Thus, each national literature carries in itself the essence of world literature in the synthesis of the assimilated phenomena. The international appears in the national, and this leaves little room for the concept of ‘supranational’, a notion that we frequently encounter in comparative literature.
In his presidential address, Lukács raised another important idea, which could be, and, in fact, was exploited in comparative literary studies. The same idea was raised again in the early sixties, in the decade of the renewal of comparative literature. This is the idea of literary "zones", which expresses the view that, in certain societies that are in analogous stages of development, one may observe analogous literary phenomena. Lukács discovered this analogy in the so-called 'Prussian path' of capitalist development (in the second half of the nineteenth century), which did not eliminate the remnants of feudalism, but, on the contrary, maintained them and provided them with new functions. According to Lukács, the analogous economic and social development creates certain similarities among the Hungarian, German, and Polish [cultural] developments. To reveal these similarities may be remarkably illuminating, but only when we also stress the differences in these developments. For example, in each case we can see that the survival of feudalism, the failure to establish national unity, took a very different concrete form in each of these three nations, and this was of crucial consequence in the differences of the cultural developments. 20

This conception of Lukács holds very little in common with the typological method; rather, it may correspond to or may be the antecedent of what István Söötér calls 'complex confrontation'. 21 The method of complex confrontation considers the differences to be more important and more characteristic than the similarities, simply because they lead nearer to the understanding of the nature and essence of phenomena.

In conclusion, it may be said that it was not Lukács's conception but the debate about him that hindered the renewal of comparative literature in Hungary. As a result of the debate, the 'cautious wording' of the mid-fifties cast doubt on the ideas that Marxist literary scholarship could resort to the method of literary comparison at all. It was only in the sixties that comparative literature became an established discipline within Hungarian literary scholarship, and in the process, it eventually absorbed much of Lukács's conception as a new way of approaching literary phenomena.

Notes


7 Endre Kovács: "Irodalomtörténeti útiügy" [The way of our literary historiography] Magyurok (1949) No. 2, see especially p. 64.

8 Géza Lukács: "Leo Tolstoy and Western European Literature", in his Studies in European Realism, trans. by E. Bone (London: 1950).


10 Lukács: "A magyar irodalomtörténet revíziója", in Magyar irodalom—magyar kultúra, p. 513.

11 Ibid., p. 496.
12 Ibid., pp. 496–497.
14 Ibid., pp. 403–4.
18 Ibid., p. 243.
19 Ibid., p. 245.
APPENDIX I
Glossary:
Hungarian Personalities, Periodicals, and Organizations

by
József Kovács

1. Hungarian Personages Mentioned in the Main Body of the Text

ACZÉL, Tamás (1921—), poet and novelist. Winner of Stalin Prize for his novel, Vihar és napsülés [Storm and Sunshine] in 1949. Editor of the literary monthly Csillag (1950—53). In 1956 he went to England and later settled down in the USA.

ADY, Endre (1877—1919), poet, figurehead of Nyugat, whose Új versek [New Verses] published in 1906, marked a revolutionary revival in the poetry of the age.

ALEXANDER, Bernát (1850—1927), philosopher, professor of the university, translator of Descartes, Hume, and Kant.

ALFÁRI, Gyula (1881—1944), (pseudonym: Julius) politician, one of the leaders of the CP, editor of Inprekorr and, subsequently, of Rundschau (1921—40).

ANTAL, Frigyes (1887—1954), art historian, became known as Friedrich Antal. From 1933 he lived in London.

APPONYI, Albert (1846—1933), conservative politician of the age of dualism and of the counterrevolutionary regime.

ARANY, János (1817—82), poet, author of Toldi, foremost representative of Hungarian epic poetry.

BARITS, Mihály (1883—1941), poet, outstanding representative and later editor of Nyugat, author of Jónás könyve [Book of Jonah].

BALÁZS, Béla, pen name of Herbert Bauer (1884—1949), poet, a pioneer of the aesthetics of film. Author of Theory of the Film: Character and Growth of a New Art, librettist to Bartók’s Bluebeard’s Castle and the Wooden Prince.

BÁLINT, György (1906—43), writer and critic, contributor to the communist oriented Gondolat.

BÁRÓCZKY, József (1849—1925), literary historian, philosopher, translator of Kant.

BÁRÓCZKY, László (1884—1945), stage director, one of the founders of Thália Society.

BARABÁS, Tibor (1911—) writer, general secretary of the Hungarian Writers’ Association (1946—49).

BARTA, Sándor (1897—1938), writer, poet of the avantgarde. In 1925 he emigrated to the Soviet Union. Editor of Új Hung (1938), victim of purges.

BARTÓK, Béla (1881—1945), composer, pianist, founder of the new Hungarian style in music. Composer of Bluebeard’s Castle, Wooden Prince, and Miraculous Mandarin.

BAUER, Hilda (1885—1965), sister of Béla Balázs.

BAUMGARTEN, Ferenc Ferdinánd (1880—1927), critic and aesthetician. From 1909 he lived in Germany. Founder of B. Prize, to support Hungarian writers.

BENEDEK, Elek (1859—1929), writer, author of tales for children.

BENEDEK, Marcel (1885—1969), writer and historian of literature.


BÉTHUY, Zsolt (1848—1922), historian of literature, professor of the university. Author of a widely read but conservative history of Hungarian literature.

BERÉNY, Róbert (1887—1953), painter, a master of modern Hungarian painting.

BERZSEMELY, Dániel (1776—1836), poet, one of the great lyricists of the period between the Enlightenment and Romanticism.

BESSYNYEI, Sándor (1743—1809), officer of the guard, poet, translator of Milton’s Paradise Lost.

BETHLEN, Gábor (1580—1629), prince of Transylvania (1613—29), one of the greatest figures of seventeenth-century Hungarian history.
HATVANY, Lajos (1880—1961), writer and critic, one of the founders of Néyugat.

HAUSEL, Arnold (1892-1978), philosopher, art historian, world-famous representative of the sociology of art.

K. HAVAS, Géza (1905—45), journalist, critic, active in the communist movement.

HAY, Gyula (Julius) (1900—75), dramatist, translator. His plays were staged in German speaking countries. In 1965 he settled down in Switzerland.

HERCZEG, Ferenc (1863—1954), writer, editor of Új Idők, a literary weekly (1894—1944), literary spokesman of the irredenta movement in the inter-war years.

HEVESI, Sándor (1873—1939), translator, stage director, one of the founders of Thálía Society. Director of the National Theater (1923—).

HÖMAN, Bálint (1885—1953), historian, professor of the university, minister of education (1932—42).

HORTHY, Miklós (1868—1957), officer of the navy, governor of Hungary (1920—44).

HORVÁTH, János (1878—1961), literary historian, professor of the university. Followed extensive research in all periods of Hungarian literature.

HORVÁTH, József (1923—), journalist, contributor to Forum.

HORVÁTH, Márton (1906—), editor of Szabad Nép (1949—53).

HORVÁTH, Zoltán (1900—67), journalist, historian, social democrat politician. Sentenced to prison in the Rákosi era (1949—56).

HUSZKA, József (1854—1934), ethnographer and art historian.

IGNOTUS (pen-name of Hugo Veigelsberg) (1869—1949), poet, critic, the first editor-in-chief of Néyugat (1908—29).

IGNOTUS, Pál (1901—78), journalist, critic, co-editor of Szép Szó (1936—39). In 1956 he settled down in England.

ILLÉS, Béla (1895—1974), writer, journalist, active participant of the communist movement. He was secretary of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers.

ILLYÉS, Gyula (1902—1983), poet, editor of Magyar Csillag (1941—44). One of the major poets of the century.

JASZI, Oszkár (1875—1957), sociologist, radical politician. Editor of Huszadik Század (1900—18). Member of the National Council and minister in the Károlyi government (1918). In 1925 he settled down in the USA.

Author of The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (1929).

JÖKAI, Mór (1825—1904), novelist, prominent representative of Hungarian romantic prose literature.

JÓZSEF, Attila (1905—37), poet, co-editor of Szép Szó, foremost representative of socialist poetry.

JUHÁSZ, Ferenc (1928—), poet, author of several ‘long poems’.

KÁPFKA, Margit (1880—1918), poet and novelist, contributor to Néyugat.

KÁLLAI, Ernő (1890—1954), art critic, a theoretician of the avantgarde trends.

KÁLLAI, Gyula (1910—), journalist, politician, played prominent role in the communist movement.

KÁLLAY, Miklós (1887—1967), politician of the counterrevolutionary period, prime minister (1942—44).


KASSAI, Géza (1894—1961), journalist, historian.

KASSÁK, Lajos (1826—1909), poet, novelist, and painter, a leading representative of the avantgarde movement.

Founder and editor of several literary magazines, including Ma (1916—26).

KATONA, József (1791—1830), dramatist, author of Bánk bán.

KELEMEN, János (1899—), journalist, critic. First published in Gondolat. From 1959 staff-member of Élet és Irodalom, a literary weekly.

KEMÉNY, Zsigmond (1814—75), novelist, politician. Author of social and historical novels.

KERNSTOK, Károly (1872—1940), painter, one of the founders of The Eight, a representative of the new trends in painting.

KIRÁLY, István (1921—89), critic, Ady-scholar, professor of modern Hungarian literature.

KISS, József (1843—1921), poet, a major representative of poetry at the end of the past century, editor of A HÉI (1890—).


KODOLÁNYI, János (1899—1969), writer, a leading personality of the populist movement.

KORVIN, Ottó (1894—1919), an outstanding personality of the Hungarian working-class movement, executed at the time of the counterrevolution.

KOSZTOLÁNYI, Dezső (1885—1936), poet, a prominent contributor to Néyugat.

KOVÁCS, Imre (1913—1980), writer, sociologist, a leading figure of the National Peasants’ Party. In 1948 he left the country and settled down in the USA.

KOVÁCS, Sándor (1886—1918), teacher of music, the first to employ the results of modern psychology in teaching of music.
KÖLCSZÉ, Ferenc (1790—1938), poet, aesthetician, a prominent representative of the Age of Reform.
KRELSHEIM, Márió (1798—?), sociologist, a student of Mannheim.
KRÚDY, Gyula (1878—1933), writer, journalist, a master of modern Hungarian prose.
KUCZKA, Péter (1923—1954), poet, author of science fiction.
KUN, Béla (1886—1939), an outstanding personality of the Hungarian and international communist movement,
one of the founders and leaders of the Hungarian communist party.
KUNFI, Zsigmond (1879—1929), journalist, social democrat politician, commissar of education in time of the
Council Republic.
LACZKÓ, Géza (1884—1953), journalist, writer, and critic. Contributed to Nyugat. Editor of Pesti Napló
(1923—1939).
LANDLER, Jenő (1875—1928), lawyer, social democrat, later communist politician. Played a prominent role
in establishing the Council Republic.
LENGYEL, Balázs (1891—?), critic, literary historian. Editor of Újhold (1946—48).
LENGYEL, József (1896—1975), poet, writer. One of the founders of the Hungarian communist party. In the
inter-war years he lived in emigration, mainly in the Soviet Union. Was arrested in 1938, and kept in
prisons and concentration camps. Returned to Hungary in 1955. Author of Preem Drifting and Spell.
LENGYEL, Miklós (1878—1952), literary historian.
LESZNAI, Anna (1885—1966), poet and writer, closely associated with Nyugat and Huszadik Század. She lived
in Vienna (1919—30), and in 1939 settled down in the USA.
LISZT, Ferenc (1811—86), composer, pianist, world-famous master of music.
LUKÁCS, József (1857—1928), bank manager, father of György L.
LUTTER, Tibor (1910—60), literary historian, professor of English literature.
MÁCZA, János (1893—1974), poet, aesthetician, art historian. First published in Ma. Moved to Moscow in
1923, from 1928 he was professor of history of art.
MADACH, Imre (1823—64), poet, a major dramatist of the nineteenth century. Author of The Tragedy of Man.
MADZSÁR, József (1876—1940), physician, an outstanding figure of the working-class movement. Emigrated
to the Soviet Union in 1936, he was arrested and became victim of the purges.
MANNHEIM, Károly (1893—1947), sociologist and philosopher, better known as Karl Mannheim, a major
representative of the sociology of knowledge.
MÁRAI, Sándor (1900—90), writer, from 1948 he lived in emigration.
MÁRFYI, Ödön (1878—1959), painter, member of the group of The Eight, a master of post impressionist
painting.
MINHALY, András (1917—), composer, professor of the Academy of Music (1950—).
MIKSZÁTH, Kálmán (1847—1910), writer, a major representative of critical realism.
MOLDOVA, György (1934—), writer, a prolific novelist and writer of social satire.
MOLNÁR, Antal (1890—1983), composer, aesthetician, teacher of music, contributor to Nyugat.
MOLNÁR, Ferenc (1878—1952), dramatist, a master of the stage. Author of The Devil, Liliom (in Rodger’s
and Hammerstein’s adaptation: Carousel, 1945, a musical) and a number of other successful plays.
MÓRICZ, Zsigmond (1879—1942), writer, a master of twentieth century prose fiction.
NAGY, Imre (1896—1958), politician, between 1929 and 1944 he lived in the Soviet Union. From 1944
member of communist party leadership. As prime minister in 1956 he was said to be responsible for the
‘counterrevolution’ and executed.
NAGY, Lajos (1893—1954), writer, one of the pioneers of socialist literature.
NAGY, László (1925—1978), poet, a major figure of contemporary poetry.
NAGY, Sándor (1922—), journalist, writer.
NÉMES 1-AMPERT, József (1891—1924), painter, representative of expressive monumentality and activism.
NÉMETH, Andor (1891—1953), writer and critic, one of the founders of Szép Szi.
NÉMETH, László (1901—75), writer, a prominent representative of modern prose literature, theorist and par-
ticipant of the populist movement.
ORUTAY, Gyula (1910—78), ethnographist, politician, one of the leaders of the Independent Smallholders’
Party. As a folk-tale scholar he was accredited with establishing a Hungarian school in folklore.
OSVÁT, Ernő (1877—1929), critic, editor of Nyugat.
ÖRKENY, István (1912—79), writer, author of Catsplay.
ÖRVÖS, Lajos (1923—), poet and translator.
PETHES, Imre (1864—1924), actor, from 1903 member of the National Theater.
PETÖFI, Sándor (1823—1849), poet, author of John the Hero, the greatest revolutionary poet of Hungary.
PÍKLER, Gyula (1864—1937), sociologist, a prominent representative of the positivist philosophy of law.
PÖGANY, József (1886—1939), journalist, writer, collaborator of the Comintern (1922—29). Victim of the
purges.
POLÁNYI, Károly (1886—1964), political economist, sociologist. Active participant of the democratic revolution in 1918. He moved to England in 1933, and after World War II he settled down in Canada.

POLGÁR, Géza (1881—?), associated with Thális Society.

POPPER, Dávid (1843—1913), violoncellist, from 1886 professor of the conservatory.

POPPER, Lőc (1886—1911), aesthetician, philosopher of art, a friend of Lukács.

PUSZKÁNY, Ágost (1846—1901), sociologist, philosopher of law.

RADNÓTI, Miklós (1909—44), poet, translator, great representative of antifascist poetry.

RAJK, László (1909—49), politician, outstanding representative of the working-class movement, victim of frame-up.

RÁKOSI, Mátéjas (1892—1971), politician, general secretary of the communist party.

REINTZ, Béla (1878—1943), composer, an advocate of modern Hungarian music.

RÉVAI, József (1898—1959), political writer, communist theoretician.

RIPPL–RÓNAI, József (1861—1927), painter, a leading figure of modern Hungarian painting.

RITOÓK, Emma (1869—1945), writer, translator, associated with Sunday Circle.

RUDAS, László (1909—1950), Marxist philosopher.

SÁNDOR, László (1909—), critic, art historian.

SÁRKÖZI, György (1899—1945), poet and novelist, contributor to Nyugat, editor of Válasz (1935—38), one of the leaders of the populist movement.

SCHÖFFLIN, Aladár (1872—1930), writer, literary historian, most prolific and influential critic on the staff of Nyugat.

SEIDLER, Irma (1883—1911), painter, first love of Lukács.


SINKÓ, Ervin (1898—1967), writer, communist expatriate after 1919, author of Die Optimisten.

SOMLÓ, Bódog (1873—1920), lawyer, professor of law, studied the general principles of jurisprudence.

SOMLYÓ, György (1920—), poet, translator, critic.

SZABÓ, Dezso (1879—1945), novelist, political writer, an advocate of the nationalistic ideology of ‘third alternative’.

SZABÓ, Ervin (1877—1918), sociologist, outstanding theoretician of the Social Democratic Party.

SZABÓ, Lőrinc (1900—57), poet, translator, contributor to Nyugat, author of Tücsőkzen (Cricket Music).

SZABÓ, Pál (1893—1970), writer, politician, a representative of the populist movement, one of the founders of the National Peasants’ Party.

SZABÓ, Zoltán (1912—84), writer, sociographer, a representative of the populist movement.

SZABOLCSEI, Bence (1899—1973), musicologist, professor of the conservatory, a representative of the modern theory of music.

SZABOLCSKA, Mihály (1861—1930), poet, a well-known representative of the Petőfi-cigions.

SZÁNTÓ, Béla (1881—1951), (pseudonym: Rőben), politician, between 1919 and 1945 he lived in emigration.

SZÁNTÓ, Lajos (1890—1965), painter, graphic artist, in 1928 he settled down in New York.

SZÁNTÓ, Zoltán (1893—1977), politician, between 1919 and 1945 he lived in emigration.

SZEFKŐ, Gyula (1883—1955), leading historian and chief ideologist on the inter-war period.

SZIGETI, József (1921—), philosopher, aesthetician.

SZILÁGYI, Sándor (1827—1899), historian.

TÁNCSECS, Mihály (1799—1884), political writer, an early advocate of socialism.

THIENEMANN, or TASS–THIENEMANN, Tivadar (1809—1855), literary historian, editor of Minerva, a representative of Geistesgeschichte.

TISZA, István (1861—1918), politician, prime minister (1903—5, 1913—18).

TOLDY, László (1846—1981), historian.

TOLNAY, Károly (1899—1981), better known as Charles de Tolnay, art historian.

TOLNAY, Lajos (1837—1902), novelist, a pioneer of critical realism in literature.

TORMAY, Cecil (1876—1937), writer, founder of Nupkeler in 1922, a conservative monthly to counterbalance Nyugat.

TÓTH, Aladár (1898—1968), musicologist.

TÓTH, András (1858—1929), sculptor, a typical representative of academism.

TÓTH, Árpád (1886—1928), poet, translator, contributor to Nyugat.

TÓTH, Kálmán (1831—81), poet.

VAJDA, János (1827—97), poet, a precursor of Ady.

VARGA, Jenő (1879—1964), economist, politician. In 1920 he settled down in Moscow.

VARJAS, Sándor (1885—1940), philosopher.

VAS, István (1910—92), poet, a follower of the Nyugat tradition.

VASS, László (1905—50), journalist, critic, contributor to Nyugat and Válasz.
2. Periodicals, Organizations, Historical Events

Ady Society, literary society established in Debrecen in 1926. Main purpose was to support literary life in Debrecen and to spread knowledge about contemporary Hungarian literature. Leading members were Pál Gulyás, Géza Juhász, and László Kardos.

Age of Reform, a period of Hungarian history from the first 'reform' diet (1825) to the Revolution and War of Independence (1848–49). It was the period when the foundations of modern Hungary were laid (István Széchenyi. Lajos Kossuth, et al.)

Bethlen era, a customary reference to the 1920s with István Bethlen as prime minister (1921–31).

Budapest School, a collective name for the students and disciplines of Győrgy Lukács, including, for example, Ferenc Fehér, Ágnes Heller, and Miklós Vajda.

A CÉL, founded in 1910 as a monthly review dealing with social and economic problems and literature. Drifted to the extreme right in the inter-war years. Ceased publication in 1944.

Compromise of 1867 (Ausgleich), restoration of the constitutional relationship between Ferenc József, Emperor of Austria, and the Kingdom of Hungary. He was crowned King of Hungary and was thereby accepted as a legitimate sovereign by the Parliament; in exchange, he undertook to reign in accordance with the Hungarian constitution. This meant the end of Habsburg absolutism and the beginning of the 'age of dualism'.

CSILLAG (1947–1956), literary and critical periodical concerned with all aspects of Hungarian cultural life. Appeared monthly. First chief editor: Andor Németh. Tamás Aczél and István Király were managing editors.

Dictatorship, a common reference to the Hungarian Republic of Councils.

ÉLET (1909–44), a pictorial literary magazine with a Catholic viewpoint. Appeared weekly.

FÁKLYA, political daily newspaper. Continuation of Világy, one of the most important organs of radical liberalism, between April 20 and May 24, 1919.

FÉSZEK Club, founded in 1901. The name was coined from the initials of the Hungarian equivalents for 'painters', 'architects', 'sculptors', 'singers' and 'comedians'.

FORUM (1946–50), literary, social scientific, and critical monthly. Addressed the intelligentsia and sought to unite communists and non-party members for the socialist revision of society and culture. Edited by György Vértés.

Free School of Intellectual Sciences (1917–18), established by members of the Sunday Circle.

Galilei Circle (1908–19), a group of radical intellectuals aiming at the spread of scientific knowledge and free thought.

GONDOLAT (1935–37), literary and scholarly periodical which served as the legal organ of the Hungarian Party of Communists. Its aim was to oppose fascism and become a representative of the popular front. Played an important role in the establishment of the March Front. Edited by György Vértés.

HALADÁS (1945–48), political weekly newspaper of the Hungarian Radical Party. Edited by Béla Zsolt.

A HÉT (1890–1924), literary weekly, the most important literary periodical before Nyugat. Edited by József Kiss until death in 1921, then by Árpád Fehér.

HID (1940–44), literary and fine-arts weekly with Lajos Zilahy as chief editor and Miklós Kállay as editor.

Horthy regime, a customary reference to the counterrevolutionary period between 1920 and 1944.
Hungarian Party of Communists, established on November 24, 1918, in Budapest, under the leadership of Béla Kun. After August, 1919 (the fall of the Hungarian Republic of Councils), the conflicts and debates within the party became more striking. The situation was complicated by the fact that, in all this, the Hungarian social democrats and the Comintern also had a say—concerning, e. g., the causes of the 1919 fall, the right strategy and tactics and the emergence of various factions. In 1945 the name of the party became Hungarian Communist Party.

Hungarian Republic of Councils, a shorter name for the Socialist Federal Council Republic of Hungary, proclaimed on March 21, 1919 and existed until August 1, 1919. Also referred to as Council Republic.


Hungarian Working People's Party, name of the Communist Party between 1948 and 1956; afterward it became Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party.

Hungarian Writers' Association, established in 1945, uniting writers, poets, critics, and translators (who endorsed the basic principles of socialism).

HUNSZADIK SZAZAD (1900—19), social science periodical expressing the radical ideas of the Society for the Social Sciences (established in 1901) and highlighting the current problems of Hungarian society. Among its contributors were: Gyula Pikler, Zsigmond Kunfi, Bödőg Somló, Ervin Szabó, and Jendő Varga. Edited by Guszvát Gratzi, from 1906 Oszkár Jászai.

AZ IFJÚ PROLETÁR, political weekly published for young workers between January and August, 1919.

Independence Front, the antifascist, national joining of forces, which began to emerge in the second half of 1941, organized as Hungarian Front in May, 1944. Changed name to Hungarian National Independence Front in December, 1944, as an alliance of the Communist party, the Social democratic party, the Smallholders' party, and the Peasant party. Reorganized as Hungarian Independence Popular Front in 1949, after the fusion of two workers' parties, absorbing the above-mentioned two other parties.

Independent Smallholders' Party, formed originally in 1909, reorganized under this name in 1930. One of its leaders was Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky (1939—44), an outstanding figure in the antifascist resistance. Although not dissolved officially, it was absorbed in the Popular Front in 1949.

INTERNATIONALE (1919) a scholarly and literary monthly edited by Aladár Komját and László Rudas. Only nine numbers appeared.

IRODALMI ÜJSÁG (1950—56), literary and critical weekly published by the Hungarian Writers' Association. Besides poems and short stories, it published articles on literature, drama, and the fine arts, aiming at the development of socialist culture in Hungary.

IRODALOMTÖRTÉNET, founded in 1912 as a scholarly journal of the Society for the History of Hungarian Literature. Presents studies and documents with special attention to the literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

JÖVENDŐ (1903—06), literary weekly, which expressed Sándor Bródy's criticism of contemporary society. Founded and edited by him.

Kisfaludy Society, literary society established in 1836, in memory of Károly Kisfaludy, a celebrated playwright of the early nineteenth century. Although it had great influence on the development of literary taste and literature, it gradually became a body of academic conservatism. Ceased in 1952.

KORUNK (1926—40), a social science and literary monthly established in Kolozsvár (Cluj, Romania) for the purpose of advancing the objective of socialism. Edited by László Dienes (1926—28) and by Gábor Gábl (1929—40).

KRITIKA, critical monthly established in 1963, concerned with all aspects of social and cultural life in Hungary.

Liberalism (of Hungary), the cessation of fascist rule and German occupation of Hungary, April 4, 1945.

MAGYAR FIGYELŐ (1911—18), a conservative and nationalistic political monthly, edited by Ferenc Herczeg.

MAGYAR SHAKESPEARE TÁR (1908—22) a scholarly journal of the Kisfaludy Society.

MAGYAR SZALÓN (1884—1936), an illustrated social, literary and critical monthly.

MAGYAROK (1945—49), the first literary and critical periodical to be published in Hungary after World War II. Appeared monthly.

MAGYARSAG, political daily newspaper founded in 1900. Edited by László Fényes, Elek Benedek, and Lajos Bartók.

March Front, an allusion to March 15, 1848, when the revolution broke out. A common platform for action, organized by populist, communist, and liberal intellectuals in 1938.

MINERVA (1922—40), a scholarly journal of the 'intellectual sciences' (Geistesgeschichte) school, edited by Tivadar (Tass-)Thienemann.

Monarchy, one of the customary names of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867—1918).

Nagyhánya artists' colony, founded by Simon Hollósy, István Réti, Károly Ferenczí, János Thorma, and Béla Iványi-Grünwald, as a summer colony of Hollósy's private school in Munich.
National Peasant Party, founded in 1939, partly by writers of the populist movement who were active in the March Front. Although never dissolved officially, it was absorbed in the Popular Front in 1949.

NÉKOSZ (National Association of People’s Colleges), organized in 1945 in order to provide education for talented peasant and working youth. Dissolved in 1949.

NÉPSZAVA, political newspaper, established in 1877. From 1905 central daily of the social democratic party. Became the central organ of the National Council of Trade Unions in 1948. Played a vital role in influencing the working class before World War I.

PÁRTTÖRTÉNETI KÖZLEMÉNYEK, a scholarly journal established in 1956.

PESTER LLOYD (1854—1944), a political daily newspaper with permanent column on economy, published by the Lloyd Co. Considered to be the semi-official gazette of the government in power, with regard to foreign affairs.

PESTI HIRLAP (1878—1944), political daily newspaper. Independent politically, but supported the policies of the government party. Conservative and liberal in viewpoint in the inter-war years.

Populist writers (movement), a group of writers active especially between 1935 and 1938. They never presented a unified ideological platform or held identical views, but were committed to the cause of the peasantry. The group included László Németh as the leading ideologue, György Sárközi, founder of the ‘Discovery of Hungary’ series of books, which included sociographical studies by, for example, Ferenc Erdély, Géza Féja, and Zoltán Szabó; novelists and poets who dealt with the various aspects of village life in such, for example, Péter Veres, Pál Szabó, József Darvas, and Gyula Ilyés. Most of them were active in the March Front and in founding the National Peasant Party.

PROLETÁR (1920—22), a political weekly published by the Hungarian Party of Communists in Vienna.

RENAISSANCE (1910—11), political, social, and literary review edited by Árpád Zigány.

Revolution of the Asters, a customary reference to the democratic revolution, October 23—30, 1918.

SÁRLO ÉS KALAPÁCS (1929—37), political and literary periodical established in Moscow by émigré Hungarian writers and journalists. Mainly concerned with political issues, but was a staunch advocate of the concept of proletarian literature.

Society for the History of Hungarian Literature, established in 1912 with the aim of promoting the study of Hungarian literature. Published the scholarly journal Irodalomtörténet. Reorganized in 1949.

Szabad Gondolat (1911—19), organ of the radical Free-thinkers’ Association, which was founded in 1905.

SZABÁD NÉP, founded in 1942 as the illegal organ of the Hungarian communist party. From 1945 its central political daily newspaper. Continued by the newly-formed Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party as Népszabadság in November, 1956. József Révai and Márton Horváth were among its editors.

100% (1927—30), literary, fine-arts, and political periodical founded as a legal organ under the secret direction of the Hungarian communist party. Edited by Aladár Tamás.

A SZELEMM (1911), aesthetic and philosophical periodical, co-edited by Lajos Filep and György Lukács.

SZEP SZÓ (1936—39), literary and critical monthly, co-edited by Pál Ignotus and Attila József, from 1938 by Zoltán Gáspár.

SZERDA (1906—07), scholarly and fine-arts periodical, edited by Antal Gundel.

SZOCIÁLIS TERMELES, appeared between May 3 and July 12, 1919, as a weekly of the Commissariat of Social Production.

Society for the Social Sciences, established in 1901 to promote knowledge in the field of social sciences and sociology. Its organ was Huzszadik Század, edited by the officers of the society.

TANU (1932—36), a periodical concerned with questions of literature, sociology, history, and philosophy. Founded and edited by László Németh, and mostly written by him.

TÁRSADALMI SZEMLE (1931—33), a Marxist scholarly journal, edited by József Madzsar and Pál Sándor.

TÁRSADALMI SZEMLE (1946—), the theoretical journal of the Hungarian communist party. First chief editor: Béla Fogaras (1946—52).

TIHALYA Society (1904—08), theatrical company, established by László Bánóczy, Marcell Benedek, Sándor Hevesi, and György Lukács, in order to deal with modern drama and unconventional acting.

The Eight (1909—12), group of artists organized by Károly Kernstok, with Róbert Berény, Dezso Czigány, Béla Csóbel, Ödön Márffy, Dezso Orbán, Berzalan Pó, and Lajos Tihanyi as members. Their main purpose was to create monumental, dramatic art. Their movement was an organic part of radicalism at the beginning of the century, representing abstract trends in painting and, hence, avant-garde in Hungary.

TRIانون, a customary reference to the peace treaty of June 4, 1920, signed in Trianon Palace, in Versailles.

Accordingly, Hungary lost a great majority of its former territory and population.

UJ HANG (1938—41), political and cultural periodical established in Moscow by émigré Hungarian writers to support popular front policy. Continuation of Súrol és Kalapács.

UJHOLD (1946—48), literary and critical quarterly, edited by Balázs Lengyel.

UJ MÁRCIUS (1925—33), political periodical of the Hungarian communist party, appeared in Vienna.
ÚJ SZŐ (1929—33), literary and social periodical, edited by Lajos Barta, Ferenc Horváth, and Rezső Pétry in Bratislava (Czechoeslovakia).

Urban writers, generally considered to be the opponents of populist writers, particularly in the thirties. They preferred the common European cultural heritage to traditional Hungarian values. For example, the so-called 'bourgeois humanists' belonged to them.

VÁLASZ (1934—38, 1946—49), literary, critical, and socio-political periodical, which served as the organ of the populist writers. Founded under the editorship of Pál Gulyás, edited by Imre Németh and György Sárközi in 1935—38. Revived under the editorship of Gyula Illyés.

VALÓSÁG (1932), founded as the periodical of the communist youth movement, with Attila József as editor. Only one number appeared.

VALÓSÁG (1958—), organ of the Scientific Educational Society, with articles on social and world problems and on scholarly and literary questions.

Sunday Circle (1915—26), a group of friends around György Lukács, who used to meet in Béla Balázs's home on Sunday afternoons to revive intellectual life, and to discuss questions of philosophy. Meetings continued in Vienna, but ceased when Balázs moved to Berlin in 1926.

VIGIJA (1935—), a scholarly literary periodical with a Catholic viewpoint.

VILÁGOSZÁG (1960—), organ of the Scientific Educational Society for the criticism of religion.

VIX note, customary name of the note entitled "Documents concernant l'Exécution de l'Armistice en Hongrie", handed over by Lt.-Col. Vix, in the name of the Entente powers on march 20, 1919, to Count Mihály Károlyi as the representative of the Hungarian government.

VÖRÖS ÚJSÁG (1918—19), established as the central organ of the Hungarian Party of Communists, the official daily of the united party (of the communists and social democrats) in the Hungarian Republic of Councils.

Year of Turn, a customary name of the period from the beginning of 1947 to the middle of 1948, which began with the disclosure of the so-called 'Ferenc Nagy conspiracy' and ended with the fusion of the two workers' parties.

Young Hungary, the democratic and radical movement of the young intellectuals of the 1840s, on the analogy of 'das junge Deutschland'.

3. Bibliography


On the history of the Hungarian working-class movement see Henrik Vass, ed., Studies on the History of the Hungarian Working-Class Movement 1867—1966 (Budapest: 1975), which seems to be very informative. Although no comprehensive survey has appeared on the Hungarian emigration in the Soviet Union, David Pike, German Writers in Soviet Exile 1933—1945 (Chapel Hill: 1982), with occasional references to Lukács and other Hungarians in contact with the German communist party, may illuminate the possible parallels. Tibor Zador, ed., History in the Present: Hungarian Politicians, Academicians and Writers on the Past and Present (Budapest: 1979) offers personal reminiscences.

(Compiled by József Kovács)
APPENDIX II
A Selected Bibliography of Works
by György Lukács

by
János Ambrus

Foreword

The idea, raised a few years ago, to publish an English-language collection of representative essays on György Lukács by Hungarian scholars reminded the editors of the need to include a bibliography of his works. Apart from Jürgen Hartmann’s bibliography and some other major bibliographies, which at the time of their publication duly reflected the state of research, no exhaustive bibliography of the works of György Lukács has been published yet. In 1983 the Greenwood Press, London, published Georg Lukács and His Critics: An International Bibliography with Annotations 1910—1982 by F. H. Lapointe. The bulky volume is the most comprehensive coverage to date of the ever growing literature on György Lukács. An exhaustive bibliography of Lukács’s œuvre would go beyond the scope of the present book, yet all the important works are included in the following bibliography. The choice of what merits the description ‘important work’ is, of course, to some extent a rather subjective one; however, when compiling this bibliography, I was keeping an international scope.

The bibliography is divided into four chapters:

(1) Series
(2) Book, Articles, and Essays
(3) Interviews
(4) Correspondence

The series (Chapter 1) are listed in order of importance. The Standard German Edition—Georg Lukács Werke life-work series of the Luchterhand Verlag comes first, as that is the best known in general. It is followed by the Standard Hungarian Edition—Complete Works of György Lukács, the life-work series of Magvető Kiadó, Budapest, which is more complete than any other series. The next one is From Lukács’s Posthumous Papers—Aus dem Nachlass von Georg Lukács, compiled by the Lukács Archives and Library, Budapest, to be followed by other series. For the detailed contents of the individual volumes, see the second chapter of the bibliography.

In Chapter 2 the books, articles, and essays are listed in chronological order. Omnibus volumes and collections of essays refer the reader to the relevant items for bibliographical information. Each entry is numbered to facilitate reference.

At each first publication there is a reference to all subsequent publications listed, so as to provide a publication history. ‘EE’ stands for English edition, ‘MGE’ stands for a modern German edition, ‘HE’ stands for a Hungarian edition, and ‘See also’ refers to other occurrences in the selection. Whenever the bibliography does not include the
first edition of a work, I give the above data and the time of the first publication under the entry where the work in question is mentioned for the first time. Similarly, some pieces in series are also treated as separate entries: their subsequent English, German, etc. editions are listed.

In the case of editions or publications other than the first, the cross-references direct the reader to the first edition or the first occurrence. Works published in a year other than when they were written are listed under the year of their writing, without bibliographical data, but with reference to the first edition. (In such case mention is made of the time of writing where the first edition is detailed. If the date does not occur in the text, it is put in parentheses.)

Chapter 3 is a selection of interviews with Lukács, arranged in chronological order. Finally, Chapter 4 presents a selection of Lukács's correspondence, arranged in alphabetical order, according to the names of the correspondents.

Hungarian and Russian titles are retained and an English translation—preferably the one in general currency—is added in square brackets.

Abbreviation used in the bibliography:
EE: English Edition
F: First Edition
HE: Hungarian Edition
MGE: Modern German Edition
V: Variant

The bibliography was closed on December 31, 1986.
1. Series

Standard German Edition – Georg Lukács Werke
Neuwied, Berlin and later Darmstadt,
Neuwied Hermann Luchterhand Verlag
Ed. by Frank Benseler

/Band 7/
[Contents see: 322]

/Band 11-12/

/Band 15/

/Band 2/
[Contents see: 364]

/Band 17/

/Band 16/

/Band 8/

/Band 13-14/

/Band 10/
[Contents see: 377]

/Band 4/
[Contents see: 403]

/Bd. 5/
[Contents see: 338]

/Bd. 6/
[Contents see: 350]

/Bd. 9/
[Contents see: 413]
[Contents see: 478]
[Contents see: 451]
[Contents see: 384]
[Contents see: 367]
[Contents see: 408]
[Contents see: 409]
[Contents see: 379]

From Lukács’s Posthumous Papers - Aus dem Nachlass von Georg Lukács
Budapest
Lukács Archives and Library
Akadémiai Kiadó
Ed. by László Sziklai


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Political Writings – Politische Aufsätze
Darmstadt, Neuwied
Hermann Luchterhand Verlag
Ed. by Frank Benseler, Jörg Kammler

/Politische Aufsätze V/
/Sammlung Luchterhand 221/
[Contents see: 463]

/Politische Aufsätze IV/
/Sammlung Luchterhand 11/

/Politische Aufsätze III/
/Sammlung Luchterhand 209/
[Contents see: 455]

/Politische Aufsätze II/
/Sammlung Luchterhand 122/
[Contents see: 447]

/Politische Aufsätze I/
/Sammlung Luchterhand 39/
[Contents see: 443]

Selected Works – Werkauswahl
Neuwied, Berlin
Hermann Luchterhand Verlag
Ausgewählt und eingeleitet Peter Ludz

[Contents see: 318]

[Contents see: 361]

Selected Works – Ausgewählte Schriften
Reinbek bei Hamburg
Rowohlt Verlag

/Rowohlt’s deutsche Enzyklopädie 276/
[Contents see: 358]

/Rowohlt’s deutsche Enzyklopädie 285-287/
[Contents see: 357]

/Rowohlt’s deutsche Enzyklopädie 314-316/
[Contents see: 378]

/Rowohlt’s deutsche Enzyklopädie 327-328/
[Contents see: 385]

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2. Books, Articles and Essays

1906

1  F  A dráma formája ["The Form of the Drama", in Hung.] Sz 1 (14 November 1906), 340-43. [See also: 452-15]

2  F  Gondolatok Ibsen Henrikről ["Thoughts on H. I.", in Hung.] HSZ 7 (August 1906), 127-137. [See also: 451-14]

1907

3  A drámaalás főbb irányai a múlt század utolsó negyedében. ["The Major Dramatic Trends in the Final Quarter of the Last Century"] (1906-1907) [See: 466a]

4  F  Motive. Essays von Rudolf Kassner [Review] PL 54 (15 December 1907) [See also: 451-18]

1908

5  F  John Ford: Ein moderner Dichter aus Shakespeares Zeiten PL 55 (5 January 1908), 19-20. [See also: 451-19, 452]

5 a  M  Midász király legendája ["The Legend of King Midas"] (1908) [See: 440]


7  F  Rudolf Kassner [In Hung.] Ny 1 (16 July 1908), 733-41. [EE: 436-2, 437-2 MGE: 404-2 See also: 20-2, 30-2, 451-23]

8  F  Stefan George [In Hung.] Ny 1 (1 October 1908), 202-11. [EE: 436-6 MGE: 404-6 See also: 20-7, 30-6, 451-25]

1909
10 F August Strindberg hatvanadik születésnapja ["On A. S.'s Sixtieth Birthday", in Hung.] HSZ 10 (February 1909), 172-75.
[See also: 39-4, 451-33]
[See: 27]
12 F Richard Beer-Hofmann [In Hung.] Ny 2 (1 February 1909), 151-61.
[EE: 436-8 MGE: 404-8 See also: 20-5, 30-8, 451-32]
13 F Thomas Mann új regénye ["Thomas Mann's New Novel", in Hung.] Ny 2 (1 November 1909), 486-91.
[EE: 333-5 See also: 39-8, 451-38]
[See also: 384-8,9 451-37 Excerpt: 39-5 (Part I)]

1910
15 F Az angol lírikusok drámából ["Plays by English Lyricists", in Hung.] Szi 1 (15 September 1910), 12-16. [Swinburne and Browning]
[See also: 451-51]
[See also: 451-94 V: 39-1]
[EE: 436-7 MGE: 404-7 See also: 30-7, 451-52 Excerpt: 33, 318-17]
18 F Esztétikai kultúra ["Aesthetic culture", in Hung.] R 1 (25 May 1910), 123-36.
[See also: 39-2, 451-47]
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191 F Volkstribun oder Bürokrat? I.-II. IL 10 (January and February, March 1940), 82-95.,
79-84., 75-81.
[EE: 467-7 MGE: 403-14 See also: 242-2, 270-4]

192 Warum haben Marx und Lenin die liberale Ideologie kritisiert? (1940)
[See: 441]

193 Was ist das Neue in Kunst? (1939-1940)
[See: 479-117]

1941

194 F Faust-Studien I. Zur Entstehungsgeschichte. IL 11 (May 1941), 93-102.
[EE: 365-8-1, 357-8-1 MGE: 350-4-1 See also: 225-7, 213-7-1, 278-8-1, 357-2-1, 379-7-1]

195 F Faust-Studien II. Das Drama der Menschengattung. IL 11 (June 1941), 87-95.
[EE: 365-8-2, 357-8-2 MGE: 350-4-2 See also: 225-7, 233-7-2, 278-8-2, 357-2-2, 379-7-2]

1942

196 Wie ist Deutschland zum Zentrum der reaktionären Ideologie geworden? (1941-1942)
[See: 481]

197 Zur philosophischen Entwicklung des jungen Marx (1840-1844).
[See: 288]

198 F Zwei Romane aus Hitler-Deutschland. IL 12 (September 1942), 78-81.
[See also: 305-7, 479-71]

1943

199 F Adam Scharrer, Der Landsknecht. Biographie eines Nazi.
[Review] IL 13 (July 1943), 69-70.

200 FB Bor’ba gumanizma i varvarstva. [The Struggle of Humanism and Barbarism, in Russ.]
[See also: 495 Excerpt: 479-74]

201 Das wirkliche Deutschland (1943)
[See: 480]

202 F Der deutsche Faschismus und Hegel. IL 13 (August 1943), 60-68.
[See also: 245-2, 305-3]

203 F Der deutsche Faschismus und Nietzsche. IL 13 (December 1943), 55-64.
[See also: 245-1, 305-2]

204 F Gruss an Andersen Nexö. IL 13 (December 1943), 68-70.
[See also: 479-73]

205 Kritik von rechts oder links. Eine Antwort an Ernst Bloch. (1943)
[See: 487]

206 Rezension des Aufsatzes von Fritz Kaufmann The World As Will and Repression (Thomas Mann’s Philosophical Novels). (1943)
[See: 479-26]

207 F Über Preußen. IL 13 (May 1943), 36-47.
[MGE: 361-16 See also: 245-3, 305-4, 385-3, 479-72, 503-8]

1944

208 FB Írásdok felelősségé. [The Responsibility of Intellectuals, in Hung.]
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1 Először [Foreword] (March 1944)
[See also: 384-39]

2 Ady, a magyar tragédia nagy énekes ["Ady, the Great Singer of Hungarian Tragedy"]
[See: 175]

3 Hárc vagy kapituláció? ["Fight or Capitulation: Notes on Some Issues of Szép Sző"]
(1940)

4 Íróstudók felelősségé ["The Responsibility of Intellectuals: Marginal Notes to a Volume of Gyula Illyés"] (1939)
[See also: 384-24]

209 F Schicksalswende. IL 14 (October 1944), 16-23.
[MGE: 361-17, See also: 245-11, 305-11, 385-4]

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IL 15 (June/July 1945), 58-75.
[EE: 302, 333-2, 433 (Excerpt) MGE: 332-5-2 See also: 246-2, 357-3-2, 379-19-1]

211 FB Balzac, Stendhal, Zola. [In Hung.] Budapest: Hungária, 1945. 146pp. As a book
[EE: 256, 342 MGE: 350-3 See also: 265]

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1 Először [Foreword] (December 1945)
[See also: 478-15 V: 265-1]

2 Balzac, Parasztok ["The Peasants"]
[See: 137]

3 Balzac, Elveszett illúziók ["Lost Illusions"]
[See: 155]

4 Balzac és Stendhal vitája ["B. and S."]
[See: 146]

5 A százéves Zola ["The Zola Centenary"]
[See: 186]

212 F Die deutsche Literatur im Zeitalter des Imperialismus. IL 15 (March and April, May 1945),
53-65, 62-68, 70-84.
[See also: 229-3, 280-3 Excerpt: 318-26, 318-27, 318-28, 492]

213 F Fortschritt und Reaktion in der Deutschen Literatur. IL 15 (August/September and October
1945), 82-103., 91-105.
[See also: 229-2, 280-2 Excerpt: 358-1, 379-8]

[MGE: 361-18 See also: 234-7, 384-30, 385-5]

215 F Tolsztoj Leo és a nyugati irodalom. ["Leo Tolstoy and Western European Literature", in
Hung.]
[EE: 256-9, MGE: 338-11 See also: 228-6, 275-9, 378-4]

1946

216 F Arisztokratikus és demokratikus világnézet. ["Aristocratic and Democratic World-View", in
Hung.] F 1 (November 1946), 197-216. [Paper delivered in Rencontres Internationales
in Geneva (September 2-14)]
[MGE: 361-19 See also: 235-5, 409-18]

217 F Bevezetés a Marx-Engels Művészeiről, irodalomról c. kötethez. [Introduction to Marx, Engels
[EE: 389-3, MGE: 377-1-5 See also: 282-5, 318-12, 267-12]

218 F Demokrácia és kultúra."[Democracy and Culture", in Hung.] 7 Sz 1 (January 1946), 31-40.
[See also: 234-2, 384-31]

219 F A demokrácia válsága – vagy jobboldali kritikája. Hozzászólás Bibó István cikkehez. ["The
Crisis of Democracy - Or its Right-wing Critique? Observations on I. B’s Article", in
Hung.]
Val 2 (January/February 1946), 86-97.


639
Deutsche Soziologie zwischen dem ersten und dem zweiten Weltkrieg. A 2 (June 1946), 585-600.


Az egzisztenciálizmus. ["Existentialism", in Hung.] F 1 (December 1946), 295-313.

Die Gretchen-Tragödie. A 2 (September 1946), 904-16.


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1 Először ["Foreword"] (March 1946)
   2 Az ifjú Werther szenvédesei ["The Sorrows of Young Werther"]
      [See: 178-2]
   3 Meister Vilmos tanulóvései ["Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship"]
      [See: 185]
   4 Schiller és Goethe levélváltása ["The Correspondence between S. and G."] (1936)
      [See also: 413-8-3]
   5 Schiller elmélete a modern irodalomról ["Schiller’s Theory of Modern Literatur"]
      [See: 162]
   6 Hölöldlin Hyperionja ["Hölderlin’s Hyperion”]
      [See: 139]

7 Faust-tanulmányok ["Faust-Studies”]
   [See also: 379-7]
   1 A keletkezéstörténetez ["Origins”]
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   2 Az emberi nem drámája ["The Drama of the Human Species”]
      [See: 195]

3 Faust és Mefisztó ["Faust and Mephistopheles”]
   [See also: 231]

A Margit-tragédia ["The Tragedy of Gretchen”]
   [See: 224]

5 Šífluskédése: a "művészki korszak” vége ["Problems of Style: The End of the ‘Artistic Period’”]

Irodalom és demokrácia. ["Literature and Democracy", in Hung.] TSz 2 (March 1946), 193-204.

[See also: 234-4]


[See: 234-3]


[As a book - EE: 256 MGE: 338-1/11 See also: 275]

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1 Először ["Foreword"] (February 1946)
   2 Az orosz demokratia irodalomkritikája nemzetközi jelentősége ["The International Significance of Russian Democratic Literary Criticism"]
      [See: 179]
   3 Tolsztoj és a realizmus fejlődése ["Tolstoy and the Development of Realism”]
      [See: 169]

4 Dosztojevszkij ["Dostoevsky”] (1943)
   [EE: 319 See also: 378-5, 379-17]

5 A forradalom előtti Oroszország "Emberi komédia” ["The Human Comedy of Pre-Revolutionary Russia”]
   [See: 147]

6 Tolsztoj Leó és a nyugati irodalom ["Leo Tolstoy and Western European Literature”]
   [See: 215]
Az újabb német irodalom rövid története. [A Short History of Recent German Literature. in Hung.] Budapest, 1946. 152pp.

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1. Előszó ["Foreword"] (February 1946)
2. Haládás és reakció a német irodalomban ["Progress and Reaction in German Literature"]
   [See: 213]
3. A német irodalom az imperializmus korában ["German Literature in the Age of Imperialism"]
   [See: 212]

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Az absztrakt művészet magyar elméletei. ["Hungarian Theories of Abstract Art", in Hung.]
F 2 (September 1947), 715-27.


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1. Vorwort (February 1947)
2. Die Leiden des jungen Werther
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5. Schillers Theorie der modernen Literatur
6. Hölderlins Hyperion
7. Faust-Studien
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1. Előszó ["Foreword"] (April 1947)
2. Demokrácia és kultúra ["Democracy and Culture"]
3. Lenin és a kultúra kérdései ["L. and the Problems of Culture"]
4. Irodalom és demokrácia 1. ["Literature and Democracy I"]
- 5 Irodalom és demokrácia II. ["Literature and Democracy II."] (1947)  
  [See also: 384-32 MGE: 385-6]
- 6 Népi írók a mérlegen ["Populist Writers in the Balance"]  
  [See also: 384-34]
- 7 Pártköltésszet ["Party Poetry"]  
  [See: 214]
- 8 Szabad vagy irányított művészet ["Free or Directed Art"] (1947)  
  [MGE: 361-20 See also: 384-36, 385-7]
- 9 Régi és új legendák ellen ["Against Old and New Legends"] (1947)  
  [See also: 384-37]
- 10 A magyar irodalom egysége ["The Unity of Hungarian Literature"] (1946)  
  [See also: 384-33]

235 FB  
A polgári filozófia válsága. [The Crisis of Bourgeois Philosophy, in Hung.]  
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  [See also: 239-2, 261-2]
- 4 A kapitalizmus világképe reformista tükörben ["The World Outlook of Capitalism - in Reformist Mirror"] (1947)
- 5 Arisztokratikus és demokratikus világnézet ["Aristocratic and Democratic World-View"]  
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  [See also: 239-4, 261-4]
- 8 Lenin ismeretelmélete és a modern filozófia problémái ["L.'s Epistemology and the Problems of Modern Philosophy"] (1947)  
  [See also: 239-5, 261-5]
- 9 Megváltozott világkép ["Changed World Outlook"] (1947)

236 A történelemi regény [The Historical Novel, in Hung.]  
[See: 172]

237 F  

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238 FB  
[As a book – Cf. 295]

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- 5 La théorie léninienne de la connaissance et les problèmes de la philosophie moderne
  [See: 235-8]

240  F Fasizmus és demokrácia. ["On the Responsibility of Intellectuals", in Hung.] F 3
(Sepember 1948), 680-84.
["*Paper delivered at a peace conference in Wroclaw.*"]
[EE: 376, 454 See also: 305-17]

[EE: 445 MGE: 359 See also: 284, 446, 502 Excerpt: 300, 344, 409-17, 413-10 Cf. 163]

242  FB Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels als Literaturhistoriker.
[As a book – MGE: 377-2 See also: 270]

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- 3 Marx und das Problem des ideologischen Verfalls
  [See: 170]
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  [See: 191]

["*Paper delivered at a conference of Marxist Philosophers in Milan (20 December 1947).*"]

244 Problems of Marxist Culture. I-II. MM 1 (June and July 1948), 6-18., 60-69.

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- 1 Der deutsche Faschismus und Nietzsche
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247 FB Új magyar kultúrdíj. ["For a New Hungarian Culture", in Hung.]

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   2 Az MKP és a magyar kultúra ["The Hungarian Communist Party and Culture"]
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   4 Heine és a 48-as forradalom ideológiai előkészítése ["H. and the Ideological
      Preparations for the Revolution of 1848"] (1941)
   5 A felszabadító ["The Liberator"] (1936)
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   6 Megjegyzések az irodalmi világhoz ["Observations on a Literary Debate"] (1947)
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   7 A népi irodalom múltja és jelene [Past and Present of Populist Literature] (1948)
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      [See also: 305–12]
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      (1947)
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   17 Elfogultan irodalomszemléletéért ["For an Unprejudiced Conception of Literature"]
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      [See also: 384–40]
   18 Féjö Ferenc: Heine [F. F.'s Heine]
      [See: 232]
   19 Baumgarten Ferenc [F. B.] (1946)
   20 Osvál Ernő összes írásai ["E. O.'s Writings"] (1946)
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   21 Márai új regénye ["M's New Novel"] (1948)
   22 Újhold ["The Journal ‘Újhold’"] (1946)

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248 F Bírálat és ön Bírálat. ["Criticism and Self-Criticism", in Hung.] TSz 4 (August/September
   1949), 571–93.

249 F A csendes Don (A polgárháboni eposza kozákföldön). ["Quiet Flows the Don:
   The Epic of the Civil War in Cossack Country", in Hung.] F 4 (November 1949),
   883–912.
   [MGE: 338–16 See also: 272–6, 275–14, 378–8]

251 Idea and Form in Literature. MM 2 (December 1949), 40–61. [See: 149]

252 F A mi Goethénk. ("Our Goethe", in Hung.) It (1949), 216–37. [See also: 278–2]


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254 F Kölvetkeztetések az irodalmi vitából ("Conclusions from the Literary Debate", in Hung.) Tsz 5 (July/August 1950), 613–16. [See also: 478–17]


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260 Don Quijote. CR (September 1951), 265–71. [See: 259]


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- Heidegger redívius (1948–1949)

262 F Felszólalás a Magyar Írók Szövetsége első kongresszusán. ["Speech at the first Congress of the Hungarian Writers' Association", in Hung.] Cs 5 (May 1951), 563–69.

263 F Szüllin cikkeinek tanulságai az irodalom- és művészetörténet szempontjából. ["The Lesson of Stalin's Articles for the History of Literature and Art", in Hung.] Cs 5 (January 1951), 29–32.

264 F Az új ember kövácsa. ["The Road to Life by Makarenko", in Hung.] Cs 5 (August and September 1951), 980–94., 1098–120.

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269 F Az irracionalizmus alapvetése a két forradalom közötti korszakban (1789–1848).
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276 F A Tanácsköztársaság kultúrpolitikája ["Cultural Policy of the Republic of Councils" in Hung.]  
*Ir. Uj.* 1 (27 March 1952), 5.  
[See also: 384–56, 478–18]

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277 FB *Adalékok az esztétika történetéhez* ["Contributions to a History of Aesthetics", in Hung.]  
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9 Irodalom és művészet mint feltételez ["Literature and Art As Superstructure"] (1951)  
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292 A kritikai realizmus utolsó nagy képviselője. ["The Last Great Representative of Critical Realism" (Thomas Mann), in Hung.] SzN 13 (14 August 1955), 5.
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   [See: 308]

299 F A haladás és a reakció harca a mai kulturálban. ["The Struggle between Progress and Reaction in the Culture", in Hung.] TSz 11 (June–July 1956), 68–88.
   [EE: 306 (Excerpt) MGE: 361–24 See also: 385–8]

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301 F Felszólalás a Petőfi-kör filozófiai vitáján. ["Speech at the Philosophy Debate of the Petőfi Circle", in Hung.] FÉ (September 1956), 147–51., 161–62.
   [MGE: 361–23 (Excerpt) See also: 478–20]

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304 F Das Problem der Pespektive. NDL 4 (March 1956), 128–33.
   [MGE: 403–17 See also: 318–14, 367–15]

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306 The Struggle between Progress and Reaction in the Culture of our Times. SS 6
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307 F Tézistervezet a magyar politikai és gazdasági helyzetről és a MKP feladatairól
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309 FB A különosség mint esztétikai kategória. ["Particularity as a Category of Aesthetics", in Hung.]
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393 F Development of the Budapest School TLS 70 (11 June 1971), 633.
396 F Führer für Angela. NF 18 (February/March 1971), 14.
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[CF. 45 see also: 451–97]

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428 FB Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins: Die Arbeit.
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430 FB Die Heidelberger Philosophie der Kunst (1912–1914).
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**F** Egy elvülen vita kérdései [“Questions of Principle of an Unprincipled Debate”, in Hung.] Vi 16 (December 1975), 739–43.
[Cf. 182 MGE: 476–3 See also: 479–111]

**F** Midász király legendája. [“The Legend of King Midas”, in Hung.] Vi 16 (January 1975), 37–41.
[Ca. 5a See also: 451–30]

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<td>IT</td>
<td>International Theater (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It</td>
<td>Irodalomtörténet [History of Literature] (Budapest)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>Internationale Umschau (Mainz)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jugend-Internationale (Berlin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Kritika [Critique] (Budapest)</td>
</tr>
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Sze A Széllem [The Spirit] (Budapest)
SzÉ Színházi Élet [Theatrical Life] (Budapest)
Szi Színház [Stage Art] (Budapest)
SzM Szabad Művészet [Free Art] (Budapest)
SzN Szabad Nép [Free People] (Budapest)
Szo Szociális Termelés [Social Production] (Budapest)
T Tagebuch (Wien)
Tat Die Tat (Zurich)
Te Telos (Amherst, N. Y.)
TK Text und Kritik (Munich)
TLS Times Literary Supplement
T Sz Társadalmi Szemle [Social Review] (Budapest)
TDR Tulane Drama Review
U l'Unità (Roma)
UH Új Hang [New Voice] (Moscow)
UI Új Írás [New Writing] (Budapest)
UM Új Március [New March] (Wien)
Val Valóság [Reality] (Budapest)
Vi Világosság [Light] (Budapest)
VF Voprosi Filosofii (Moscow)
Vo Volksstimme (Wien)
VU Vörös Újság [Red Newspaper] (Budapest)
W Das Wort (Moscow)
WF Der Wille der Form
Z Die Zeit
ZfA Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft (Stuttgart)
ZIFS Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung (Leipzig – Paris – New York)
Although György Lukács is widely known all over the world, the international scholarly public knows little about the progressive and multifarious literature dealing with Lukács in the native country of this great Hungarian thinker. There are various reasons for this. Although there is no denying the fact that the study of Lukács's oeuvre started relatively late—only in the first half of the seventies—in Hungary, it is also true that this research has steadily gained momentum since then. The other reason is the well-known isolation of the Hungarian language, which is a major impediment because only a few writings of Hungarian Lukács-scholars are available in translation.

This research, however—quite understandably—can rely on sources which are only available in Hungary and in the Hungarian language, and it can interpret Lukács's activities in the intellectual atmosphere and social environment in which Lukács himself—except for his years of emigration—lived and worked. By virtue of these advantages the writings of Hungarian authors can provide a more reliable image of Lukács than that currently reflected in the international scholarly literature.